United Nations (UN)

UN First Committee General Debate: September 30-November 1

V. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Argentina (Luis E. Cappagli, October 2): Argentina regrets that after six years the negotiation of...an effective protocol of verification that would reduce the risk of biological weapons...[has] not been completed. ... Argentina considers that no country should be exempt from the formulation of a legally binding [BWC] regime and calls for the study of innovative ways that would legitimately serve for the strengthening f the verification regime. As regards non-proliferation of chemical weapons...[the OPCW] is in charge of a very difficult and complex task due to the immense arsenals that have to be destroyed and the hugeness of the installations that have to be inspected, all of which requires large financial contributions. The mission of [the] OPCW has particular relevance in moments in which the international community feels itself more threatened by the phenomenon of terrorism. Argentina also identifies with the primordial objective of the OPCW in achieving the universality of the Convention. Our country considers that the efforts to advance these and other subjects of the Convention should be taken to the extreme. In this sense, we feel very pleased that the states parties deposit their trust in a distinguished Argentine diplomat to lead the Technical Secretariat. We feel that we should [all] benefit from the renewed spirit of harmony and cooperation that prevail in this new stage [of the CWC's evolution]...

ASEAN (U Mya Than (Myanmar), October 9): [W]e note with regret that the 5th [BWC] Review conference...was adjourned without any substantive results... The ASEAN countries emphasise the validity of the mandate that was given to the Ad Hoc Group and underlines that the only sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally-bonding agreement. We express our hope that the re-convened session of the BWC Review Conference...will make progress...especially by agreeing to hold annual meetings of the states parties. WE also urge all states which have neither ratified nor acceded to the CWC to do so at an earliest possible date.

Australia (Michael Smith, October 7): We were disappointed that efforts last year to conclude a protocol to strengthen the BWC proved unsuccessful and that the Fifth BWC Review Conference subsequently failed to agree on a forward programme. In light of these setbacks, it is vital that momentum towards strengthening the BWC is renewed at the resumed Review Conference in November. Australia urges all states to increase their efforts to achieve practical and effective international measures promoting effective implementation of the BWC. We are pleased that the difficulties which hampered the work of the OPCW have been resolved and that the OPCW is pursuing its objectives with renewed vigour. We reiterate our earlier calls for all states that have not signed and ratified the CWC to do so as soon as possible to ensure its enhanced effectiveness through universal membership.

Bahrain (Sheikh Turki bin Rashid Al Khalifa, October 9): My country welcomes all the efforts made for the implementation of the [CWC]... Despite the fact that a protocol on the verification of biological weapons [non-proliferation] has not yet been concluded, my country hopes that the states parties to the [BWC]...would agree a formula to review the Convention at their upcoming meeting...

Brazil (Celina Assumpcao, October 9): [M]ultilateralism in the area of international security and weapons of mass destruction is facing new challenges. Changes have taken place. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has not remained immune. ... Let us hope that the changes which took place do not affect the chemical weapons regime and do not alter the positive course that the OPCW has taken up to now. The independence of the Organisation...constitutes one of the foremost qualities of the Convention. ... [W]e must work together to reinforce the BTWC regime. The negotiations for a verification protocol were abruptly suspended in July 2001. The 5th Review Conference was left unconcluded because it did not reach consensus on whether multilateral negotiations on the strengthening of the BWC were to proceed. For Brazil, there is no alternative to a multilateral approach. The outlook for the [resumed]...Review Conference...is not promising. At the present stage, a failure of the Conference to be resumed might express that the BTWC is in agony.

Canada (Christopher Westdal, September 30): We are...concerned that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention lacks effective means to ensure compliance and that our sustained effort to negotiate a Protocol to that end has so far been fruitless. At the resumed Review Conference next month, we want to reaffirm that biological weapons are repugnant, abhorrent. And we will want to plan concerted, cooperative, practical BTWC implementation. ... Since we last met, the Chemical Weapons Convention has marked its fifth anniversary in force. The Convention is now supported by 146 states parties, a remarkable total, and there are good prospects for more adherents in the near future. The less good news, though, is that the OPCW still struggles to fulfil its vital mandate. Next month, states parties must ensure that the organization gets the resources it needs to do its job, verification and inspections above all.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM - Stafford Neil of Jamaica, October 7): With regard to chemical and biological weapons, we should continue to develop and refine the verification arrangements which will further promote even greater confidence in the effectiveness of these agreements.

