United Nations (UN)

UN First Committee and General Assembly

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58th Sessions, September - December 2003

Latest update, November 5.

On October 27, the UN First Committee (Disarmament and Security) began voting on some 48 resolutions and 6 draft decisions keeping issues on the UN agenda. These covered nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon free zones, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space (space weaponisation), and a variety of regional and confidence-building measures, as well as support for a variety of UN-related bodies and centres dealing with disarmament or regional security issues. Overshadowing the debates, too many of which concerned resolutions which do little more than duplicate political or institutional gestures that have been passed by the UN General Assembly over successive years, one of the most interesting features of the 58th First Committee meeting has been a discussion about its own shortcomings and need for reform. Although discussion papers from Norway and Britain/EU were received with interest, only the United States put in a resolution on reform. Intended to kick off a more wide-reaching debate, this requested the UN Secretary General to seek the views of states and prepare a report with options and recommendations, for consideration by the First Committee and General Assembly in 2004.

The Acronym Institute will be providing a fuller analysis of the First Committee in the next Disarmament Diplomacy. Here, as they are written up, we provide a summary of the resolutions' main points, with voting figures where applicable.

Voting is given as for-against-abstention.

For copies of the entire resolutions, statements to the General Debate and Thematic discussions and other First Committee-related reporting, click on http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Index of Resolutions

Nuclear Weapons

• UNGA 58/ (L.52), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
• UNGA 58/ (L.49), Fissban
• UNGA 58/ (L.40), Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda
• UNGA 58/ (L.39), Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
• UNGA 58/ (L.53), A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
• UNGA 58/ (L.31), Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
• UNGA 58/ (L.47), Nuclear disarmament
• UNGA 58/ (L.4), Missiles
• UNGA 58/ (L.34), Reducing Nuclear Danger
• UNGA 58/ (L.8), Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons [NSA]
• UNGA 58/ (L.36), Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
• L.2 (DECISION), United Nations Conference to Identify Ways of Eliminating Nuclear Dangers in the Context of Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

• UNGA 58/ (L.6), Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
• UNGA 58/ (L.11), African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
• L.14 (DECISION), Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
• UNGA 58/ (L.22), Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East
• UNGA 58/ (L.23), The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
• UNGA 58/ (L.38), Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas
• UNGA 58/ (L.12), Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes
• UNGA 58/ (L.19) WITHDRAWN, Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties by which Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have been Established

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

• UNGA 58/ (L.37), Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [BWC]
• UNGA 58/82 (L.41), Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction [CWC]

Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects

• UNGA 58/ (L.44), Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Conventional Weapons

• UNGA 58/ (L.1), The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light weapons in All its Aspects
• UNGA 58/ (L.16/Rev.1), National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual Use Goods and Technology
• UNGA 58/ (L.43), Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction [Mine Ban Treaty]
• UNGA 58/ (L.46/Rev.1), Promotion at the Regional Level in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of the United Nations Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects
• UNGA 58/ (L.50), Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [CCW]
• UNGA 58/ (L.51), Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them

Regional Disarmament and Security

• UNGA 58/ (L.9), Regional Disarmament
• UNGA 58/ (L.10), Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Sub-regional Levels

Confidence-building Measures including Transparency in Armaments

• UNGA 58/ (L.18), Confidence-building Measures in the Regional and Sub-regional context
• UNGA 58/ (L.32), Objective Information on Military Matters, including Transparency of Military Expenditures
• UNGA 58/ (L.45), Transparency in Armaments (TIA)
• L.48 (DECISION), Verification in all its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification
• UNGA 58/ (L.54), Regional Confidence-building Measures: Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

Disarmament Machinery

• UNGA 58/96 (L.5), Report of the Conference on Disarmament
• UNGA 58/ (L.7), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin American and the Caribbean
• UNGA 58/91 (L.13), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
• UNGA 58/ (L.21), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
• UNGA 58/87 (L.28), United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament
• UNGA 58/95 (L.20), Report of the Disarmament Commission
• L.61 DECISION, Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [UNSSOD IV]
• UNGA 58/ (L.15/Rev.1), Enhancing the Contribution of the First Committee to the Maintenance of International Peace and Security

Other Disarmament Measures

• UNGA 58/ (L.3), Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
• UNGA 58/ (L.24), Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
• UNGA 58/ (L.27), Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Control
• L.29 (DECISION), Relationship between Disarmament and Development
• UNGA 58/ (L.33), Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament
• UNGA 58/ (L.35), Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

Related Matters of Disarmament and International Security

• L.17 DECISION, Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures

International Security

• UNGA 58/ (L.26/Rev.1), Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
• L.30 DECISION, Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security
• UNGA 58/ (L.42), Strengthening of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Nuclear Weapons

UNGA 58/ (L.52)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Introduced by Australia, on behalf also of Mexico and New Zealand, with overwhelming, cross-group co-sponsorship

Updating the resolutions of 2000 and 2002, this resolution welcomes the Final Declaration of the September 2003 CTBT Special Conference in Vienna and underlines the continuing urgency of the treaty and its entry into force. It notes that 32 of the 44 ratifications needed for entry into force have been obtained and urges the rest to sign and/or ratify as soon as possible. The resolution urges all states to maintain their existing moratoria and to refrain from doing anything that would defeat the CTBT's object and purpose in the meanwhile (such as conducting a nuclear explosion).

First Committee, October 27: 151-1-4

UNGA:

First Committee comments:

The United States, which had insisted that this resolution could not go through on consensus, as once was the case, voted against. India, Colombia, Mauritius and Syria abstained, as they did in 2002. The CTBT resolution was endorsed and supported by an overwhelming majority of states, most of whom mentioned its importance in their opening or thematic statements. Before the vote, Italy on behalf of the EU and a long list of aligned countries, underscored the Europeans' call for all states, especially the 12 required for entry into force, to sign and ratify and in the meantime to give full support for the rapid establishment of the verification regime in all its elements. After the vote, the US explained that it voted against because "the US does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to that treaty". The US said it would maintain the moratorium it has had in place since 1992, and urged all other states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing. Israel explained that it voted in favour because it is committed to the CTBT's objectives, but argued that completion of the verification regime was a "prerequisite" to entry into force. Israel raised concerns about regional difficulties, including lack of cooperation by some Middle East states to complete and test the IMS, and attempts "to block or bypass the functioning of the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) group". Syria said it abstained because the CTBT did not enshrine security assurances against the use or threat of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and complained about the inclusion of Israel as part of the MESA group defined in the treaty. Explaining its abstention, Colombia referred to a "constitutional difficulty" with regard to ratifying the CTBT and hoped further discussions with the CTBTO and others would remove this impediment. It is understood that Colombia's national laws preclude its payment for a treaty until it ratifies; since September 1996, in accordance with the UN resolution adopting the CTBT, states have been paying towards the establishment of the CTBTO. Colombia is concerned that when it deposits its ratification it will be hit with a large bill for backdated contributions which it is not permitted to pay, according to its domestic law.

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UNGA 58/ (L.49)
The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its Agenda Entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices [Fissban]

Introduced by Canada with co-sponsorship of a wide cross-group of states

Identical to the resolution adopted by consensus in 2002, this emphasises the value of a treaty banning the production of fissile material in contributing to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Recalls the decision of the CD to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate such a treaty and urges it to establish a programme of work to enable fissban negotiations to commence.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments:

The United States said it joined consensus because it supported a FMCT that would advance US security interests, but noted that Washington was reviewing elements and policy related to the FMCT and so joining consensus was "without prejudice" to that review. It is understood that the US interagency process is going through the implications of a cut-off treaty with a fine toothcomb, coming up with verification concerns, for example, over naval propulsion fuel and intrusive monitoring. Israel said it joined consensus but that the FMCT could not be done in isolation from the peace process in the Middle East and its other considerations regarding the Middle East NWFZ concept, including "the overall effort to reduce tension, curb proliferation and limit armaments" in the region.

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UNGA 58/ (L.40/Rev.1)
Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda

Introduced by Brazil on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition

This detailed resolution, with 30 operative paragraphs, takes further the New Agenda's concerns regarding the current "limited progress" in implementing the "blueprint" of steps on nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It underlines the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons, cites the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the legality and use of nuclear weapons, and describes a range of measures that need to be pursued. Differences from earlier years include preambular reference that the retention of nuclear weapons [by the NWS] "carries the inherent risk of contributing to proliferation and falling into the hands of non-state actors" (PP3); and that "collective engagement" is needed to enhance international peace and security (PP5). The resolution highlights the tasks and principles required for implementing the thirteen steps, devoting, for example three OPs to the CTBT and nuclear testing (OP5, OP6, OP7), and deep concerns about the possible development of new nuclear weapons and rationalisations for use (PP21), calling on all states to refrain from actions that could lead to a new arms race or impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation (OP2). Tacitly acknowledging that the NPT-endorsed reference to the ABM Treaty has been superseded, the NAC resolution reiterates concerns first put forward in 2002, that missile defences could lead to the weaponisation of space as well as risking a new arms race on earth (PP20). OP14 calls for the CD to update its mandate to work on prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). OP10 on non-strategic nuclear weapons reproduces key elements of the NAC resolution on NSNW in 9 sub-paras. A very specific call is also made for NPT parties to make time available at the 2004 PrepCom to "thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances" and make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference (OP19).

