ACRONYM Reports
ACRONYM Report No.10, May 1997
Conclusion
The CTBT may be a flawed treaty. It is difficult to imagine a
perfect legal instrument emerging from three years of negotiations
and compromises among 37 to 60 states. Nonetheless, it is an
example of successful multilateral negotiations and represents a
very important (and long overdue) achievement in arms control. The
versions of stockpile stewardship and management programmes being
put in place by those NWS with the money and facilities, pushed by
the US example, undermine some of the CTBT's objectives but not
all. It will greatly constrain, but not prevent, the development of
new weapons by NWS with sophisticated research and laboratory
testing capabilities. It will reduce military confidence in any
significantly new or modified design, which would tend to work
against the production of new warheads for the precision and
warfighting doctrines which are assuming greater weight in the
post-Cold War strategic considerations of some of the NWS. The CTBT
will not prevent, but can make more difficult, the design and
construction of a crude nuclear arsenal by nuclear wannabes,
whether state or sub-national groups. It will seriously constrain
the development from first generation bombs to second generation
boosted fission and thermonuclear warheads for delivery by
missile.
The Treaty's most positive features are:
- the establishment of a norm against testing and enhancing
nuclear weapons;
- an end to the contamination of the environment from nuclear
explosions;
- the commitment to zero yield, which was sought but not
expected;
- the banning of PNEs unless both a Review Conference and an
Amendment Conference give consensus to amend the Treaty;
- extension of the international verification regime for
detecting and identifying clandestine nuclear operations and the
potential proliferation of nuclear weapons.
On the negative side:
- it lacks a clear statement of objective in terms of preventing
qualitative improvements, new designs or other forms of vertical
proliferation if these can be accomplished through technological
advance without fission testing;
- article XIV is a misguided and potentially dangerous provision,
which makes the Treaty hostage to the national considerations of
certain countries, with the consequence that it may never take full
legal effect;
- if it does not enter into force within reasonable time, the
verification regime may lose credibility and financial support,
especially if signatory countries do not agree procedures for
authorising on-site inspections in the absence of a full
implementing authority.
It is not within the powers of test ban advocates to create all
the appropriate conditions for India, Pakistan and North Korea to
sign and ratify. But the following undertakings would go a long way
to meeting their genuine concerns, undercut some of the arguments
they hide their own nuclear ambitions behind, and reinforce the
Treaty regime for its participants:
- Early ratification by the P-5 and Israel must be considered a
priority. It is now obvious that the US and Russian governments are
experiencing grave difficulties in passing treaties through the
Senate and Duma ratification processes, so Britain, France and
China should take the lead. The new Labour government in Britain
should aim to ratify the CTBT in its first term, knowing that this
is a popular public measure and that the size of its parliamentary
majority would ensure smooth passage of the ratification Bill.
- The NWS bear a responsibility to ensure that their research and
stockpile programmes do not undermine the CTBT. Not only because
that is what signing a treaty means, but also because they need to
undercut India's rationale for staying out of the Treaty. In
particular the US should cancel the planned programme of
subcritical tests and reconsider the cost, size, role and
sophistication of 'science-based Stockpile Stewardship'.
- Further steps should be taken to speed up the progress towards
nuclear disarmament. The six immediate steps identified by the
Canberra Commission could be undertaken without further delay:
taking nuclear forces off alert; removing warheads from their
delivery vehicles; ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear
weapons; ending all nuclear testing (covering subcritical tests and
laboratory explosions); initiating negotiations to reduce US and
Russian arsenals further (START III); an agreement among the
nuclear weapon states on reciprocal 'no first use' undertakings and
a 'non-use' undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear
weapon states. Discussions should commence multilaterally or among
the P-5 to identify arms reduction targets involving the lesser NWS
(China, Britain and France).
- An ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament should be convened
in the CD to identify further multilateral measures appropriate to
follow on from the CTBT, with a view to adopting a mandate to
commence negotiations, as agreed.
All in all the best way to ensure that the CTBT retains its
credibility and has some chance of being fully implemented is to
move forwards on irreversible nuclear arms reduction, greater
regional security and confidence building in South Asia, and
further progress on nuclear disarmament.
© 1997 The Acronym Institute.
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