China (Hu Xiaodi, October 1): We would like to congratulate Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter on his assumption of [position of] Director-General of the OPCW. We believe that, under [his] leadership..., the OPCW will pass this transitional period smoothly, get back on track and make new progress in the implementation of the Convention. ... With the joint efforts of China and Japan, progress has been made last year in the disposal of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on Chinese territory. We hope that the substantive destruction process will start as soon as possible so that the grave threat posed by these weapons to the local environment and the lives and property of the local people can be eliminated within the timeframe set forth in the Convention. China has supported and actively participated in the negotiation of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. We deeply regret that the protocol failed to come to fruition as expected. ... China welcomes and is willing to discuss within the multilateral framework any suggestions and measures aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. As the resumed session of the Fifth BWC Review Conference is approaching, China wishes to work with other parties in a constructive manner to seek consensus on the specific mechanism and measures for strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, so that the Conference could achieve concrete results.

Croatia (Vice Skracic, October 3): [O]n CWC issues, it is important to note that in September 2001 the Croatian delegation to the Conference of the OPCW Executive Council in The Hague proposed the inclusion in Articles I, VI and X of the CWC [of] regulations concerned with and aimed at minimising the possible risks of attack against declared facilities and chemical or other storage sites, with conventional weapons or in terrorist actions. While it is well known that international assistance under Articles I, II, VI and X...can be provided in case of a chemical weapons attack, nothing in the provisions of these Articles provide for assistance to be given in [the] case of a conventional weapons attack against a declared chemical (or biological) storage facility. ... Croatia was actively involved in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BTWC on an Implementing Protocol... At the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC, Croatia supported the continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group on the basis of the Ad Hoc Group Chairman's Composite Text on a future Protocol. ... Croatia extended the position that while work in several areas of the Composite Text may still have been required, especially with regard to future inspections and visits, with stronger provisions for the protection of commercial property information needed, it nevertheless provided an excellent opportunity to move toward bring negotiations to their desired result... Croatia shall, with its partners, work towards the successful conclusion of the reconvened Fifth Review Conference...including...the adoption of a strong Final Declaration. Also, Croatia has indicated that it shall unilaterally support US proposals on national implementation measures and legislation for BTWC implementation, although it shares the view of some other European delegations that this presents political, not legal, obligations on states. For this reason, Croatia prefers the resumption of negotiations for a legally binding Implementation Protocol...

Cuba (Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, October 1): Some US government senior officials have addressed slandering accusations against Cuba, alleging that our country carries out a "limited offensive research work and biological warfare development". Once again, Cuba rejects with strong determination such lies. In contrast to the United Stares, Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to ever possess, any weapon of mass destruction. It is the United States and not Cuba which opposes the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention by means of a protocol that includes transparent and non-discriminatory international verification measures. Cuba restates the validity of the ad hoc expert group mandate, which has been negotiating the aforementioned protocol for more than six years, and calls on the United States to discontinue its insistent attempts...[to terminate] so many years of effort by the international community. ... Through pressures, including the threat ton stop paying its financial contributions, the United States had the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons dismissed in April of this year. It is unacceptable that a country, no matter how powerful it is, manoeuvres at its whim who can and cannot take key posts in an international organisation, according to narrow national interests.

Ecuador (Fernando Yepez Lasso, October 2): [Ecuador] called for the strengthening of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as an independent, multilateral forum.

