United Nations (UN)

General Debate of the UN First Committee

October 8-17, 2001

Biological and Chemical Weapons

Argentina: "It was regrettable that consensus had not yet been reached on the Biological Weapons Convention [protocol]... No state should stand by while attempts were made to complete an agreement on this subject."

ASEAN: "ASEAN notes with regret the lack of consensus...on the draft composite text of [the] BWC Protocol. ASEAN emphasises the validity of the mandate that was given to the ad hoc group and underlines that the only sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory legally-binding agreement."

Australia: "It is vital that the OPCW functions in an effective manner. Australia is committed to working with the Director General and other states parties to resolve the OPCW's current financial and administrative problems. Reforms must be carried through effectively and the Organisation's core verification activities must be preserved. We are disappointed that a [BWC] Protocol...has not been achieved... Australia strongly supported the Chairman's composite text as a valuable, if imperfect, means of strengthening the BWC. In our view, the draft Protocol would have provided security benefits for all. Now it is vital that momentum towards strengthening the BWC be renewed, and this must begin at the Fifth BWC Review Conference..."

Brazil: "Brazil is deeply disappointed with the lack of consensus regarding the draft Protocol, as proposed by Chairman Tibor Tóth, to the Biological Weapons Convention. We can no longer continue to ignore the threat to security posed by biological weapons... We expect the Fifth Review Conference...to succeed in identifying the necessary tools to prevent proliferation and ensure biological disarmament. For Brazil, the provisions contained in the draft Protocol would doubtless contribute to strengthening international security in the biological field. We should do our utmost not to totally squander the product of more than six years of intensive work."

Canada: "[Along] with many other state parties, Canada had hoped that the BTWC Review Conference later this year would be able to adopt a compliance Protocol strengthening global norms against the possession of biological weapons through an effective multilateral instrument providing means to investigate allegations of non-compliance, complicate and deter biological weapons proliferation and reduce the risks of the weaponisation of disease. The potential linkages to terrorism are clear and disturbing. Unfortunately, the Ad Hoc Group has failed to report. The threat of biological weapons, though, equally unfortunately, has not disappeared. Indeed, our governments face growing public concern. At the Review Conference, we will examine with great interest any and all proposals to serve our common, primary goal to reinforce the Convention and prevent the possession and use of biological weapons. As to chemical weapons...we have been heartened by the strength of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the demonstrated potential of the OPCW to ensure its effective implementation. In less than five years, the Convention's operations have proven the feasibility of stringent verification through detailed reporting and on-site monitoring. As well, stockpiles of chemical weapons are being destroyed. There is much more to be done, though, and it is ever more important that we eradicate stocks and ensure their strict control and security until they are destroyed. The OPCW's drive against chemical weapons obviously needs more funding. Moreover, some states haven't joined the Convention yet. We need them all on board."

CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), Patricia Durrant of Jamaica, October 12: "We share the concerns expressed at the inability of the [BWC] ad hoc group...to advance its work... It is our hope that the upcoming Review Conference...will contribute towards strengthening this regime..."

Chile: "[W]e have seen how the long and arduous process aimed at strengthening the [Biological Weapons] Convention through the adoption of a verification protocol has come to a halt. The strenuous and commendable efforts of Ambassador Tibor Tóth to achieve consensus on his composite text were not only fruitless but the process itself degenerated into a confrontation that was both unnecessary and sterile."

China: "The Chinese side deeply regrets the fact that after nearly seven years of negotiation, the very basic approach of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention has been negated, leading to the suspension of the negotiations. ... [This] can only be detrimental to international non-proliferation efforts. ... As an original state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China attaches great importance to the implementation of the Convention, and has strictly and faithfully carried out its obligations under the Convention. We are happy to see that, with the joint efforts by the international community, the implementation of the Convention on the whole has been good in the past four years since its entry into force. ... China was a victim of the use of chemical weapons. Even today, the large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China are still posing a serious threat to the security of the Chinese people and their ecological environment. In recent years, some progress has been made in the disposal of the abandoned chemical weapons. However, it still falls far short of the expectations of the Chinese people and the requirements of the CWC provisions. It is our hope that the country concerned work out a comprehensive and practical destruction program as soon as possible in accordance with its obligations under the Convention, which should guarantee the safety of the local people and the environment, so that the substantive destruction process can be started and the grave danger posed by the abandoned chemical weapons eliminated within the time-frame set forth in the Convention."

