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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 63, March - April 2002

News Review

US Officials Outline Approach to BWC, Bioterrorism Challenges

US officials have been setting out their approach to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and related efforts to deter and detect bioterrorist activities, following the unprecedented suspension of the Convention's Review Conference in December. The Conference failed to reach agreement on a near-complete final declaration when the US delegation proposed the official termination of the work of an ad hoc group of states parties negotiating a verification Protocol (see last issue for extensive coverage). The Conference will reconvene from November 11-22, 2002. In the interim, the Bush administration is clearly determined to shift the terms of the debate decisively away from consideration of the Protocol - which it regards as ineffectual and even dangerous - towards a range of coordinated national and international legislative and cooperative measures.

Addressing the CD on January 24, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and a prominent player in the ill-fated Review Conference, set out his post-Protocol vision:

"[T]he United States was urged to go along with this proposal because it was 'flawed, but better than nothing'. After an exhaustive evaluation within the US government, we decided that the Protocol was actually counterproductive. New approaches and new ways of thinking are needed to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The United States presented a number of new proposals to do just this, including tightened national export controls, fully implementing the BWC by nationally criminalizing activity that violates it, intensified non-proliferation activities, increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefence and counter-bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks. Many, if not all, of these measures can begin to be implemented now. We look forward to discussing and refining them with all of you and hope that you will join us in endorsing and beginning to implement them as we prepare for the resumption of the BWC Review Conference next November."

In a State Department interview on January 30, John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation was asked: "With negotiations to strengthen the [BWC]...suspended for a year, how do you expect the US will work with friends and allies to attempt to bridge the gap between the US position on how to improve it and that of other delegations?" Wolf replied:

"We are going to work with them. And we have a number of ideas that we expect to discus with friends and others on things relating to trafficking - bilaterally and multilaterally. Some of these ideas will be a complement to the measures described at the BWC Review Conference in Geneva. So there is a whole package of ideas, and you may find that in all of that it creates a common international sense of purpose. Meanwhile, you've got to get the substance right. ... Form ought to derive from the substance and not the substance from the form. We have to organise to accomplish real things as opposed to meeting just to meet. in this administration, we like to know we are doing something real that can be accomplished, rather than just meeting to talk..."

On February 5, President Bush proposed a $4.15 billion, or 319%, increase in spending on bioterrorism in the US government budget for 2003. The new total of $5.9 billion is justified - and certain to be adopted or even increased by the Congress - as necessary to significantly improve the biodefence and health system infrastructure, overhaul state and federal response systems, and accelerate and intensify scientific research into prevention, treatment and cure.

Note: on February 17, the New York Times reported that the Bush administration had begun to withdraw from public circulation thousands of previously declassified government documents relating to the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons (see last issue for more details). According to Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge: "We're working hard for a set of guidelines so terrorists can't use information that this country produces against us." The article further reported that those guidelines may include an administration request to scientific journals not to publish information, in articles on sensitive subjects, which would permit other scientists to reproduce experiments and check results. The paper reported that administration officials had discussed the proposal with the American Society of Microbiology, quoting the Society's President-elect, Ronald M. Atlas, as observing: "That takes apart the whole foundation of science. I've made it reasonably clear that we would object to anything that smacked of censorship. They're discussing it, and I wouldn't rule out them doing something. ... I think it undermines science..." The article also quoted criticism of the suggestion from Robert R. Rich, President of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology: "It comes down to a risk-benefit ration... I think the risk of foregone advances is much greater than the information getting into the wrong hands."

Related Material on Acronym website:

Reports: Bush pushes budget for bioterrorism in Pittsburgh, Reuters, February 5; Text - Bolton calls for stronger curbs on weapons of mass destruction Washington File, February 24; Transcript - Bolton says US will not resume nuclear testing, Washington File, January 24; Interview - key official says US is committed to non-proliferation, Washington File, January 30; Fact Sheet - Bush strategy to defend against bioterrorism, Washington File, February 5; US tightening rules on keeping scientific secrets, New York Times, February 17.