United Nations (UN)

UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security: 1999 General Debate

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General Debate of the First Committee, 11-20 October 1999

Note: the Committee Chair is Raimundo Gonzalez of Chile.

Algeria (Abdallah Baali): "Convinced of the need to establish a new model for international relations, African leaders had decided at their thirty-fifth summit to give special emphasis to disarmament issues, with a view to reaching concrete decisions that would improve the security situation in Africa and possibly pave the way for the rest of the international community... His delegation had noted the seriousness accorded the problem of small arms and light weapons by African leaders, whose constituents had been exposed to them directly. Those weapons had posed real threats to their stability and security. A decision on the proliferation, circulation and illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons had been adopted at the summit, as an expression of the determination of Africans to deal resolutely with that threatening scourge.

Regions that did not produce such arms had nonetheless faced the ravaging scope of the phenomenon... Reducing the flow of those weapons called for coordinated action, including among the producer countries and especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, whose exports amounted to 85 per cent of the world market. The international conference on illicit trafficking represented the ideal opportunity for serious-minded consideration of the issue and, he hoped, the adoption of concrete measures. In order to ensure the success of that important conference, an agenda must be prepared in detail and agreement should be reached on the venue. United Nations Headquarters in New York was the most appropriate for the conference itself, as well as the preparatory committee meetings leading up to it. The report of the group of governmental experts on small arms was a useful basis for discussions, which, along with the conference itself, should be presided over by a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

While specific attention should be given to conventional arms…the international community could not shirk the priorities that it had defined in 1978, namely that negotiations in good faith should be pursued in the area of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, a complete programme was adopted at that special disarmament session with a timetable for the gradual reduction of those weapons and of their delivery systems, aimed at their total elimination. Three decades later, the progress had not met the expectations of the international community or of those traumatized by nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Furthermore…the serious developments in South Asia and the emergence of nuclear deterrence doctrines had renewed concerns and increased apprehension. Similarly, the lack of implementation by the political powers towards implementation of article VI of the NPT was not reassuring. Moreover, the attitude and inflexibility of some States and nuclear Powers, observed during the Preparatory Committee meetings of the NPT Review Conference, did not augur well. The nuclear Powers should, pursuant to article VI of the NPT, commit themselves in good faith to carry out negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. In that spirit, the proposal of the Group of 21 countries in the Conference on Disarmament to create a special committee to establish a timetable for the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons deserved serious consideration. …

In the Mediterranean region, Algeria had always endeavoured to establish an area of peace, security and prosperity. It was logical, therefore, that such commitments be extended to the region of the Middle East, where only Israel had refused to join the NPT and submit its installations to IAEA control. It was essential that all States in the region finally and unequivocally advocate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That appeal had also applied to South Asia, where the arms race between two neighbours was of great concern." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Andorra (Joan Forber-Rovira): "Andorra was one of the first examples of a demilitarized territory in Europe, formed in 1278 out of a pact of peace that required all castles to be destroyed. That measure might seem simple now, but the philosophy it carried could still be applied in the current situation, where many countries were still spending large amounts to build up their arsenals." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Argentina (Fernando Enrique Petrella): "[I]t was both odd and contradictory that just when it seemed that the NPT was on track, serious threats had emerged, increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation… [Argentina] believed that renouncing all nuclear arms and arms of mass destruction constituted the highest priority. … [Argentina] was watching the debate currently taking place in the United States concerning ratification of the CTBT, since it reflected the sensitivities and political challenges posed by the disarmament process. His country would continue to promote a conference on the destruction of fissile material for weapons purposes, as well as efforts to control the excess accumulation of conventional weapons, in particular small arms. He fully supported the international conference on the illicit traffic in small weapons to be held not later than 2001… [Argentina] ratified the Ottawa Convention this year, and hoped to extend its status to the whole hemisphere." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Armenia (Movses Abellan): "[Armenia] welcomed adoption of the Ottawa Convention. However, only one of four of its neighbours had signed the Convention, while the other three did not seem ready to do so. That reality left his country without an option, impeding unilateral accession to the Convention, although his Government had no doubts that the ban on landmines must become universal. His Government would welcome the assistance of international organizations and individual States in training Armenian experts, who would then disseminate information among the population of mined areas." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Australia (Les Luck): "Recently, the international non-proliferation norms and disarmament aspirations had been confronted by a number of challenges... The immediate consequence had been a heightened risk to both the regional and international security environment and a fuelling of regional arms competition and proliferation pressures. That troubling picture was an indication that much remained to be done to constrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster long- standing disarmament goals, including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Those challenges had underscored the value of the existing security system, by which countries were expected to address their security needs with the lowest practical level of armaments and, most importantly, without acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. It was also a reminder of unfinished business, namely the priorities identified in the principles and objectives of the NPT. …

[T]he nuclear testing in South Asia last year had underlined the continuing need to bring the CTBT into force. All those who had not yet signed or ratified that Treaty should do so without delay. His country was deeply disappointed about the decision of the United States Senate to vote down United States ratification of the Treaty. The United States Government should continue its efforts to build support for the Treaty in order to enable its early ratification and encourage other countries among the required 44 to ratify it, thereby enabling its entry into force. The Vienna Conference last week had underscored the determination of States "ratifiers" and signatories to work towards an early entry into force. Another clear priority was the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the nuclear field, both those treaties were 'crying out' for attention, as both could bring early security benefits to all Member States. …

The value of the NPT had been clearly reflected in its near universal adherence. Its universality had remained an essential objective of his country, which called again on those States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Fresh concerns about the need for ballistic missile defences and the debate about implications for the international security system, including the ABM Treaty, were relevant to the collective endeavours. Those principally involved should negotiate, in good faith, their respective security concerns and ensure that those issues did not delay progress in other established areas. …

[Australia] was committed to the establishment of a 'robust' compliance regime that would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. To ensure the adoption of that protocol in 2000, it was essential to build upon the momentum achieved during the last session of the ad hoc group, with the introduction of a range of substantive new proposals, including by the Non-Aligned Movement. The positive steps taken by the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and by the OPCW in implementing the Treaty and consolidating its verifiable, legally-binding norms were welcome. Implementation of that Convention had demonstrated the strength added to a disarmament and arms control instrument through a verification machinery. If the Convention were to succeed in its goal of ridding the world of chemical weapons, however, those countries which had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention must do so." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Bahrain (Bibi al-Aloui): "[I]t was essential to put an end to the nuclear nightmare and that negotiations to put an end to weapons of mass destruction should have the full priority of the international community. … [Bahrain] called for the establishment of rules and regulations for the circulation of small arms and fully supported all international efforts to curb the flow of such weapons. The report of the Panel of Experts contained recommendations that would support the conference on the issue, to be held no later than 2001… [Bahrain] regretted that no consensus had been reached on the objectives and agenda of a fourth special session on disarmament. Such a session was the appropriate framework for disarmament issues. Her country also viewed the building of nuclear-weapon-free zones as important steps in disarmament. They aided in confidence-building and helped to safeguard the stability of a region, enabling the financing of many development projects. Israel was the only country in the region not to support the building of a zone of peace in the Middle East." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Bangladesh (Anwarul Karim Chowdhury): "[T]he cap on nuclear proliferation remained unprotected, and there were suggestions that the number of threshold States could increase. The controversy over vertical proliferation had also been accentuated by subcritical tests. … In the field of conventional arms, attention had remained focused on transparency... The open sale and easy availability of small arms was a matter of serious concern. It was the abundant and ready supply of easy-to-use tools of conflict and weapons of death and disability that was responsible for an estimated 90 per cent of all conflict-related deaths and injuries, of which 80 per cent were women and children. The illicit international trafficking and transfer of small arms and their accumulation in many countries constituted a serious threat to their populations and to regional security. The problem had been exacerbated by the absence of global norms for reducing the accumulation, transfer and trafficking. The convening of an international conference next year would be an important step towards the urgent goal of building a global consensus on the issue. … Bangladesh had been the first to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention, which it ratified in April 1997. That action would have little meaning, however, unless the major States that possessed chemical weapons also joined the Convention. …

[Bangladesh] attached considerable importance to the activities of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. Those should be given sufficient resources to enable them to actively promote dialogue on disarmament issues in a regional and subregional context. Regarding the Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific, it was disappointing that, despite repeated requests, the Centre was operating from New York, rather than from Kathmandu. Surprisingly, the Secretary-General's report on the Centre did not report any positive indication about moving the Centre to Kathmandu. He sought information from the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs on the funding required to operate the Centre at Kathmandu and asked whether the funding was the only obstacle towards its establishment in the region." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Belarus (Sergei Martinov): "[T]he process of international disarmament was rapidly approaching its critical point. New approaches and solutions were needed. A draft resolution would be submitted at the current session by his country aimed at preventing the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The goal of the resolution was to maintain an international action, if such would be required. He hoped the resolution would be adopted without a vote and would become another modest element of the 'preventative. disarmament trend. … [Belarus] called for a strict and full compliance with the ABM Treaty by all parties through preserving its substance and without undermining or revising its basic provisions. The actual deployment of national anti-ballistic missile systems would torpedo all the efforts made earlier by the international community in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, undermine the START process, as well as create conditions for the escalation of an arms race in new spheres. His delegation, with the delegations of China and the Russian Federation, had tabled a draft resolution concerning preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty. … [Belarus] considered the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a positive step, which was why his country had presented an initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. He was convinced that its realization would become a clear priority for the nations of the region in the first half of the twenty-first century." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Benin (Samuel Amehou): "The nuclear Powers needed to take more responsibility towards bringing about the elimination of such weapons. … Only concerted international action would curb the proliferation of small weapons... [Benin] supported the international conference to be held in Geneva no later than 2001, believing that it would serve as a fresh start to combating the small weapons threat. It attached great importance to the United Nations regional centres as cornerstones in the architecture of regional security." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Brazil (Gelson Fonseca): "[T]ogether with other members of the new agenda coalition, the level of support the initiative had gathered since it was launched in June 1998 encouraged his country. The motivating force behind the new agenda formulation was the pursuit of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The new agenda countries believed it was imperative to speed up the pace of negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. … [Brazil] continued to welcome efforts towards expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and that it would once again present a draft resolution on the 'Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas Free of Nuclear Weapons'. The proposal received 154 votes in the last General Assembly, a sign of support of a large majority of Member States to the consolidation and expansion of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones… [Brazil] was also extremely concerned that the Disarmament Commission had failed to reach consensus on the question of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. A carefully prepared special session would enable the international community to make an inventory of what had been achieved and lay the foundations for future work." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Burma/Myanmar (Mya Than): "1999 had been a frustrating year for arms control and disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament was locked in an impasse and was unable to agree on even a programme of work. The third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference was unable to make any recommendations on substantive matters. Even the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treat (CTBT) had been called into question. Those difficulties were not due to procedural matters, but were rooted in substantive issues. It was disconcerting to note, for example, that the nuclear-weapon States were now apparently placing greater emphasis and reliance on nuclear weapons. It was also regrettable that some nuclear-weapon States were still reluctant to engage in a serious dialogue on nuclear disarmament in a multilateral context. … The nuclear-weapon States must wake up from their 'nuclear slumber' and do what was necessary to undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament.

Meanwhile…international support for nuclear disarmament had been gaining momentum. The report of the Tokyo Forum, which outlined a range of important practical measures of nuclear disarmament, was welcome. As an ardent advocate of nuclear disarmament, his country had been tabling a resolution on nuclear disarmament at the annual sessions of the General Assembly since 1995. That resolution had introduced the concept of the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in addition to the bilateral negotiations and the possible future plurilateral negotiations. His delegation, together with the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other co-sponsors, was tabling a follow-up text on nuclear disarmament in the current session. …

[Burma reiterated its] call to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament to commence multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of those weapons. All member States of the Conference were urged to show maximum flexibility and find a compromise solution to establish, on a priority basis, that ad hoc committee. It was disappointing that, once again, it had been unable to meet the urgent need to re-establish an ad hoc committee on a ban of fissile material for weapons purposes. Although the prevailing circumstances might impede negotiations, a start should at least be made on that issue without further delay.