European Union (Danish Ambassador Erling Harild Nielsen, September 30): The European Union has carried out demarches to promote universal adherence to the states that have yet to sign and ratify the [Chemical weapons] Convention. ... The European Union calls on all the states parties concerned to do everything to ensure compliance with the prescribed [CW destruction] deadlines. We are fully aware of the application by the Russian federation of a revised delayed draft plan for destruction of its chemical weapons. The European Union stresses the importance of ensuring that the OPCW and all member states be provided with the relevant information to allow decisions on such new deadlines. ... The European Union attaches high priority to the strengthening of the [Biological Weapons] Convention and [to] a successful outcome of the Fifth Review Conference when it resumes in November of this year. Member states of the EU have considered the issue of national compliance and legislative and regulatory implementation measures and support proposals to strengthen such measures. The Union has presented proposals to this effect...during the first part of the Fifth Review Conference in November of 2001. The European Union believes that such proposals could be agreed for a follow-up process to strengthen the BTWC when the Review Conference resumes... The Union is consulting with states parties for a consensus along these lines at the Review Conference and encourages other states parties to take a similar approach.

Haiti (Betrand Fils-Aimé, October 4): [Haiti] insisted that progress in the area of biotechnology and genetics were signs of scientific advancement that also could bring about more lethal biological and chemical weapons.

Holy See (Archbishop Renato R. Martino, October 1): During these next few months, the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention will reconvene to complete work on negotiating a legally binding verification protocol. The first session of this Review can hardly be termed a success. A reorganisation of this process is clearly called for, and this is the reason why the Holy See decided to accede to the BWC on January 4, 2002. ... The 145 states parties to the BWC should agree on a comprehensive list of measures, perhaps to be implemented in stages, that will ensure a strengthening of the BWC through increased transparency and an increase in potential detection and deterrence of prohibited activities.

India (Rakesh Sood, October 7): All of us have a stake in ensuring that all the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are implemented fully and effectively. As an original state party to this non-discriminatory treaty, India is fully committed to this task. We are also relieved that certain unhealthy developments that threatened the working of the OPCW have been resolved with the cooperation of all states parties. ... India is deeply concerned by the circumstances in which the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention last year had to be abruptly adjourned. The developments since then also do not bode well for the resumed Review Conference this year. The anthrax incidents of last year, instead of prompting the world community to act collectively to challenge the threat of biological weapons, have instead led to a path that rejects the framework for multilateral action and may threaten the norm that has existed for thirty years. While national implementation measures and certain group efforts may be worth pursuing, they cannot substitute for meaningful multilateral efforts to strengthen the Convention. We hope that the resumed Review Conference can be saved from failure by at least reaching agreement on a modest follow-up work [programme] in a truly multilateral context. At a time when the threat from BW proliferation and bioterrorism is of great concern...it would be tragic to undermine the norm established by the BWC.

International Committee of the Red Cross (Georges Paclisanu, October 7): The ICRC...regrets that lengthy negotiations to strengthen the [Biological Weapons] Convention through a compliance-monitoring mechanism were not concluded as expected in November 2001. We urge states parties to spare no effort to ensure that the resume Fifth Review Conference...takes steps to ensure that the norms contained in the 1925 [Geneva] Protocol and the [BWC]...are maintained and strengthened in [the] face of rapid scientific developments. The ICRC is concerned that the "biotechnology revolution" which has already begun could inadvertently facilitate the use of biological weapons. This led the Institution to issue a rare appeal to governments, scientists and industry on 'Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity' in late September which is being distributed to Permanent Missions.

Iran (Dr. Javad Zarif, October 4): The negotiations on a Protocol strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, which was blocked at the very final stage of its conclusion and adoption, await good will and practical initiatives to exit from the impasse.

Japan (Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, October 1): In order to address the threat of biological weapons, it is necessary to create a comprehensive strategy, with the Biological Weapons Convention as its most fundamental element. However, since the suspension last year of the BWC Review Conference, states parties have yet to agree on a common ground to strengthen this multilateral convention. It is crucial for the success of the Review Conference in November to agree on a follow-up mechanism addressing a focused agenda of certain key issues. We will continue to support the efforts of Ambassador Tibor Toth, President of the Conference, to bring about a convergence of positions.