Cuba: "[W]ork for six years on biological weapons was interrupted by the announcement by the United States, a depositary of the Biological Weapons Convention, that it did not want to continue negotiations on the text presented by the chairman of the ad hoc group, not even with amendments. What had been achieved thus far could not simply be left aside... [Cuba] welcomed the recent agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW...[and] hoped that would motivate implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention."

Czech Republic: " "The Czech Republic was supportive of the compromise text of the draft of the [BWC] verification Protocol but we view the outcome as a political reality. Now, as we consider other options, we should not lose what has been achieved. We do believe that the mandate of the expert group remains in force and that many elements of the draft verification Protocol can be used in our further work. We hope that the forthcoming Fifth Review Conference will give rise to new prospects for...credible verification... Joint precautions against the danger of bio-terrorism will have to receive a high priority."

European Union: "The European Union would emphasise the importance of the destruction obligations laid down in the [Chemical Weapons] Convention. ... These are key articles. Each state concerned is...under an obligation to submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons. The RU thanks the Russian Federation for presenting its revised plan for the destruction of chemical weapons at the last OPCW Executive Council meeting. The EU expresses the hope that this plan will now be effectively implemented at the earliest opportunity. In this connection the European Union would also like to emphasise the importance of Article V...obliging all states parties to destroy all chemical weapons production facilities on their territory not later than ten years after the Convention's entry into force. ... We regret the fact that the ad hoc group was unable to finalise the work on a Protocol strengthening the [Biological Weapons] Convention, or even to adopt a procedural report. In the light of this failure, the EU reiterates the fundamental importance it attaches to the preservation and reinforcement of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and to compliance with the ad hoc group's terms of reference. Convinced that the biological weapons threat calls for an appropriate multilateral response, the European Union will retain and build on the experience it has acquired over many years of negotiations, including the composite text [introduced by the Chair of the ad hoc group]. It points to the importance it attaches to the process of strengthening the Convention, for which the next focal date will be the November [Review] Conference..."

Haiti: "It was unfortunate that after seven years no consensus could be reached on the verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention... To better guard the peace, efforts should be made to resolve the problem at the upcoming conference in Geneva."

Holy See: "This past year also saw efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. A protocol had been drawn up to enforce the 1972 Convention, which would require signatory states to declare all industrial facilities capable of manufacturing bio-weapons. The lack of full agreement to the protocol was another setback for the international cooperation that is so necessary to prevent terrorism."

India: "India...was disappointed that the [BWC] ad hoc group was unable to conclude its work in time for the Fifth Review Conference... It is particularly sad that an endeavour that had come so close to a successful outcome was abandoned so abruptly, [just] when threats of bio-terrorism are becoming more likely. It is our sincere hope that the forthcoming Review Conference will succeed in maintaining the mandate for strengthening...implementation...within the framework of the Convention."

Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), October 17: "The Fifth [BWC] Review Conference...should strongly reaffirm the long-standing public abhorrence of the use of any form of biological weapon by any party to a conflict for any purpose whatsoever. ... States parties are urged...to spare no effort to strengthen the BWC. This is particularly urgent to ensure that rapid advances in the field of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology are used to benefit humanity and are not turned against it."

Iran: "[T]he recent failure of the 10-year long negotiations to conclude an additional protocol to [the BWC]...has caused international concerns. We...hope that such [a] development would not give an improper signal to wrong circles in these circumstances. We furthermore remain hopeful that the new situation would encourage the United States to review its position and open the way for stimulating a momentum to revive the Geneva negotiations with the aim of concluding the BWC Protocol. ... Every effort should be utilised to encourage the accession of more parties to the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, particularly in the Middle East region. Furthermore, new resources need to be provided to the [OPCW]...to enable it to engage in full-scale humanitarian medical operations if any chemical attack would be realised against innocent people."