The CTBT was a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament… Without the CTBT, 'the floodgates for nuclear proliferation will be open'. For that reason, it was incumbent upon everyone to ensure its early entry into force under universal and strict adherence. Now, even the matter of its entry into force was in question. Regrettably, the ratification process had been delayed in some nuclear-weapon States. In fact, those countries should lead the way for others to join the Treaty. The issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was another crucial issue... It was, therefore, incumbent on all the States parties to the NPT to create such international legal instrument on security assurances, both negative and positive, for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, at the earliest possible date.

At the dawn of the next millennium, it was necessary to lay down a new set of principles, objectives and priorities for arms control and disarmament for the first decade of the next century and beyond, he said. The international community would have two great opportunities to do so in the near future: the 2000 NPT Review Conference; and the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was crucial that such principles, objectives and priorities be substantive in nature and constitute a distinctive advancement over the indefinite extension in 1995 of the NPT." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Canada (Christopher Westdal): "States might survive nuclear war, in a manner of speaking, but many human beings would not. … The Committee's job was about survival itself, from which 'we can't duck'. Many were too young to remember what it was like before the stakes got that high, before the stopwatch started. Beware of banalities like 'nuclear science cannot be unlearned' and 'nuclear weapons cannot be un-invented'. There was passive abdication in them. … [T]he said the most important bilateral negotiations were those between the United States and the Russian Federation. … [Canada] had welcomed the joint statement made by their leaders in June that they had remained dedicated to strengthening strategic stability and international security; that they had recognized the fundamental importance of the ABM Treaty; that they were getting START III talks going even before START II ratifications; and that the agreed START I reductions would be achieved earlier than scheduled. Strategic nuclear weapons, however, were not by any means the only nuclear threat. There were many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in the combined arsenals of Russia and the United States. Russia's reliance on those weapons, deepened by deteriorating conventional forces, was of particular concern.

Another step forward was the CTBT, which was a more effective obstacle to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons than all previous disarmament treaties... It was up to everyone to advance the gains of the last 30 years, and it was deeply disturbing to see that the country that had spearheaded many of those gains by championing the cause had now 'retreated from the battle' to bring the landmark CTBT into force… [Canada] very much regretted the United States Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT. He hoped that that decision would be reconsidered at an early date. …

[T]he next obvious step was to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Pending the conclusion of those negotiations, his Government had promoted an immediate and universal moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. His Government had remained deeply worried about the implications of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan last year. Those tests had been a great setback and had remained deeply disturbing. … Further, the tests might lead some nuclear-weapon-capable countries that had renounced weapons to question that decision. Clearly, an arms race could retard further progress towards global disarmament. … [Canada] was one of 16 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was currently adapting to the current, altered and dynamic security needs of its members. As part of that adaptation, the Summit of NATO leaders in Washington, D.C. last April had taken two vital steps forward. First, they had recognized that international arms control and disarmament arrangements had contributed to alliance security and that alliance members should work together to further advance those arrangements. Second, they had also acknowledged the diminished salience of nuclear weapons and agreed that the alliance would consider options for confidence- and security-building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

Although adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention was widespread…problem areas remained. Of greatest concern was the Middle East, where Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were not yet States parties. … The Biological Weapons Convention had not yet included verification provisions, and as the experience with Iraq had shown, advances in biotechnology and the spread of knowledge made biological weapons capability more readily achievable by an increasing number of countries. Many technologies were used legitimately in peaceful research. Clearly, new measures to verify the prohibition of those weapons were urgently required. It was odd that those who had been most vocal on the need for all conventions to be verifiable had been blocking efforts to bring that about.

Five years ago…the landmines issue had languished in the Conference on Disarmament; now 135 countries had foresworn the use of anti-personnel mines, including all but two of the countries of the Americas, most of Europe and Africa, and much of Asia. Eighty-seven countries had ratified the Ottawa Convention, and the number of mine victims in some of the world's most severely affected countries had been declining. The once-flourishing trade in anti-personnel mines had all but vanished. There were fewer than 10 mine-producing countries in the world that did not support a comprehensive moratorium, or a de facto ban, on the export of those weapons. Further, since 1996, when the Ottawa process had begun, 20 countries had destroyed more than 14 million stockpiled mines, which would never claim a life or limb again. Despite such encouraging achievements, since the Convention's entry into force in March 1999, anti-personnel landmines had been used in Kosovo and Angola, and major Powers - the United States, Russia and China - had yet to sign the Convention. Those were urged to do so, and the international community was encouraged to devote more resources to demining efforts.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of all casualties in current armed conflict were civilians, there was still a huge and eagerly supplied market for small arms and light weapons... Protecting civilians was literally impossible without stemming the flow of such arms. That required comprehensive and systematic efforts to find new ways to contend with that growing threat. The small arms conference in 2001 must take a comprehensive approach, tackling the issue of proliferation in all its aspects - arms control, law enforcement and peace-building. … [Canada] had shared the international community's desire to protect current economic and security benefits from the use of outer space, but it wanted to void its weaponization and the new, costly arms race that would result. It had actively promoted the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament to address those issues, and it had proposed that negotiations for a convention for the non-weaponization of outer space be the objective. It was time to preserve outer space as a sanctuary, an environment that was weapon-free." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Chile (Juan Larrain): "[I]t was essential for the First Committee to restore shattered concepts in international security, including a total prohibition of anti-personnel landmines, protection of civilians in conflicts, and prohibitions on small arms. … Chile…supported the aims of the new agenda coalition, which accurately reflected the realities of the nuclear disarmament debate. The goals on non-proliferation must be strengthened. When Chile acceded to the NPT in 1985, it did so with the understanding that all countries would commit to nuclear disarmament - not that a small group of States had the right to possess nuclear weapons, while the large majority of States did not. The International Court of Justice had provided a solid doctrinal base that should not be ignored. The Court established a link between disarmament and humanitarian law. Members of the international community had a binding obligation to maintain peace and security. Any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited… [Chile] viewed the Court as having established a vital conceptual framework, based on confidence, rather than threat of conflict.

Also of great importance was the need to regulate international transport of radioactive waste and nuclear fuel... [Chile] supported any initiative aimed at raising international standards to ensure such regulation, taking into account IAEA rules concerning such shipments, including contingency plans in case of accident. He also welcomed the reactivation of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America, which should help build a new climate through confidence-building measures." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

China (Shen Guofang): "[S]ince the last General Assembly session, the international situation had undergone profound and complex changes. The Cold War mentality was still present, coupled with new developments in hegemonism and power politics, thus, making the world even less stable. In Europe, he said, the only military bloc left over from the cold war, under its 'new strategic concept', had bypassed the Security Council and bombed, with the world's most powerful and sophisticated military machinery, the weak sovereign State - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - thereby turning the Balkan region into a testing ground for its new strategy. In Asia, certain countries were rapidly pressing ahead with their joint theatre missile-defence development programme in a bid to further strengthen their military alliance in the region, which should have died out with the end of the Cold War. In North America, the vigorous and accelerated pursuit of the so-called missile-defence programme had confronted the ABM Treaty with grave challenges. Those negative developments had worsened the international security environment and constituted an obstacle to the sound development of the international arms control and disarmament process. …

[T]he old security concept based on military alliance and arms build- ups would not resolve any problem. His country did not favour any attempts to seek, under certain excuses, military strength that went beyond one's legitimate self-defence needs. Likewise, it was against any attempt to unilaterally seek an absolute security advantage for one country or country bloc by limiting and weakening other countries, under the pretext of arms reduction and non-proliferation. In order to promote disarmament, prevent an arms race and safeguard international security, it was imperative that a new security concept be established, consistent with the changed international situation. As a guideline for a new security concept, countries should recall the statement made by China's President in the General Assembly last month.

Although the elimination of nuclear weapons was the common global aspiration, the nuclear disarmament process between the United States and the Russian Federation was now 'bogged down' in a stalemate, following the achievement of certain temporary progress... That was coupled with new nuclear tests after the conclusion of the CTBT. Such developments clearly indicated that the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear proliferation would remain a formidable task for the international community for some time to come. The next nuclear disarmament step was for those countries that possessed the largest nuclear arsenals in the world to drastically reduce those arsenals and refrain from improving the quality and development of nuclear weapons. Also imperative was the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty to cap the quantity of nuclear weapons. … [T]he non-proliferation of those weapons should be ensured through the NPT. An international legal instrument should be negotiated on the unconditional no-first use of nuclear weapons, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as a comprehensive prohibition on the use of those weapons. Ultimately, the international community should conclude a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, in order to genuinely achieve the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Reaching that goal required the maintenance of global strategic stability and the safeguarding of the security interests of all countries.

The vigorous development and proliferation of advanced missile defence systems would obviously not contribute to international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation… On the contrary, those would only 'poison the atmosphere' and breed risks for a more advanced arms race. The comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be the ultimate goal of the international community. The elimination of those weapons would lead to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of long-range missiles, thus, also eliminating the missile threat. … [China's] nuclear weapons were purely for self-defence, and had not constituted a threat to anyone. Moreover, China's extremely limited number of nuclear weapons had been placed under strict control, thereby removing the risk of an accidental launch. An overall international environment of peace, security, stability and trust was imperative in any discussion of the transparency of nuclear arsenals and in de-alerting those weapons... Such measures, therefore, should be linked with nuclear disarmament negotiations. Presently, there was a very wide gap among nuclear-weapon States in terms of their nuclear strength. A certain country was pursuing its nuclear-deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, while vigorously developing its missile defence systems, to the detriment of the strategic balance. That country also 'wantonly' resorted to or threatened to use force in international relations. Under such circumstances, it was both premature and unfair to indiscriminately call for the adoption of transparency measures on the nuclear front. …

[China] had always attached importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Of particular concern were the latest developments on that front. A certain country had tried hard to block the establishment of the ad hoc committee on an outer space arms race in the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, it had pressed rapidly ahead in pursuing its outer space and missile-defence programmes in an attempt to seek military advantage on the ground through dominating and controlling outer space. The developments in the vigorous pursuit of missile-defence systems since the beginning of the year was most disturbing. The global community was confronted with the danger of the weaponization of outer space and the repudiation of the ABM Treaty. … The relevant resolution adopted by the current General Assembly should continue to urge the Conference to re-establish the ad hoc committee at an early date next year and immediately begin its substantive work in order to reverse the negative developments concerning an outer space arms race and the development of missile defence. The current session should also take measures to preserve the integrity and validity of the ABM Treaty." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Colombia (Jose Renato Salazar): "The international community had lost at least two clear opportunities to rid itself of the weapons of terror... The first was in 1945, after their first use and after witnessing their terrible effect. The second opportunity was at the end of the Cold War. How many more opportunities must be lost before becoming fully aware of the irrationality of those weapons? … [Colombia] attached much importance to the convening of an international conference on small arms, and it had welcomed the recommendations of the Panel of Experts on Small Arms, particularly on the objectives and scope of the conference. It was time to set a specific date and venue for the conference, as well as to define an agenda, scope and expected outcome. …

[T]he nuclear tests in South Asia had indeed challenged the non-proliferation regime. Unless the international community could show some true nuclear disarmament progress, it risked a setback in the advances associated with the NPT regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That goal required a deeper commitment by the nuclear-weapon States. Concerning a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, it was important to take advantage of the work achieved so far by the Disarmament Commission and to press for a consensus that would allow the session to be convened in the near future. Such a session would enable the world community to consider the consequences of the continued modernization of weapons and technological advances for military purposes." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Costa Rica (Bernd Niehaus): "[T]he $191 billion squandered on the armed forces of developing countries would be better spent on health; the $22 billion spent on arms transfers to the developing world would be better spent on education. There was a positive relationship between disarmament and development. Measures were needed to combat arms transfers that undermined national or regional security and development. Arms producers must exercise effective control over their exports, as well as over the illegal traffic in weapons. Broadening the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms had his country's support. … [Costa Rica] had also advocated a ban on the transfer of material and military personnel, financial and logistical support to those States whose security forces had been engaged in human rights violations. Such a ban should also be extended to those States which had not extended a minimum human rights guarantee to its people. Moreover, arms exports should be prohibited to those countries that had not declared their imports to the United Nations, or that had not signed the main instruments on human rights, international humanitarian law or disarmament. Such measures should be incorporated into an international agreement, binding on all States. In addition…all States should adopt measures to control and restrict the use, possession, and transfer of all types of small arms, as well as measures to collect and destroy those weapons. Costa Rica supported an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms in 2001. It also endorsed the Ottawa Convention and had appealed to all States to ratify it as soon as possible. The international community must continue to support mine-clearance activities.

