Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 68, December 2002 - January
2003
First Committee Report
Anxiety, Hope and Cynicism:
The 2002 UN First Committee
By Fiona Simpson
See also: Appendix: Summary of
Resolutions
Introduction
The deliberations of the United Nations (UN) First Committee
(International Security and Disarmament), which began on September
30 and continued until October 29, involved a general debate and
the consideration of fifty resolutions and two decisions, the
results of which were frequently straightforward and occasionally
surprising.1 Chaired this year by Ambassador Matia
Mulumba Semakula Kiwanuka of Uganda, the Committee demonstrated a
curious amalgam of hopefulness and cynicism. Hopefulness, because
of continued progress in the areas of small arms and light weapons
(SALW), nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), the accession of Cuba to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and
the new US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) or
Moscow Treaty. Cynicism, because of the continued paralysis in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD), concern that the nuclear-weapons
states (NWS) of the NPT were not only failing to move forward on
their disarmament commitments but were, rather, retreating from
them, and because the Moscow Treaty was viewed as a poor substitute
for genuinely irreversible and verifiable reductions of nuclear
weapons. The "Thirteen Steps" on nuclear disarmament, agreed as
part of the consensus Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, were viewed by some as having been abandoned in all but
name. In addition, the penultimate week of the Committee meeting
took place alongside the apparent revelation by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it was actively pursuing
nuclear weapons in spite of being a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS)
party to the NPT. (Interestingly, it was a full week before Germany
became the first state in the Committee to actually broach the
DPRK's violations of its treaty obligations.) A decade after the
end of the cold war, the allying of former Soviet bloc states with
the United States is clearly visible in the voting patterns.
Moreover, recent NATO applicants from the former Eastern bloc are
even more keen to demonstrate their loyalty to US positions than
some long-time NATO members and allies. On a number of resolutions,
the voting reflects a basic political divide between the Movement
of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and this enlarged "Western" caucus, led
by the United States.
The resolutions themselves echoed the mixed emotions which
infused the First Committee. As usual, many were repeat versions
from previous years, with slight and often insignificant updating.
Others, however, contained more significant changes. Last year, the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been addressed as
a procedural decision, which the United States nevertheless
insisted on voting against. This year, delegates were resigned to
seeing the US again oppose the CTBT resolution. The New Agenda
Coalition (NAC) - comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, South Africa and Sweden - tabled two resolutions this
year. One, which attempted to address reductions of non-strategic
nuclear weapons, evoked opposition from some NWS, backed largely by
NATO and NATO wannabe states. The other, a resolution on the need
for a new nuclear disarmament agenda, was again juxtaposed against
Japan's usual resolution on a path to the elimination of nuclear
weapons - and, once again disagreement about the real meaning of
the legacy of the NPT 2000 agreement prevented the sponsors of one
giving support to the other.
One of the more controversial and yet least surprising events
(in the wake of recent confrontations with Iraq) was the United
States' decision to put forward a resolution on compliance with
arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The
wording of this resolution, which had not been put forward since
1997, caused concern among many and, although it was eventually
adopted without a vote, served to reinforce the prevailing
scepticism regarding the disarmament commitments of the NWS.
Other resolutions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remained
much the same as last year. The resolution on biological weapons
put forward by Hungary remained as a procedural decision for the
second year. Chemical weapons were once again addressed in a
resolution co-sponsored by Canada and Poland, which was again
adopted without a vote.
The following report comprises an overview of the whole of the
First Committee's meeting, from the General Debate to a general
synopsis of the main resolutions and discussions. Attached is an
appendix which incorporates a summary of the fifty resolutions and
two procedural decisions, the outcome of the votes in both the
First Committee and General Assembly, where relevant, a brief
discussion of any debate which followed their adoption or
rejection.
General Debate
Last year, the UN First Committee met in the immediate aftermath
of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Although
more than a year has now passed, the events of September 11th once
again permeated the Committee's General Debate (September
30-October 10). Terrorism, thematically speaking, made an
appearance in nearly all of the 91 statements - in particular, the
possibility of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), a threat powerfully addressed at the outset of the debate by
Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala. Of perhaps greater
significance, however, was the palpable concern that, in the desire
to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists,
multilateral regimes, institutions and the underlying tenets of
multilateralism itself were being sacrificed on the altar of what
might be termed "selective unilateralism" - a willingness to
exercise arbitrary military might and political pressure when
frustrations arise in the multilateral sphere. Numerous delegations
were thus careful to emphasise their conviction that
multilateralism provided the best framework for confronting these
issues, and to warn of the dangerous contradiction between support,
on the one hand, for non-proliferation regimes and, on the other,
unilateral solutions to the problems facing these regimes.
