Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 64, May - June 2002
NPT Report
The 2002 PrepCom:
Papering over the Cracks?
By Rebecca Johnson
Introduction: Surface and Subtext
As the first session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of
the 2005 Review Conference of states parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) closed on April 19,
2002, the meeting's Chair, Henrik Salander of Sweden, summed up not
only the main points covered in the cluster debates and special
sessions but also, more subtly, the general mood of frustration.
After delivering a concise factual summary of the debates and
issues raised, appended in full below, Salander chose the wistful
tune of the Beatles' song Yesterday to ask: "Why not try to
say something bold and actual?" The tumultous applause Salander
received was not only for his singing and the witty aptness of his
lyrics, but also for the adroitness with which he had chaired the
two-week meeting. Yet many also left the meeting with a sense of
dissatisfaction. In giving an account of the main disputes and
agreements of the 2002 PrepCom, this analysis seeks to uncover the
concerns beneath the surface. Rather than providing a précis
of the issues covered in the numerous statements, reports and
working papers - succinctly covered in the Chair's factual summary
in any case - I will focus on the implications for the future of
the NPT and its review process.1
In diplomatic terms the meeting showed every appearance of
success: it was efficiently organised, starting on time and even
ending with an afternoon to spare; it heard a great many statements
relating to nuclear disarmament, safeguards, regional issues and
proliferation, nuclear energy, safety and so on; it discussed and
decided various procedural issues and dates for the forthcoming
PrepComs and 2005 Review Conference; NGOs held many useful
briefings in the margins and also addressed a morning plenary and
held a roundtable with government representatives; and the meeting
weathered a tricky challenge to its timetable (programme of work)
and so was not suspended early in disarray. Finally, the PrepCom
gave consensus to the adoption of its report.
The Chair's factual summary - an innovation agreed by the 2000
NPT Review Conference - did not have to be agreed or adopted, and
was therefore not debated. It was the Chair's own characterisation
of the meeting's substance, to be annexed rather than attached to
the PrepCom report, serving chiefly as an aide memoire for future
meetings. Although all concurred with Salander's understanding of
the function of the Chair's factual summary, opinion was divided on
whether it was preferable to avoid negotiations on it, thereby
enabling meetings to focus on substantive information exchange, or
to negotiate with the aim of providing a basis for future
recommendations, on the premise that political debate and
interaction only occur when there is something at stake or text to
be agreed. The overt issues of contention at the PrepCom were not
about what was going on in the real world, but about the internal
workings of the review process, chiefly the reporting requirements
agreed in May 2000 and the desirable level of debate and
interaction in the substantive sessions.
Not having been given the opportunity to debate or amend the
report, delegates nevertheless seemed widely to share the opinion
that Salander's concise, 7-page summary had identified the major
issues and given a balanced account of states' expressed views on a
range of substantive questions. As these included highly
contentious issues such as implementation of the nuclear
disarmament commitments in the Treaty, the nuclear programmes of
India, Israel and Pakistan and associated regional security
concerns, and lack of compliance by Iraq and North Korea, it was
also no surprise that some delegations - notably Iraq and the
United States, as well as some of the other nuclear-weapon states
(NWS) and Arab and non-nuclear states, made final interventions
explaining their disagreements or reservations about aspects of the
summary. Even these states, however, complimented Salander for, in
the words of US Ambassador Norman Wulf, his "dedication and sense
of fair play".
So what was wrong? I have covered NPT meetings for some years
now, in different and often difficult political climates. On the
surface, the 2002 PrepCom was one of the smoothest. But there was a
negative subtext of nostalgia and fear, influencing most
delegations to stick close to routines and rituals. Britain's Head
of Delegation, David Broucher, was pleased that there were no
"unnecessary polemics", but others were concerned that the serious
questions were left unsaid. Perhaps some feel that the patterns are
now set, since the NPT was extended in 1995 and the review process
was used effectively to achieve a consensus final document in 2000
(against most predictions), resulting in less to fight for this
time round. Was this why, in the open debates - and reportedly even
more so in the cluster and "special time" discussions, which due to
procedural mistakes made in 1997 remained totally closed to
non-state party observers - states appeared to be going through the
motions of diplomacy without any serious plans or objectives? While
some, like the UK, no doubt welcomed the lack of conflict, the
corridor complaints and discussions told a different story,
brimming with post-9/11 anger, unease and anxiety. While
condemnation of the September 11 attacks continued to be widespread
and genuine, again and again (and across the political and regional
spectrum) there were also signs of deep concern - seldom expressed
in open interventions - about the Bush administration's behaviour
towards multilateral treaties and regimes and the implications of
the classified but leaked Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Though almost all the statements expressed support for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and many regretted the
decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
there was also an undertone of resignation. The United States' bald
announcement that it only "generally agrees" with the conclusions
of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was greeted with cynicism and a
kind of bitter amusement, as another example of the US
cherry-picking what it wants from the multilateral
regimes.2 In a later US statement, CD Ambassador Eric
Javits identified some of the areas in which the United States now
disagrees with the consensus commitments. For example, it "no
longer support[s] some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final
Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference". Javits cited the ABM
Treaty, which was put into the 13 steps at the behest of the
nuclear-weapon states, reproducing the language the P-5 had
negotiated amongst themselves. More fundamentally threatening to
the credibility of the NPT regime, he called the CTBT "another
example of a treaty we no longer support".3
Some 66 statements were delivered during the general debate.