In the field of nuclear disarmament…his country had been concerned about the nuclear testing in South Asia. In that context, it had strongly appealed to those countries not yet party to the NPT to immediately cease nuclear weapons development and, as soon as possible, to unconditionally adhere to that universal instrument. Similarly, all countries that had not yet signed the CTBT should do so without delay. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular, had a special obligation to ratify or sign the CTBT and, thus, demonstrate their leadership. Their ratification was indispensable if a new arms race was to be avoided. The entry into force of the CTBT was an urgent step towards guaranteeing the security of all humankind. As such, his country had supported the appeal made last week in Vienna." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Croatia (Ana Marija Besker): "[Croatia] recognized the promising disarmament achievements of the first half of the decade, but recalled that last year the First Committee took action on 48 draft resolutions -- and almost none were pursued with any productive effect. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was a blatant case in point. … [Croatia] fully supported the Secretary-General in his appeal for better prevention in strategies and disarmament, especially in regard to small arms and light weapons... [Croatia] also concurred with the Tokyo Forum conclusion that there was an urgent need for concerted action and a 'realistic dialogue', so that recent setbacks could be reversed." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Czech Republic (Alexandre Slaby): "[P]rompt steps were needed to overcome stagnation in the negotiations on treaties promoting nuclear non-proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States must resume a constructive approach to those talks. Efforts should focus on achieving clear, practical and realistic measures in nuclear disarmament in the next millennium. His Government hoped for a push forward on the START series. Also, fissile material cut-off negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament would greatly contribute to speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament in all its fields. The ad hoc group on the fissile material treaty should be re-established during a very early stage of the 2000 session of the Conference. … [T]here were still many countries that had not yet signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and efforts aimed at the universality of the Convention must be supported. His Government attached great importance to an early and successful result of negotiations on the verification protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention. … [The Czech Republic] welcomed the enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament by another five countries, but was of the opinion that the membership of the Conference could not be denied to other countries sincerely wishing and able to participate in its work. The interest of countries striving for active involvement in the process of disarmament, including the Czech Republic, should be met." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Dominican Republic (Cristina Aguiar): "[E]ach region's uniqueness defined the threats to its security. Thus, a genuine risk to some might be quite insignificant to others. Those non-military concerns and threats, therefore, required a different approach from the one contained in traditional security doctrines. Among the challenges faced today were those emanating from the production and distribution of every type of weapons which would not be used in the absence of the tension and distrust that arose from extreme poverty. Undoubtedly, island States felt more vulnerable than others to negative factors, such as transnational crime, natural disasters or environmental change. With the economies of many Caribbean countries based on one or two basic commodities, any change in the price of an export product or the suspension of some tariff could produce a considerable economic imbalance.

Although it might seem unorthodox to talk about economic or natural disasters in the First Committee…the occurrence of natural situations that threatened the survival of a people constituted a national security threat. For those nations, that type of threat was decisive in terms of their existence as independent States. A new paradigm of international security should be defined. Those countries, however, were not drifting away from the traditional concerns of the Committee, namely to bring about the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It was also important to control the very dangerous light or small weapons and anti-personnel mines. Since many small island States lived off agriculture, fisheries and tourism, their fragile ecosystems were a key factor in their development. They were, therefore, very concerned about the tremendous threat of the transport of nuclear waste in the Caribbean. Strengthening control mechanisms to protect against any unexpected occurrences related to shipping had become even more urgent." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Ecuador (Emilio Izquierdo): "Particularly worthy of mention was the success, although partial, of the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee on the NPT, which had made it possible to advance some very high levels of discussion on the issue. Also noteworthy was the success of the Disarmament Commission in adopting guidelines regarding conventional weapons control and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Commission had made a significant contribution by adopting a range of specific recommendations within the framework of peace-building, disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation. It was with sense of great responsibility that Ecuador had assumed membership in that body. … The illicit traffic and stockpiling of small arms constituted a great scourge confronting society, since the victims were nearly all civilians. Statistics on the trade of those weapons were alarming, and Ecuador fully supported the conference on illicit trade of small arms and light weapons." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Egypt (Ahmed Aboulgheit): "[T]he high priority accorded nuclear disarmament and other weapons of mass destruction by the 1978 Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be observed until the international community decided otherwise. The convening of a fourth special session should not be held hostage to the consent of one party or another. …

The logical quest posed today was whether the matter required a further nuclear test to awaken the nuclear-weapon States from their 'cat nap'... Those countries had continued to turn a blind eye to the dangerous situation of their own creation. The thrust of the new agenda coalition to rid the world of nuclear weapons had already received much support. … [Egypt] regretted the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on its agenda, as well as the continued absence of a genuine political will among nuclear-weapon States to embark on serious multilateral negotiations leading to the full implementation of the article VI provisions of the NPT. …

Concerning the need for effective international arrangements to assure non- nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons…the Conference on Disarmament had a special role, but the Security Council also had a responsibility to discharge, namely, that of adequately safeguarding the security of Member States. In that respect, the Council should adopt a new resolution that would surpass the limited scope of prior resolutions on that subject. … [S]ince 1974 the First Committee and the General Assembly had been adopting annually a resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Such zones had spread worldwide and numerous new initiatives had been launched. Regrettably, the case in the Middle East had remained stagnant. Despite the severe frustration over that issue, his country remained committed to the earliest establishment of such a zone in the region and, indeed, of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. … Nonetheless…the reaction of the international community to that dangerous and provocative situation had remained mitigating, at best. Double standards in the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation were dangerous and counter-productive. The international community should clearly choose whether it was for or against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was no 'in between' and no room for hypocrisy. He failed to understand how certain countries could fail to condemn and take certain action against an outlaw State. The arguments employed by Israel to justify its erroneous position against adherence to the NPT and the safeguarding of its nuclear facilities were pretexts to shield its nuclear policies, programmes and ambitions. …

[Egypt] supported the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a confidence-building mechanism, not as an arms control instrument. The outcome of the latest meeting of the Panel of Governmental Experts was disappointing, in light of their failure to broaden the Register's scope and include additional categories of weapons of mass destruction. Transparency of those weapons was as important as the transparency of conventional arms; security was indivisible. The 2000 Panel of Governmental Experts should not be bound by a renewed vague assignment. Rather, it should be given a concrete mandate enabling them to overcome the blatant deficiencies crippling the normal functioning of the Register in its present form. The illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons should be accorded higher priority. As one of most heavily mined countries in the world… [Egypt] urged that international efforts aimed at curbing landmines should be accompanied by serious and concrete steps geared towards their clearance." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Ethiopia (Duri Mohamed): "[S]ince the First Committee had met last year, the United Nations disarmament machinery had not been fully utilized. No consensus had been reached on the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which could set goals for the future. Nuclear disarmament was one of the most important of the disarmament issues facing the international community, though some States continued to refuse to recognize it as such. … Another area of great concern for his country was the destabilizing accumulation and illicit spread of small arms and light weapons. Notwithstanding the legitimate right of States to acquire such weapons for national defence, their proliferation and illicit trafficking posed a significant threat to regional peace and security. The magnitude of those problems was particularly evident in Ethiopia's subregion, the Horn of Africa. … [Ethiopia] was pleased with the ongoing efforts of the international community to ban and eliminate landmines, which was a matter of great concern in the Horn of Africa, due to the irresponsible actions of those who had no respect for international norms. At present, more than 1 million landmines were planted by those forces in different parts of Ethiopia and the task of clearing them remained arduous and expensive. Substantial international assistance would be required." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

European Union (EU) and the Associated Countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Iceland (Markku Reimaa of Finland): "[T]he Union emphasized the importance of a full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention, including the deadlines laid down as to the destruction of anti-personnel mines, as well as assistance to the mine victims. The Union had carried out a number of démarches, underlining that the further production of anti-personnel mines could no longer be justified and urging mine-producing countries to strictly refrain from exporting those weapons. Another area of great concern…was the destabilizing spread of small arms and light weapons. The Union was of the view that the international conference on small arms, to be convened in the year 2001 at the latest, should be the main focal point in efforts to combat the problem of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of those weapons. …

The Union…called for a continuing commitment on the part of the international community in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. All the Union Member States on the list of 44 States whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force, including the two nuclear weapon States, France and the United Kingdom, have ratified the CTBT. The Union calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. One issue of particular concern for the Union is the lack of progress in the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that context, the Union calls again upon the Democratic People's Republic to adhere to the resolution adopted at the forty-third General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency…and to comply with its safeguard treaties." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Haiti (Bertrand Fils-Aime): "[T]he mentality of the Cold War still existed. Policies of nuclear deterrence and nuclear superiority maintained a 'balance of terror'. Authority was above all moral. How could States like India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be encouraged to ban nuclear testing under a non-proliferation regime that was so unequal? … [Haiti] fully subscribed to the statement of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), expressing concerns over the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. … [Haiti] was encouraged by Canadian and Swiss efforts towards 'marking' small weapons, and fully supported the convening of an international conference on small arms planned for 2001." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

India (Savitri Kunadi): "The failure of the international community to effectively address the threat posed by nuclear weapons over the past 50 years made it all the more necessary to redouble efforts for their elimination in the coming years. The instrument designed to deal with those weapons and promote global nuclear disarmament and genuine non-proliferation in all its aspects - the NPT - had proved to be ineffective. Genuine and long-lasting non- proliferation in all its aspects was difficult to measure and achieve. Global nuclear disarmament demanded that the international community look beyond the old framework and embrace a new security paradigm that could ensure international peace and security on the basis of equal and legitimate security for all. … [T]he non-discriminatory international conventions banning chemical and biological weapons had been based on a devaluation of the military utility of those weapons and on the belief that, rather than partial and discriminatory arms control, the interests of international security would be better served through the complete prohibition and elimination of those weapons. The delegitimization of nuclear weapons and their progressive reduction through a step-by-step process was the most credible way forward towards the elimination of those weapons. As an original State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, her country had shared the collective concern that some parties, despite voicing support for that Convention, had not provided full declarations to the OPCW, adversely affecting inspection schedules.

The initial promise of deep, continuous and irreversible reductions in strategic nuclear forces…appeared to be fading fast, she said. Those countries with the largest nuclear arsenals had the main responsibility for advancing the process of nuclear arms reductions... [India] hoped the agreements reached during the Cologne Summit would lead to an early revitalization of the bilateral process. The current stalemate in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations should not be taken as a disincentive for the other long-established nuclear-weapon States, each with substantial arsenals of their own, to undertake reductions in a multilateral framework.

Doctrines of first-use of nuclear weapons had been revalidated, even though the perceived threat that had given rise to those doctrines had long since disappeared… The only remaining military alliance with transcontinental dimensions had continued to assign nuclear weapons the highest priority, with several of its members - ostensibly non-nuclear-weapon States - permitting the peace-time deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories and giving war-time access to those very weapons, in violation of their treaty obligations. Further steps should build upon the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation, not only to begin, but to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. …

[T]here was no justification for thousands of nuclear weapons - maintained in a state of hair-trigger alert - posing the unacceptable risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons that could have catastrophic consequences for mankind. The international community was entitled, therefore, to clear commitments from all the nuclear-weapon States that the most important objective of their policies was to remove the danger of war and reduce the risk of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons, including through what had been referred to as the 'Y2K problem'. Her country's introduction of a new resolution on reducing nuclear danger had received widespread General Assembly support. It would reintroduce the text at the current session with the expectation that the international community would take necessary action, both individually and collectively, to reduce the risks posed by hair-trigger alert postures and related doctrines of use.

