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Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 66, September 2002

News Review

US Hails Post-ABM Era as Moscow Treaty Comes Under Spotlight

On June 13, the US completed its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, clearing the major political and legal obstacle to the development of a national missile defence (NMD) system designed to protect US territory against limited ballistic missile attack.

The following day, as expected, Russia announced itself no longer bound by the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) II Treaty. The treaty, signed in 1993 but never fully ratified, detailed the verified reduction of strategic warheads per side to 3,500-3,000 by 2007. It was superseded by the Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty, signed in the Russian capital on May 24 (see last issue). The Moscow Treaty commits each side to a strategic warhead ceiling of 2,200-1,700 by 2012. The accord, however, has attracted criticism for lacking verification mechanisms, requiring the destruction of no warheads or missiles, and allowing large, readily-deployable reserve forces.

As the ABM Treaty officially expired, a statement from President Bush heralded the dawn of a new arms control era:

"Six months ago, I announced that the United States was withdrawing from the...ABM Treaty, and today that withdrawal formally takes effect. With the Treaty now behind us, our task is to develop and deploy effective defenses against limited missile attacks. As the events of September 11 made clear, we no longer live in the Cold War world for which the ABM Treaty was designed. We now face new threats from terrorists who seek to destroy our civilization by any means available to rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Defending the American people against these threats is my highest priority as Commander-in-Chief. ... I am committed to deploying a missile defense system as soon as possible to protect the American people and our deployed forces against the growing missile threats we face. Because these threats also endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them, an important task which the ABM Treaty prohibited. The United States will deepen our dialogue and cooperation with other nations on missile defenses. Last month, President Vladimir Putin and I agreed that Russia and the United States would look for ways to cooperate on missile defenses, including expanding military exercises, sharing early-warning data, and exploring potential joint research and development of missile defense technologies. Over the past year, our countries have worked hard to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and to dismantle its structures. The United States and Russia are building a new relationship based on common interests and, increasingly, common values. Under the Treaty of Moscow, the nuclear arsenals of our nations will be reduced to their lowest levels in decades. Cooperation on missile defense will also make an important contribution to furthering the relationship we both seek."

On June 14, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, writing in the Wall Street Journal, sketched out the main features of the new missile defence landscape:

"We need to defend against all avenues of attack with weapons of mass destruction. Missiles in the hands of states that support terrorism are a growing threat to the US and our friends and allies. We've watched rogue states invest scarce resources to acquire increasingly capable missiles even while they starve their people. Until yesterday, because of the ABM treaty, we have not been able to develop appropriate defenses against this threat. We are at a turning point in defense and deterrence policy. We can now move forward with the robust development and testing program that the Department of Defense has designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes. Recent tests provide a foundation on which to proceed. Development and testing will continue, but we will also begin to deploy effective layered defenses against limited missile attack. Tomorrow, the US will break ground in Alaska on silos to house missile-defense interceptors. These silos, scheduled to be completed in 2004, are part of our test program but could give us, for the first time, an emergency capability to protect our country in a crisis. We are determined to improve these initial defenses over time, building additional silos there and possibly in other locations for operational deployment of ground-based interceptors. This week, the US is also testing an interceptor from a Navy destroyer against a missile off the coast of Hawaii - a needed step toward deployment of sea-based missile defenses. If our testing and development efforts progress as planned, we should be able to begin initial deployments of sea-based interceptors in the 2004-2005 period. We will soon reach another milestone in our pursuit of advanced technologies for missile defenses as well. The prototype Airborne Laser is scheduled to attempt to shoot down a target missile. If successful, the program could represent a major advance in missile-defense capabilities. In addition to limiting development and deployment, the ABM treaty prohibited us from sharing and working on missile defense with other nations. The President is committed to working closely with them now to address the shared threat we face and helping to extend missile-defense protection to our friends and allies. Over the coming weeks and months, the administration will open a new phase of dialogue on the issue. We will explore ways to deepen existing cooperative efforts and begin new joint programs to develop missile-defense systems."