First Committee, November 4:

PP20 (BMD): 117-6-39

Whole resolution: 121-6-38

UNGA:

First Committee comments: China and most of the NAM voted in favour, while most of NATO and NATO-aspirant states abstained. Canada requested a vote on PP20, which expressed concern that missile defences "could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space..." Canada abstained on this, saying that it disagreed that missile defences would definitely impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but if carried out cooperatively, missile defence "could complement non-proliferation efforts". After registering this abstention, Canada was the only NATO member to vote in favour of the whole resolution. Japan and Australia surprised many by joining the US, UK, Israel, and Micronesia in voting against PP20, though Japan and Australia both abstained on the whole resolution. Germany said it was deeply disappointed to have to abstain on the NAC resolution, having conducted intensive negotiations with a view to voting in favour. Despite its drafting suggestions, which were not asking for an extra mile, Germany said, the sponsors had "refused to go the extra few yards". Germany said it was committed to "an incremental approach that gradually and inexorably leads to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons". One of Germany's major difficulties is understood to have been PP2, which equates nuclear weapons to "a threat to the survival of humanity"; Germany reportedly wanted the reference to 'threat' downgraded to 'risk'. Japan said it had a fervent desire to prevent nuclear devastation and shared the goal of the NAC resolution, elements of which it considered "useful and agreeable"; but Japan objected to the resolution's depiction of missile defence and believed the the steps needed to be "realistic and practical and take into account different circumstances". Australia said much the same. The UK, on behalf of France and the US, explained that these P-3 were "fully committed to meeting their obligations under the NPT", but voted against the NAC resolution because it went beyond the agreements of 1995 and 2000 and did not take into account progress since 2000, including the Moscow Treaty. China voted in favour, but said it had reservations on the NSNW parts of the resolution and reiterated that there should be a requirement not to use nuclear weapons first (no-first-use). Pakistan voted no "with a degree of diffidence" because it "fully shares the objectives of preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors" and believes that the best assurance is to eliminate the weapons through total nuclear disarmament. But despite this, Pakistan voted against the resolution because it disagreed with PP18, OP20, OP22, and OP23 (which referred to South Asia or called on India, Pakistan and Israel to join the NPT). In Pakistan's view, such paragraphs did not reflect the reality for South Asia or Pakistan's "reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons", which were "for self defence and strategic balance". Like Pakistan, India objected to PP18, OP20, OP22 and OP23, saying they were "prescriptive" and did not reflect the "ground realities". India argued that the only relevant document or agenda for the international community was that of UNSSOD I agreed in 1978, which contained a programme of action that has only been partially implemented. India therefore questioned whether there was a need for a new agenda and said "a new agenda cannot succeed in the framework of the NPT, which is flawed and discriminatory". Colombia gave its familiar reservation about its political-constitutional difficulty over CTBT ratification.

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UNGA 58/ (L.39/Rev.1)
Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Brazil on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition

First introduced by the NAC in 2002, this resolution focuses on the necessity of reducing and eliminating non-strategic (aka tactical) nuclear weapons. It raises explicit concerns about the threat posed by NSNW "due to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict" and "the risk of proliferation and of early, preemptive, unauthorised or accidental use", as well as changing security strategies and the "possible development of new types of low-yield" NSNW. With 10 OPs, in contrast with 8 in 2002, it calls for the reduction and elimination of NSNW weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner, in the context of commitments made by the NWS in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including the NWS' unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons, agreed by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In addition to calling upon the US and Russia to formalise their 1991 and 1992 Presidential Initiatives, the resolution stresses the need for the NWS to undertake not to develop new types of NSNW or rationalisations for their use, nor to increase the number or types of such weapons in their arsenal. It calls for additional concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of NSNW and enhance security and physical protection, so as to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons would be used.

First Committee, November 4: 118-4-41

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The US, UK, France and Russia voted against. China did not vote at all. Abstentions included Australia, Japan, South Korea NATO members and NATO hopefuls, as well as India, Pakistan and Israel. The US spoke on behalf of the UK and France, though it noted that the two lesser NWS no longer had NSNW in their arsenals. The US said it had completed its pledges under the 1991-2 Presidential Initiatives without a formal treaty and was working bilaterally for increased transparency, and said that such approaches would be more effective than the resolution, which risked complicated existing arrangements and would create obstacles of definition, verification, etc. Russia, which had abstained in 2002, said it was faithful to its commitments and that reductions of NSNW were being conducted systematically, but voted no this year: the resolution was still insufficiently precise; concerns Russia expressed about it last year had not been addressed; the draft proposed "new and specific" commitments that went beyond agreements undertaken in 1991-2 and in 2000, and, in Russia's view, added new problems. China said it chose not to vote on this resolution because its definitions of NSNW were not clear. Referring to its own paper on this subject in the NPT meetings, Germany said that though NSNW were of especial interest, it had abstained because their elimination must be "irreversible and controlled" and "could not be achieved in one leap".

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UNGA 58/ (L.53)
A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Japan, together with Australia, and a number of others

This omnibus resolution, which Japan has sponsored since 1994, has grown noticeably stronger since 2000. It reaffirms the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, expresses concern about challenges to the regime (PP6, which was orally amended to cover all challenges, not only 'recent' ones), and calls for a successful review conference in 2000. Most substantively, it lists (at times paraphrased and updated) the 'thirteen steps' on nuclear disarmament agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including (OP3e) the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Although the importance of this undertaking was especially emphasised by Japan when it introduced the resolution, this did not allay the concerns of the New Agenda Coalition, however. Containing new preambular paragraphs about nuclear devastation (PP4) and expressing deep concern about the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (PP3), the resolution obtained a broad level of support. As testified by its strong endorsement of the CTBT's entry into force "without delay and without conditions", and moratoria on testing (OP3a) and fissile materials production (OP3b), as well as endorsement of the IAEA resolutions regarding strengthened safeguards (OP11), Japan no longer pursues the lowest common denominator in order to obtain agreement from all sides, including the NWS; this stronger stand has increased the pertinence of the resolution's message about nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The resolution also calls for the CD to establish a programme of work in 2004, and for a fissban to be concluded within five years. It stresses the need for, and importance of, a successful outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and calls upon all states to maintain standards of physical protection of nuclear materials and technology.

First Committee, October 30: 146-2-16

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The United States and India voted against: the US because of the endorsement of the CTBT, and India because of the fundamental context of the NPT imbuing this resolution. Complaining that the resolution stressed the urgent necessity for CTBT signatures, ratifications and entry into force, the United States repeated its explanation for voting against the CTBT resolution a few days earlier: the US "does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to it". Giving its familiar assurances about its unfailing commitment to nuclear disarmament and opposition to "the discriminatory framework of the NPT" India said it voted against the resolution because it follows the NPT's "flawed premises and approach".

As they had done in 2002, the New Agenda Coalition abstained. On their behalf, Brazil explained that though the NAC recognised that Japan was committed to nuclear disarmament, they considered that the resolution "misinterpreted" the adoption by the 2000 NPT Review Conference of the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals; the NAC were concerned that its placement in a sub-para of OP3 might imply that the unequivocal undertaking was a step still to be taken, and that it created a contextual linkage with general and complete disarmament, whereas the NPT 2000 agreements had clearly delinked the necessity for nuclear disarmament from general disarmament as a whole. Japan and others, however, disagreed with this interpretation, pointing out that the purpose of paragraph 3 was to emphasise and list the practical steps that had been agreed in 2000 and urge that they be implemented. From a different viewpoint, Germany also complained that the resolution was open to misinterpretation because it did not reflect the practical steps in their entirety; while objecting to this "selective quoting", however, Germany voted in favour because of its commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and the full implementation of the 2000 agreements and outcome. China, known to oppose the exhortation to declare and adhere to a moratorium on the production of fissile materials, also abstained. Complaining that the resolution failed to mention "some fundamental principles", China said some of its paragraphs were "not realistic or feasible in the current situation". France, after some agonised deliberation, voted in favour but complained that PP4, which called for every effort to be made to avoid nuclear devastation, was a distortion of the NPT's preamble, which had put devastation in the context of nuclear war. Reiterating, therefore, that France considered its security underpinned by nuclear deterrence, France said that its acceptance of the text was a gesture of friendship towards Japan and should not be taken as a precedent in any future debates or in other fora. Pakistan abstained because of the NPT references. Colombia abstained because of its constitutional difficulties regarding CTBT ratification, discussed in more detail in regard to the CTBT resolution. Malaysia voted in favour, as it supports all efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon free world, but expressed frustration at the lack of progress. Austria said it voted in favour because of its shared commitment to nuclear disarmament, but complained that OP11, which addressed IAEA safeguards was weak and inadequate and referred instead to the resolution adopted by the IAEA General Conference, September 17, 2003.