There was no dilution of India's commitment to the goal of global nuclear disarmament… India was the only nuclear-weapon State that believed that its security would be enhanced in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Thus, it had continued to press for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit forever the development, production, stockpiling, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and provide for the elimination of all existing weapons under international verification. … The Indian Government had already spelled out the main elements of its policy of minimum nuclear deterrence with the stated purpose of meeting the requirements of its democratic policy - of openness and transparency consistent with national security. That minimum deterrent posture…governed both the quantum, as well as the operational mode of its nuclear policy. That policy had been characterized by restraint - an essential confidence-building element owed by all nuclear-weapon States. The deployment posture, with a civilian command and control structure, would be governed by India's abiding commitments, voluntarily offered and unconditionally undertaken, for a no-first-use of nuclear weapons and a commitment of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Her country had already stated its willingness to strengthen that undertaking by entering into bilateral agreements on no-first-use or multilateral negotiations on a global no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

… [T]he Committee was aware of the circumstances leading to India standing aside from the CTBT in 1996. That decision had been governed by considerations, some of which had been addressed through the limited series of five underground nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998. Her country had announced, thereafter, a voluntary moratorium on further underground test explosions. The Government was committed to creating the widest possible consensus, which had required as an essential enabling element, a positive national environment. It also expected other countries to adhere to the CTBT without conditions. Recent developments had indicated, however, that the Treaty was complicated; among other things, it required a national consensus in the countries concerned, including in India.

The Conference on Disarmament in 1999 had been unable to address issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space... Technological developments, including in ballistic missile defences, could open new areas of competition, adding to pressures against the ABM Treaty. Her country shared the concerns expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement on 23 September regarding the negative implications of those developments and the further erosion of the international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. India supported the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on an appropriate instrument that would, as a first step, ensure the non-weaponization of space, while at the same time preserving the use of space for the full range of peaceful and developmental activities. … [I]t was disappointing that the deliberations in the 1999 Disarmament Commission on a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had failed. While her country remained committed to the convening of such a session, its convening was contingent upon a reaffirmation of priorities, including of nuclear disarmament. India could not be a party to attempts to overturn that consensus. Other initiatives, especially on the nuclear disarmament issue, would complement as well as contribute to the success of a fourth special session." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Indonesia (Makarim Wibisono): "Despite such notable developments as the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention and the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the global disarmament scene was dismal. The steady progress in eliminating nuclear arsenals had come to a virtual halt. ... Further compounding the situation were the ongoing plans for the weaponization of outer space and for missile defence, which were incompatible with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The continued intransigence of the nuclear-weapon States to initiate negotiations on nuclear and related issues had led to a virtual deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, which had not augured well for future disarmament endeavours. … The report of the Tokyo Forum had warned of continuing dangers posed by nuclear armaments and had projected its vision of resolving nuclear issues. It called for, among others, concrete steps to reduce nuclear dangers, to adopt nuclear transparency measures, to stop the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and end the hair-trigger alert status of thousands of nuclear weapons. It also called for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons and parallel reductions by the two leading military Powers to 1,000 deployed weapons, regardless of START II ratification, and the commencement of START III negotiations. … [R]ecent political, security and technological developments had rendered a nuclear-weapon-free world a 'realizable' goal, and the opportunity should be seized to take irreversible steps towards eliminating those weapons. As recent events had demonstrated, however, the non-proliferation regime could not be ensured in the absence of credible advancement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The often-repeated claims of sustained progress in nuclear disarmament were a distortion of the truth. As the Non-Aligned Movement had stated, there was no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals for the security of a handful of powerful nations. Neither could there be any justification for the insistence that nuclear weapons had provided unique security benefits. Countries could not continue to monopolize those weapons while pursuing the objective of non-proliferation. … The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States would uphold the demand for nuclear disarmament in a phased approach and within a time frame.

Significant differences had prevailed in the three meetings of the Preparatory Committee leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference... Clearly, its success would depend, to a large degree, on the ratification of the CTBT by all nuclear-weapon States and by those deemed nuclear-weapon capable. The countries which had taken the lead must now set an example by ratifying the CTBT. Progress would also depend upon the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty that would focus equally on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Progress on the objective set by the 1995 NPT Review Conference must be pursued in the context of an agenda to 'roll back' existing arsenals, in order to address related issues of past stockpiles and future production, verification mechanisms and the right of civilian applications, universality and non- discrimination. Above all, it would depend on the resumption of bilateral efforts and the initiation of multilateral negotiations for the total abolition of nuclear arms. Hence, it would be a testing time for the NPT, as it navigated unknown terrain." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Iran (Nejad Hosseinian): "A different agenda should be drafted based on the new realities. … [Iran] believed that convening the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a real necessity for updating the only charter of disarmament, which had been adopted back in 1978, a year clearly different from 2000. … A legally-binding verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention was now well developed... [Iran] hoped the protocol could be concluded in early 2000. Striking a balance between disarmament and technological cooperation aspects of the protocol was among the issues that deserved full consideration.

Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should been seen as the real top priority on the agenda... Disarmament should be pursued at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The Conference on Disarmament should be mandated to start at least some level of negotiations at its next session. Nuclear-weapon States should show more flexibility in allowing those negotiations to commence. … [T]he NPT 2000 Review Conference should agree on an updated declaration of principles and objectives, in addition to a substantive document that evaluated implementation of the Treaty. He requested the President of the Conference to start his consultations on outstanding key points in the Preparatory Committee. In addition, despite the recent setback for the CTBT in the United States, the international community should spare no effort to overcome that challenge and make every possible effort to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.

Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, was one of the main elements for the success of nuclear non-proliferation… Also, the development of missiles beyond necessary national defence could destabilize regional and international security. The missile issue was very complex and a comprehensive study needed to be carried out by a competent body." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Iraq (Saeed Hasan): "[W]hat had been achieved in disarmament was far less than what had been aspired to. Nuclear disarmament still eluded the world. The collapse of the socialist camp had given the United States a feeling of hegemony over the whole world. Among examples of the brute-force policy of the United States, aided by Britain, was the imposition of no-fly zones and the bombing of civilian targets in Iraq. Such use of force contradicted the United Nations Charter and posed a serious threat to international security. … [T]he United States and the United Kingdom had used more than 300 tons of depleted uranium bombs against both Iraq and Yugoslavia. In Iraq, that had led to an increase of cancer and genetic deformations in the civilian population. … [Iraq] called for a ban on the use of depleted uranium in weapons. …

[Iraq] was extremely concerned at the news of American intentions to deploy a new missile defence system that included the use of satellites for military purposes. That plan to militarize space contradicted United Nations resolutions and conventions and was additional evidence of the arrogance that would lead to the escalation of the arms race. Further, the field of verification had been dealt a strong blow in the current decade. Statements by United States officials and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) showed that the Commission had been used by the United States and Israel to spy on Iraq, and that became a pretext to resume air attacks against Iraq. The United Nations had not yet investigated that issue or taken any action to hold accountable those who used its name to undertake spying and undermine its reputation. … [T]he Arab region suffered an imbalance in strategic weapons. The Israeli entity acquired all sorts of weapons, including nuclear, and had the capacity to produce at least 250 nuclear warheads. That was a serious threat to the region." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Israel (Nimrod Barkran): "The increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with the inability of the international security and arms control regimes to meet the challenge of proliferation in the Middle East, had been alarming. … In the case of Iraq, that county had signed and ratified the NPT, signed a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA, and during the last eight years, had been under a most intrusive arms control and disarmament regime, he said. Yet, that had not prevented Iraq from maintaining its clandestine programmes for developing chemical, nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had remained a major threat to international peace and security. Indeed, it had directly threatened Israel with annihilation by chemical weapons, and had actually attacked Israel's civilian population with lethal missiles. … [T]he present political process, which had reflected a growing recognition of the futility of the use of force as a means to advance political goals, had not yet fundamentally and irreversibly changed the basic strategic setting or the general threat under which Israel had existed. … [Israel] firmly believed in the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also envisaged a zone free from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic weapons. Such a zone should be established by direct negotiations between States after those had recognized each other and had established full peaceful relations between them. It could not be established by those other than the parties themselves, nor could it be established in a situation where some of the States had maintained that they were in a state of war with another, and had refused, in principle, to maintain peaceful relations. Unlike other regions where nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established, in the Middle East there was a continuing threat against the very existence of one State in the region, namely, Israel, and that had directly affected the region's ability to establish such a zone. …

In considering ratification of the CTBT, he said his Government would consider the realization of Israel's sovereign equality in the work of the CTBTO and developments in the region, including the question of adherence by other States in the Middle East… [Israel] had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but the open declaration by some other countries that they had no intention of doing so would be considered when making a decision. On the question of landmines, while his county had wholeheartedly supported the ultimate goal of the Ottawa Convention, it had remained uniquely unable, at present, to stand behind the immediate total ban on landmines, in light of ongoing defensive operations against terrorists who attacked civilians and infiltrated its borders. In 1994, Israel had enacted a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, which it had renewed on a revolving three-year basis. It was also actively participating in the Mine Awareness Project launched by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Angola.2 (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Japan (Akira Hayasshi): "[D]irectly after the nuclear tests last year the Government of Japan organized the Tokyo Forum to discuss the ways and means of stopping trends in nuclear proliferation and of revitalizing nuclear disarmament efforts. The Forum conducted an in-depth analysis of the current international security environment and issued its report containing a number of concrete recommendations. While Japan recognized that all of those recommendations might not be readily accepted by some countries, it believed they outlined concrete and realistic steps for advancement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

If countries were not yet in a position to agree on the entire roadmap to our destination…they needed to agree on certain medium-term measures. It would be more realistic to negotiate the successive steps, while proceeding first with those within reach. Feasible in the near term, for instance, were the early entry into force of the CTBT, the early conclusion of the negotiations on the fissile material and progress in the START process. Regarding the NPT, the international community stood at a crossroads and did not have the luxury to allow the Review Conference in 2000 to fail. Everyone had to summon the political will to ensure the Conference would not be convened in vain.

The verification mechanism for biological weapons required the support of the industry concerned, he said. The mechanism needed to be efficient, as well as cost effective. In order to ensure that the negotiations were concluded before the next Review Conference in 2001, further efforts to bridge the differences were urgently required. In addition, bearing in mind the significance of the international conference on small arms, Japan would table a resolution again this year. Also, anti-personnel landmines were one of the most pressing global disarmament issues. Many important countries had not acceded to the two important legal instruments on anti-personnel mines - the Ottawa Convention and the amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It was essential to create a legal framework that could involve these countries while maintaining the global and total ban on anti-personnel mines as a goal.

The importance of regional efforts for peace and security could not be overstated… His Government paid particular attention to the activities of the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, and had pledged financial contributions to boost their activities. His Government also welcomed the recent announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on its restraint regarding a missile launch as a result of the bilateral consultation held in Berlin. That development would improve the security environment of the region." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Kazakhstan (Yerzhan Kazykhanov): "[Kazakhstan] was in favour of steady, step by step nuclear disarmament through fulfilment of the commitments by all States parties to the NPT. On the eve of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials remained tasks of paramount importance. The problem of providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be a major concern… Measures must be taken to legalize the so-called 'negative' security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States on the basis of Security Council resolution 984 (1995)… [A]rticle VII of the NPT and the decisions of the 1995 Conference on Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament had provided a solid legal basis for establishing new, internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones that would help strengthen peace and security at the global and region levels… [Kazakhstan] attached paramount importance to the preservation of peace and security in Central Asia and was keenly interested in progress towards implementing the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-fee zone there." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Kenya (Fares M. Kuindwa): "[N]umerous developments in 1999 had not augured well for international security. Chief among them had been the continued recourse to arms as a means of resolving conflict. In Africa, the ready availability of illicit small arms and light weapons continued to cause untold suffering and hardship. … [Kenya] looked forward to the conference on the illicit arms trade by 2001. It was also exploring the possibility of organizing a conference on the illicit arms circulating in its subregion. …

[T]he Conference on Disarmament had come to a complete standstill, arising from disagreements over how to address the issue of nuclear disarmament and of the prevention of an outer space arms race. Nuclear weapons posed the greatest singular danger to the entire spectrum of life on earth, but the reduction and eventual elimination of those weapons had yet to occur. … It had been nearly 30 years since the NPT came into force, and almost five years since the five nuclear-weapon States had renewed their commitments at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Yet, progress towards nuclear disarmament had been 'dismally slow'. The START II talks had stalled, owing to the failure of one party to ratify that Treaty. At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had recently reaffirmed its doctrine of 'nuclear sharing' with its non-nuclear-Power partners, in contravention of the NPT. That development had been followed by the release in one country of a draft nuclear doctrine aimed at the development of land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons. … The CTBT had yet to enter into force. While the efforts of the United States Government in seeking the ratification of the Treaty were appreciated, it was disquieting that the United States Senate had rejected ratification and put into serious jeopardy the very survival of the Treaty. In a nutshell, nuclear disarmament was in a state of disarray. The nuclear-weapon States, except one, did not seem to have the political will to seriously undertake nuclear disarmament in any forum. … In order to restore some balance in the disarmament agenda, it was time to lay the foundation for an eventual instrument outlawing the use of nuclear weapons and banning their production, with a view to their eventual elimination. The prevention of an arms race in outer space was vital. The rapid pace of technological development in both space and military science had increased the prospects of the weaponization of outer space. As every country had a "border" with outer space, each had a legitimate interest in its peaceful use." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

South Korea (Lee See-Young): "[A]t the twilight of the twentieth century, it was utterly frustrating to see that the generation that had invented and experimented with nuclear weapons had been unable to take any effective measures to control them. The NPT remained the first and only attempt to establish a global non-proliferation regime, but last year's nuclear testing in South Asia had dealt a serious blow to efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free world and undermined the credibility and integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Further, the continuing non-compliance with the NPT by some States parties had also damaged the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, there was growing concern over the limited progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in reducing those weapons. … [South Korea] joined others in expressing profound disappointment at the inability of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT. He sincerely hoped that the United States, which had led international efforts to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, would continue to play a leadership role by resolving the CTBT ratification issue as soon as possible.