The same day, Russia's statement of disassociation from the START II Treaty was noticeably less celebratory in tone:

"In May 2000, the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty Between Russia and the USA on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty), and the ABM Treaty-related New York understandings of September 26, 1997. There was mutual understanding with the American side that the USA would act similarly. This would have made it possible to realize the important agreements concerning the strategic offensive and defensive arms of the two countries. But the USA refused to ratify the START II Treaty and the New York understandings. Moreover, on June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, with the result that this international legal act, which served for three decades as the cornerstone of strategic stability, has ceased to be in force. Taking into account the aforesaid actions of the USA and proceeding from the provisions of the Federal Law on Ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation notes the absence of any prerequisites for the entry of the START II Treaty into force, and does not consider itself bound any longer by the obligation under international law to refrain from any actions which could deprive this Treaty of its object and goal."

Most Russian comment on the demise of ABM/START II made little or no comment on the prospects for enhanced missile defence cooperation with Washington, emphasising instead the unthreatening nature of US missile defence plans for the foreseeable future. Although the Moscow Treaty would entitle Russia to reconfigure its strategic forces as it saw fit - for example, by deploying multiple-armed warheads on its land-based missiles, a practice START II sought to eliminate - officials stressed that no short-term action was necessary to maintain a broad strategic balance. As senior Defence Department official Major-General Yevgeny Buzhinsky observed (June 13): "This step by Washington [to withdraw from the ABM Treaty] is regarded in Moscow as an error, but no reason for drama, as the United States is not seen presently as a threat to Russia's security." On June 14, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov stated: "The missile defence system as yet has only a virtual, not a real, existence. Therefore, there are no grounds for talking about retaliatory measures". The same say, a resolution adopted by the Duma described the ABM withdrawal as a "grave political mistake", while asserting that Russia's post-START II freedom of nuclear manoeuvre would allow the country to "limit the damage done to strategic stability" and "react in a timely manner to US moves to deploy the missile defence system". The resolution further noted, however, that Washington's declared intent to maintain a large strategic nuclear reserve force was likely to "feed the parties' growing distrust about the fulfillment of mutual obligations and weaken their adherence to the agreed cuts in [deployed] strategic nuclear forces".

On June 20, President Bush submitted the Moscow Treaty to the Senate, urging that "prompt and favourable consideration" be given to its ratification. In his letter of submission, the President declared:

"The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break through the long impasse in further nuclear weapons reductions caused by the inability to finalize agreements through traditional arms control efforts. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries' strategic nuclear arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United States and Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship. On May 1, 2001, I called for a new framework for our strategic relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear weapons to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over. On November 13, 2001, I announced the United States plan for such cuts - to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade. I announced these planned reductions following a careful study within the Department of Defense. That study, the Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were sufficient to maintain the security of the United States. In reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be preferable for the United States to make such reductions on a reciprocal basis with Russia, but that the United States would be prepared to proceed unilaterally. My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded immediately and made clear that he shared these goals. President Putin and I agreed that our nations' respective reductions should be recorded in a legally binding document that would outlast both of our presidencies and provide predictability over the longer term. The result is a Treaty that was agreed without protracted negotiations. This Treaty fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions."

On June 21, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement recorded simply that "today...the Treaty text and article-by-article commentaries thereto were sent to the related committees of the State Duma and Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation."

Senate hearings on the Treaty opened on July 9 with testimony from Secretary of State Powell to the Foreign Relations Committee. Powell stated that the US planned to reduce the total number of strategic warheads - both deployed and in reserve - to around 4,600 by 2012. Such a total would include at least 2,400 reserve warheads, assuming a maximum operationally-deployed SOR Treaty figure of 2,200. The current total stockpile is estimated at around 6,000 warheads, suggesting the destruction of around 1,400 warheads over the next ten years. In the perhaps ironic words of Committee Chair Joseph Biden (Democrat) - an advocate of the systematic destruction of warheads withdrawn from deployment - it is at least "welcome that they're going to destroy something". The Secretary of State's ballpark projection, however, was cast into some doubt when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared before the Committee on July 17 (see below). Describing Powell's figure as "theoretical", Rumsfeld cautioned: "We ought not to get 4,600 chipped into concrete".