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UNGA 58/ (L.31)
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Malaysia with co-sponsorship from over 50 NAM states

First tabled in 1996, this resolution builds on the ICJ advisory opinion of July 1996 on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (a major conclusion of which is endorsed in OP1) and links it with a call for negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention (OP2). It recalls many international obligations, including the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the 2000 Review Conference thirteen steps, the various nuclear-weapons-free zones, and traditional NAM positions, such as a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, it stresses that the CD should "commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework on time" (PP12).

First Committee, October 28

OP1: 140-4-5

Whole resolution: 104-29-20

UNGA:

OP1:

First Committee comments: China, most NAM states and the New Agenda Coalition supported the resolution. NATO and Western-aligned states either opposed or abstained. A separate vote was requested for OP1, which endorsed the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". This enabled some of the states intending to oppose or abstain on the resolution to register their endorsement of this important ICJ conclusion. Only the US, Russia, Israel and the Democratic Republic of Congo voted against OP1, while Belarus, Britain, France, Georgia and Portugal abstained. As expressed by Japan and Luxembourg on behalf of the Benelux countries (Belgium and Netherlands), the main arguments employed by countries supporting OP1 but not the resolution as a whole centred on complaints that the ICJ opinion should not have been quoted "selectively" or that it was premature to call on states to negotiate a nuclear weapon convention. (This resolution evoked one of the unanimous conclusions, since parts of the July 1996 opinion were equivocal or indeterminate, as the judges were divided over whether there might be circumstances under which nuclear weapon use would not be unlawful, and if so, what these extreme circumstances might be.) After voting no in the First Committee, Australia said this had been a mistake, and it meant to abstain.

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UNGA 58/ (L.47)
Nuclear disarmament

Introduced by Myanmar (Burma) with co-sponsorship from many NAM states, but notably not New Agenda states or Chile, nor India or Pakistan.

This traditional omnibus resolution on nuclear disarmament evokes past NAM declarations and recommendations, UN Special Sessions on Disarmament and the Millennium Declaration, and the NPT agreements (stressing the importance of the NPT 2000 thirteen steps). Despite having 22 OPs, it is more rhetorical and less practically oriented than the resolutions sponsored by the New Agenda or Japan, though it touches many of the same bases. More specifically, it urges the NWS to de-alert and deactivate their nuclear weapons (OP6: this demand had more resonance before the architects of the Moscow Treaty, which this resolution notes with appreciation, came up with the ingenious device of using de-alerting in place of irreversible reductions and elimination). The traditional NAM call for a timetable or timebound framework for nuclear disarmament no longer appears, but the resolution calls for conclusion of an "international legal instrument or instruments" on "adequate" security assurances to NNWS (OP16), and an international conference on nuclear disarmament to "identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament" (OP20). Stressing "the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect" (PP13), the resolution also urges the NWS "to commence plurilateral negotiations" on further deep reductions in nuclear weapons (OP9).

First Committee, November 3: 101-43-18

UNGA:

First Committee comments: This traditional nuclear disarmament resolution is backed by most of the NAM, and opposed by NATO and aligned states. While most of the NAC voted in favour, Sweden and Ireland abstained. Russia abstained. China was the only NWS to support, though it explained that it had some reservations and considered that it was premature to pursue some of the steps outlined in the resolution, which in any case needed to "follow the principle of strategic stability and undiminished security". India and Pakistan abstained because of references to the NPT. Japan welcomed some "positive developments" in the resolution, and said that it came to the "difficult decision" to abstain because of the references to a time-bound framework. Japan favours a step by step approach.

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UNGA 58/ (L.4)
Missiles

Introduced by Iran

In its fifth year, this resolution is calling now for a second panel of governmental experts to explore further "the issue of missiles, in all its aspects", to be established in 2004 on the basis on equitable geographical distribution. Earlier resolutions were successful in establishing a UN Panel of Governmental Experts in 2001-2, under the auspices of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Panel on missiles reported back in 2002, but although it provided an excellent overview, irreconcilable differences of approach among the panellists and the states they represented meant that the panel could not agree on recommendations. The UN provided an oral statement that funding could be found for 3 sessions in New York over 2004-5.

First Committee, October 27: 90-3-59

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The resolution was opposed by the United States, Israel and Micronesia. The EU and numerous aligned states explained their abstention on grounds that the resolution failed to welcome the International Code of Conduct (ICoC), adopted in the Hague in November 2002, which European countries believe is the most comprehensive way to address missile proliferation, and the EU did not consider that another UN panel of experts to be an effective way to proceed. Japan and the Republic of Korea, which participated in the 2001-2 UN Panel, and Australia also abstained, while emphasising the grave concern they attached to the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMD. Japan and Australia complained that the resolution made no acknowledgement of ongoing efforts including the HCoC, and South Korea said it favoured a "step by step" approach and was "sceptical" of the value of another study based on an "unfocussed mandate".

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UNGA 58/ (L.34)
Reducing Nuclear Danger

Introduced by India with co-sponsorship from sixteen NAM states

Now in its sixth year, this resolution focuses on de-alerting and the adoption of measures to prevent accidents arising from computer or other technical malfunctions, as well as nuclear postures based on "hair-trigger alert". In addition to general exhortations for all member states to work to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament, it calls for a review of nuclear doctrines (OP1), specifically by the five NWS (OP2), and calls for implementation of the seven recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Millennium Declaration related to reducing nuclear dangers and the risks of nuclear war.

First Committee, October 27: 99-46-14

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Though many agree that more must be done to reduce nuclear danger, the vote splits along NAM-Western lines, with China, Japan, South Korea and a few Eastern European/Central Asian states abstaining. The high number of negative votes from NATO-EU aligned states reflects their deep scepticism about the underlying motive for this resolution, which was tabled by India in the same year as it conducted nuclear tests and declared its admission to the nuclear 'club' as a NWS. The references to preventing nuclear accidents are taken by some to relate to the controversial question of whether India and Pakistan should receive assistance or technologies, such as permissive action links (PALs), developed by some of the NWS in this regard. De-alerting, which was promoted as an interim step by the Canberra Commission and others during the 1990s, is less popular with disarmament advocates since the Moscow Treaty in essence presented the withdrawal of weapons from deployment as a substitute for irreversible, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

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UNGA 58/(L.8)
Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons [NSA]

Introduced by Pakistan with co-sponsorship from a handful of NAM states

Pakistan's traditional resolution on security assurances, put forward since 1990, carried forward despite Pakistan's own nuclear tests and assertion of nuclear weapon possession and status, has changed little over the years. It evokes numerous past UN and NAM meetings and declarations, asserts the need to safeguard the "independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty" of non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and argues that, until nuclear disarmament has been achieved universally, a common approach on security assurances needs to be negotiated. Among the six OPs, three refer to the CD, which is called on to "actively continue intensive negotiations" on effective international arrangements. Though none voted against, because the concept of security assurances is one that even its opponents feel the need to pay lip service to, the tired language and lack of enthusiasm reflect that this resolution is one widely regarded as having outlived its usefulness in this form.

First Committee, October 27: 98-0-59

UNGA:

First Committee comments: While most of the NAM voted in favour, NATO and European states abstained en bloc. Although some may be dissatisfied with the security assurances contained in UNSC 984 (1995), many view this issue as more appropriately dealt with in the context of the NPT, rather than the CD. The United States made clear that it abstained in this resolution because it "continues to oppose any proposal for a negative security assurances treaty or global, legally binding security assurances regime.