Japan: "Although the ad hoc group of the stats parties to the BWC was not able to reach agreement on a verification protocol by a target date this year, the states parties should continue to seek ways to enhance confidence in and compliance with the Convention. The forthcoming Review Conference will be an important occasion for states parties to demonstrate their collective will to strengthen the Convention."

South Korea: "Despite the painstakingly long process, we feel that it is unfortunate that the negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons convention have failed to meet their mandate. Since the Convention falls far short of the mantra of disarmament instruments - trust but verify - we look forward to a constructive outcome for the future direction of the BWC Protocol at the Review Conference in November."

Laos: "It is regrettable that the negotiation on a [BWC] verification Protocol...has reached no agreement. ... [I]t is crucial that the Fifth Review Conference...achieves positive results. In dealing with this issue, we would like to reiterate our opinion that the use of biological [technology] for economic development and peaceful purposes should be taken into consideration."

Lithuania: "Adequate funding is needed in order not to compromise the OPCW's capacity to carry out its mandated activities in a robust and efficient manner. ... [The BWC is the] weakest link in the system of weapons of mass destruction prohibition regimes. Development in areas such as defence, preparedness, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism have not removed the raison d'etre for a verification regime that can play a useful and cost-effective role, particularly in the light of mounting concerns of possible use of bio-weapons in terrorism."

Malaysia: "As advances in biotechnology are increasing the potential threat posed by biological weapons, there is an urgent need to speed up the negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. ... [M]any years of efforts to conclude a Protocol to strengthen this key treaty have ended abruptly due to the decision by a major negotiating partner... We also regret that the [ad hic] group could not even adopt a final report on its work. However, we look forward to the...Review Conference...in the hope it will provide another opportunity to revisit this issue."

Mexico: "Mexico regrets that after more than six years of negotiations...it has not been possible to fulfil the mandate of the ad hoc working group [on the BWC Protocol]... We wish to reiterate our view that unilateral or partial verification and control regimes are insufficient and that multilateral negotiations undertaken within the framework of the Convention are the best means of preserving and strengthening the prohibition on bacteriological weapons."

Morocco: "The increase in [the] number of states adhering to the Chemical Weapons Convention was a welcome development, but the financial constraints faced by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should be remedied."

New Zealand: "New Zealand regrets that the negotiations to develop a compliance mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention failed this year to agree on a draft Protocol. Evidence of non-compliance with the Convention's prohibitions in the past, or difficulties with the parameters of the subject, should not lead ipso facto to the conclusion that a compliance Protocol is of limited value. We should instead focus our attention on the real need: effective compliance machinery that will make it harder for proliferators to cheat, or terrorists to go undetected and unchecked. Unilateral and plurilateral measures...such as biodefence programmes are essential and consistent with the implementation of the Convention. But the biowarfare threat also requires broad collective responses from all who subscribe to the norm. ... Squabbling fruitlessly over the past at the next Review Conference...will not take us forward. It should be the time for fresh thinking 'outside the box' to address non-compliance concerns in an effective manner. New Zealand continues to believe that measures to strengthen the Convention are possible. And we consider the ad hoc group's mandate remains valid as a basis for doing this. ... [I]t has been a challenging year for the [OPCW]... Financial and housekeeping problems have unfortunately diverted attention from implementation. Despite this, implementation is on the whole proceeding well with the treaty's highly professional inspectorate. Verification activities are continuing as best they can under the circumstances."

Pakistan: "It is regrettable that a Biological Weapons Convention Protocol could not be finalised this year. All along, Pakistan has sought a balanced and effective Protocol which genuinely strengthens the Convention and is acceptable to all states parties. We are ready for the resumption of negotiations. At the forthcoming Fifth BWC Review Conference the Pakistan delegation will work toward this end. We could not, however, endorse proposals which are likely to sabotage the multilateral approach or seek solutions which cannot be effective nor command universal support."

Rio Group: "[We] regret the lack of progress towards the conclusion of a [BWC] protocol... We hope that at the next review conference of the Convention, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group will be renewed so that negotiations can continue..."