Many individual delegations and groupings such as the European
Union (EU), the non-aligned states parties to the NPT (NAM), and
the New Agenda Coalition of seven non-nuclear countries (Brazil,
Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) also
submitted papers for each of the cluster and special issue
sessions. Much information and familiar rhetoric flowed through the
microphones, but there was little new thinking and little evidence
of strategies to take forward the implementation of the NPT
obligations and agreements undertaken in 1995 and 2000. In part,
perhaps, because the Chair chosen by the Western Group was a New
Agenda member, the New Agenda Coalition was low key, though it
issued several statements and a working paper on nuclear
disarmament. The NATO-5 (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and
Norway) struggled to come up with a common position paper and in
the end gave up, though Germany put forward some interesting
proposals of its own on non-strategic nuclear weapons and
"attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world".
Behind the relative passivity of this year's delegations are
problems that could undermine the health and credibility of the NPT
regime. Many thought the weapon states were backtracking from or
trying to reinterpret earlier agreements, and considered the US and
French opposition to reporting in the indicative timetable to be
illustrative of this reneging on consensus commitments. But no-one
wanted to take their concerns to the mat. Outside Committee Room 4,
three types of attitude seemed to predominate: "Why bother: the
Americans aren't listening"; "America is our ally and we don't want
them to think we're being disloyal" (chiefly from NATO states); and
"In this climate, we don't want to be tarred with the terrorist
brush" (from much of the rest of the world). It appears that
President Bush's declaration "Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists" has succeeded in silencing more than his
critics in the US Congress and media. Even with regard to the CTBT,
which is clearly and intimately related to the NPT4,
NATO allies exhibited a tendency to whisper that they were raising
their concerns privately in Washington but didn't think much could
be gained by raising the issue publicly at the PrepCom.
The recent and dramatic deterioration in relations between
Israel and the Palestinians also caused grave concern that tended
to mute the traditional arguments about Israel's nuclear programme.
Where, in times of greater stability, Middle East issues were
considered fair game in the NPT context, with deaths occurring in
such high numbers on both sides, few in the PrepCom wanted to kick
this particular political football very far.
By the second week, some indications of disquiet about the
absense of real discussion could be detected in interventions from
South Africa, Canada, Indonesia (speaking on behalf of the
non-aligned states), and Egypt, speaking for the New Agenda
Coalition. In different ways, these states complained of a lack of
interaction and discussion among the NPT parties. Where some
interpreted the piles of statements generated in each of the
substantive sessions as evidence that the PrepCom had devoted most
of its time to substance, as required under the strengthened review
process, others warned that the repetitious issuing of government
positions should not be seen as a precedent for future meetings.
The New Agenda Coalition put emphasis on the injunction to
"consider principles, objectives and ways" to implement the Treaty.
They called for "structured debate and interaction" leading to
concrete conclusions that would lay the foundation for further
recommendations. Canada suggested that it would be better if states
(and also NGOs, in their contributions) gave shorter formal
statements and interventions, but aimed for "spontaneous exchanges
and comments".
Procedural Decisions
The meeting was held in New York from April 8 to 19, 2002, and
attended by 137 of the NPT's 187 states parties. Of the four UN
members not party to the NPT, only Cuba attended as an observer,
although Israel's representatives were visible in and around the
open sessions in Committee Room 4. Representatives of 62 national
and international NGOs attended the meeting, as did representatives
from a variety of specialised agencies and intergovernmental
organisations, including the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO), the Agency
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (OPANAL), the Pacific Islands Forum, the European
Commission, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
The meeting reached a number of procedural decisions,
determining that the next two sessions of the PrepCom will be held
as follows: April 28 to May 9, 2003 in Geneva; and April 26 to May
7, 2004 in New York. In addition, it was decided provisionally that
the 2005 Review Conference would be held in New York, May 2 to 27,
2005. The Group of Western States and Others nominated Hungary's
Ambassador to the UN in New York, Laszlo Molner, to chair the
second PrepCom.
Resistance to Reporting Requirements
By the end of the PrepCom, there remained divergent opinions and
considerable confusion as to why reporting became such a stumbling
block. The reporting commitments had not been a major focus of
disagreement before they were adopted as part of the final document
of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, appearing as number 12 of the 13
steps on nuclear disarmament and in paragraph 16 on the Middle
East.5 Where most of the commitments on disarmament and
the Middle East exhorted particular states to take actions outside
the NPT to comply with the Treaty's implementation, the reporting
requirements were actions to be undertaken in the context of the
NPT review process itself. With this in mind, the
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha
Dhanapala, had invited states parties in January to submit reports
for the Secretariat to publish with the conference papers. Many of
the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), but none of the Nuclear-5,
complied.