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UNGA 58/ (L.36)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by India with the co-sponsorship of thirty NAM states

This is another traditional resolution (dating back many years), for which India, despite its own nuclear testing and weapons capabilities, continues to take the lead in sponsoring. It evokes the July 1996 ICJ opinion and various past UN resolutions, and argues that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the total elimination of nuclear threats. Despite regretting the CD's inability to undertake negotiations, the two OPs request the CD to commence negotiations on an international convention "prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances" and to report the results to the General Assembly.

First Committee, October 27: 102-46-10

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The vote divided along traditional lines, with most NAM states and China voting in favour, and the EU/NATO aligned bloc, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan voting against. Russia was among the handful that abstained.

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L.2 (DECISION)
United Nations Conference to Identify Ways of Eliminating Nuclear Dangers in the Context of Nuclear Disarmament

Introduced by Mexico

This decision puts the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" onto the agenda of the 59th session of the General Assembly.

First Committee, October 27: 104-7-40

First Committee comments: The US, UK, France, together with Israel, Poland, Monaco, and Germany voted against, while most other European countries abstained. The New Agenda states voted in favour. As it did in 2002, Germany expressed sympathy with Mexico's concerns and sense of urgency, but raised concerns that the establishment of such a conference was not appropriate at this juncture as it could undermine the CD and the ongoing NPT process.

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Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

UNGA 58/ (L.6)
Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Introduced by Mexico on behalf of all the states in the region

This resolution welcomes that the Tlatelolco Treaty is now in force for all states in the region, as will be officially underscored at OPANAL's meeting in Havana, November 5-6, 2003.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA: consensus

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UNGA 58/ (L.11)
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States

This resolution, which goes back to 1996, when the Pelindaba Treaty was signed in Cairo, supports the establishment of the African NWFZ, calls on the relevant states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Pelindaba Treaty so that it can enter into force without delay (OP1), and also to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as required (OP4). It expresses its appreciation to the NWS that have signed the Protocols that concern them and calls on those that have not yet ratified the Protocols concerning them to do so as soon as possible (OP2). Because the Canary Islands, which are legally part of Spain, lie within the zone mapped out by the Treaty, Spain put in an amendment (L.58) which would have slightly amended OP2 and deleted OP3. OP3 calls upon states "contemplated in Protocol III....to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty." Although the cosponsors did not revise their resolution, Spain withdrew its amendment just before the vote, thereby allowing consensus. Spain warned, however, that unless the anomalous situation was resolved, it would refuse to join consensus in 2005.

First Committee, November 4: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Spain made a long and detailed statement saying that it withdrew its amendment as a gesture of goodwill to allow consensus because it supports the general objectives of the Pelindaba Treaty, but that the Canary Islands, "part of Spanish territory", should not be included in the zone of the African NWFZ. Instead of this problem being addressed in accordance with NWFZ guidelines established by the UNDC, including the necessity that they be a "well defined geographical region" by agreement freely arrived at by the states concerned, Spain complained that OP3 singled it out unacceptably. Therefore, Spain would not regard itself as bound by consensus on OP3. The United States, and Italy on behalf of the EU, made statements agreeing that Spain had "legitimate concerns". They supported the view that Spain should not have been singled out in the resolution and called for the problem to be resolved before the issue comes before the First Committee again.

Spain stressed that all Spanish territory had been denuclearised in 1976, by agreement with the US, but that it had decided it was not appropriate for it to join Protocol III because it "would lead to redundant safeguards over Spanish territory already subject to comprehensive safeguards", since Spain already adheres to Euratom and the NPT-related IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. Spain referred also to its membership of NATO (which, in view of NATO's nuclear doctrine, may be part of the problem), and mentioned other relevant agreements, including the INF and CFE treaties, underlining that all its nuclear facilities were exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that Spain already abided by obligations "that go well beyond Pelindaba". Despite the EU's statement of support for Spain, some EU delegations appeared less than sympathetic with its position on this.

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L.14 (DECISION)
Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

Introduced by Uzbekistan, on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

Since the Central Asian states were still in the midst of consultations, they proposed a draft decision to keep the issue on the UN agenda.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

First Committee comments: There has been considerable support for the states of the region to conclude a treaty establishing a Central Asian NWFZ, but though it was widely expected last year, it is bedevilled by persistent problems; hence the decision rather than a more substantive resolution.

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UNGA 58/ (L.22)
Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East

Introduced by Egypt on behalf of the League of Arab States

This traditional resolution, which goes back to 1974, cites the need for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, while at the same time reaffirming the right of states to develop and acquire nuclear energy for so-called peaceful purposes. It invites all countries of the region to declare their support for establishing such a zone.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA: consensus

First Committee comments: Israel explained that it had joined consensus "notwithstanding substantive and important reservations regarding certain elements in the resolution". Repeating the mantra that a NWFZ must be based on "arrangements freely arrived at among all the states in the region concerned", Israel argued that the nuclear issue, and all regional security issues, should be dealt with in the context of the peace process. In particular, Israel favoured a step by step approach, beginning with "modest CBMs, followed by the establishment of peaceful relations and reaching reconciliation..." Characterising a NWFZ in the Middle East as a "more ambitious goal", Israel said it could not be established "in situations where some of the states maintain they are in a state of war with each other, refuse in principle to maintain peaceful relations with Israel or even recognise its right to exist".

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UNGA 58/ (L.23)
The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

Introduced by Egypt on behalf of the League of Arab States

This annual resolution is the less consensual sibling of the previous, and names Israel, while stressing the need for universality of the NPT. PP6, on which there was a separate vote, emphasises the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, while OP1 welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East adopted by NPT parties in 2000. Noting that Israel is now the only state in the region that remains outside the NPT it calls upon that state "to accede... without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under fullscope" IAEA safeguards. In addressing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the resolution does not mention the IAEA additional protocol or raise concerns about the activities of any states other than Israel.

First Committee, November 3:

PP6: 142-2-11

Whole resolution: 146-3-10

UNGA

First Committee comments: India joined Israel voting against PP6, which endorsed the 1995 NPT agreements. The US, Pakistan and an odd group of small countries, including Bhutan, Vanuatu, Micronesia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, abstained. On the whole resolution, The United States and Micronesia joined Israel in opposing the resolution. India abstained, referring not only to its oppositon to PP6 but additional reservations over other references to the NPT, including PP5. Noting its reservations over PP6, Pakistan joined those in favour. Though the EU voted in favour, Canada and Australia joined those who abstained. Canada said it supported the universalisation fo the NPT but was concerned that this reservation was unbalanced and did not address compliance. Calling this resolution "blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive", Israel contrasted it unfavourably with the one on a NWFZ in the Middle East, in which it had been able to join consensus. In particular, Israel objected that it focussed on only one country "that has never threatened its neighbours", and does not address other states in the region who "abuse arms control" to develop technologies for hostile uses. Israel said this "biased resolution" discredited the General Assembly and undermined efforts to build peace and security in the region.

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UNGA 58/ (L.38)
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas

Introduced by Brazil, together with New Zealand, with the co-sponsorship of a wide cross-group of states in the southern hemisphere

As in past years, this resolution, which has been led by Brazil and New Zealand since 1996, caused anxiety for India and Pakistan because it refers to a NWFZ in South Asia, and for Britain, France and the United States, which regularly transport nuclear weapons or materials through the oceans of the Southern Hemisphere. Slightly longer than in past years, the resolution places its calls for the ratification of all nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols, as relevant, in the context of the determined pursuit of "the total elimination of nuclear weapons" and "the important role of NWFZ in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime." As it did in 2002, the resolution recalls "the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space", including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but as the votes reflect, this paragraph has done little to allay the fears of some of the NWS. Using the traditional language associated with NWFZs, OP5 "welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, and calls upon all states to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones in the Middle East and South Asia".

First Committee, October 27: India insisted on separate votes on OP5, and the last three words of OP5 (..."and South Asia.")

OP5 (last three words of): 142-2-11

OP5: 145-1-11

Resolution as a whole: 146-3-9

UNGA whole resolution:

OP5 (last three words of):

OP5:

First Committee comments: As in previous years, Britain, France and the United States voted against, while Russia, Israel, India, and Pakistan abstained. Bhutan, Georgia, Spain, the Marshall Islands and Albania also abstained, while China joined the majority of NNWS voting in favour. The specific mention of the need for a NWFZ in South Asia was objected to by India and Pakistan (who voted against the last three words of OP5, and when these were nevertheless adopted, voted against OP5 as a whole and then abstained on the whole resolution). India, practically duplicating its statement of previous years, declared that this aspect of the resolution ran counter to the established understanding that NWFZ must be freely arrived at by the states concerned, and queried why South Asia was singled out, when it was "no more relevant" than a NWFZ in Western Europe or East Asia. To explain the three NWS' negative vote the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the United States and France, said notwithstanding the preambular acknowledgement regarding the laws relating to freedom of the seas, they questioned "whether the real goal of this resolution is the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone that covers the high seas". They took the view that "it seems contradictory to simultaneously propose an area that is comprised largely of high seas and effectively say it does not apply to the high seas."