In his defence of the Treaty, Powell was quick to point out that previous US-Russia strategic nuclear reduction accords - while containing detailed limits on the permissible configuration of deployed forces, and requiring the destruction of delivery systems - did not specify the elimination of warheads removed from service. Such destruction was, however, adopted as a guiding principle for START III reductions to 2,500-2,000 warheads per side, agreed in outline by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Helsinki in 1997. In another departure, the START III guidelines mandated negotiations on non-strategic (tactical or 'battlefield') nuclear reductions, an area controversially omitted from the Moscow Treaty. Powell also coupled his praise of the Treaty's flexibility with muted concern about the unpredictable post-START II evolution of the Russian nuclear arsenal:

"During the course of the negotiations, we proposed a detailed definition of 'operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads', but we did not achieve it and so the Treaty does not contain such detail. Nor did President Putin state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions. During the negotiations, the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers in a manner similar to the counting concepts in the START Treaties. Should Russia elect to achieve the 1,700-2,200 warhead level in this way, or by using the US method, the result in either case will limit the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for immediate use. Russia is also free to choose another method for making its required reductions. Some have expressed concern that the Moscow Treaty does not require the destruction of warheads. No previous arms control treaty - SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation], START or INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] - has required warhead elimination. Contrary to what was frequently reported in the press, the Russians did not propose a regime for verifiable warhead elimination during the negotiations. Given the uncertainties we face, and the fact that we, unlike Russia, do not manufacture new warheads, the United States needs the flexibility to retain warheads removed from operational deployment to meet unforeseen future contingencies and possible technical problems with the stockpile. That said, the Moscow Treaty does not prevent the United States and Russia from eliminating warheads and we anticipate that both Parties will continue to do so. For our part, some of these warheads will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed. Economics, our new strategic relationship with Russia, obsolescence, and the overall two-thirds cut in US and Russian inventories mandated by the Treaty will undoubtedly result in continued warhead elimination. The Treaty is also highly flexible in other ways. Within the bounds of the aggregate limit on numbers of strategic nuclear warheads, each side is free to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. As I noted earlier, the Treaty does not limit the total number of strategic delivery vehicles or contain either numerical sublimits or bans on categories of forces. We saw no strategic need for such limits given our new relationship with Russia and the low levels of forces to which both sides will reduce."

In his July 17 appearance, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was likewise forced to counter criticism about the treaty's lack of provision for the elimination of either warheads or delivery systems. Rumsfeld raised a fundamental objection to the concept of 'irreversible' reductions: "This charge is based on a flawed premise - that irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons are possible. In point of fact, there is no such thing as an irreversible reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons exists - and there is no possibility that knowledge will be lost. Every reduction is reversible, given enough time and money." Rumsfeld also praised the lack of verification provisions: "we saw no need for including detailed verification measures in the treaty. First, there simply isn't any way on earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Second, we don't need to. Neither side has an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since it simply codifies unilaterally announced reductions - and gives both sides broad flexibility in implementing them. Third, we saw no benefit in creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where US and Russian officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity - not to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century."

Notwithstanding this devotion to the apparent post-START maxim of 'trust, don't verify', Rumsfeld, pressed by Biden, further told the Committee that the US had pressed Russia to discuss transparency arrangements to fill the three-year gap between the expiration of the verification regime established under the START I treaty (2009) and the implementation of the Moscow Treaty reductions (2012):

"Biden: 'I'd like to go back to this notion of need to verify, the need not to verify. ... You went and explained...in a very lucid manner why there was really no need for verification. You were going to go down to this number anyway. It was in our own interest to go down to this number. And we would have gone down to this number over this period of time regardless of whether or not the Russians were willing to go down to this number. ... [But] does it really not matter that you, that we can't verify any of this? ... Or...would we have been better off had we been able to verify or entered into some kind of agreement where we could fill in that gap of knowledge about what they have?'

Rumsfeld: 'That's a fair question. And let me answer it in several ways. First of all, the START treaty is in effect, and according to its terms, we do have those verification [procedures]...'

Biden: 'Let me make sure - but there's a three-year gap there.'

Rumsfeld: '... Exactly. But between now and '09...there's plenty of time to sort through we'll do thereafter. Second, we do have national technical means. Third, we have agreed that we will meet and work through improved transparency and predictability with the Russians. Now, will we be able to do something that's better than the START treaty? I hope so. Do we have a number of years that we can work on that? Yes. And we're starting in [Washington in] September [at the first meeting of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established in May]. So I think that that is not something that...ought to in any way stand in way of approving the treaty. ...'