In developing a timetable of work, Salander proposed giving
equal time to debates on the three main clusters - nuclear
disarmament, safeguards, and 'peaceful uses of nuclear energy' -
and three specific blocks of issues - practical steps on nuclear
disarmament, regional issues (particularly the Middle East), and
the safety and security of the nuclear fuel cycle. The first two of
these special sessions corresponded to the subsidiary bodies
established in the 2000 Review Conference, while the third
reflected an area which had begun to receive more attention in
2000. Though some of the weapon states had not been very keen to
see special time allocated in this way, they did not oppose the
move directly. Instead, the United States and France objected to
the inclusion of reporting references in the description of treaty
issues allocated to the specific sessions on practical disarmament
and regional issues. In allocating topics to particular sessions,
Salander had done nothing more than utilise language agreed in the
1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Although both countries had
submitted reports to NPT meetings since 1998, the United States and
France were prepared to block the programme of work if it included
reporting as part of the timetable allocations. The UK promised
support if it came to this, reportedly on grounds of P-3 solidarity
rather than on the merits of the case.
As the conflict threatened to block further work in the PrepCom,
Salander obtained agreement for the cluster 1 and special sessions
on nuclear disarmament to proceed as planned, despite the lack of
any formally adopted work programme. He also set a series of
deadlines for agreement to be reached and made clear that if the
parties were still unable to agree a timetable by 10.00 am on
Monday of the second week, he would adjourn the PrepCom
indefinitely.6
Salander's approach ensured that the conflict could not be used
as an excuse for time-wasting or blocking discussion. While the
debates continued, a small group of delegates, convened under the
auspices of Ambassadors Jean Lint of Belgium and Christopher
Westdal of Canada, worked out compromise language, omitting the
offending mention of "reporting" while tightening the link with the
2000 agreements in other ways, ensuring that the discussions on
Article VI were to be conducted in the context of the "agreements,
conclusions and commitments" listed in the 2000 NPT final document,
while discussions on regional issues were to include "commitments,
conclusions and follow-up submissions" in accordance with the
relevant sections agreed in 1995 and 2000. When all sides had
concurred with the new language, the PrepCom then "took note" of
the indicative timetable in a closed session, following which the
Chair made a statement that "Nothing in the indicative timetable...
alters the status of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference".
Arguing that the PrepCom could not function effectively without
an agreed timetable and work programme, Salander had paved the way
for the compromise by showing (or at least threatening) that he was
prepared to take the risk of adjourning the PrepCom indefinitely if
no agreement had been reached by Monday 10 a.m. If that had
happened, it is not clear what the consequences would have been for
the second and third PrepComs, scheduled for 2003 and 2004. Whether
due to this threat or a realisation of the ultimate absurdity of
the objections to reporting, the problem was resolved before the
weekend.
While the majority of delegates remained bemused about the
nature and reasons for the potentially serious dispute, the agreed
formula made it possible for both sides to claim moral and
political victory. Even as it blocked mention of reports, the
United States provided an "information paper" on its approach to
Article VI. Among the explanations of its position offered by
France, the accusation of "unbalanced" reporting requirements was
frequently invoked, and the concept of "regular" reports
challenged. If I understood correctly - and many observers and
delegations, including the UK's, privately admitted to being
confused by the US-French attempted explanations - France
complained that reports were not required for the other clusters
and that reporting was given prominence and privileged above the
other 12 disarmament steps.
In 2000, no-one had fought for reporting requirements for parts
of the treaty other than disarmament and regional issues. Moreover,
among the 13 steps in the Article VI section of the May 2000 Final
Document, reporting was the only measure carrying specific
responsibilities for the review process. Some delegations
considered that it was precisely for this reason that the French
wished to delete the reference, thereby placing further distance
between the May 2000 agreements and the creation of conditions to
facilitate implementation. It was recalled that soon after the 2000
Review Conference had concluded, France (and Russia) had behaved as
if they had gone further than intended in making the nuclear
disarmament commitments. Accordingly, government representatives
and diplomats in Geneva had been at pains to represent the
agreements as non-binding.
Having on many occasions emphasised that the NPT was a treaty
that the Bush administration valued, many in the American
delegation appeared to be uncomfortable at the prospect of their
objections to the timetable causing (albeit with France) the
obstacle over which the first PrepCom of a new review cycle
ignominiously stumbled, especially for such an apparently minor
procedural point. Speculation was rife (but unconfirmed) that the
tenacity of the US objection stemmed from the view of John Bolton,
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, that mandatory reporting and accountability to other
Treaty partners was inconsistent with US sovereignty and
prestige.