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UNGA 58/ (L.12)
Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States

This periodic resolution highlights the hazards of radioactive waste, particularly in the event of their use for radiological warfare, and calls on states to prevent "any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of states" (OP3). It reflects various agreements, including the IAEA code of practice of the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste and the Bamako Convention banning the import of hazardous wastes into Africa and controlling their transboundary movements within Africa. Most specifically, it requests the CD to "intensify efforts towards an early conclusion" of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons (a topic that remains part of the CD's decalogue, but which has never got off the ground), and if and when it does so, to consider radioactive waste.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA

First Committee comments: In this case, consensus indicated not support so much as lack of engagement with this issue. Though no-one bestirred themselves to oppose, few if any of those joining consensus have any intention of working on this issue in the CD in the near future.

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UNGA 58/ (L.19) WITHDRAWN
Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties by which Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have been Established

Introduced by Mexico

Mexico had hoped to win support for convening a conference of NWFZ signatories and parties before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, with the objective of improving dialogue and cooperation among states parties and signatories, the treaty agencies and other interested states, both to facilitate the more effective implementation of these treaties and to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Although a number of states expressed interest in the concept, Mexico also met with resistance to the idea from those who considered it would cost too much and/or raised concerns about its purpose, fearing it would detract from rather than support the NPT. Failing to garner the kind of support necessary to take such an initiative to fruition, Mexico withdrew its resolution on November 3.

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Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNGA 58/ (L.37)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [BWC]

Introduced by Hungary with the support of BWC states parties.

After disagreements prevented a resolution in 2002, there was satisfaction that a more substantive resolution was able to be adopted this year without a vote. This notes that the BWC now had 150 states parties and emphasises the understanding that article I of the BWC effectively prohibits the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling under all circumstances. The Fifth Review Conference's decision to hold annual expert meetings and meetings of states parties until the Sixth Review Conference is recalled, and the resolution calls for further signatures and ratification, increased information exchange and resources to implement the BWC states parties' decisions.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/82 (L.41)
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction [CWC]

Introduced by Poland on behalf of CWC states parties

This now-traditional resolution once again seeks to underline the importance of the CWC. Welcoming the growth in its membership over the past year and the cooperation between the UN and the OPCW, the resolution calls for the CWC's "full, universal and effective implementation" so as to exclude completely the possibility of any further use of chemical weapons. Noting "with appreciation" the outcome of the CWC meeting, the resolution underscores some of the key points in its Political Declaration, including urging universalisation, effective application of the verification system, fulfilment of financial obligations, and the fostering of peaceful international cooperation.

First Committee, October 27: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Egypt said it had not wanted to disturb consensus, but was concerned about some of the language, especially with regard to the calls for universality. Egypt argued that universalisation of the CWC should be in parallel with universalisation of the NPT, a point made by other Arab states in various First Committee interventions.

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Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

UNGA 58/ (L.44)
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Introduced by Sri Lanka with traditional co-sponsorship by Egypt, as well as support from China and the Russian Federation and a host of non-aligned states.

Although this resolution still sticks closely to its traditional language, and was identical to the PAROS resolution of 2002, the politics surrounding it have sharpened in recent years. In 9 operative paragraphs, it focuses on the CD. Although recognising the "complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral agreements", the resolution invites the CD to establish an ad hoc PAROS committee. Asserting that the growing use of outer space has increased the need for greater transparency and information within the international community, the resolution makes note of the fact that the legal regime applicable to outer space does not, as it currently stands, guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space and thus needs to be reinforced and expanded. The resolution calls upon all states, particularly those with major space capabilities to contribute actively to the peaceful uses of space and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and to keep the CD informed of the progress of any bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

First Committee, October 27: 161-0-3

UNGA:

First Committee comments: This is the largest vote for PAROS in many years. Moreover, for the first time in years, the First Committee held a short thematic debate on PAROS, in which Russia, China, Canada and a number of other states participated. Despite receiving the largest level of support for many years, the PAROS resolution has yet to be taken seriously. For example, in an explanation after the PAROS vote, Italy on behalf of the EU and numerous aligned countries stated that they regarded the CD as the only appropriate multilateral negotiating body for addressing PAROS issues, which would have to have a mandate subject to agreement by all, but that as far as the EU was concerned, the FMCT was the priority for work. This position, advanced by Britain for a number of years, has been adopted by the EU since 2002: in effect, the EU is prepared to make the gesture of voting in favour of the resolution, but views PAROS as a non-priority for the CD, while at the same time opposing any attempt to address the issue in any forum other than the CD.

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Conventional Weapons

UNGA 58/ (L.1)
The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light weapons in All its Aspects

Introduced by Japan with Colombia and South Africa and a wide cross-group co-sponsorship

This substantive and practical resolution expresses its support for the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action and welcomes the consensus report of the first biennial meeting of states held in NY from July 7-11, 2003. Expressing support for initiatives to mobilise resources and expertise to further implementation of the Programme of Action, it decides to convene a two-week UN Conference to review progress on this some time in June/July 2006, in New York (OP1), as well as a two-week PrepCom in January 2006 and subsequent sessions if necessary (OP2). It also decides to convene a second biennial meeting of states in accordance with the Programme of Action in 2005 (OP3) and establish an open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable states "to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons", requesting assistance and services from the UN OP8-10). The Secretary General is further requested to hold "broad-based consultations" with a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental experts and agencies on "further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons..."(OP11)

First Committee

UNGA:

First Committee comments: This resolution was the subject of intensive consultations and significant revisions, which removed the specificity attached to the dates for the 2006 meetings in January and June-July and added a paragraph containing the decision to convene a further meeting of states in 2005.

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UNGA 58/ (L.16/Rev.1)
National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual Use Goods and Technology

Introduced by the Netherlands

This resolution, which builds on the Netherlands' traditional role in supporting the UN Conventional Arms Register, invites states to enact or improve their national legislation, regulations or procedures to control more effectively the transfer of arms, military equipment, dual use goods and technology, and encourages them to provide information on these to the UN on a voluntary basis.

First Committee, October 30: consensus

UNGA

First Committee comments: Cuba stated that although it had joined consensus because it agreed that multilateral efforts needed to be complemented by national measures, it opposed selective export control groups, regarding these as an obstacle to developing a nondiscriminatory regime. Cuba stressed that strict international controls could be guaranteed only within the context of legally binding treaties, negotiated and applied multilaterally.

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UNGA 58/ (L.43)
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction [Mine Ban Treaty]

Introduced by Thailand with the co-sponsorship of a wide cross-group of over 100 states

Now in its fifth year, this resolution welcomes the entry intro force of the Mine Ban Treaty, with 141 states parties, and calls on all other states to accede without delay and undertake the full and effective implementation of the treaty. It renews its call for states and other relevant parties to work together to remove and destroy anti-personnel mines throughout the world, help mine victims in all necessary ways, and undertake mine risk education programmes. It invites and encourages "all interested states, the United Nations, other relevant international organisation or institutions, regional organisations the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relevant non-governmental organizations" to participate in the programme of intersessional work established at the first meeting and developed at subsequent meetings. It requests UN assistance for the Convention's first review conference in Nairobi, to be held November 29 to December 3, 2004.

First Committee, October 30: 143-0-19

UNGA:

First Committee comments: In explaining their abstentions, several states argued that while they shared the resolution's concerns regarding anti-personnel landmines (APL), their "legitimate security needs" and long land borders prevented them from acceding to the Treaty. They then sought to push the issue off into other fora, such as the CD or the CCW. India, for example, said that it would support CD work on a ban on mine transfers, and offered a contradictory approach, with a nondiscriminatory, phased process that would reflect differentiated security interests. Cuba objected that the treaty and resolution did not recognise "legitimate self defence", but said it supported banning certain kinds of non-detectable mines, so as to protect civilians. The Republic of Korea referred to its long land-border and said the treaty was therefore inconsistent with its security needs but said it would support other APL-related initiatives and measures, including the CCW. Burma (Myanmar) wanted the CD to address the issue. Pakistan also said it supported the CCW initiatives, stressing that landmines were part of its "self-defence strategy", but that it was committed to responsible employment of APL and opposed their indiscriminate use. Likewise, Iran also made reference to its long land borders and complained that landmines had been used irresponsibly, but that the Ottawa treaty went "too far". Russia said it supported a step by step process but would be prepared to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty when conditions were provided for the actual implementation of all its provisions. Nepal and Singapore both said they had voted in favour of the resolution, but that their current situation precluded their acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.

