ACRONYM Reports

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but not Sealed

ACRONYM Report No.10, May 1997

Conclusion

The CTBT may be a flawed treaty. It is difficult to imagine a perfect legal instrument emerging from three years of negotiations and compromises among 37 to 60 states. Nonetheless, it is an example of successful multilateral negotiations and represents a very important (and long overdue) achievement in arms control. The versions of stockpile stewardship and management programmes being put in place by those NWS with the money and facilities, pushed by the US example, undermine some of the CTBT's objectives but not all. It will greatly constrain, but not prevent, the development of new weapons by NWS with sophisticated research and laboratory testing capabilities. It will reduce military confidence in any significantly new or modified design, which would tend to work against the production of new warheads for the precision and warfighting doctrines which are assuming greater weight in the post-Cold War strategic considerations of some of the NWS. The CTBT will not prevent, but can make more difficult, the design and construction of a crude nuclear arsenal by nuclear wannabes, whether state or sub-national groups. It will seriously constrain the development from first generation bombs to second generation boosted fission and thermonuclear warheads for delivery by missile.

The Treaty's most positive features are:

the establishment of a norm against testing and enhancing nuclear weapons;
an end to the contamination of the environment from nuclear explosions;
the commitment to zero yield, which was sought but not expected;
the banning of PNEs unless both a Review Conference and an Amendment Conference give consensus to amend the Treaty;
extension of the international verification regime for detecting and identifying clandestine nuclear operations and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the negative side:

it lacks a clear statement of objective in terms of preventing qualitative improvements, new designs or other forms of vertical proliferation if these can be accomplished through technological advance without fission testing;
article XIV is a misguided and potentially dangerous provision, which makes the Treaty hostage to the national considerations of certain countries, with the consequence that it may never take full legal effect;
if it does not enter into force within reasonable time, the verification regime may lose credibility and financial support, especially if signatory countries do not agree procedures for authorising on-site inspections in the absence of a full implementing authority.

It is not within the powers of test ban advocates to create all the appropriate conditions for India, Pakistan and North Korea to sign and ratify. But the following undertakings would go a long way to meeting their genuine concerns, undercut some of the arguments they hide their own nuclear ambitions behind, and reinforce the Treaty regime for its participants:

Early ratification by the P-5 and Israel must be considered a priority. It is now obvious that the US and Russian governments are experiencing grave difficulties in passing treaties through the Senate and Duma ratification processes, so Britain, France and China should take the lead. The new Labour government in Britain should aim to ratify the CTBT in its first term, knowing that this is a popular public measure and that the size of its parliamentary majority would ensure smooth passage of the ratification Bill.
The NWS bear a responsibility to ensure that their research and stockpile programmes do not undermine the CTBT. Not only because that is what signing a treaty means, but also because they need to undercut India's rationale for staying out of the Treaty. In particular the US should cancel the planned programme of subcritical tests and reconsider the cost, size, role and sophistication of 'science-based Stockpile Stewardship'.
Further steps should be taken to speed up the progress towards nuclear disarmament. The six immediate steps identified by the Canberra Commission could be undertaken without further delay: taking nuclear forces off alert; removing warheads from their delivery vehicles; ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; ending all nuclear testing (covering subcritical tests and laboratory explosions); initiating negotiations to reduce US and Russian arsenals further (START III); an agreement among the nuclear weapon states on reciprocal 'no first use' undertakings and a 'non-use' undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states. Discussions should commence multilaterally or among the P-5 to identify arms reduction targets involving the lesser NWS (China, Britain and France).
An ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament should be convened in the CD to identify further multilateral measures appropriate to follow on from the CTBT, with a view to adopting a mandate to commence negotiations, as agreed.

All in all the best way to ensure that the CTBT retains its credibility and has some chance of being fully implemented is to move forwards on irreversible nuclear arms reduction, greater regional security and confidence building in South Asia, and further progress on nuclear disarmament.