Biden: '[D]id our desire not to have more stringent verification regimes as related to our systems play any part in not seeking additional verification capability beyond START I provisions that exist that could apply to the Moscow Treaty?'

Rumsfeld: 'The answer's flat no. Indeed we repeatedly raised verification and transparency and predictability issues. And the Cold War mindset felt that there simply wasn't time to do that, it's so laborious and difficult and thick. ... But I still believe we will end up having serious discussions about this, and we may even find better ways. The reason for transparency is that it develops confidence. ... We did try. In other words, we did have this whole series of meetings: at the [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith and [Undersecretary of State John] Bolton levels, at the Rumsfeld and Sergey Ivanov and at Colin's level with Igor Ivanov, we had a series of meetings. And for whatever reason, just getting what we got done consumed the time. We raised it, we pushed it and we're interested in it, in greater transparency and predictability, and we have alerted them and they're fully aware of it. We're going to be raising it right back up again in September.'

Biden: 'This is a welcome transformation, but, I mean, to have Bolton and Feith trusting like this is really amazing. This is an epiphany. These are the same guys who spent hours of my time beating my brains out about why we were going to take all those [risks] in the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Treaty. They're going to hide all these missiles in garages and roll them back out... And now, heck, we're going to sign a treaty we don't even worry we're able, you know, to verify for three years and we don't question why they won't be willing to let us verify. I think that's called being born again.'"

Expressing himself frustrated by such exchanges, Biden amusingly defended his support for speedy ratification of the accord: "[T]he only questions I have remaining relate to not again whether or not we should ratify this treaty. ... [B]ecause, you know, some press person said to me, 'Well, Biden, if you have these concerns about these things that could happen, why are you for the treaty?' And I said, 'You know, it's kind of...a little like my car breaking down in the desert 20 miles from...the nearest town. Someone comes along and says, "Hey, look, I can give you a ride for four miles".' Get me four miles closer, I'm for it. This gets us four miles closer or whatever, so I'm for it. But I hope it's not the end of the ride. I hope we're going to be doing more and I expect that you may attempt in terms of transparency and other things."

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 25, the Defense Secretary returned to his theme of unprecedented levels of trust between Washington and Moscow, rendering the Moscow Treaty a prudent and well-considered step, mixed oddly with concerns over predictability and transparency: "There's no question that, even today, Russia is not transparent. They have a very secretive approach to a great deal of things. It is a concern. We're a good distance from feeling comfortable." On July 28, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, reportedly responding to Rumsfeld's comments, insisted that Moscow had unsuccessfully pressed for more systematic verification, control, transparency and irreversibility measures to be included in the Moscow Treaty: "We have felt no response from our negotiating partners", Ivanov complained.

Rumsfeld's July 25 testimony set out a number of funding and programme conditions to be met in order for the US to implement the reductions set out in the new accord: "Our decision to proceed with reductions as deep as the one outlined in the Moscow Treaty is premised on decisions to invest in a number of other critical areas, programs that are...recommended in our 2003 budget." In the Secretary's summation, these "critical areas" include a fully-funded missile defence programme and enhancements to the survivability of US space assets. "Investments in these and many other transformational capabilities in the 2003 budget", Rumsfeld concluded, "should allow the US over time to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the deep nuclear reductions contained in the Treaty."

Questioning Rumsfeld, Committee Chair Carl Levin (Democrat) echoed Biden's characterisation of the Treaty as a flawed half-measure: "The Treaty is certainly somewhat unusual. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads between 1,700 and 2,200 some ten years from now, apparently just for one day at that moment, when the Treaty then expires". Levin nonetheless expressed the hope, as have Russian officials, that the treaty might mark the beginning of a more meaningful process, asking: "Can this treaty provide an opportunity for the United States to make real reductions in nuclear weapons - not just the number of weapons deployed, but the total number of nuclear weapons? Can this treaty provide an opportunity for the United States to rethink its nuclear weapons employment policy so that nuclear weapons are seen as weapons of last resort? Can this treaty provide an opportunity to establish new multilateral approaches to dealing with and reducing weapons of mass destruction?"