There was, equally, recognition that the situation was not
completely gloomy and that headway had been made. Cuba's decision,
announced at the General Assembly on September 14, to accede to the
NPT and to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was
welcomed by almost every delegation. Notable exceptions were the
United States and those three states - Israel, India and Pakistan -
who continue to remain outside the NPT, and who were naturally
subjected to a fresh barrage of exhortation urging them to join it.
Also in the nuclear arena, many delegations welcomed the reductions
set out in the Moscow Treaty signed by Russia and the US in May of
this year, while generally also adverting to concerns that the
agreement does not adequately address issues of transparency,
irreversibility or verification.
The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2005
NPT Review Conference, held in New York in April this year, was
generally welcomed as a success, while general applause also
greeted the news - breaking as the General Debate opened on
September 30 - that agreement had been reached by Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the
establishment of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
(CANWFZ).
Elsewhere, the Programme of Action to tackle the illicit trade
on small arms and light weapons continued to be seen as an
encouraging step. A sense of tentative optimism also reigned
regarding the effective future functioning of the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) following the
difficulties of the previous year.
Nonetheless, it was generally accepted that however welcome such
progress it could not conceal or compensate for an alarming degree
of stalemate and impasse in other areas. The Thirteen Steps on
nuclear disarmament - whose agreement had allowed for the
successful conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference - remain
far from being even marginally implemented. The CD remained mired
in disagreement over its programme of work, thus preventing
negotiations to achieve a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
(FM(C)T). Prospects for bringing the CTBT into force remain
elusive, due to the refusal - much lamented in the debate - of
thirteen key states to ratify it. In the wake of fears that nuclear
weapons were not only being retained but, at least in one case,
were actually being reasserted as a key element of strategic
doctrine, such calls for the implementation of Article VI were made
with little confidence that they would prompt the desired response.
The US delegation, however, took the opportunity to assert that the
end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had not plunged the
world into an arms race, as had been widely anticipated, and that
the Moscow Treaty not only demonstrated this fact but constituted a
step in accordance with their obligations under Article VI of the
NPT.
An issue fast emerging in recent years - the need to prevent the
weaponisation of outer space - was alluded to by many delegations,
and appeared for the first time in a New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
resolution. It would, however, be premature to say it has yet
entered into mainstream diplomatic consciousness as an urgent
matter requiring more multilateral attention than that provided by
the annual, somewhat ritual resolution urging the establishment of
an ad hoc committee at the CD under the agenda item on Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (CWC and BWC)
also inspired comment. In both cases, their lack of universality
was regretted, and the seeming collapse in July 2001 of efforts to
negotiate a verification and compliance protocol for the BWC,
followed by the unprecedented and embittering suspension of the
Fifth Review Conference in December 2001, was widely cited as a
major concern, requiring urgent remedial action. The resumption of
the Review Conference was thus seen as a vital (if unlikely)
opportunity to restart meaningful discussions on strengthening the
Convention - and, in the process, as one delegation noted, to
reinforce the multilateral character of disarmament and
non-proliferation.
The subject of conventional weapons was approached with a
cautious optimism, at least relative to the discontent that infused
the discussion of WMD. It was noted several times that illicit SALW
are responsible for many thousands of deaths yearly, particularly
in developing countries, as well as forming a major link in the
international chain of terrorism, drug trafficking and organised
crime. The implementation of the Programme of Action, agreed by
consensus at the historic July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, was therefore identified -
most forcefully by the South African delegation - as evidence of
growing political will to address this problem. In addition, the
expanding membership of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty was viewed as an
indication that the norms against these weapons were becoming
ingrained and likely to prove - given ongoing support and effective
implementation - irreversible.
In parallel with the formal work of the First Committee, the UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) hosted a series of
seminars and panel discussion featuring governmental and
non-governmental speakers. These included consideration of
'Disarmament in Conflict Resolution' (October 1), 'The Impact of 11
September 2001 on the Disarmament Agenda for the 21st Century'
(October 3), 'The Outer Space Treaty at Thirty-five' (October 14),
the 'Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms' (October 15), and also, importantly, a high
level launch of the 'UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Education' (October 9).