Those States which remained outside the Chemical Weapons Convention, especially the major possessors of chemical weapons, should accede to the Convention at the earliest possible date… The recent rapid developments in biotechnology had made the prospect of biological weapons even more frightening. The important task of creating a verification regime of the Biological Weapons Convention should be tackled more constructively, in order to conclude negotiations for the Convention protocol before the fifth review conference. … [T]he proliferation of missiles as a means of the delivery of weapons of mass destruction had seriously undermined international peace and stability. The missile tests conducted in South Asia, the Middle East and North-East Asia had triggered an increased awareness, as well as concern, over the dangers of missile proliferation. In view of the absence of international norms regulating the proliferation of long-range missiles, his country agreed with the Secretary-General on the need for multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes and restraint in missile development. A step-by-step approach would be most practical, given the complexities inherent in that issue. As a beginning, an expert group to study all aspects of the missile issue could be created.

The international community had exerted strenuous efforts to bring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into full compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement... Unfortunately, the Democratic People's Republic had so far failed to cooperate fully with the IAEA in implementing that agreement. It was imperative that, as a State party to the NPT, the Democratic People's Republic implement the Safeguards Agreement fully and faithfully. The adoption, without a vote, of the resolution on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement two weeks ago bore witness to the repeated calls of the international community for full compliance by the Democratic People's Republic. … [T]he [1994] Geneva Agreed Framework was an important step forward in addressing the 'nuclear problem' of the Democratic People's Republic. His own Government had faithfully fulfilled its commitment to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization by playing a central role in the organization's project of constructing lightwater reactors in the Democratic People's Republic. It would continue to do so as long as the Democratic People's Republic lived up to the letter and spirit of the Agreed Framework." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Kuwait (Hisham al-Ghanim): "The United Nations Register for Conventional Arms was an excellent mechanism for countering mistrust and fostering confidence-building. Anti-personnel landmines were also of great concern, and the international community needed to look into the best means for their elimination. He urged all States to immediately ratify treaties and conventions that aimed at halting the production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. It was not enough to sign those treaties, without a sincere wish for their implementation. The goals of the NPT were shared by all Arab States... Only Israel refused to sign. … [Kuwait called for continued international pressure on Iraq to remove all its weapons of mass destruction, as well as release all prisoners of the Gulf War and restore plundered Kuwaiti property. Those steps would lead to more stability in the Gulf region. His country was also following the situation in South Asia with great concern. He called upon the two brotherly countries to resort to wisdom and avoid being plunged into an arms race." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Kyrgyzstan (Elmira Ibraimova): "[E]vents of the past year had highlighted the importance of the work of the First Committee. The 1996 opening for signature of the CTBT was one of the most striking steps forward in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Regretfully, however, the high expectations of three years ago had remained only partially fulfilled, and last week's rejection of the Treaty by the United States Senate had cast into doubt its future entry into force. In addition, Kyrgyzstan was greatly concerned that the development of a missile defence system by some States could lead to the advent of a new arms race. Another grave issue of concern for his country, terrorism, was also not confined by national borders... Militants trained in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, who had encroached into the southern region of his country, had been ejected in a cooperative effort with neighbouring countries. His Government called for stronger measures against international terrorism, and fully supported steps taken to restrain the illicit traffic in small arms. Also, his Government supported efforts towards the creation of a Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Naste Calovski): "[T]he repercussions of the Kosovo conflict had been huge on his country, and what was now important was the future development of the region. His country had been assured that the political commitments and promises would be honoured. Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) was essential, as was the implementation of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe adopted in Cologne, Germany. …

For non-nuclear States…the production, stockpiling and trade of conventional weapons were the priority preoccupations. There was a need for an international instrument that would regulate the production, stockpiling and trade of those weapons. An international conference on the matter should be well-prepared in advance. His country also supported all efforts towards the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. His Government was in favour of full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the reinforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention. The elimination of those weapons was an important part of the struggle against destructive forces, such as terrorists…

[H]is Government shared dissatisfaction with the results of the Conference on Disarmament. It was clear that nuclear States had no interest in negotiating with non-nuclear States. Realistically, that difference could not be breached at present. The Conference should deliberate on nuclear disarmament, but only on aspects where both nuclear and non-nuclear States agreed. The Conference should democratize its work and should abandon consensus. A qualified majority and procedural decisions should adopt negotiated legal instruments by a simple majority. The Conference should also abandon the practice of establishing too many committees and the nomination of so many rapportuers. Each agenda item should be examined at the meetings of the plenary. Expertise should be provided by the secretariat of the Conference, not by the member States of the Conference. A serious review of all aspects of the work of the Conference was necessary." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Malaysia (Hasmy Agam): "The prospect of a successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference…remained dim. The inability to agree on substantive issues reflected the chasm between the nuclear-weapon States and their allies and non-nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament. Malaysia was concerned that the legal obligations of article VI of the Treaty continued to be unfulfilled. As in previous years, Malaysia would again table a resolution to remind the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, of their obligation to take serious steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons once and for all. … [T]o facilitate the work of the Conference on Disarmament, its programme of work should be automatically renewed without having to seek a fresh mandate each year. If not for that procedure, the working group on fissile material cut-off treaty, established in late 1998, would have been reconstituted and engaged in serious negotiations. The Conference admitted five new members in the current year, including Malaysia. There were still 21 others waiting for admission, and they should be admitted without further delay." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Mexico (Antonio de Icaza): "Nearly seven years after its signing, START II had still not entered into force and, for the third consecutive year the Conference on Disarmament had achieved no results in substantive negotiations, he continued. The Preparatory Committee for the upcoming NPT Review Conference had failed to agree on substantive recommendations for the meeting next spring. Amid that background, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and Mexico met on 22 September to review the progress of their joint initiative: 'Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda'. They noted the complacency with respect to nuclear disarmament efforts and urged that such a posture must be overcome, mainly through an unequivocal commitment at the highest levels to the early and total elimination of nuclear arsenals. … [What was essential] was the demonstration by nuclear-weapon States of an unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a foreseeable period. Those countries must also put in place a series of measures to reduce the nuclear threat, such as: to de-alert and deactivate nuclear weapons; withdraw non-strategic nuclear weapons from the locations where they were currently deployed; and continue the process of steady and systematic reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Despite the NPT's extension for an indefinite period, the Treaty could not be considered a permanent framework for the existing impasse... Rather, the NPT was the framework of a dynamic process which pointed firmly towards the ultimate objective, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. His country had reserved the right to introduce, at the upcoming NPT Review Conference, a resolution on nuclear disarmament outlining a programme of action that provided for specific measures enabling the disarmament community to move towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. … [T]he growing trend towards the development and deployment in outer space of missile defence systems and the reports that substantial funds were being allocated in that regard had underscored the urgent need to adopt measures to prevent any attempts to utilize outer space for military purposes. The Assembly last year had adopted by consensus a resolution inviting the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a review of the mandate contained in its decision of 1992, with a view to reconstituting negotiations of a multilateral agreement to prevent an outer space arms race. …

The convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, no later than 2001, was an opportunity to take measures to prevent and reduce excessive accumulations of such weapons and their destabilizing effects. Concerning landmines, his Government reaffirmed its commitment towards making the [Ottawa] Convention…universal. …

[T]he aspirations of disarmament would be unattainable if a State or group of States maintained military supremacy and a readiness to use force to promote their interests. How could security - the condition in which States considered that they ran no risk of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion - be reconciled with strategic doctrines based on threats, the rebirth of archaic concepts of just wars and presumed rights of interference not recognized by international law?… The First Committee must seek to provide answers to those questions as the century drew to a close." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Moldova (Ion Botnaru): "[T]he principles and objectives set out in the NPT process had to be honoured. A priority task would be to carry out the forthcoming Review Conference of the NPT to be held in 2000, and to overcome the stagnation in negotiations of the relevant treaties. … [W]hile emphasizing the importance of ensuring universal adherence to all agreements related to eliminating weapons of mass destruction, it was also necessary to take into account the concerns expressed by a number of States with respect to the financial aspects implied by the ratification act. Full implementation of treaties was a costly endeavour and could constitute a heavy burden for some developing countries, as well as for a series of newly independent States confronted with difficult financial problems. It was necessary to analyse appropriate approaches to addressing those concerns, while not discouraging such States and not endangering the implementation process. … In the Transnistrian region of Moldova there were huge quantities of armaments belonging to foreign troops still stationed there, and registered cases of the leaking of armaments from those stocks to the separatist movements. It was very important, therefore, to take measures aimed at destroying non-transportable weapons and withdrawing foreign military arsenals." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Nepal (Ghanedra Basnet): "[R]ecent events were offering a formal challenge to disarmament. Last year's events of testing and the development of long-range missiles and development of missile defences have become worrisome. The strategic balance between the two States parties maintained by the current ABM Treaty of 1972 should be preserved. … [T]he recent joint statement issued by the five permanent members of the Security Council reiterating their commitment to article VI of the NPT was noteworthy. That commitment needed to be translated into action for salvaging the Treaty, at a time when it was under the pressure of ongoing tests of ballistic missiles. The issue of conventional weapons was no less important... [Nepal] hoped that organizational matters related to the convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all aspects would be decided at this year's session." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

New Zealand (Clive Wallace Pearson): "The nuclear non-proliferation norm had been challenged and, now, there was extremely worrying talk about the pursuit of a minimum credible nuclear deterrent policy in South Asia. Frustrating though the current situation might be…[New Zealand] did not believe that the world was about to enter some kind of disarmament meltdown. Prophesies like that were too often prone to become self-fulfilling. There was, however, no doubt that the pace of the global disarmament effort overall was faltering. … While New Zealand remained committed to the Conference [on Disarmament], the need to take a serious look at its working procedures, in particular its now anachronistic political group structures and ritualistic decision-making machinery, was overdue and compelling. He could not and would not accept the assertion that the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States should be excluded from contributing, in a constructive way, to the process of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons were multilateral in their reach and in their pernicious devastation." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Nicaragua (Mario H. Castellon Duarte): "The nuclear- weapon States had been very slow to dismantle their installations, although international tension had diminished. The lack of unanimity in ratifying the CTBT, as well as the weakening of the conventions on controlling other weapons of mass destruction, had increased insecurity. … [Nicaragua] favoured binding measures to insure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also supported initiatives to establish international mechanisms for a phased reduction of nuclear weapons, with a view to their prompt and comprehensive elimination. Indeed, their elimination should be the basic objective of the global community. Negotiations must commence, in good faith, to bring about nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective control… [Nicaragua] supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world. In that context, the recommendations of the Tokyo Forum were very positive. …