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UNGA 58/ (L.46/Rev.1)
Promotion at the Regional Level in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of the United Nations Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects

Introduced by France with wide cross-group co-sponsorship

This new and controversial resolution underwent a substantial revision as a result of intensive consultations. It emphasises the importance of regional and subregional efforts and measures to support and complement the multilateral Programme of Action adopted in July 2001 to "prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons", with particular reference to the efforts of OSCE nations.

First Committee, November 3: consensus

UNGA

First Committee comments: Although the resolution achieved consensus, it provoked criticism from two distinct sides. One side, represented explained by South Africa after the resolution had been adopted, supported the substance but questioned the rationale behind singling out the work of the OSCE in this way. South Africa described some of the national and regional initiatives it had been working on, including a legally binding instrument on firearms, and argued that the "consensus based operational implementation" of the Programme of Action on SALW was the most appropriate framework for encompassing different activities such as these without prejudice to particular approaches. Cuba, more bluntly, saw no need to single out best practices developed by the OSCE and suggested that the resolution "duplicates and detracts". Others, including Egypt and India, made a point of commending the energetic and flexible consultations conducted by France, the resolution's prime mover, whose willingness to meet their concerns (illustrated by the revisions recognising regional particularities) enabled them to join the consensus.

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UNGA 58/ (L.50)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [CCW]

Introduced by Sweden with wide cross-group sponsorship

This routine resolution supports the CCW and its Protocols, covering non-detectable fragments (protocol I), restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices (protocol II), prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (protocol III), blinding laser weapons (protocol IV) etc, as well as the decision by the Second Review Conference in December 2001 to extend the scope of the CCW to include "armed conflicts of a non-international character", i.e. civil wars and intra-state uses. The resolution calls upon all states who remain outside the CCW to becomes parties as soon as possible and also be bound by the Protocols of the Convention. It supports continued work by the working group on explosive remnants of war (ERW), with a mandate to negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures, and additional work on "mines other than anti-personnel mines". Also requests the Secretary-General to render any necessary assistance as may be required for the meeting of CCW states parties on November 27-28, 2003, and for follow-up work, as decided by the Second Review Conference.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/ (L.51)
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them

Introduced by Mali and co-sponsored by African states and others

This now regular resolution emphasises the problems caused by small arms and light weapons (SALW) for security and development in Africa, most particularly in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion. It supports the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of SALW, encouraging the international community to support its implementation. It welcomes the progress made so far, including the 2000 Bamako Declaration on an African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the 2001 UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, the conclusion of the African Conference on the implementation of the Programme of Action in March 2002. The resolution invites the Secretary-General and states and organisations to provide assistance in curbing the proliferation and trafficking in SALW and collecting them.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

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Regional Disarmament and Security

UNGA 58/ (L.9)
Regional Disarmament

Introduced by Pakistan with co-sponsorship from Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

This routine resolution takes note of recent proposals for disarmament at both the regional and subregional levels and maintains the need for efforts to promote regional disarmament to incorporate the specific characteristics and requirements of each region. Asserts that efforts towards disarmament must be taken both regionally and globally and welcomes initiatives already taken. Purporting to support and encourage efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at various levels as well as easing regional tensions.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: This resolution is one of several for which Pakistan acts as principal sponsor. It is routinely adopted without a vote, but far from this being a reflection of its importance, consensus is a reward for the text remaining inoffensively general and bland. Nevertheless, it is largely viewed as part of Pakistan's ongoing rivalry with India, in which Pakistan promotes regional approaches as a way to undermine the international approaches that India favours.

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UNGA 58/ (L.10)
Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Sub-regional Levels

Introduced by Pakistan with co-sponsorship from Bangladesh, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Nepal, Peru, Spain, Ukraine, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Another customary resolution from Pakistan, with similar cosponsors to 2002, this stresses the special responsibility of "militarily significant" states "with larger military capabilities" in promoting conventional arms control and regional peace and security. The resolution requests the CD to consider developing principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements, and requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of member states on the subject.

First Committee, October 28: 158-1-1

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Another routine resolution stemming from South Asian rivalries and concerns, this one was too specific for India to go along with consensus. India, arguing that the resolution was too restrictive to reflect its security concerns, voted against, while Bhutan, a satellite of India, abstained. India held that consensus guidelines for disarmament relating to global security have existed since 1993, and said it was neither convinced of the productive value of calling on the CD to act in this area, nor persuaded by the rationale for the development of principles for regional arrangements.

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Confidence-Building Measures, Including Transparency in Armaments

UNGA 58/ (L.18/Rev.1)
Confidence-building Measures in the Regional and Sub-regional context

Introduced by Pakistan.

This new resolution from Pakistan, linking CBMs with regional concerns, builds on UN resolution 57/337 (July 3, 2003), entitled "Prevention of armed conflict", which calls for states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, including using the ICJ more effectively. It relates disarmament to development, commenting that resources released by disarmament could be devoted to economic and social development and the protection of the environment, and welcomes the peace processes "already initiated in regions to resolve their disputes through peaceful means bilaterally or through mediation by third parties, regional organisations or the UN", noting also that continuing regional disputes may endanger international peace and security and contribute to an arms race. In 9 OPs, the resolution calls for states to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in the settlement of disputes; it calls for dialogue, compliance with bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament agreements, and the promotion of bilateral and regional CBMs to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. Finally, the UN is requested to consult with states in the (unnamed) "regions concerned" to explore further CBM efforts in "regions of tension".

First Committee, November 4: 68-47-34

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Because this resolution was viewed by many as being more about regional rivalries in South Asia than about CBMs, the combined negative votes and abstentions outweighed the votes in favour. Nevertheless, it was adopted. India objected strongly to the resolution, arguing that CBMs were important but that this resolution used them as a "subterfuge" for other purposes and would "drag the UN Secretary General into an ambiguous role". Carefully insisting that its vote should not be construed as opposing CBMs or choosing sides in a regional dispute, the United States said it was necessary to vote no because "if the First Committee adopts this resolution it will vote onto our annual agenda another resolution whose underlying motive is to bring a bilateral dispute into the Committee." The US said the resolution was "deeply flawed", introduced concepts not relevant to CBMs and ran "contrary to the spirit of voluntary cooperation" that gave CBMs their power. Echoing the US, Italy on behalf of the EU and associated states, evoked the principles evolved by the UNDC in the last three years, and said the EU strongly supported CBMs, but voted no on this "unbalanced" resolution. Nigeria abstained because of OP5, which urged "the maintenance of military balance between states" in regions of tension. Brazil said it voted in favour because it supported the general objectives of the resolution, but noted that CBMs should not be imposed or monitored by actors other than those directly concerned. Kazakhstan abstained because of its regional situation but thanked Pakistan for its flexibility in consultations. Although India objected that this was a misuse of the rules "to score propaganda points", Pakistan was allowed to take the floor after these explanations of vote to make a 'general statement', which was mainly a justification of its own resolution. Ambassador Munir Akram, visiting the First Committee for the purpose, objected to some of the objections he had heard. He insisted that Pakistan had tabled the resolution with the best of intentions and with a desire to promote peace and security, and demanded that delegations should "look at the text and not at the sponsor". He then undermined his own assertion somewhat by relating many of the concepts in the resolution to Pakistan's concerns about India.

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UNGA 58/ (L.32)
Objective Information on Military Matters, including Transparency of Military Expenditures

Introduced by Germany with a large group of cross-group co-sponsors, including France, Russia, UK and US.

This resolution, offered biannually in recent years, is aimed at strengthening and broadening participation in the UN system for standardised reporting on military expenditure, as first established in UNGA 35/142B (December 12, 1980) and reinforced in subsequent resolutions. In 7 OPs, it calls on states to report annually by April 30, on their military expenditures and requests the UN to continue with and augment various procedures and practices related to promoting standardised reporting on military expenditure.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/ (L.45)
Transparency in Armaments (TIA)

Introduced by the Netherlands with the wide co-sponsorship of a cross-group of over 100 states

This regular resolution emphasises the need for an enhanced level of transparency in armaments and welcomes the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the UN Register on Conventional Arms. In 10 OPs, it promotes universal participation and the provision of additional information on procurement from national production and military holdings. In OP2, the subject of a vote, it endorses the UN Secretary-General's report and recommendations ensuing from the consensus report of the 2003 group of governmental experts. In OP3, also voted on separately, it agrees to adapt the scope of the Register in conformity with the recommendations in the UN Secretary-General's 2003 report; in OP4 it calls for universal participation, referring again to the UN Secretary-General's 2003 report, and in OP8 it requests the UN Secretary-General to implement the recommendations in the 2003 report.