Nuclear Disarmament
To the concern of many, the discussion of nuclear disarmament in
this year's First Committee was increasingly steered in the
direction of, and thus overshadowed by, an emphasis on terrorism
rather than on arms control objectives, particularly with respect
to compliance with existing treaties. The resolution put forward by
the United States entitled Compliance with arms
limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements
best reflects its palpable desire to redirect the First Committee
towards a greater emphasis on proliferation and "rogue" regimes at
the expense of disarmament. This resolution was tabled for the
first time since 1997 and contained certain alterations that caused
anxiety to some. In particular, references to a programme of future
work, which had been present in 1997, were now left out, despite
concerns expressed at the outset about this absence. The fact that
it was eventually adopted by consensus does not therefore indicate
any widespread satisfaction with the resolution as it stands. Also
indicative of the submerging of disarmament initiatives, a recorded
vote was again requested on a draft decision put forward by
Mexico calling for implementation of the UN
Secretary-General's Millennium proposal for a UN conference on
eliminating nuclear dangers. In addition, conflicting views between
and within certain groups of states appears to be increasing, with
potentially serious implications for the future.
The United States astonished the First Committee last
year by calling for a vote on a procedural decision on the CTBT,
which had been expected to go through on consensus. This year
Mexico introduced a CTBT resolution that welcomed the Final
Declaration of the Conference on Measures to Facilitate the Entry
into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Article XIV), held
in New York in November 2001. The United States, as last
year, cast the only negative vote declaring that while it takes
seriously its obligations under Article VI of the NPT, it "does not
support the CTBT." India, a prominent opponent of the test
ban, abstained, along with Syria, Mauritius and, to the surprise of
many, Colombia - whose explanation after the vote left the First
Committee none the wiser.
The two largest NWS, the United States and Russia,
sought to emphasise that they take their disarmament obligations
seriously by jointly sponsoring a resolution entitled Bilateral
strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic
framework, the main purpose of which was to parade the Moscow
Treaty. During the course of the general debate concerns were
voiced that, however welcome such reductions in deployed strategic
nuclear weapons, this was not genuine, irreversible disarmament.
The New Agenda Coalition was particularly vociferous in
raising such concerns, and prior to the text's adoption by
consensus reiterated its belief that although the resolution
acknowledged a positive step in the process of nuclear
de-escalation and de-alerting, this should not be considered a
substitute for disarmament. Concerns regarding the privileging of
terrorism and non-proliferation over disarmament were also
expressed in response to the resolution's operative paragraph (OP)
5, which in its original form "calls upon all countries" to join
the 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction', an initiative launched by the Group of Eight
(G-8) at the June 2002 Kananaskis summit in Canada, with the
primary objective of internationalising efforts to thwart terrorist
acquisition and use of WMD. This was subsequently revised to
"invite" all countries, "as appropriate," to do the same, and the
resolution was adopted by consensus.
Once again, there were competing resolutions on nuclear
disarmament, with both Japan and the New Agenda
claiming to be the real bearers of the NPT 2000 torch in the
future. This continuing lack of unity was viewed by many as a
regrettable lost opportunity to present the kind of challenge to
the NWS that cohesion between such parties would better have
represented. Two other Nuclear Disarmament resolutions, put
forward by Myanmar (Burma) and Malaysia (launching a
call for a nuclear weapon convention to the 1996 advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice), were considered from the
outset to be unlikely to find significant support from states
outside the NAM.
The NAC resolution on Reductions of non-strategic
nuclear weapons met with considerable support, although a wide
swathe of NATO allies abstained. Some complained that the
resolution failed to acknowledge actions towards the reduction of
non-strategic nuclear weapons which had already occurred. Others,
such as the United States, were unreceptive to the call in
OP4 for the creation of formal, legal instruments to bring about
such reductions.
Canada once again introduced a resolution on banning the
production of fissile material (fissban), as usual calling on the
CD to agree on a programme of work that "includes the immediate
commencement of negotiations." As was the case last year, the
United States did not co-sponsor the resolution, despite
having done so in previous years, and in its statement during the
general debate noted that its support for an FMCT was contingent on
such negotiations "advanc[ing] the security interests of the
negotiating parties."2 Nonetheless, the resolution was
adopted by consensus.
Outer Space and Missiles
Concerns regarding the weaponisation of space have escalated in
the discussions of the First Committee, creating predictable
divisions between certain states. The customary PAROS
resolution was introduced this year by Egypt. As in years
past, there was a general anxiety that this important issue
remained largely outside existing treaties and regimes, a sentiment
forcefully expressed by the Russian Federation prior to the vote.
The resolution passed, all states voting in its favour except the
United States and Israel, which abstained.