Russia: "We are in favour of creating an efficient verification mechanism for the [BWC]... We believe that the negotiations on the subject should be continued on a multilateral basis. ... We view the Chemical Weapons Convention as an effective instrument for strengthening international peace and security, and stand for ensuring its universal character. We commend the work in this area carried out by the OPCW and, being in favour of developing cooperation between the OPCW and the UN, welcome the agreement on relations between them. We consider it useful to regularly discuss at the GA sessions issues relating to the implementation of the Convention."

South Africa: "It would...be an understatement to say that South Africa was disappointed by the outcome to the Biological Weapons Convention ad hoc group negotiations... It is necessary that the international community - as a whole - take action and commit themselves to strengthening the norm against...these reprehensible weapons. South Africa continues to see this as a core element of the international security architecture and we remain convinced that this objective would be possible. The concerns that were expressed at the July/August meeting of the BWC ad hoc group can still be addressed in a satisfactory manner. ... We are...encouraged by the renewed vigour of the [chemical weapons] destruction programme of the Russian Federation. We are hopeful that with the assistance of states parties in a position to do so, the Russian Federation will achieve all future destruction deadlines in the Convention."

Sri Lanka: "We deeply regret that the initiative fir establishing a [BWC] Protocol...has ended in Geneva without an agreement. ... [T]he BWC is likely to remain, for the foreseeable future, the only treaty dealing with a weapon of mass destruction that has no verification mechanism. ... The implications of this situation would certainly have adverse effects...particularly at a time when the international community is preparing to deal with the menace of terrorism."

Switzerland: "[M]y government is planning to reinforce in a significant way its contribution to the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons in Russia. ... After six years of diplomatic and scientific efforts...the [BWC ad hoc group] negotiations...reached a deadlock last summer. The threat of biological weapons, including that of bioterrorism, is today, more than ever, a key problem for international security. We must use all means, including multilateral instruments such as the verification protocol, to reduce and eliminate this threat... These efforts must include all key players. ... The Fifth Review Conference...will be the occasion to strengthen these efforts, in particular by confirming the current mandate of negotiations."

Tanzania: "We are concerned...by financial constraints facing the OPCW stemming from failure by some states parties to pay their contributions on time. ... The failure of the [BWC] ad hoc committee...is regrettable and disappointing... It is our hope that the BWC Review Conference...will salvage the draft protocol."

Thailand: "[A]s effective verification measures are an integral part of the effective functioning of the Biological Weapons Convention, we regret that the ad hoc group on the draft composite text...failed to achieve a consensus and to adopt a final report of its work. We hope that this impasse can be resolved in the near future, and it is in this spirit that we look forward to the Fifth Review Conference... On chemical weapons, Thailand hopes to ratify the CWC by the end of this year."

United States: "Over the past six years, the United States and many other countries sought to negotiate...a Protocol that would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention... Last July, we made clear that we could not support the Protocol, because the measures that were proposed to enforce the ban against possession and development are neither effective or equitable - and given the inherent properties of biological products it seems all bit certain that they can never be made so. This continues to be our view. But in addition, the events of September 11 have reinforced our view that the priority focus must be on use. ... The US is also fully engaged in international efforts against chemical weapons. ... We are...assisting the Russian Federation in its stockpile destruction programme. We note that it is not only chemical weapons activities that are of concern. In Japan, terrorists made and used nerve gas. It is essential that Chemical Weapons Convention member states put in place national laws and other regulations that help to keep materials for making chemical weapons out of unauthorised hands and ensure effective prosecution of those who make or use chemical weapons."

Vietnam: "[E]fforts to strengthen compliance to the [BWC]...are needed as urgently as ever. ... [M]y delegation regrets that the negotiations on a Protocol...have not been successful. We earnestly hope that the differences will be soon resolved and multilateral negotiations on this regime will restart as soon as possible."

Yugoslavia (Dejan Sahovic, October 15): "[T]he importance of our collective engagement in countering threats of biological and toxin weapons cannot be emphasised enough. Also, additional action is needed to reconfirm the determination of the international community to annihilate, once and for all, chemical weapons..."

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.