Meanwhile, controversy continues to swirl around the technical viability and required level of funding for Washington's ambitious post-ABM missile defence agenda. An overarching concern is the ability of Congress to make an accurate, comprehensive assessment of progress. In a special Pentagon briefing on June 25, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), defended the need for extensive secrecy, insisting it would not constrain appropriate political debate:

"Question: 'Can you explain the decision that was made three weeks ago not to review information about countermeasures and so on beforehand and even after [tests]...?'

Kadish: 'In regard to the idea of classifying our work in terms of countermeasures now...I think the basic answer to that is, is that we're to the point in our testing where we are going to aggressively pursue what we can do against countermeasures, and that might and has a great possibility now to be a part of a war-fighting system, a defensive system, whether that's part of the testbed or any follow-on activity. And once we reach that point, there is no responsible individual that would make that type of information available to our adversaries so they can defeat our system. And in my view, this was the proper time to start classifying those details. That doesn't mean that those people who need to know what we have as a part of that process won't have access to it; they will. There are a lot of people responsible. But we will not give our adversaries a free ride as we develop the system.'

Question: 'But how will members of Congress, the public, how will people know...the level of success you're having...?'

Lt. Gen. Kadish: 'We have a very important responsibility to make sure that the Congress and our elected representatives and the administration decision makers know what the system can actually do, and we will fulfil that responsibility. It will be done in a different way in terms of the way we handle classified information against any system that we have in the inventory. What will be important for people to know is that the decisions on to move forward on specific elements will be based on factual information, based on the test results, about what it is they are able to do. And people should have confidence in that. Exactly how they do it will be closely held not to give our adversaries an advantage. And that's no different than any other military system.'"

Kadish's reasoning met with a mixed reception. On June 26, for example, a strongly-worded editorial in USA Today countered: "During the 1991 Gulf War, Americans watched US Patriot missiles intercept Iraqi Scuds as they hurtled in the night sky toward Israel. An American success story for the anti-missile system, it seemed. But the US Army's initial claim of a near-perfect 'hit' record for the Patriot proved false. Ted Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examined TV tapes and concluded that the Patriot missed virtually all of its targets. Other critics agreed, and the Pentagon has since revised down the Patriot's success rate. Today, the kind of independent review that Postol conducted is at risk. The Defense Department acknowledged this month that it has pulled the plug on disclosing the results of missile defense tests to the public. Absent such analysis, the public will have to take the Pentagon's word on whether its missile defense tests are working. That's asking too much. On June 15, the Defense Department began building a major missile defense facility at Fort Greely, Alaska, the first step in what could become part of a larger system costing $238 billion by 2025, according to Congressional budget experts. Before deciding whether to foot such a huge bill, taxpayers deserve assurances beyond the Pentagon's word that the system works. The Pentagon says it needs a secrecy shroud because revealing details about successful tests and failures would tip off enemies trying to overcome a missile defense. That's a valid argument. At some point, the Pentagon will want to conceal the vulnerabilities of a missile defense system. But the program is nowhere near that point."

The same day, in the same newspaper, Pete Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, objects to the "groundless charges" of unwarranted secrecy, arguing: "These precautions reflect the common sense evolution of any national defense program making rapid progress in time of war. On June 14, our obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ended, and our testing program can now proceed. What could be a more appropriate time to tighten security? Doing so is sensible, not sinister."

After protracted wrangling, on June 26 the Senate unanimously agreed to provide the President with an additional $814 million of funding to be spent, at his discretion, on missile defence priorities and/or counter-terrorism measures. The move followed a move by the Armed Services Committee to cut $814 million from the Pentagon's Fiscal Year 2003 $7.6 billion missile defence budget request; the Committee recommended that the sum be spent instead on other military and counter-terrorism projects. In allowing Presidential discretion with regard to the funds, Senate Democrat Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (June 26) made clear his preferred course of action: "How could anyone think we are more likely to be a target of a ballistic missile attack than another terrorist incident?" Pentagon officials, however, predict a significant retardation of missile defence efforts should any meaningful portion of the $814 million sum be diverted.

The Senate measure, part of the gargantuan $393 billion Defense Appropriations Bill, stands sharply at odds with House authorisation of additional funding for missile defence. Reconciliation of the two versions will fall to the House-Senate Conference Committee following the summer recess.