With the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM
Treaty in June 2002, the traditional resolution was omitted. The
remaining resolution was Iran's, tabled for a third
consecutive year and simply called Missiles. In spite of the
widespread agreement with its general goals, the resolution once
again inspired a significant number of abstentions, while the
United States and Israel up-graded their 2001
abstentions to votes against. This lack of support stemmed from a
dissatisfaction with the resolution's continuing failure to make
explicit mention of the proliferation of ballistic missiles or to
the draft International Code of Conduct (ICoC), whose
importance was considered to have been inappropriately overlooked.
Such concerns existed despite the participation of some of the
abstaining countries in the Panel of Governmental Experts,
established two years ago by the initial version of this
resolution, and charged with preparing a report, duly submitted
this year, on "the issue of missiles in all its aspects".
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The resolutions on chemical and biological weapons again
reflected the blend of optimism and pessimism that pervaded the
Committee. There is hope that the accession of the new
Director-General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina, may
enable the problems of the previous year to be overcome, and that
the Organisation may now receive sufficient support and funding to
enjoy a timely and much-needed renaissance. The expansion of the
number of signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention to
145 has contributed to the perception that this regime is becoming
embedded. The resolution on chemical weapons was introduced as
usual by Poland and co-sponsored by Canada. It urged all states to
meet their obligations under the CWC and support the OPCW. Once
again the resolution was adopted without a vote.
Continuing US opposition to a verification protocol for the
Biological Weapons Convention and the suspension of the last
Review Conference limited the extent of action in this area. The
text relating to the Convention was downgraded from a resolution to
a procedural decision for the second year in a row to the
disappointment, if not surprise, of many. Last year, the proposed
draft resolution had to be withdrawn following a lack of agreement
on the language and the much more modest procedural decision
submitted in its place. The fragile optimism that exists with
respect to the CWC did not appear to be present during
discussions of the BWC. The suspension of the Review
Conference last December prompted the belief that any attempt to
return to a resolution would be doomed to failure and that a
procedural decision should be tabled once again. This decision,
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on their Destruction, was again introduced by Hungary,
due to the role of Ambassador Tibor Tóth, as President of
the Review Conference and Chair of the ill-fated efforts of the ad
hoc group (AHG) to draft a protocol. The adoption of this draft
decision without a vote was accompanied by expressions of hope
(albeit lacking much conviction) that the reconvened Review
Conference in November would bring about change for the better.
Terrorism and WMD
As noted previously, much of the discussion in the general
debate was infused by concerns about terrorism, particularly the
acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups. Last year's
resolution on terrorism was introduced by the Chair. This year,
India opportunistically introduced a resolution entitled
Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. While the preamble of the initial draft of the
resolution spoke of the urgent need to address this threat within
the UN framework, this was amended following consultations with
other states to invoke both the UN and international cooperation
generally. Several states also expressed concern with the failure
of the initial draft to incorporate the need for export controls.
The revised draft duly urged all member states "to undertake and
strengthen national measures" to prevent the acquisition of WMD by
terrorists. The substantial changes that were made to the initial
draft resolution allowed the resolution's adoption by
consensus.
Conventional Weapons
The Netherlands submitted a new resolution entitled
National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and
dual use goods and technology. This resolution was proposed
last year, but was withdrawn in the face of objections and concerns
about the number of NAM states likely to vote against it. This
time, objections to the initial draft of the resolution were
successfully addressed, including the failure of the first draft to
mention the right of states to use technology for peaceful
development. In addition, there were calls to incorporate the
enshrined right of states to self-defence and the voluntary nature
of the disclosure of information regarding arms, military equipment
and dual use goods and technology. These changes were duly
integrated into the revised resolution. A separate vote was
nonetheless held on a preambular paragraph (PP2), which Iran
and many Arab States considered provided "ambiguous" justification
to export controls. Although there were abstentions in the vote on
PP2, when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote it was, to
general satisfaction, unanimously adopted.
Israel, in a general statement on conventional weapons
(not related to one specific resolution), emphasised the need for
armaments in response to certain situations - especially that posed
by the threat of terrorism - and spoke of the need to balance
legitimate security needs with unnecessary loss of life.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
This year's First Committee included two resolutions dealing
with small arms and light weapons. The first, introduced by
Mali, dealt with Assistance to states for curbing the
illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. The
resolution continues to make particular mention of the illicit
proliferation, circulation and traffic of small arms in the states
of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion. It was adopted without a vote and
without last year's concerns about adequate time being given to
consult the sponsor.