One reason for the United States and France digging in over the
timetable may have been the proposals from other states to firm up
the reporting and accountability requirements. Canada, which had
submitted a working paper and pushed hardest for reporting
procedures to be established, noted that the current requirements
lacked detail on the object, scope, format and framework of
reporting. Canada favoured "reporting to each of the Preparatory
Committees and to the Review Conference, with an opportunity
provided in each of these settings for states parties to review and
comment upon each others' reports". In a further statement on the
last day, Canada acknowledged that the questions on scope,
frequency and format of reporting were very complex; it therefore
proposed "the organisation of informal consultations, open to all
states party who wish to participate, to enrich preparations for
future sessions", suggesting that these consultations take place in
Geneva over the coming year. After the timetable was accepted, the
New Agenda Coalition issued a paper making clear that since the
reporting requirements were an integral part of the Final Document,
they were also integral (albeit unspecified) to the timetable. The
New Agenda also spoke in support of Canada's proposal for
intersessional consultations on reporting. Voicing its strong
opposition to expanding beyond the PrepComs to include
intersessional work, the United States argued that the decision on
subsidiary bodies in 1995 was limited to the PrepComs. In fact,
paragraph 6 of Decision 1 on Strengthening the Review Process for
the Treaty, gives the PrepComs the power to recommend the
establishment of subsidiary bodies; intersessional work is not
ruled out as the decision gave little indication of their role,
powers or limitations, which would be a matter for states parties
to determine.7
The non-nuclear weapon states were unwilling to capitulate on
reporting because they considered the dispute indicative of a
deeper struggle over accountability and the meaning and weight of
what had been agreed by consensus at previous Review Conferences,
especially in 2000. The fact that all the weapon states were
prepared to issue reports as long as they were voluntary rather
than mandatory reinforced the view that they still wanted special
privileges to choose how and when they would comply, in
contradistinction to the mandatory safeguards underpinning the
non-nuclear-weapon states' obligations. This point was reinforced
in the final debate. Responding to the Chair's summary, in one way
or another all the NWS addressed the question of reporting. The
United States said it would provide information but not with a
checklist or tables determined by others - each party must decide
for itself how to report. China agreed, saying that the "specifics,
format and frequency" should be left to the determination of
individual states parties. Russia promised to provide information,
but said there was no need to make the process "excessively
formal". (It should be noted that Russia, remaining on the
sidelines with every indication of enjoyment, pointedly gave its
report on Article VI in accordance with the recommendations
disputed by the United States and France.) Despite the silence of
China and Russia during the reporting dispute, they were
nevertheless understood to share the other weapon states' desire to
downgrade the requirement for regular reports into something more
voluntary.
Disarmament Themes and Issues
The Appendix to this report - the Chair's factual summary of the
debates - provides a useful, general snapshot of the important
matters raised. All the major issues were faithfully acknowledged,
utilising separate paragraphs in cases where diametrically opposed
views had been expressed. For example, the summary reported that
the NWS had provided information on the measures they were taking
to reduce their arsenals and their reliance on nuclear weapons, and
that they were not developing new nuclear weapons. The following
paragraph then noted the level of concern and uncertainty about the
veracity of such information, including the possible development of
new generations of nuclear weapons. Taken together, the
juxtaposition of these two paragraphs graphically illustrates the
tone and coverage of this aspect of the disarmament sessions.
Despite commending Salander for his "wisdom, skill and fairness"
(UK), and for preparing a "balanced and well weighted" (Russia) and
"relatively objective and balanced" (China) summary, the Nuclear-5
were prominent among those raising objections to portions of the
text - along with Iraq, which despite having been consulted prior
to the final version, was first to put on record its "extreme
reservations" about the paragraph dealing with its own compliance
(or lack thereof). The United States, France and Britain echoed
each other in complaining of a lack of balance, by which they meant
a disproportionate emphasis on nuclear disarmament compared to the
room allotted to safeguards, proliferation or energy. They also
felt it necessary to emphasise that "states parties" and the
passive voice in the summary should not be taken to mean all those
present, although that is clear from the context.
This accusation of imbalance - taken a step further when the
United States mistakenly compared the treatment of safeguards with
another issue that had been accorded one paragraph (though IAEA
safeguards were actually given two) - is disingenuous. As the issue
of safeguards generates far less debate or disagreement than the
more numerous and complex aspects of disarmament, the demand for
equal words would make a mockery of the concept of a factual
summary. Furthermore, the division of issues into main committees
and clusters is only by convention and precedent, and for some
years now a number of parties have argued that this should be
changed to reflect the much higher level of attention and detail
now attached to Article VI implementation.
Two themes ran through many of the opening statements: terrorism
and compliance. Views differed sharply, however, about how these
connected with the NPT's non-proliferation and disarmament
obligations. The United States surprised no-one by placing heavy
emphasis on keeping nuclear weapons and nuclear materials out of
the hands of terrorists, and on compliance, citing violations by
Iraq and North Korea. As with these debates in the CD, others also
noted the increased awareness of terrorist threats but stressed the
role of multilateral treaties and disarmament in defeating
terrorism, and the need for full compliance with the Treaty and
related international instruments, including the disarmament
commitments made in 1968 and spelled out in 1995 and 2000.