Small weapons were killing more people and causing more suffering than any other type of armaments. … Regional or international measures to contain the small arms problem would not be truly effective unless States also designed domestic controls on the production, sale and transfer of those weapons, he said. Domestic and international security required the political will of every State. At the end of Nicaragua's civil war, a tremendous number of small arms had remained with former combatants on both sides, causing much apprehension and provoking a great increase in the level of violence and criminality. With the help of the United Nations and other organizations, development projects were reintegrating most of the former combatants into civilian life. … [Nicaragua] was also aware of the suffering and death caused by anti- personnel mines. Many Nicaraguan farmers had wives and children who had either been killed or been disabled by the explosions of landmines. The entry into force of the Ottawa Convention was, thus, gratifying. Nicaragua had been the first country among the signatories to create a national demining commission and to implement a national plan to eliminate those weapons. Also, it had embarked on a programme to destroy its stockpiles and had eliminated a first batch of 5,000 units as part of a national demining programme to eliminate the mines buried throughout its territory during the armed conflict of the 1980s. The world movement towards disarmament had prompted his country to cut back its army. As a result, it had noted a substantial reduction in its military budget and had diverted those funds to social development projects." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Nigeria (W. O. Akinsanya): "A world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remained a legitimate expectation that would serve the security interests of all States. However, at a time when the developing countries were faced with the serious challenges of globalization, poverty and development, the world was still witnessing the pursuit of military doctrines and scientific research that resulted in new weapon systems and nuclear proliferation. That was unacceptable. … A number of concerns demanded immediate attention... The failure of the Conference on Disarmament was due to the lack of consensus on nuclear disarmament and outer space. Certain working procedures of the Conference were not suitable and needed to be reviewed, in order to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. …

[Nigeria's] priority remained crafting a new security and disarmament agenda for the next century. The current agenda was based on the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament of 1978. That document needed to be revisited in order for new strategies to be developed. …

The control of conventional weapons…called for concerted international action. Calling for control of those weapons, on the one hand, while pursuing an aggressive arms sales policy, on the other, was a disservice to the cause of peace… [Nigeria] was very interested in practical disarmament measures, such as the collection and destruction of small arms, and welcomed the decision to convene an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms not later than the year 2001. Nigeria also aligned itself with the total elimination of landmines and was committed to acceding to the Ottawa Convention as soon as possible." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Norway (Jorg Willy Bronebakk): "[N]uclear disarmament and non-proliferation continued to be a primary concern of Norway, whose ultimate goal remained complete nuclear disarmament. His country was prepared to enter into a dialogue with countries of the new agenda coalition and others to discuss ideas and means that might contribute to new momentum in that area. Several practical steps should be given priority.

The review process of the NPT needed to be revitalized... It was important to agree on a strategy that clearly defined the substance, direction and objectives of the process. Other forums should also be utilized for that purpose. All measures were important and needed to be viewed as mutually reinforcing. Norway, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands had submitted a proposal that the Conference of Disarmament should establish an ad hoc working group to study the ways and means of establishing information and views towards nuclear issues and policies. That would give the nuclear-weapons States an opportunity to supply information on both the results achieved through unilateral and bilateral initiatives and on their nuclear policies. …

[N]egotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons had, unfortunately, not yet commenced, and the Conference of Disarmament was responsible for getting these negotiations on track - a challenge that must be given top priority. … There would be merit in establishing voluntary measures that would increase transparency on military inventories of fissile material. Focusing on a ban on future production of fissile material, however, was not enough. A set of principles for dealing with weapons usable fissile material was needed. Such a norm should ensure irreversibility. In other words, none of those stocks should be returned to or diverted to weapon programmes. The stocks must be made secure from theft and sabotage, and the material must not be permitted to harm human health or the environment.

Norway was committed to completing the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention during the year 2000... It was also a matter of concern that a considerable number of signatories had yet to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, it was essential that effective implementation of the Ottawa Convention was insured. Mine-action projects should be integrated into overall plans for national reconstruction, and victim assistance should be regarded as an integral part of mine action and viewed in a broader context of national health plans and general disability issues. Solutions to the small arms problem could, at the current stage, probably best be found at the local, national and regional level. Thus, Norway strongly supported regional efforts, such as the moratorium and code of conduct adopted by the European Union." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Oman (Mohamed al-Hassan): "[I]n the Middle East, Isaraeli nuclear programmes remained a disturbing issue… On the question of small arms, Oman supported the convening of a conference in 2001, but preparations had to be thorough and take into account the views of many States." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

Pakistan (Munir Akram): "[D]uring the current decade wars and conflicts had proliferated. The progress made towards disarmament had been partial and was now in danger of being reversed. The reasons for that reversal were complex, but the increasing concentration of power following the Cold War, as well as the inevitable resistance to that asymmetry in strength, were major factors in the regression. In the past year, several negative developments had taken place. Mutual trust between some of the major Powers in the context of the Kosovo conflict had eroded. A 'new strategic doctrine' by the western alliance had been adopted, which had envisaged 'out of area' actions and the threat of nuclear weapons use, including against non-nuclear-weapon States. … [O]ne party to the START II Treaty had failed to ratify it and another had sought the amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which could revive the nuclear arms race between the major Powers. The announcement of a 'draft nuclear doctrine' by a 'new' nuclear Power, envisaging the operational deployment of a huge arsenal of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons could generate further nuclear and conventional arms escalation in South Asia and beyond. In addition, the CTBT had been rejected by the legislature of the Treaty's main sponsor. …

The present grossly discriminatory situation must be reversed, if human survival was to be ensured. Today, there were not five, but at least eight nuclear Powers and at least a dozen other States that could quickly develop nuclear weapons if they felt compelled to do so. The resistance of some nuclear Powers to allow negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament had compromised their political and moral credentials to promote non-proliferation. The Conference could undertake negotiations on several important aspects of nuclear disarmament, including a convention committing States to the early abolition of nuclear weapons and a programme for the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. … [I]t was equally important for the Conference on Disarmament to open negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1967 Treaty had declared that outer space 'shall be the province of all mankind'. That 'province' was now under threat of being transformed into yet another area for military competition. The ABM Treaty, which until now had had a crucial restraining effect on the otherwise 'irrational nuclear arms race' between the two nuclear super-Powers, now faced an uncertain future. Moreover, national missile defences and theater missile defences were planned in several sensitive regions of the world. The militarization of outer space would likely be perceived as aimed at global domination and, thus, could provoke new strategic rivalry among the major Powers. The emplacement of theater missile defence systems could provide one side with a quantum military advantage over potential adversaries. Those adversaries, in response, would likely enlarge and improve their nuclear delivery systems. Nuclear stability would be seriously eroded. …

[T]he endeavour for 25 years to promote a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia had been sadly subverted last year by his neighbour's nuclear tests and assumption of nuclear-weapon 'status'... [Pakistan] continued to support the creation of such a zone in various other parts of the world, and was prepared to extend appropriate assurances to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of various zones, such as in Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia. His country would support the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

Some difficult issues had remained in the negotiations to evolve a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention... Those could be addressed in focused deliberations and resolved through strict adherence to the rule of consensus. … [Pakistan] had been committed to act responsibly in relation to nuclear and other sensitive technologies and equipment, but it could not accept double standards of exclusive regimes that sought to apply rules without its participation or consent, or which sought to deny his country even the peaceful uses of the same technologies. The aim of preventing the spread of sensitive technologies should be promoted through transparent multilaterally agreed arrangements that conformed to international law.

A regional approach offered the most effective framework in which to successfully negotiate conventional arms control agreements... The adoption of principles for conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels by the Conference on Disarmament could contribute to specific negotiations for conventional arms control in various regions of the world. In addition, the Conference could take up other important facets of conventional arms issues, such as the question of new military technologies and their impact on international security and the global imbalance in possession of conventional arms and technologies between different groups of States. Clearly, small arms should be better controlled, but that should not detract from the more important need to resolve the underlying causes of conflict. Further, such control should not compromise the right of countries, especially the smaller ones, to exercise the right to self-defence, or the right of peoples struggling against foreign occupation for their legitimate right to self-determination. …

[Pakistan's] policies on disarmament were inevitably linked with its priority objective of promoting peace, security and stability in South Asia. It had not changed in its positive approach to the CTBT, but it had required an atmosphere 'free of coercion'. Sanctions and pressure were not only unacceptable, they were counter-productive. Their continuation did not convey a sense of equity or inspire confidence of cooperation. His country sought a relationship of peace, justice and dignity with India, as well as the genuine resolution of outstanding differences, including the Kashmir dispute, on the basis of Security Council resolutions. It was prepared for a resumption, without preconditions, of the structured dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. On 17 October, his country had announced a unilateral military de-escalation of its international borders with India and the initiation of the return of all of its forces moved to the border in the recent past. He hoped that confidence-building measures would be reciprocated. Such measures could be complemented by additional steps to build mutual trust and confidence.

The summary judgement from the Canadian delegate about the internal situation in Pakistan had revealed a naiveté and ignorance, if not arrogance... [I]f the Canadian Government was genuinely concerned about instability in South Asia, it would not have blithely ignored the announced plans for the operational deployment of nuclear weapons by Pakistan's neighbour. Historically, the Canadian Government could have prevented instability and proliferation in South Asia if it had heeded Pakistan's warnings not to sell the CIRRUS nuclear reactor to India without any safeguards. It was that Canadian action that had initiated proliferation in South Asia. He had hoped to see some acknowledgement of responsibility by the Canadian Government, but that was perhaps too much to hope for, when democracies transformed themselves into hypocrisies." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Philippines (Francisco S. Tatad): "[A]s the offspring of the nuclear age, the disarmament record was somewhat mixed. In the area of nuclear weapons, the record was replete with compromises that had always stopped short of the ultimate objectives. The disarmament community had sought to put a positive spin on those compromises by referring to them as 'small steps' towards the eventual and total elimination of nuclear weapons. Last week, the sorry situation had turned sorrier still. The rejection by the United States Senate of the CTBT was a major setback, even to the existing regime of compromise agreements. Far from being at a crossroads, the world might now be moving away from the road of nuclear disarmament. One thing was clear from the Senate debates: the United States was determined to keep not only a viable nuclear option, but above all a clear and overwhelming nuclear advantage. Even those who had fought nobly and valiantly for ratification had conceded that point. That was not the best way to pursue disarmament, or play a leading role in the process… [M]ost political and security analysts had agreed that five of the more critical flashpoints in the world today were in Asia - the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Indonesia and East Timor. Four of them had involved countries with nuclear weapons. His country was deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in his region and had reiterated its support of the call by the Non-Aligned Movement for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the aim of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to provide for their destruction. Despite its recent setback, the CTBT remained one of the cornerstones of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament… It was a compromise agreement and was far from entirely satisfactory, but it held the promise of providing a legal regime and a viable investment towards nuclear disarmament. For that reason, the Philippines had remained firmly committed to the Treaty and joined all others who had called for its universality. It was encouraging that, despite the rejection on Capitol Hill, the President of the United States had vowed to continue to fight for its ratification. Last week's defeat, though a major one, did not and should not represent the end or a weakening of resolve to fight for disarmament. To the contrary, it should challenge the world to move on with greater resolve, remembering that the cause of nuclear disarmament had suffered setbacks before. Currently, however, the START process was at a standstill, the NPT review process had been inconclusive, problems remained in relation to the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and tensions had remained high in South Asia…

[T]he Conference on Disarmament had chosen to ignore nuclear disarmament. Even discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty had bogged down. Indeed, the Conference had not done anything substantive in three years. That body could still make a serious contribution to disarmament, despite of that impasse, and he remained committed to it and joined others in calling for its universal membership. On nuclear disarmament, the world must not give in to complacency or defeat. The initiative of Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and Mexico towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and the need for a new agenda was timely and worthy of everyone's support, as it had broadened the choices and included countries from almost all the regional groups…