Israel (Jeremy N. Issacharoff, October 10): In our area it would be impossible to forget that chemical weapons have been used in wars by more than one state in the region and Iraq has used such weapons against its own Kurdish citizens in Halabja. There are other states in the region that possess extensive chemical and biological weapon capabilities with the means to deliver them. ... I naturally looked for the resolutions in this Committee that deal with this troubling aspect of Middle Eastern security - but my search was in vain.

Kenya (Bob F. Jalang'o, October 9): Kenya hopes that the work of the OPCW will be speeded up towards the implementation of the CWC. My delegation has no doubt that the new Director-General of the Organisation...will inject new vigour. The dangers posed by chemical weapons in the hands of terrorist groups demand urgency in dealing with the matter.

South Korea (Sun Joun-yung, September 30): My government, as an active member of the Executive Council of the [OPCW]...attaches great importance to ensure the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the full compliance of states parties with their obligations... Given the danger of chemical materials falling into the wrong hands, the issue of industry inspection is gaining attention within the framework of the Convention. My delegation hopes that, under its new leadership, the OPCW will be more efficient in carrying out its challenging tasks, and that the First Review Conference of the Convention next year will provide a valuable opportunity for useful discussion on a more effective implementation of the Convention. ... Within the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention, it is our sincere hope that, in the interests of strengthening the Convention, states parties will be able to devise an effective work programme at the resumed Review Conference...

Laos (Alounkeo Kittikhoun, October 9): [E]ssential for the maintenance of international and regional peace and security is universal adherence to the BWC, especially the strengthening of it through multilateral negotiations for a legally binding Protocol... [S]pecial emphasis must be put on the need for all states parties ton pursue the objectives set forth by the Fourth [BWC] Review Conference and to contribute towards the successful conclusion of the...[Fifth] Review Conference to be reconvened in the near future.

Libya (Ahmed Own, October 7): The Fifth Review of the Biological Weapons Convention, held in 2001, had failed to adopt a final declaration. The United States delegation had proposed a termination of the ad hoc group, which had been mandated to negotiate a protocol to strengthen that Convention. That was clear evidence of the lack of political will needed in all spheres of disarmament.

Malaysia (Hasmy Agam, September 30): We are...dismayed at the suspension of the Fifth Biological Weapons (BWC) Review Conference last November. This was another disappointing setback in the multilateral disarmament process in the last few years. We hope that the 'cooling off period' would enable states parties to the Convention to continue their important work towards reaching an agreement on a Final Declaration to strengthen the BWC.

Mexico (Gustavo Albin, September 30): [Mexico] called for the negotiation of a verification protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

Nepal (Murari Raj Sharma, October 4): Other weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological ones, should have no place in a civilised world. Sadly the faltering of the proposed protocol on [the] Biological Weapons Convention does not bode well, but we hope the resumed Review Conference...will be able to achieve its objective.

New Zealand (Deborah Panckhurst, September 30): It is an issue of deep concern to New Zealand that the preparations for the resumed Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention...are in difficulty. States have negotiated for years towards the development and implementation of a compliance mechanism for the Biological weapons Convention. The technology and science that feeds into biosecurity and bioterrorism is being rapidly developed. But while the United nations is struggling to identify and eliminate biological weapons developed in one state, and we have witnessed the use of BW in another state, we have been unable to bring the negotiation for a system of verification and compliance to completion. ... 2002 has been a challenging year fir the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The process of changing the leadership of the Technical Secretariat was a difficult one for all of us, but we are confident that the new Director General, Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina, has the skills to take the OPCW forwards. He has made a fine start. 2003 can be expected to present challenges as well. Member states must seize the opportunity provided by the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention to give tangible effect to our determination, "for the sake of all (hu)mankind," to "exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons". That is our task, and we should not fool ourselves that it is complete.

Norway (Leif A. Ulland, October 2): We should use the Fifth [BWC] Review Conference to reaffirm our commitment to preventing the production, proliferation and use of biological weapons when the Conference resumes in a few weeks time. We urge all states parties to the BWC to demonstrate sufficient flexibility so that a consensus decision can be reached... But we need to explore further national as well as multilateral measures to ensure compliance with the Convention.