Each of the weapon states provided reports (or, by any other
name, information) explaining their policies and listing the steps
undertaken in pursuit of their article VI obligations. For the
United States, Javits sought to explain the Nuclear Posture
Review and allay some of the specific anxieties its media coverage,
and selected leaking, had generated, assuring a wide range of
worried states that the Review did not constitute or suggest a
weakening of America's commitment to the NPT.
In light of the NPR's discussion of nuclear roles - in essence,
stressing the role of dissuasion and the defeat (of adversaries)
alongside deterrence, specifically justifying the threat or use of
nuclear weapons against an adversary's "high value targets", deep
underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities, or in response to an
opponent's "surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities"8 -
concerns had been raised that US policy had shifted from the
negative security assurances declared in the Conference on
Disarmament on April 6, 1995 and incorporated by reference in UN
Security Council Resolution 984 (April 11, 1995), which contributed
to acceptance of the NPT's indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference. In response, Javits stated
bluntly: "There is no change in US negative security assurances
towards NPT non-nuclear weapon states".9 This may be
true, since the elision of nuclear with other WMD began under the
first Bush administration and was continued under President
Clinton.
Without explicitly alluding to the NPR's consideration of
modifying, upgrading or providing new nuclear weapons for the US
arsenal and "maintain readiness to resume underground testing if
required",10 states also raised concerns about nuclear
testing. To these, Javits reiterated support for the US moratorium,
declaring simply that "the United States has no plans for a
resumption of nuclear testing". (The NPR does not count as an
official plan until it has been the subject of a Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) and turned into policy.)
Despite warmly commending Salander's fairness, the United States
had the longest list of reservations to the Chair's summary. On the
administration's behalf, Ambassador Wulf said they were pleased
that the impact and implications of September 11 had been reflected
and that IAEA safeguards, the additional protocol, nuclear energy
and so on had been recognised, but he complained that there was no
balance in the representation of nuclear energy and nuclear
disarmament concerns or between nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation issues. In response to the characterisation of
the debate on security assurances in the Chair's summary, Wulf
underlined that the US opposed the idea of a legally binding treaty
on negative security assurances. He also objected to the summary's
implication that the legal effect of the 1995 indefinite extension
of the NPT was linked with the Resolution on the Middle East
adopted at the same time, saying that the United States opposed any
new mechanisms for dealing with this issue.
Wulf also expressed disappointment with the reference and
characterisation of the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
and development of missile defence systems - the summary had
identified concerns that these steps could lead to a new arms race,
including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability
and international security. The US also objected to the reflection
of concerns about the possible development of new nuclear weapons,
telling delegates "not to confuse media reports with US policies".
The US further criticised the naming of individual countries
(referring to Israel in the sections on the Middle East) but then
went on to regret the inclusion of Iraq's assertion of its
compliance when it clearly stood in violation. (Echoing this point,
the UK also underlined that IAEA inspections do not substitute for
UN inspections under the relevant UN security council resolutions
relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.)
Russia agreed with the United States that terrorism and
proliferation constituted real and great dangers: "That is why
enhancement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction is the most important integral part of
combating terrorism". New measures to counteract new challenges and
threats should not compete with traditional disarmament and
non-proliferation aspects of security, but make them more
comprehensive. Amongst its list of measures to reduce its nuclear
arsenal, Russia emphasised its ratification of the CTBT and hoped
that the United States would reconsider its position to avoid a
"crisis" not only in the CTBT but in the related regimes based
around that treaty. Russia reiterated its objections to the US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, "guided by considerations of
maintenance and enhancement of international law foundations in the
area of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction".
Noting that it had ratified START II and agreed to reduce
strategic weapons to 1,700-2,200 warheads, Russia declared itself
"prepared to implement even more radical reductions". It devoted
several paragraphs to opposing the further militarisation and
placement of weapons in outer space, a step which it described as
"fraught with unpredictable consequences for the process of arms
control, strategic stability and international security as a
whole". Russia also devoted considerable time to spelling out
initiatives it was undertaking further to reduce its arsenal of
non-strategic nuclear weapons. In a familiar challenge to NATO,
which still deploys some 200 US tactical nuclear weapons in seven
European countries (six of which are designated non-nuclear-weapon
states), Russia proposed that "all the nuclear weapons should be
brought back to the territories of the nuclear states to which they
belong". A promise "to complete implementation of the initiatives
in the sphere of [non-strategic nuclear weapons] by 2004 on
condition of adequate financing" was welcomed by some, but the late
deadline and conditionality were regarded by others as a step
backwards.11
Remarking on the Chair's summary, Russia complained that general
criticisms of the nuclear-weapon states had failed to take into
account the considerable and specific steps Russia had undertaken
towards the "ultimate goal" of nuclear disarmament (exhibiting a
slip back into 1995 language which has actually been superseded by
the 2000 agreements). Russia also felt "unjustifiably little
attention" had been given to nuclear energy. Finally, touching on
the question of NGO participation, which had been raised by Canada,
Russia said that while NGOs could be beneficial, their
participation should be kept within current regulations.