The proliferation of small arms and the use of landmines continued to be a high priority. For decades, his country had had to deal with illegal armed groups dedicated to violence and terror. It had seen first hand the death and destruction arising from the unrestricted availability of small arms and light weapons. Women and children were never spared in those conflicts and were often the primary victims. Many of those weapons came to the Philippines after being used in conflicts halfway around the world. Landmines were insidious instruments of death... [The Philippines] had signed and was now ratifying the Ottawa Convention. It was also preparing draft legislation to criminalize the possession, use, transfer, sale and production of anti-personnel landmines. The legislation would also penalize parties that transshipped landmines through the Philippines, and it would cover not only landmines, but also components that were clearly intended for that use." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Russia (Sergey V. Lavrov): "For more than a quarter of a century, the ABM Treaty had been the key element of strategic stability and the most important prerequisite for reducing strategic offensive weapons, he said. During its existence, the ABM Treaty had demonstrated its viability and effectiveness. Under the Treaty, mutual restraint of the parties in the sphere of ABM defence had halted the strategic offensive arms race, substantially reduced the offensive strategic arms and, now, in addition to that, maintained dialogue on a continuation of the process. As the Russian Federation had consistently stood for a reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals, it had faithfully observed its obligations in accordance with START I. It was important that START II and other related instruments be ratified by the Russian Federal Assembly, and that procedures necessary for their ratification be fulfilled by the United States Congress. … [T]he process of strategic arms reduction and limitation would have the most promising prospects under conditions of strategic stability. The Russian Federation was ready to hold talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons on the basis of basic elements defined during the meeting between its President and the United States President in Helsinki in March 1997, and confirmed in Cologne in June 1999. Within the framework of the future START III, the Russian Federation was ready to foresee a reduction of the overall threshold of up to 1,500 warheads - namely, to agree to a more substantial reduction of nuclear arms than had been foreseen in Helsinki. …

[A]ll those achievements and prospects were directly connected to the observance of the central element of the ABM Treaty - not to deploy an ABM system on the territory of either country and not to create a base for such a defence. Attempts to revise and infringe that central provision would, in fact, undermine the Treaty. In such a case, the observance of the START I and START II would become impossible. In fact, it would result in a collapse of the whole structure of the agreements on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The disarmament dialogue would actually return to the point of departure of the Cold War era. The system of international agreements in the sphere of non-proliferation and control over armaments would be threatened. Besides, new factors would appear capable of destabilizing the international situation, both at the global and regional levels. …

[Russia] was conscious of the danger of the spread and sophistication of missiles and missile technologies. His Government supported the efforts undertaken by many countries to strengthen the regime of missile non- proliferation. For its part, it had proposed the creation of a global system of control over the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, that would foresee, in particular, a regime of notification on the ballistic missile launches. Unfortunately, plans for deployment of a national ABM system could bring the opposite result, namely, to stimulate the creation and proliferation of more sophisticated missiles globally. Aware of such consequences, which were extremely negative for all countries, he said his country had called upon the General Assembly to take a stand in favour of preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty. His delegation, jointly with the delegations of Belarus and China, had distributed a clear and non-confrontational draft resolution (document A/C.1/54/L.1), which was based on the provisions of the ABM Treaty itself, and on joint statements made by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States on that subject. He counted on the broadest possible support of the text and invited co-sponsorships. …

[Russia] was against attempts to revise or dilute the NPT under any pretext, or cast doubt on the decision on its indefinite extension. The preparatory process of the NPT in preparation for the 2000 Review Conference should be directed towards strengthening the Treaty and assist in the implementation of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. It was also important to undertake joint steps to advance the entry into force of the CTBT. India and Pakistan should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and other countries whose participation was necessary for its entry into force should also accede to it.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world was welcome… [Russia] had recognized Mongolia's non-nuclear status, pursuant to bilateral agreements, and was ready to consider, together with other countries, the provision of corresponding security assurances to Mongolia. The initiatives aimed at establishing such zones in Central Asia, the Middle East and other regions, as well as the proposal related to a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe, deserved support. … The zones were an optimum way for States to receive legally binding security assurances. His country was also ready to consider the development of effective international arrangements on security assurances for non-nuclear NPT member States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and starting respective work in the Conference on Disarmament. …

It was natural…that the problem posed by the proliferation of small arms had occupied a central place on the agenda. The issue was an important and topical one, in which the United Nations should play the leading role. A global approach should be developed that harmonized States efforts in setting up a mechanism of international cooperation. As a first step, the focus should be to suppress illicit arms transfers, which were used to violate arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council. As such, his country supported the convening of an international conference on the illicit arms trade in 2001. His country also supported proposals to reconstitute the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Saudi Arabia (Abdulrahman al-Ahmed): "[T]he establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a result of the cooperation among countries towards creating a world free from weapons of mass destruction. Regrettably, the Middle East was not free from nuclear weapons because of Israel's refusal to create such a zone. … Saudi Arabia…supported transparency in armaments as one of the means that consolidated international peace and security. It believed that, for such transparency to succeed, there needed to be definite and clear principles that were balanced, total and non-discriminatory. The United Nations Register for Conventional Arms represented a first attempt by the international community to deal with transparency at such a level. However, more than half the Member States had declined to offer information to the Register. The fears of those States should be dealt within an effective manner that made the participation in the Register more international. An enlarged Register, which would include information on advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, might represent a more balanced and complete means to attract a larger number of participants." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Senegal (Ibra Deguene Ka): "His Government deplored the uncertain situation of the Disarmament Commission, which was entrenched in sterile considerations and suspicion of every proposal made. That important multilateral negotiating body was incapable of continuing negotiations on halting the production of fissile material for military purposes. … More attention must be paid to the proliferation and illicit traffic of those weapons, which were major obstacles to the democratic process, without which no development could be successful. Absolute priority needed to be given to combating the proliferation of those small weapons. Anti-personnel landmines were also a major concern, and efforts to support implementation of the Ottawa Convention towards demining and aid to victims must be redoubled." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Singapore (Kishore Mahbubani): "Simplistic logic may work well in academia, but in the real world mankind had come to accept the five nuclear Powers as an undeniable and irreversible fact of history. It was important and necessary to prevent proliferation, but the nuclear Powers in turn needed to retain the trust and confidence of the rest of mankind by behaving responsibly on all nuclear issues. Given the horrifying capability of weapons of mass destruction…it was surprising that so few non-governmental organizations and public personalities had vigorously pursued any campaign to wipe them from the face of the earth. Their preoccupation with landmines and small arms was understandable, but it was distressing to see disarmament advocates behaving like fashion designers, going with the flavour of the day and not looking at long-term needs.

Weapons in themselves did not ignite wars... In some cases they might actively prevent wars. Sometimes the international community helped defuse conflicts, but often it did not. Self-reliance in defence might yet be necessary for some time to come. It was, therefore, puzzling that so much of the international community's attention was taken by disarmament of small weapons. Most of mankind was still relatively poor. To deprive them of the basic means to defend themselves would be unfair. In the event of a crisis, they would be defenceless. Certainly the illicit trade in small arms should be terminated, but it would be folly to curtail the legal trade in small arms. That did not mean…that the international community should not persevere in disarmament work. Small gains made over the years were valuable and should be strengthened. It was a pity that last year only 66 countries out of 188 Member States submitted their returns to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. By contrast, over 100 Member States were addressing the Committee on Disarmament issues this year. The international community should work towards a more universal participation in the Register, before thinking of expanding it. Similarly, a useful verification regime had been established for chemical weapons. Each such regime contributed to greater compliance. Compliance, in turn, inspired trust." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

South Africa (Dumisani S. Kumalo): "[I]t must be conceded that the inability of multilateral forums and the international community to substantively address some of the most central issues of the day reflected a deepening crisis in international relations, non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. The nuclear tests in South Asia last year and the release of a draft nuclear doctrine in India this year should have been a wake-up call, especially to the nuclear- weapon States… [South Africa] was deeply concerned to see new or expanded rationales being offered for the use of nuclear weapons, which exacerbated the prospect of their indefinite possession and might lead others to develop similar rationales for acquiring them. Nuclear disarmament was a concern of the entire international community... A source of concern for South Africa was the continuing refusal to recognize that that was indeed the case. That refusal had led to the failure to reach accommodation in the Conference on Disarmament and the review process of the NPT. South Africa, together with its partners of the new agenda coalition, will again present a resolution for consideration by the First Committee, the objective of which would be to put forward a realistic agenda for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. He hoped delegations would seriously engage the substance of the resolution and not retreat into vague conceptual notions for reasons of political expediency, as had been the case with certain delegations last year. The notion that the future agenda could not be considered until the completion of the so-called present agenda would be an unconscionable waste of valuable time. The new agenda approach sought to form the basis for a common approach for the achievement of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons through existing unilateral and bilateral processes, as well as through complimentary and mutually reinforcing steps at the plurilateral and multilateral levels." (GA/DIS/3140, 11 October)

Sri Lanka (S. Palihkkara): "The nexus between the illicit arms trade and international criminal organizations…clearly pointed to the need to address the problem as a matter requiring specific international cooperative measures. The issue could no longer be treated as a law and order problem relegated to the limited capabilities and authority of national law enforcement bodies. The forces and technologies that drove the globalization process might be unwittingly supporting the activities of criminal groups… [Sri Lamka] was pleased to note the growing support garnered by the initiative to convene an international conference on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. He expected the conference to adopt a specific action programme for international cooperation on a broad range of measures to combat the phenomenon of illicit arms. The Expert Group on Small Arms had provided useful inputs to the work of the conference, and those inputs, together with the views received from Member States, should be brought into the preparatory process, to ensure a representative agenda and scope. … [Sri Lanka] expressed concern regarding the possibility of new weapon developments undermining the peaceful uses of outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space had enjoyed broad-based support in the Conference on Disarmament. Any developments that could lead to the weaponization of outer space would undermine the security regime on earth and the peaceful uses of outer space. If the international community did not foreclose opportunities for the weaponization of space now, it might have to grapple with non-proliferation measures in outer space later." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Sudan (Tarig Ali Bakhit): "One reason for the imbalance in international relations…was unilateral hegemony and a 'double yardstick', which had a negative impact on stability. American aggression against the medical factory in the Sudan last August under pretext that the factory was producing chemical weapons, was flagrant proof of that hegemony. Those claims were not based on scientific logic. The factory produced 70 per cent of the medicine needed by the Sudan. His Government had transmitted information to the Security Council that confirmed the erroneous nature of United States claims. The United States continued to hinder the role of the Council after the Sudan requested the Council to send an inquiry. The United States failed to submit any proof to the Council giving validity to its claims. The best known chemical weapons experts examined the results of bombing and the evidence showed that the factory only produced medicines.

The Sudan…attached special importance to the issue of conventional weapons. It supported the principle of limiting the trafficking of conventional weapons, but reaffirmed its right to make use of such weapons to defend its borders. … [Sudan] welcomed efforts to hold a conference on small arms, and believed the focus should be on illicit trafficking of such arms. The transparency of arms was one important step towards increasing security. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms needed to be extended to cover information on arms of mass destruction… [Sudan] called on Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the NPT, to heed international appeals and submit its nuclear installations to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency..." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Syria (Mikhail Wehbe): "The gaps in the NPT had been highlighted in 1995 when it was made possible for some countries not to adhere to the Treaty, thus, violating one of its most important principles - universality. That, in turn, had paved the way for a new nuclear arms race, and the resulting unstable and unfair world order. The relaunched nuclear arms race was irrefutable proof of the drawbacks inherent in the CTBT. That Treaty had not banned all types of nuclear testing, nor ended the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. It had been unable to prevent nuclear-weapon States from updating their weapons, through simulations and tests which had not reached the critical level. The Convention, therefore, had opened the way for the further development of nuclear weapons.