Pakistan (Shaukat Umar, October 10): We regret that the fact that the Fifth BWC Review Conference last year had to be suspended. ... The reconvened...Conference...[will] need to agree on a balanced and meaningful follow-up programme, encompassing both regulatory and promotional activities.

Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela), statement by Bruno Stagno of Costa Rica, October 1: [W]e trust that the negotiations being held in Geneva to strengthen the [BWC]...will make some progress. We believe that the [CWC]...is an essential instrument for disarmament and non-proliferation.

Russia (Andrey Granovsky, October 9): We consider the Chemical Weapons Convention to be an effective tool to consolidate international peace and security and we find it necessary to assure its universal character. We applaud the important decisions taken at the September session of the OPCW Executive Council 2002, which allow the Russian Federation to implement its commitments under the Convention in a systematic and consistent manner. We attribute the decisions taken by this authoritative international organization, to no small extent, to Russia's continuous adherence to its international commitments in the area of chemical disarmament as well as to the specific steps to implement this complex and expensive program. Favoring the continuation of the multilateral efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we are willing to discuss also the proposals that supplement the verification mechanisms, on enhancing the Convention during the second stage of the 5th BWC Review Conference in November.

Senegal (Cheikh Niang, October 7): Concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention, it was imperative for the Organization for the OPCW to have the funds needed to discharge its verification and inspection functions. Regarding biological weapons, it was urgent to conclude a protocol designed to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

South Africa (Ncumisa Pamella Notutela, October 2): In the area of the Biological Weapons Convention, the situation has...moved from bad to worse - with a faint glimmer of hope being vested in the resumed meeting of the suspended BWC Review Conference... We had believed that the inability of the states parties to adopt the draft Protocol to strengthen the implementation of the BWC...was a low point in the history of the Convention and we had consequently approached the Review Conference in 2001 with scepticism and a low expectation. It, however, turned out to be possible for even scepticism and a low expectation to be further disappointed when the Conference had to be suspended, unable to even agree on a minimalist common position. The reconvened Review Conference will therefore be starting from a low point and it will be important for the overwhelming number of states parties, who had joined together from all political groupings during the meetings of 2001, not to be forced into accepting a failure. South Africa was persuaded by the strong arguments put forward at the Review Conference...that it would be important for the states parties not to allow a situation where no further work is done to enhance the implementation of the BWC. These states parties...insisted that a vacuum in the period until the next Review Conference in 2006 would be detrimental for the Convention and for our fight against the biological weapons threats confronting the international community... To this end, South Africa would support a proposal at the reconvened meeting of the Review Conference that would include: the rapid conclusion of the Review Conference's work with a focus to enhance the implementation of the Convention, also without raising divisive issues where it is known that agreement will not be possible; no reference to the BWC Ad Hoc Group and its draft Protocol in the final documents of the Review Conference; agreement to establish a Group or Groups of Experts to deal with a limited and non-exhaustive list of specific issues related to the Convention and to consider and reach agreement on proposals that could enhance the implementation of the Convention; annual meetings of the Group or Groups of Experts for a period of approximately four weeks in two separate periods (if there is still time available after the reconvened meeting of the Review Conference in November has completed its work, then the remaining time could be used by the newly-established Expert Group or Groups to begin an initial consideration of their work); annual meetings of the states parties for a limited duration of time (a few days) that would consider the work of the Group or Groups and decide upon further work once issues had been dealt with (the annual meeting should coincide with one of the periods of time that have been allocated for a meeting of the Expert Group or Groups); and, the possible strengthening of the UN Secretariat in the area of biological weapons so as to assist the states parties, especially from developing countries, in the abovementioned work. ... With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the past year has proved to be somewhat of a challenge. The OPCW has been required to deal with difficult institutional challenges which have resulted in a lack of focus on the core business of the Organisation. South Africa is gratified that these difficulties now appear to have been resolved, and we take this opportunity to wish Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter every success in his new role as Director-General of the OPCW. The OPCW has also once again faced the challenge of underfunding in 2002. The upcoming Conference of States parties in The Hague will seek to approve a budget that accurately reflects the needs of the Organisation... The principle of "the possessor pays" has been clearly defined in the Convention and those countries that do possess such weapons must accept the responsibility they have brought upon themselves by developing these weapons in the first place. The world's only disarmament treaty dedicated to the elimination of an entire category of weapon of mass destruction [along with the BWC] must not be allowed to falter because of attempts by possessors to engage in creative accounting.