Like others, China agreed that the prevention of nuclear
weapons proliferation and nuclear terror had become even more
important and urgent. In its statements, China reiterated its
familiar positions on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons,
no-first-use and its "minimum level" nuclear arsenal. With regard
to the NPT, China listed "new negative developments", noting (with
an obvious dig at the United States) that some important provisions
had been breached. Saying that the documents from the NPT review
process, especially from 1995 and 2000, must be "faithfully
implemented", China stated: "Nuclear-weapon states should continue
their moratoria on nuclear explosive tests, persevere with CTBT
ratification and entry into force, refrain from the development of
new types of nuclear weapons, and provide negative security
assurances to non-nuclear weapon states
unconditionally."12
Britain also enumerated all the positive steps it had
taken over the past decade. To these, and as proof of the UK's
commitment to irreversibility, Peter Jenkins, Britain's Ambassador
to the UN in Vienna, added the announcement that the UK's last
Chevaline warhead (from the obsolete Polaris system)
would be dismantled by the end of the month. The effect was spoiled
somewhat by reiteration of Her Majesty's Government's position that
"Having reduced our nuclear weapons to a single system at the
minimum level necessary for the UK's national security, further
unilateral steps we can take now without compromising that security
are limited". Such statements, which link nuclear weapons indelibly
with notions of national security, do not sit well with the 182
governments who have joined the NPT as NNWS and, in many cases,
assured their peoples that this decision has not undermined their
national security, and may indeed have enhanced it. Nor do such
linkages assist in efforts to devalue nuclear weapons, prevent
proliferation, and persuade India, Pakistan, and Israel to join the
NPT.
Underlining this assumed (and apparently unquestioned) national
security link for the third time in one paragraph, Jenkins repeated
the official UK position: "When we are satisfied that sufficient
progress has been made to allow us to include British nuclear
weapons in multilateral negotiations without endangering our
security interests, we will do so."13 Like the United
States, and following remarks by Britain's Secretary of State for
Defence, Geoff Hoon, in Parliament and the press14, the
UK delegation found it necessary to assure NPT colleagues that "we
remain fully committed to our declaration on Negative Security
Assurances in April 1995, as noted in UN Security Council
Resolution 984. Our policy has not changed."15
In the UK intervention following the Chair's summary, there were
complaints that Salander had not adequately reflected the steps
taken by Britain on Article VI, and that more weight could have
been given to the reaffirmation of negative security assurances.
The UK also wanted to put on record that the section on the
transportation of nuclear materials had not reflected UK views, and
then emphasised yet again that, as the Chair's personal assessment
of discussions, the summary was not binding on any states
parties.
Like the US, France placed emphasis on the need to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist
hands, but noted that "more international cooperation is
imperative", and that "multilateral non-proliferation and
disarmament regimes are indispensable", providing confidence and
predictability. France summarised various steps taken to reduce its
arsenal, despite what it viewed as an increasingly uncertain
international strategic context. Reiterating that its nuclear
deterrence was based on "the principle of strict sufficiency",
Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle declined to elaborate on what this
meant in relation to efforts to persuade NNWS and potential
proliferators that nuclear sufficiency for their security was set
at zero. Rather than discuss the concept in relation to the May
2000 undertaking to achieve the elimination of nuclear arsenals,
France reintroduced the objective of general and complete
disarmament as illustrative of the "principle of reality". Ignoring
the fact that these two qualitatively different disarmament aspects
of security had been delinked, first in the July 1996 advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and then in
the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, de la
Fortelle claimed that general and complete disarmament was
"inseparable from nuclear disarmament" and "must underpin the
nuclear disarmament process to ensure that the latter is carried
out in compliance with the principle of undiminished security for
all."16
France raised several objections to the Chair's summary,
particularly its lack of mention of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) and inadequate positive references to nuclear energy. France
did not think a new instrument on security assurances was required
and emphasised that it put safety first when transporting nuclear
materials around the world.
In its opening statement, supplemented by a more detailed
working paper, Egypt, on behalf of the New Agenda
Coalition gave a disappointed appraisal of progress in meeting
the commitments made in 2000. Reiterating that the principles of
transparency, verification and irreversibility should be applied to
all disarmament measures, the New Agenda called for the
nuclear-weapon states to provide legally binding security
assurances and make no-first-use commitments. In reference to the
mixed messages from the United States and Russia regarding the
proposals put forward at the Crawford Summit in November last year,
the New Agenda said they welcomed any reduction in the operational
status of deployed nuclear weapons, but underlined that such
measures "cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the
total elimination of nuclear weapons". Further reductions in
non-strategic nuclear weapons were identified as a priority, and
concerns were raised about missile defence developments and the
"risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space".17
In response to the Chair's factual summary, the New Agenda
Coalition reiterated that the NPT and its consensus commitments
constituted real undertakings, on which there could be no going
back. It called for greater interaction on the issues and supported
Canada's suggestions for intersessional work to improve the
accountability and responsiveness of the review process to deal
with the treaty's important subject matter.