Despite the creation around the world of many nuclear-weapon-free zones, in the key strategic area of the Middle East, only Israel had refused to adhere to the NPT… Israel was sixth in the world, behind the five nuclear Powers, in plutonium possession for military purposes, of which it had approximately 500 kilogrammes. That had not included a count of the nuclear missiles, which were well known to all. It was unacceptable to promote a nuclear policy by using two yardsticks, and for one country to benefit from all types of support and protection. … During the current session, the General Assembly would consider a draft resolution dealing with preparations for the international conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms. In that regard, the conference must be limited exclusively to the trafficking of small-calibre arms..." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

Tanzania (Daudi Mwakawago): "[I]n the past year there had been more setbacks than achievements in the process of disarmament. More than ever nuclear-weapon States were determined to cling to the doctrines of deterrence. Their words and actions were evidence of their determination to maintain their weapons for an indefinite future. … The nuclear-weapon States were obliged to engage in serious negotiations leading to an unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Thailand (Asda Jayanama): "[Thailand] attached high importance to the problem of landmines. Removal of mines was an important first step, but only part of the answer. It had to be accompanied with increased attention to mine awareness, victim assistance and long-term rehabilitation. … [Thailand] also supported all forms of international cooperation to redress the problem of illicit transborder trafficking in guns, small arms and other light weapons, including the convening of an international conference on the issue in the year 2001... The conference should be held in a venue that would ensure the broadest participation at the highest level possible. Nuclear disarmament remained one of the top priority issues of international security… He associated his country with the earlier Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) statement. He hoped that the States parties to the NPT would make use of the upcoming Review Conference to revitalize the process, in order to fulfil the principles and objectives set out by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Tunisia (Ali Hachani): "Nuclear disarmament should be a priority. In that context, the five nuclear Powers had specific obligations under article VI of the NPT. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was an opportunity to motivate nuclear disarmament. … Pending the attainment of nuclear disarmament…the non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled to negative security assurances. … The creation and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones had promoted non- proliferation at both the regional and international levels. As a State party to the CTBT, and a signatory to the Pelindaba Treaty, [Tunisia] had always supported efforts to establish new zones. In the Middle East, that commitment continued to be blocked by Israel, which refused to accede to the NPT, despite the many appeals by States of the region and the General Assembly. A resolution on that issue was first adopted in 1974, and then adopted by consensus since 1980. …

[Tunisia] welcomed the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, an important event which had attested to the will of the international community to end the suffering of so many. Mindful of the importance of the Convention and of its effects on international peace and security, his country had been quick to ratify it, as it had supported the elimination of that category of destructive weapons. … [Tunisia] welcomed the moratorium on the export of light weapons to West Africa. … The success of the conference on the illicit arms trade, to be convened by 2001, required decisive coordination, under the aegis of the United Nations." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

Uganda (Fred Beyendeza): "[T]he nuclear-weapon States had turned a deaf ear to the objectives and ideals of nuclear disarmament. They had become indifferent to any serious multilateral arrangement on current disarmament programs. … In Africa, most armed conflicts were fought exclusively with small arms and light weapons. The degree of destruction and the loss of life and property as a result of these arms was overwhelming. The roots of those conflicts should be addressed, in particular, the lack of social and economic development." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Ukraine (Volodymyr Yel'Chenko): "[Ukraine,] having become an independent State, had made the choice to give up its nuclear arsenal, among the most powerful in the world. It proceeded from the understanding that the national interests of Ukraine would be met through its participation in all treaties in the sphere of strategic stability. To date, 64 per cent of the total number of strategic arms that had been deployed on the territory of Ukraine had been eliminated… [Ukraine] closely followed developments concerning the ABM Treaty. That Treaty stood as an effective instrument for promoting peace and strengthening world strategic stability. His Government, therefore, called upon all State participants to refrain from any unilateral actions that were inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and could negatively affect its viability or effectiveness. Ukraine, whose people suffered the terrible consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, was fully aware of the real threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons. The continuation by some States of nuclear- missile-development programmes had become a source of deep concern. Those developments could create an extremely dangerous precedent, once the non-nuclear choice would be questioned and challenged by other States. … [Ukraine] supported the initiatives concerning the need to establish the regime of international control over light weapons and to commence negotiations on elaboration of a convention on preventing the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Such an international legal document could become an effective element in the international arms control system." (GA/DIS/3148, 19 October)

United Arab Emirates (Mohammad Samhan): "The Arab region had experienced many wars and occupations…including the Iranian occupation of United Arab Emirates islands and that of Kuwait by Iraq. Some countries in the region continued to develop forbidden weapons, which had led to a prohibited weapons race in the Gulf region. Eradication of all weapons of mass destruction and peaceful ways to end disputes based on the United Nations Charter and international law were necessary, so the Gulf region could change from one of instability and tension to a new era of coexistence and strengthened economic and cultural relations. … [T]he NPT Review Conference should guarantee the implementation of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. His country also supported the international community's efforts to curb illegal transactions in small arms, as well as efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines and give humanitarian support to victims. He looked forward to the third millennium as an era in which all weapons of mass destruction would be eradicated, bringing about a new era of stability and security." (GA/DIS/3141, 12 October)

United States (John Holum): "An honest assessment of the past year was that, despite some real and disappointing setbacks, the world did move ahead in reinforcing the consensus against proliferation. The United States had continued to reduce its nuclear-weapon stockpile and work with the Russian Federation and others to ensure that nuclear materials were safe and secure, to enhance transparency, to place excess fissile material stocks under international safeguards, and to transform - irreversibly - excess plutonium into forms unusable in nuclear weapons. … [T]he United States had worked with others to strengthen the OPCW and to complete the process for United States industry declarations to that organization. In September, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had announced it was suspending its long-range missile programme, in the context of a broad initiative developed by the former United States Secretary of Defense, William Perry. Worldwide, exports of destabilizing missiles and related technologies had intensified. Likewise, the reach and breadth of efforts to discourage proliferation had been expanding. Progress had also been made in efforts to address the regional dimension of non-proliferation. In South Asia, the United States and other countries had sustained efforts to promote strategic restraint. Recent political developments in the region had made further progress even more essential. In the Middle East, an emerging climate of cooperation had opened opportunities on regional security issues. The United States had worked to cultivate that atmosphere and discourage actions in multilateral forums that could undermine it.

On 13 October, the United States Senate had voted against ratification of the CTBT - a 'deep disappointment' to him personally, as well as to others who had laboured in support of it. The outcome was clearly a setback, but efforts to bring it into force were not over. United States President William Clinton had made clear that his efforts to secure ratification would continue, and he would continue to urge others to ratify the Treaty, particularly among those 44 countries required for its entry into force. President Clinton had also made clear that as he had pursued ratification, there would be no return to nuclear explosions. The United States would sustain the testing moratorium it had observed since 1992. Concerns had been raised about stockpile stewardship and verification. The United States' programme was strong on the first and the Treaty was fully adequate on the second. Given time, those concerns could be resolved. The Conference in Vienna had demonstrated, once again, that support for the CTBT in the international community had remained a powerful force, one that would be sustained and could not be ignored. 'We will complete the task of bringing the Treaty into force'…

[America's] dedication to non-proliferation and arms control had not flagged. Moreover, the Senate vote on the CTBT ratification was not reason for anyone else to 'stand back' from that cause. After all, non-proliferation and arms control steps were matters of vital self-interest. For that reason, one of the most important priorities for the United States next year would be to ensure that the NPT Review Conference would reaffirm the Treaty as an essential part of the non-proliferation regime. His country was looking forward to a constructive Review Conference, which would produce a balanced and thorough assessment of the NPT. There would be differences on key issues, such as on article VI of the Treaty, but let there be no doubt about the United States' continued strong commitment to its article VI obligations. The NPT had served all of its parties well.

Another key priority was the conclusion of negotiations for the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention - a 'linchpin' of the global non-proliferation regime... The parties had been labouring in the ad hoc group in Geneva for four years, the parameters of the protocol were well established and countries had made clear their bottom lines or 'red lines'. Now was the time to settle the remaining core issues. The multilateral arms control calendar was full, but strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention was far too important. ... The fissile material cut-off treaty was another issue that had languished far too long. The world was marking time because the Conference on Disarmament could not agree on a work programme. He hoped such agreement could be reached in January. Failure to do so would not only threaten a fissile material cut-off treaty, but call into question the credibility of the Conference itself.

The START process had remained at the top of the arms control agenda... At the June Summit between the Russian Federation and the United States, the two Governments had agreed to begin discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty in late summer. He had conducted the first such meeting with Russian officials in August, and further meetings were planned shortly. … Concerning the ABM Treaty - a cornerstone of strategic stability - it remained critical to preserving confidence on both sides in the stability of their respective strategic deterrent forces... The threat of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems was real, it was growing, and it was increasingly unpredictable. Accordingly, the United States was considering 'a limited capability' to defend against the long-missile threats of rogue States. The ABM Treaty had been amended before. It should be possible to prevent the deployment of a limited national missile defence in a way that preserved the Treaty's essential purposes - namely, strategic stability and strategic offensive-weapon reductions, while providing limited defence against the missile threats from rogue States. A decision as to whether to proceed with deployment would be made next summer, consistent with considerations of feasibility, threat, cost and arms control. …

[A] number of States had urged a 'new agenda' in arms control - towards a world free from nuclear weapons. His country had recognized the frustration that some felt about the pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The United States had made a sincere and conscious effort to approach that process in the best way forward, and it would continue to record the many steps taken to support that process. Indeed, the United States was part of the international consensus on nuclear disarmament, but there had been no consensus on how best to attain that goal and no agreement that the answer was to forge a new agenda. The situation did not reflect a failure on the part of the international community or a deficient commitment to disarmament, but rather the essence of the disarmament process. Disarmament was best achieved through practical, discreet, incremental... 'The way forward was not through a "new agenda", but a renewed agenda.' The problem was not too few items on the agenda, or insufficiently lofty goals, but insufficient collective willingness to grasp the attainable ones. Efforts must be redoubled to complete the agenda. There was one road forward, and the key milestones along the way should not be bypassed in the world's haste to reach a shared destination." (GA/DIS/3149, 20 October)

Uruguay (Jorge Pertez-Otermin): "Strict compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime remained the cornerstone of macro-disarmament, and it was inadmissible that any State should digress from it. It was also necessary to achieve a consensus of new norms on the multilateral level, so that the ABM Treaty would become a mechanism to stop the deployment of new missile-defence systems. … [R]apid and effective action to halt the proliferation of small arms remained one of the most important challenges in coming months. All were aware of the importance of the subject, since the number of deaths caused by those weapons was almost equal to those caused by weapons of mass destruction. His country fully supported the aims of the international conference on small arms to be held not later that 2001." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Uzbekistan (Alisher Vohidiv): "[T]he creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones had secured its solid place in the international disarmament agenda, and Uzbekistan welcomed progress achieved in the realization and strengthening of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the planet. … Since the last session of the First Committee…a group of experts from the Central Asian States, with the active assistance of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, had carried out a number of intensive meetings, which had closely approached an agreement on all aspects of a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. He hoped that all Member States would support the draft resolution on the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia, which would be submitted on behalf of the five States of Central Asia for the attention for the members of the Committee in due course." (GA/DIS/3142, 13 October)

Viet Nam (Pham Binh Minh): "Nuclear-weapon States were obligated under legal instruments to conduct genuine negotiations to eliminate each and every nuclear weapon they had produced. In that context…discussion on the measures needed to make the upcoming NPT Review Conference a success was of special significance. Urgent actions should be taken to pave the way for the review process. The record of accomplished work in implementing the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference was poor. Further, he said the fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened as early as possible. The objective of the session should be to chart a new course in the field of disarmament. His country supported the proposal put forward by the representative of Chile to set up an informal working group to sound out the positions of member countries, in order to arrive at a satisfactory programme and agenda for the special session.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament…Viet Nam shared the concerns of other delegations on the failure of that important multilateral negotiating body on disarmament to reach an agreement on its working agenda… [Viet Nam] was also disappointed that, due to the divergence of views of the member countries, the Conference had not been able to set up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. He was pleased, however, that after years of negotiations, five more countries had been admitted to the Conference. He wished to underline that the Conference should be further expanded, so as to become a more representative and strengthened body." (GA/DIS/3145, 15 October)

Zimbabwe (T. Jokonya): "[D]espite the adverse developments that had dominated the disarmament agenda in recent months, his country's commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament remained unshaken. Zimbabwe had acceded to the CTBT in October of this year. It had also agreed to the installation of an auxiliary seismic station on its territory, as part of the International Monitoring System. Nuclear testing and nuclear disarmament were interrelated and inseparable issues... The non-existence of nuclear testing could not be an end in itself, but rather a step towards nuclear disarmament. His Government was opposed to nuclear testing, whether it was for the acquisition of nuclear weapons or for their qualitative improvement. The continued existence of a nuclear club of States bent on preserving their nuclear monopoly, while pontificating to the rest of the world not to acquire the same weaponry, was unacceptable. As long as the exclusivity of the nuclear club was maintained, there would always be irresistible temptation on threshold nuclear powers to knock at the door and gain entry.

In his part of the world…it was not possible to de-link problems related to unauthorized weapons possession, criminality and intra-state armed conflict from drug trafficking, car smuggling and money laundering. The experience in southern Africa was that the sharing of tactical and strategic information was vital in combating the small arms menace. Responsibility in arms transfer policies was crucial in addressing the problem. Zimbabwe believed that Africa's arms exporters should adopt an ethical policy, such as the Code of Conduct on arms exports approved by the European Union." (GA/DIS/3147, 18 October)

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.