Sri Lanka (Prasad Kariyawasam, October 10): The 5th [BWC] Review Conference...is yet another opportunity to sustain the multilateral system of disarmament and non-proliferation. It is essential to approach the resumed session of the Review Conference with new vigour and [a] renewed sense of purpose. We look forward to its successful conduct and to agree[ing] at least on some follow-up measures that are balanced and forward-looking. A total failure once again might mean a serious setback for the Convention itself.

Switzerland (Christian Faessler, October 2): The rapid scientific and technical progress in the area of biotechnology and genetics in both civilian and military spheres increases the risk of abuse of this knowledge for military purposes. A concerted action by the international community to prevent such abuses is needed. In this respect, we welcome the recent appeal of the ICRC concerning biological disarmament. ... We deeply deplore that it has not been possible to successfully conclude the negotiations on the strengthening of the [Biological Weapons] Convention and we hold dear [the hope] that multilateral efforts in this area are vigorously pursued without further delay. ... Switzerland actively contributes to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and devotes considerable efforts and resources to this task. Specifically, Switzerland, together with other member states, has established a successful training programme relating to chemical weapons assistance and protection. It also supports the inspector training programme of the OPCW.

Thailand (Dr. Suriya Chindawongse, October 7): The failure of the 5th Review Conference of the BWC past November to produce substantive results has potentially placed the BWC regime in jeopardy.

Turkey (Alper Coskun, October 10): Turkey has been party to the CWC since 1997 and is firmly committed to its objectives. ... We also try to encourage other countries, especially those in our neighbourhood which have not yet signed or ratified the CWC, to become party to it. ... The [upcoming resumption of the] 5th [BWC] Review Conference...is yet another opportunity to reinforce the multilateral system of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ukraine (Markiyan Kulyk, October 10): Ensuring proper implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is one of the key priorities of the foreign policy of Ukraine... Ukraine calls on all the countries that have not yet ratified or signed the Convention to join it as soon as possible. ... We believe that suspension of the negotiations on the BWC Protocol should not lead to the failure of international efforts to strengthen compliance with the Convention. At the same time, we see no major impediments which would not allow [states parties] to accommodate the provisions of the draft Protocol and the additional proposals in one, integrated BWC compliance control instrument.

United States (Stephen G. Rademaker, October 3): The strong US commitment to effective multilateral arms control is demonstrated by our actions over the past year with respect to the OPCW. When the United States and other parties to the CWC recognized that the OPCW was not being effectively administered, the politically expedient course would have been to remain silent while the CWC slowly atrophied. Indeed, many countries strongly counseled us to follow precisely such a course. We chose instead, however, to initiate efforts to revitalize the Organization. Now that the OPCW is under new leadership, we are confident that it can effectively enforce international norms with respect to chemical weapons, provided it receives sufficient support from the international community. Accordingly, the United States is making a voluntary contribution to the organization of some $2 million. In addition, we have decided to upgrade our diplomatic representation at the OPCW in The Hague. We urge other members to join us in making such voluntary contributions to the OPCW, and in taking other steps to underscore international support for Director General [Rogelio] Pfirter as he begins to revitalize this important institution of multilateral arms control.

Uruguay (Dr. Felipe H. Paolillo, October 4): Uruguay reiterates the need for enhancing the CWC and the need to move forward on the Protocol to the BWC... Therefore, we regret that no further step has been taken to strengthen this [BW] Convention.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Dejan Sahovic, October 9): Yugoslavia expects that the resumed session of the Fifth [BWC] Review Conference...will be brought to a successful conclusion.

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