Many of these points were reinforced in the interventions from
Indonesia, representing the views of more than 100
non-aligned states party to the NPT. Indonesia also stressed
the urgency and importance of achieving universality and full
compliance with the Treaty, underlining the importance - as
separate measures, and as a cohesive programme - of the 13 steps
and principles.
The EU statement gave emphasis to implementation of those
steps that it had particularly advocated in 2000, such as reduction
of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the principles of transparency
and irreversibility. It gave one of the more resounding
endorsements to the CTBT (which all EU members have ratified),
urging "all states with nuclear capabilities to abide by a
moratorium and refrain from any actions which are contrary to the
obligations and provisions of the CTBT". The EU also argued that
any bilateral strategic reductions agreed between Russia and the
United States should be "swiftly embodied into a legally binding
instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification
and transparency". The EU also issued copies of its September 21,
2001 conclusions on concrete measures relating to terrorism and
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.18
Since being included for the first time in the NPT 2000 Final
Document, non-strategic nuclear weapons are now clearly on the
disarmament agenda, especially among Europeans, with support and
ideas from several quarters. Of especial note were Germany's
proposals for confidence building measures and enhanced security
precautions, including reporting by Russia and the US on the
implementation of the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
Germany's recommendation that the Initiatives be formalised and
verified received further support, including a joint paper from
Finland and Sweden.
A second paper from Germany also sparked considerable
interest. Entitled "Attaining a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World", the
paper was introduced by Ambassador Volker Heinsberg as a conceptual
exploration of the pre-requisites for the complete and permanent
elimination of nuclear weapons, focussing on "a disaggregated and
reliable data exchange, effective verification and
non-circumvention" as well as enforcement. The idea of the data
exchange contributed to speculation that Germany might revive its
earlier proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Register, put forward in
1993 by then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Introducing Germany's
two working papers, Heinsberg stated: "The NPT is no licence to
perpetuate the status of the nuclear 'haves' versus the nuclear
'have nots'. By way of an incremental approach we must make
determined, steady and irreversible progress towards achieving the
total elimination of nuclear weapons."19
Inevitably, particularly in light of the terrible events
unfolding in the Middle East, Israel's continued possession of
nuclear weapons was strongly condemned, mainly but not exclusively
by Arab delegations. Less was said about India and Pakistan, which
had shocked the world with nuclear tests in May 1998. Where the EU
remained "deeply concerned" about South Asia and called on India
and Pakistan to meet the requirements of UN SC 1172 (June
1998)20, the United States seemed to set a tone of
acquiescence, calling only for "restraint" in the nuclear
programmes of the non-NPT parties, and calling on them to "protect
against the proliferation of technology and materials to others
seeking nuclear weapons".21
Most of the non-nuclear-weapon states expressed warm
appreciation to Salander for his effective chairing and balanced
summary. In addition, Japan made a special point of
emphasising that the CTBT had received overwhelming support and its
conclusion was recognised as a milestone underpinning the NPT and
its extension. Japan also wanted to stress the importance of the
universality of the IAEA additional protocols and gave notice of
its plan to organise a conference on this in Tokyo. Ambassador
Yukiya Amano agreed with a reservation expressed by South Korea
about the Chair's summary's characterisation of DPRK compliance
questions and the 1994 Agreed Framework. He also wanted to record
that Japan complies with international standards when transporting
nuclear materials and that any regulations should be without
prejudice to rights of free maritime passage. Finally, Amano
highlighted Japan's support for disarmament and non-proliferation
education, a new issue raised at this PrepCom and mentioned in the
Chair's summary.22
Conclusion
Having overcome the risk of deadlock in its first week over
opposition by the United States and France to the inclusion of
reporting requirements in the work programme, the first PrepCom for
the 2005 Review Conference appeared to proceed and conclude rather
smoothly. In fact, the apparently low key statements and debates
masked a mounting degree of frustration about policy developments
in key nuclear weapon states that are inconsistent with the NPT and
consensus agreements undertaken as part of the Treaty's review
process in 1995 and 2000. The frustration, expressed in the
corridors of the UN, but seldom in the meeting itself, at times
fuelled angry comments about having been cheated by nuclear-weapon
state promises in 1995 and 2000, while others expressed concern
that if states began to view the NPT review process as futile they
would lose confidence in the wider non-proliferation and
disarmament regimes that underpin international security. States
parties have a year before the next PrepCom to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the review process and determine how they want it
to function and what they want it to achieve. By past experience,
when the first PrepCom has covered over the cracks, the second
proves a much rougher ride.
Musical Endnote
In their concluding remarks, the ambassadors of Austria and the
United Kingdom had both expressed their relief (or was it
disappointment?) that since the Chair's summary had gone through
without a hitch, Salander (a chart-topper during the 1970s in
Sweden) would not have to carry out his threat to sing the summary.