First Committee, October 28: Separate votes were taken on all references to the 2003 Report.

OP2: 138-0-22

OP3 plus reference to the 2003 report in OP4 plus OP8: 138-0-22

OP4 as a whole: 137-0-22

Whole resolution: 140-0-23

UNGA whole resolution:

First Committee comments: Traditionally opposed by Arab states on the grounds that this TIA resolution does not cover transparency for weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, the votes were this year requested by Cuba, on the grounds that the experts group was too limited to be representative of member states. Instead of endorsing the 2003 report, Cuba complained that the sponsors had not accepted its suggestion that the resolution should merely take note of the report and call for further consultations on its recommendations. Moreover, Cuba, like several other abstainers, including Syria, speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, Iran, Algeria and Burma (Myanmar) argued that the inclusion in the register of sophisticated conventional weapons, WMD and especially nuclear weapons, would have made the register "a better balanced and more comprehensive instrument". Egypt said it supported the principle of TIA and commended the Netherlands for its transparency and outreach, but abstained because the resolution addressed peripheral, not core issues. Israel, which voted in favour, complained that the explanations of some abstainers had contained "baseless allegations against Israel's security policy and its alleged capabilities" by countries that were themselves "unwilling to subject their own arms transfers to any transparency measure". Israel argued that participating in the Register was "an important step in the right direction" but said that "only when regional transparency measures can be agreed upon between Middle Eastern countries will it be possible to improve and develop the global Register" in a subtantial way. Israel especially welcomed the inclusion of MANPADs, which terrorists have attempted to use against civilian aircraft.

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L.48 (DECISION)
Verification in all its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification

Introduced by Canada.

This draft decision placed the issue of verification onto the agenda of the 59th GA, for consideration in 2004.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/ (L.54)
Regional Confidence-building Measures: Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

Introduced by

This resolution supports the work of the Standing Advisory Committee and promotes CBMs at regional and subregional levels to ease tensions and conflicts and further peace, stability and sustainable development in Central Africa. It supports the establishment of a network of parliamentarians and the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa, and requests voluntary funding from governmental and nongovernmental organisations to provide assistance and implementation of the programme of work.

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Disarmament Machinery

UNGA 58/96 (L.5)
Report of the Conference on Disarmament

Introduced by Japan (as current President of the CD)

This resolution reaffirms the role of the CD as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community" and, in much stronger terms than usually employed in these routine resolutions, takes note of "significant contributions" to promote substantive discussions, supports the work of the current and incoming CD Presidents to find a way out of the long deadlock, and strongly urges the CD to commence substantive work in 2004.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Though there had been some tough negotiations in the early stages of this resolution, particularly with Austria, which initially tabled a much more hard hitting resolution urging CD members "to do their utmost to overcome outstanding differences", there were no comments when the resolution was adopted without a vote.

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UNGA 58/ (L.7)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin American and the Caribbean

Introduced by Costa Rica on behalf of states in the region

This routine resolution once again expresses its support for the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Lima, Peru and related developments and work.

First Committee, October 29: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/91 (L.13)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African states

This routine resolution makes note of the widespread support for the revitalisation of the African Regional Centre and appeals to states, international governmental organisations, NGOs and Foundations to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen its programmes and activities. It calls for cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, and emphasises the importance of its work in promoting the consistent implementation of the 2003 Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW.

First Committee, October 28: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/ (L.21)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

Introduced by Nepal with co-sponsorship from states in the region

This routine resolution again welcomes the report of the Secretary-General regarding the continuing validity of the Regional Centre's mandate and welcomes the idea of the possible creation of an educational and training programme for peace and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, including locating its headquarters in Kathmandu, although that has still not been put into effect. The resolution underlines the importance of the Kathmandu process and, as in other resolutions dealing with Regional Centres, appeals to member states, international governmental and nongovernmental organisations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to support the work of the Regional Centre. It also urges the Secretary-General to ensure "the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement."

First Committee, October 29: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/87 (L.28)
United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf on NAM

Recognises the importance of the regional context in progress towards peace and disarmament, in particular the role of education, and the need to revitalise the three Regional Centres in Nepal, Peru and Togo. Calls upon the support of member states as well as NGOs and the UN. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support - within existing resources - to these three centres.

First Committee, October 30: consensus

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/95 (L.20)
Report of the Disarmament Commission

Introduced by Nepal

Despite the discussions on reform of disarmament machinery, this routine resolution remained little changed from past years and, as in past years, received consensus, though it was clear that a growing number of states are questioning its role and effectiveness. The resolution, as always, reaffirms the importance of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and its mandate, dating back more than 20 years. It also reaffirms the importance of "enhancing the dialogue and cooperation" among this body, the First Committee and the CD, and requests the UNDC to meet for not more than three weeks during 2004.

First Committee, October 29: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: In similar statements, the United States and Italy (on behalf of the EU and many aligned states) said they had joined consensus because of the potential contribution that could be made by the UNDC, but expressed disappointment that this year it had failed to reach agreement on its two important topics (nuclear disarmament and practical CBMs on conventional arms). They urged it to be more focussed, constructive and cooperative and to identify relevant issues to address over its next 3 year cycle. Canada called for the UNDC's revitalisation, saying that "properly constituted, the UNDC could make a valuable contribution" such as elaboration of verification principles.

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L.61 DECISION
Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [UNSSOD IV]

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM

This decision takes note of the Report of the Open-ended Working Group in 2003 to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It requests states to continue consultations on this and decides to include the issue on next year's agenda.

First Committee, November 5: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: After trying hard (but in vain) to win consensus for a resolution on this subject (L.25), Malaysia, on behalf of the NAM, withdrew the resolution and submitted a draft decision on the final day. The withdrawn resolution, echoing its predecessors since 1994, had expressed the conviction that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament "would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilise the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons."

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UNGA 58/ (L.15/Rev.1)
Enhancing the Contribution of the First Committee to the Maintenance of International Peace and Security

Introduced by the United States

This new resolution is an attempt by the United States, with the support from the EU and others, to steer the debate over reform of the UN machinery, with application in this case to the First Committee. The first draft was considerably more blunt in framing the context within which reform was to be considered: "grave concern at the emergence of new threats to international peace and security in the post-September 11, 2001 period" (PP1) and argued that a review "of the focus, priorities and mode of operation of the First Committee could enhance its ability to address these new threats more effectively".(PP3) Following intensive consultation, the resolution was revised to express grave concern "over both existing threats to international peace and security and new threats that have become manifest in the post-September 11, 2001 period"(rev PP1) and argues that "the improvement of the methods of work of the First Committee would complement and facilitate the broader effort to revitalise the General Assembly".(rev PP3) To ensure that the debate on reform begun at this First Committee session does not fade away, the resolution requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of member states on the issue "of improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee, to prepare a report compiling and organising the views... on appropriate options" and submit it for consideration in 2004. The first draft had actually called for the Secretary-General to recommend options, but some delegations were concerned that this would involve the Secretary General in a more active, policy role than generally accepted.

First Committee, November 6: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Several states, notably Italy, on behalf of the EU and associated states, which co-sponsored the revised resolution, emphasised the importance of keeping First Committee work "constantly under review" in order to rationalise it and "keep abreast of the security challenges that need to be addressed". Others, particularly NAM countries, joined consensus, but raised reservations about the US approach. Iran, for example, said it joined consensus hoping the resolution would help revitalise the Committee, but reaffirmed NAM opposition to dealing with these issues piecemeal. Objecting to the characterisation of the major threats in terms of terrorism, Iran argued that vertical proliferation was one of the "most dangerous threats to international peace and security". Cuba was critical of the resolution's linking the need for reform to the date of a terrorist crime (September 11th). Cuba called for reforms that would enable the UN to implement the Millennium Declaration, including nuclear disarmament, and raised concerns about the role of nuclear weapons in policy, and the need to halt the deployment and development of new lethal conventional weapons and prevent the weaponization of outer space. Pakistan also expressed scepticism about how the resolution had been framed, noting other grave threats, such as the "growing corrosion" of the concept of multilateralism, the "insidious concept" of pre-emptive military strikes, and the "occupation of foreign lands", and questioning how reform would further the cause of nuclear disarmament. Also reflecting NAM concerns that disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, should not be ignored in the rush to reform, Gabon welcomed the initiative but pointedly hoped it would "contribute to making strides in disarmament". Several, including Brazil, India and Côte d'Ivoire hailed the initiative and commended the US on its willingness to consult and listen, but stressed that enhancing First Committee efficiency should not be viewed in isolation. India warned against hanging "all our problems, difficulties, or frustrations" on the issue of reform and characterised the resolution as a "platform" for much-needed discussion and for furthering the Committee's work.