The major resolution on this subject, introduced as usual by
Japan and entitled Illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons in all its aspects, was broadly unchanged from last
year. It once again calls upon all states fully to implement the
measures contained in the Programme of Action. This year's
resolution, however, made no mention of the decision taken in the
previous year's resolution to convene a conference no later than
2006 to review the progress thus far made in the implementation of
the Programme. It was proposed in this year's resolution that the
first of the biennial meetings of states would take place in New
York in July 2003. The resolution was adopted by consensus.
Other Issues
In 2001, Iraq had introduced a new draft resolution,
Effects of the use of depleted uranium. Although adopted by
the First Committee, the resolution was overturned and defeated in
the General Assembly. Iraq reintroduced the resolution this
year, receiving heavy opposition. Clearly the main problem for most
states was the resolution's sponsor, whom few wanted to be seen to
support. Even those states who privately considered it legitimate
to request an examination into the health effects of depleted
uranium felt the need to show some scepticism, especially regarding
the scientific basis for Iraq's claims regarding the effects of
depleted uranium. In addition, many objected to depleted uranium
being included among "new types of weapons of mass destruction."
This year, instead of progressing to the General Assembly, the
resolution was defeated in the First Committee.
This year's controversy over South Africa's resolution on
the Relationship between disarmament and development, was
also indicative of the conservative shift in attitudes, marking a
notable break with previous years. Last year this passed without a
vote, although the consensus was facilitated by the decision of the
United States not to participate in it. This year, the resolution
was forced to a vote, resulting in four abstentions and one
negative vote. France, abstaining, felt that the resolution
went beyond the more "realistic" approach that underscored the
consensus achieved at the 1987 International Conference on the
Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. The United
States this time decided to participate in order to vote
against the resolution, arguing that far from having a "symbiotic
relationship", as described in the resolution, disarmament and
development were distinct issues "that do not lend themselves to
being linked."3
The story of the Chair's resolution on Disarmament,
Non-proliferation and International Peace and Security, which
ended up being withdrawn on the final day, epitomised some of the
basic conflicts of perception represented in the 2002 First
Committee. Resolutions sponsored by the Chair are normally expected
to command consensus, and this resolution from Kiwanuka was
supposed to follow on from last year's consensus resolution by the
2001 First Committee Chair, Ambassador André Erdös
(Hungary), on Multilateral cooperation in disarmament,
non-proliferation and global terrorism. After incorporating an
amendment from Cuba and Iran, however, Kiwanuka's resolution ran
into difficulties from the United States (and others), and after
swallowing up considerable time trying to find a compromise, it was
finally withdrawn in ignominy.
Conclusion
The year which has passed since the shock of the 9/11 attacks
has served to deepen international concerns regarding terrorism and
the risks of the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist networks,
with or without state support or connivance. The subject was
ubiquitous in the general debate and, consequently, made its
presence felt in many of the resolutions proposed and adopted.
While recognising the glaring need to address terrorist threats,
however, there was also significant concern that broader questions
of disarmament were being subsumed into, and even overridden by, a
narrow focus on certain aspects of the global complex of issues
relating to WMD. Arms control, for the time being, appears to have
trumped disarmament, although the determination to reassert the
importance of disarmament remains strong. Sadly, however, the
divide that has grown in recent years between some of the NWS and
the rest of the international community continued to widen, and
there are growing signs of strain among key NNWS. Nonetheless,
there were some encouraging signs that the divisions between Japan
and NAC were by no means insuperable, in spite of the continued
inability of Tokyo and the New Agenda countries to coordinate their
disarmament approaches. Moreover, the heartening steps in the arena
of NWFZ, the CWC and in tackling the complex and very important
problems posed by small arms and light weapons should not be
overlooked.
Notes and References
1. For extensive documentation from the First Committee, see the
United Nations, http://www.un.org/ga/57/first/,
the Acronym Institute for Disarmament
Diplomacy, and the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/1comindex1.html.
2. Stephen G. Rademaker, US Assistant Secretary for Arms
Control, First Committee, October 3, 2002.
3. Sherwood McGinnis, Acting Representative of the United States
at the First Committee, October 28, 2002.
This report and appendix was written by Fiona Simpson,
with substantial input and assistance from Rebecca Johnson and Sean
Howard. Dr. Simpson, a recent doctoral graduate in
non-proliferation and international relations from St. Andrew's
University, Scotland, attended the 2002 annual session of the UN
First Committee in New York on behalf of the Acronym Institute for
Disarmament Diplomacy.
Back to the Top of the Page
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
|