Notes: the relationship between the offensive and defensive sides of the nuclear equation was brought into structural focus on June 25 with the announcement of plans to merge the Pentagon's Strategic and Space Commands. Currently, Strategic Command (StratCom) is responsible for the deployment and operation of US strategic nuclear forces, while Space Command (SpaceCom) is set to emerge as a central component of the country's missile defence warning, tracking and interceptor infrastructure. According to officials, responding to a report on the plan in the New York Times, the new integrated Command has yet to be designated a title but does have a probable commander - Admiral James Ellis, the current head of StratCom. An unnamed Pentagon official told Reuters (June 25): "I know it sounds like an esoteric corporate merger. But it's important in the post-September [11] world to marry warning and response".

On July 1, Alexei Arbatov, Vice Chair of the Duma's State Committee for Defence, expressed deep scepticism over US expressions of interest in missile defence cooperation with Russia. Addressing a press conference, Arbatov stated: "We cannot retain relations of mutual deterrence when...both of us try to maintain the deterrence potential through the possibility of a joint strike, and at the same time jointly create [a] missile defence, at least a strategic one... Joint missile defence presupposes a close military-political alliance, closer than the alliance between the US and its NATO allies. ... [In addition, US companies] want these contracts all for themselves... [Any minor cooperation will be] political advertising". Speaking at the same briefing, former senior Defence Ministry official Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov observed: "The technological parametres of the US ABM system are, above all, anti-Russian and anti-Chinese."

Related material on Acronym website:

Reports: Text - Bush pledges greater dialogue, cooperation on missile defense, Washington File, June 13; Russians downplay significance of end to ABM Treaty, Associated Press, June 13; Beyond the ABM Treaty, by Paul Wolfowitz, Wall Street Journal, June 14; On legal status of the Treaty between Russia and the USA on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1221-14-06-2002, June 14; Russia withdraws from defunct START II nuclear arms treaty, Associated Press, June 14; Moscow plays down threat of US missile defense, Reuters, June 14; Anti-missile work begins in Alaska, Associated Press, June 15; Text - Bush sends new arms reduction treaty to Senate for ratification, Washington File, June 20; On preparations for ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1280-21-06-2002, June 21; Special briefing on missile defense, The Pentagon, June 25, 2002, US Department of Defense transcript; New command would meld missile defense and offense, New York Times, June 25; US to cloak missile defense tests in secrecy, Reuters, June 25; Pentagon to merge space, strategic commands, Reuters, June 25; Pentagon policy wrongly shields missile-defense data, USA Today, June 26; Tight security makes sense, USA Today, June 26; Pentagon expedites missile defense plan, Washington Times, June 26; Pentagon creating a new military command to combine space and nuclear operations, Associated Press, June 26; Senate acts on missile defense - sort of, Council for a Livable World, June 26; Wolfowitz decries missile defense cuts approved in 2003 budget, DefenseNews.com, June 27; Missile defense funding increased, Washington Post, June 27; House shifts $30 million from space-based interceptors to airborne laser, Aerospace Daily, June 28; Budget increases for Pentagon pass easily, New York Times, June 28; Joint missile defense program unlikely, Russian official says, Global Security Newswire, July 2; Powell says US plans to cut total strategic warheads to 4,600, Washington File, July 9; Text - Powell urges quick Senate action on Moscow Treaty, Washington File, July 9; Under treaty, US to keep 2,400 reserve warheads, USA Today, July 10; Treaty on strategic offensive reductions is an important step, but more must be done, Biden says, Senator Joseph Biden Press Release, July 17; Senators expect approval of US-Russia arms treaty, Reuters, July 17; United States should press for more cuts, security for Russia's nukes, Senators say, Associated Press, July 17; US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 17, 2002, US Department of Defense transcript; Text - Rumsfeld urges Senate to consent on Moscow Treaty, Washington File, July 18; Senators want more Russia arms cuts, Associated Press, July 19; US seeks more Russia nuclear info, Associated Press, July 25; Rumsfeld lowers bar for Moscow Treaty withdrawal, Global Security Newswire, July 26; Report - Russian defense minister rebuffs US criticism about transparency on arms reductions, Associated Press, July 28; Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov meets with US Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1547-30-07-2002, July 30; Missile defense program changes course, Washington File, August 5; Boeing, Raytheon will build US radar station in Alaska, Wall Street Journal, August 5; Officials praise nuclear reductions treaty for requiring no cuts, Global Security Newswire, August 5.

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