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Other Disarmament Measures

UNGA 58/ (L.3)
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security

Introduced by the Russian Federation

This resolution, first introduced in 1998, primarily to highlight concerns provoked by US plans for missile defence, notes that scientific and technological developments can have dual-use, civilian and military applications, and expresses concern regarding the abuse of information resources and technologies in ways that may "adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of states to the detriment of their security". Calling on member states to consider these threats, the resolution this year requests the establishment in 2004 of a study by governmental experts to examine "relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems".

First Committee:

UNGA:

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UNGA 58/ (L.24)
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM

This periodic resolution, last submitted in 2001, supports the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and argues that the participation of all permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean "would greatly facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue to advance peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region".

First Committee, October 29: 110-3-42

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The NAM voted in favour, the United States, Britain and France voted against, and the abstainers mainly comprised a bloc of NATO/EU aligned states.

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UNGA 58/ (L.27)
Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Control

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM

In its ninth year, this resolution emphasises the need to observe environmental norms in both the negotiation and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements. It explicitly refers to "the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons". It calls for unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral measures to ensure that environmental and sustainable development considerations are taken into account in relation to scientific and technological progress applied to international security, disarmament and related spheres, and invites states to inform the Secretary-General of measures they have adopted in this regard.

First Committee, November 3: 156-1-4

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The United States which has previously abstained on this resolution, this year voted against. Arguing that the US itself "operates under stringent domestic oversight", its negative vote was to underscore its belief that there was no direct relationship between environmental norms and disarmament and that environmental concerns should not be allowed to overload arms control negotiations. Britain, France, Israel and Micronesia abstained.

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L.29 (DECISION)
Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf on the NAM

Instead of the traditional resolution, this draft decision merely places the issue of the UN General Assembly's agenda in 2004.

First Committee, October 29: 157-1-2

First Committee comments: The United States voted against, while Israel and France abstained. The US reiterated its well-known belief that disarmament and development are two distinct issues. Since the US did not participate in the 1987 conference on Disarmament and Development, it did not regard itself as bound by any of its decisions.

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UNGA 58/ (L.33)
Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament

Introduced by India with co-sponsorship of some thirty NAM states

This routine resolution highlights both the civilian and military potential of scientific and technological developments and stresses the importance of encouraging civilian applications. Though it acknowledges the role of dual-use items in the development and upgrading of weapons of mass destruction, the resolution mainly reflects the concerns of a number of NAM states regarding export control regimes with emphasis on a perceived threat by a self-selected cartel of developed states to the peaceful development rights of others. Declares that the benefits of advances in the civilian sphere should be available to all and urges member states to undertake multilateral negotiations towards this end, with the encouragement of the relevant UN bodies.

First Committee, October 29: 94-47-18

UNGA:

First Committee comments: As in previous years, most NAM states voted in favour, while states aligned with the Western caucus opposed, objecting that the resolution runs counter to the international system of export controls, in which many of them participate.

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UNGA 58/ (L.35)
Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduced by India and co-sponsored by several NAM states and France

Building on a resolution entitled Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, first tabled in 2002, this resolution calls on all states to support international efforts and to undertake and strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. It also encourages cooperation among member states and relevant regional and international organisations to help strengthen national capacities. It urges states to inform the UN "on a voluntary basis" of measures taken, and requests the Secretary-General to compile a report on these and seek states' views of further measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of WMD.

First Committee, October 29: consensus

UNGA: consensus

First Committee comments: Pakistan said it joined consensus because it agreed that it was important to prevent terrorists acquiring WMD, but stressed that the nature and complexity of the threat required multilateral responses and that the surest way to prevent terrorist acquisition was through the complete elimination of these weapons, including nuclear weapons. Likewise, Brazil said that the resolution's adoption by consensus showed the importance and urgency of the problem, but insisted that the best way to prevent terrorists acquiring WMD, especially nuclear weapons, was to ensure the total elimination of such weapons, which was why Brazil and others devoted so much energy to promoting disarmament measures. Referring to a growing awareness of this problem, Israel congratulated India on its initiative and also welcomed initiatives by UNIDIR and some CD members to hold meetings on this subject in Geneva. Referring to "suicide terrorism" by those opposed to peace and coexistence as being "strategic", Israel said the link between terrorism and proliferation was very dangerous, and the danger was doubled when states supported terrorists. Quoting President Putin's remarks that the spread of WMD and their acquisition by terrorists was the most dangerous problem facing the world, Russia called for universalisation of the NPT regime and international instruments of verification, and said responsibility for dealing with these issues should rest with the UN Security Council as well as the UN General Assembly. The United States commended this resolution for sending a "positive sign" of the First Committee's willingness to deal constructively with the "urgent threat that WMD could fall into the hands of terrorists, the world's most dangerous people." In accordance with A/58/208 and its additions, the US urged states to share information on measures to combat terrorism and terrorist acquisition of WMD.

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Related Matters of Disarmament and International Security

L.17 DECISION
Consolidation of Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measures

Introduced by Germany and others

To set an example for others not to table the same resolutions every year, Germany this year sponsored a draft decision to put this issue - which relates to the implementation of practical measures to disarm warmongers of small arms and light weapons - onto the First Committee's agenda next year and consider it biennially in the future.

First Committee, October 29: consensus

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International Security

UNGA 58/ (L.26/Rev.1)
Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM

Following on from similar resolutions in 2001 and 2002, this resolution, though refraining from naming names, reflects serious international concerns about the Bush Administration's undermining of multilateral arms control, and emphasises the centrality of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. While recognising "the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament", it expresses concern at the "continuous erosion of multilateralism" in arms regulation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and characterises multilateralism as "the core principle" in disarmament and non-proliferation concerns, negotiations and norm-building. It underlines the importance of preserving existing agreements, calls on states to renew and fulfil their commitments to multilateral cooperation. In its most controversial paragraph, OP6, it requests the states parties to relevant instruments on WMD "to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation..." and "to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified noncompliance against one another to resolve their concerns". It also requests the Secretary General to seek states views and report back next year.

First Committee, November 5: 104-10-44

UNGA:

First Committee comments: The NAM of course voted in favour of their resolution, while most others opposed or abstained. Stressing its fervent support for multilateralism, Canada complained that the resolution offered "an overly rigid, restrictive and harmful interpretation" that would be counterproductive. Italy also stressed the commitment of the EU and associated states to multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation, referring to the EU's approach to uphold multilateral treaties and agreements and support multilateral institutions. Both stressed that multilateralism was a core principle but not the (only) core or fundamental principle in disarmament and nonproliferation, as suggested by the resolution. The position of those who could not support the resolution was neatly summed up by Canada: "shared security is the sum of many parts: multilateral, plurilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral measures". Australia said it didn't agree there was an "erosion of multilateralism", while sharing with Switzerland and others the view that the resolution failed to acknowledge the legitimate role of other approaches.

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L.30 DECISION
Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

Introduced by Malaysia on behalf of the NAM

This decision to put this issue on the agenda in 2005 was adopted by consensus, but amidst some confusion. The United States said it had earlier conveyed its desire for a vote to the Secretariat, and so was caught off guard and responded too slowly to prevent the gavel coming down on an unwanted consensus.

First Committee, October 29: without a vote (consensus challenged by the US)

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UNGA 58/ (L.42)
Strengthening of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Introduced by Algeria and co-sponsored by most of the states in the Mediterranean region and Europe

As in previous years, the resolution refers to the "indivisible character" of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean states created benefits in the form of economic and social development. It also asserts that the prospects for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation would be enhanced by positive developments in Europe, the Maghreb and the Middle East. In 9 OPs, it stresses continuing efforts by Mediterranean and European countries to eliminate causes of regional tension and adhere to all the multilateral legal instruments relating to disarmament and nonproliferation, promote genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, including participating in the UN Register of Conventional Arms and in standardised reporting of military expenditures. It encourages Mediterranean and European states to further strengthen their cooperation in combating terrorism, crime, illicit arms transfers and drug production, consumption and trafficking, and suchlike activities that pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region. It also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the means to strengthen security and cooperation in the region.

First Committee, October 29: consensus

UNGA:

First Committee comments: Though accepting consensus, certain key riparian states, including Israel, Syria and Libya, were conspicuous by their absence from the list of co-sponsors.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.