But Salander, after sitting through the litany of reservations and
final comments, decided to have the last note. Having guided the
PrepCom through to as good a conclusion as most considered possible
under the circumstances, the Chair made some gracious remarks about
the quality of papers and interventions, applauded the NGOs for
informative and thought-provoking contributions, and thanked the
Secretariat and everyone concerned for their hard work and support.
He then produced his guitar. This is unusual, unprecedented even,
for a Chair in a UN meeting, and many in the room looked decidedly
nervous. They needn't have been, for with consummate
professionalism, Salander had perfectly fitted his song to his
audience.
The tune was Paul McCartney's "Yesterday", the words were
Salander's own:
Summary
On only my responsibility
So full of endless possibility
Oh I believe in "Summary"
Suddenly
I'm not half the Chair I used to be
No more shadow hanging over me
oh "Summary" came suddenly
Why did it have to be so correct and
factual?
Why not try to say something bold and actua-a-al?
Summary
All my troubles seem so far away
Now I need a place to hide away
Oh I believe in "Summary"
Notes and References
1. Most of the statements to the PrepCom
were scanned and can be obtained from the website of the British
American Security Information Council (BASIC), http://www.basicint.org. Selected
documentation is available on the website of the Acronym Institute
for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt. For UN
coverage and background information, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/NPT/2005/index.html.
2. Statement by Ambassador Norman A. Wulf,
representative of the United States of America, to the first
session of the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 8, 2002.
3. Statement by Ambassador Eric M. Javits,
permanent representative of the United States of America to the
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, delivered to the NPT PrepCom,
Article VI "special time", April 11, 2002.
4. The CTBT was enshrined in the preamble
of both the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the NPT when it
was signed in 1968. Endorsement by all the NPT parties of the US
Senate requirement to conclude a CTBT by September 30, 1996 was
viewed as an indispensable part of the bargain that brought about
the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and a further clear
statement of support for the CTBT's early entry into force was
included as the first of 13 steps identified in the plan of action
on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2000 NPT Review
Conference.
5. Article VI, paragraph 15, subparagraph
12 referred to the provision of "Regular reports, within the
framework of the strengthened review process...on the
implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) [1995]... and
recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice on 8 July, 1996". A similar commitment to reporting was
made with regard to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
(paragraph 16, subparagraph 7).
6. Salander had warned that if the
relevant objectors failed to find a solution by Friday, he would
table his second "and final" proposal for a timetable, giving them
until Monday to agree or come up with an acceptable
alternative.
7. For more discussion of the provision on
subsidiary bodies and debate about this in 1998 and 1999, see
Rebecca Johnson, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Challenging
Times, ACRONYM 13 (London: The Acronym Institute, February
2000) pp. 25-26.
8. US Nuclear Posture Review, January 2002
(excerpts), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
9. 3. Statement by Ambassador Eric M.
Javits, Article VI "special time", April 11, 2002.
10. Nuclear Posture Review (see note
8).
11. Statements by the delegation of the
Russian Federation, to the first session of the Preparatory
Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 8
and April 11, 2002.
12. Statement by Ambassador Hu Xaiodi,
Head of the Chinese delegation, to the first session of the
Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, April 8, 2002.
13. Statement by Ambassador Peter Jenkins,
Acting Head of the UK delegation, to the first session of the
Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, April 9, 2002.
14. See Britain's nuclear warning to
Saddam, The Times, March 21, 2002, and News Review in
this issue of Disarmament
Diplomacy.
15. Intervention by David Broucher, Head
of the UK delegation, to the first session of the Preparatory
Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April
12, 2002.
16. Intervention de M. Hubert de la
Fortelle, Ambassadeur, chef de la Délégation
Française a l'Occasion du Debat Général de la
Premiere Session du Comite Preparatoire de la Conférence
d'Examen du TNP de 2005, April 8, 2002.
17. Statement by Ambassador Mahmoud
Mubarak, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Multilateral
Relations of the Arab Republic of Egypt on behalf of the
delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South
Africa and Sweden, to the first session of the Preparatory
Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 8,
2002; and New Agenda Coalition Paper,
NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/9.
18. Statements by H.E. Mr Carlos Miranda,
ambassador of Spain to the Conference on Disarmament, on behalf of
the European Union, to the first session of the Preparatory
Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 8
and 15, 2002, including annex on Draft Council conclusions on list
of concrete measures with regard to the implications of the
terrorist threat on the non-proliferation, disarmament and arms
control policy of the European Union, September 21,
2001.
19. Statement by Ambassador Volker
Heinsbert, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of
Germany, to the first session of the Preparatory Committee Meeting
for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 11,
2002.
20. Statement by H.E. Mr Carlos Miranda,
on behalf of the European Union, at the first session of the
Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, April 8, 2002.
21. Statement by Ambassador Norman A.
Wulf, April 8, 2002.
22. The quotes from Ambassador Yukiya
Amano, as with all paraphrasing and quoting from the concluding
statements of delegations after adoption of the PrepCom's report
and in response to the Chair's factual summary, are from the
author's contemporaneous notes of the final session.
Rebecca Johnson is
Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament
Diplomacy.
Appendix
Chairman's Factual
Summary
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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
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