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Issue No. 68, December 2002 - January 2003
By Fiona Simpson
See also: Appendix: Summary of Resolutions
The deliberations of the United Nations (UN) First Committee (International Security and Disarmament), which began on September 30 and continued until October 29, involved a general debate and the consideration of fifty resolutions and two decisions, the results of which were frequently straightforward and occasionally surprising.1 Chaired this year by Ambassador Matia Mulumba Semakula Kiwanuka of Uganda, the Committee demonstrated a curious amalgam of hopefulness and cynicism. Hopefulness, because of continued progress in the areas of small arms and light weapons (SALW), nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), the accession of Cuba to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the new US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) or Moscow Treaty. Cynicism, because of the continued paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), concern that the nuclear-weapons states (NWS) of the NPT were not only failing to move forward on their disarmament commitments but were, rather, retreating from them, and because the Moscow Treaty was viewed as a poor substitute for genuinely irreversible and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The "Thirteen Steps" on nuclear disarmament, agreed as part of the consensus Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, were viewed by some as having been abandoned in all but name. In addition, the penultimate week of the Committee meeting took place alongside the apparent revelation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it was actively pursuing nuclear weapons in spite of being a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) party to the NPT. (Interestingly, it was a full week before Germany became the first state in the Committee to actually broach the DPRK's violations of its treaty obligations.) A decade after the end of the cold war, the allying of former Soviet bloc states with the United States is clearly visible in the voting patterns. Moreover, recent NATO applicants from the former Eastern bloc are even more keen to demonstrate their loyalty to US positions than some long-time NATO members and allies. On a number of resolutions, the voting reflects a basic political divide between the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and this enlarged "Western" caucus, led by the United States.
The resolutions themselves echoed the mixed emotions which infused the First Committee. As usual, many were repeat versions from previous years, with slight and often insignificant updating. Others, however, contained more significant changes. Last year, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been addressed as a procedural decision, which the United States nevertheless insisted on voting against. This year, delegates were resigned to seeing the US again oppose the CTBT resolution. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) - comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden - tabled two resolutions this year. One, which attempted to address reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, evoked opposition from some NWS, backed largely by NATO and NATO wannabe states. The other, a resolution on the need for a new nuclear disarmament agenda, was again juxtaposed against Japan's usual resolution on a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons - and, once again disagreement about the real meaning of the legacy of the NPT 2000 agreement prevented the sponsors of one giving support to the other.
One of the more controversial and yet least surprising events (in the wake of recent confrontations with Iraq) was the United States' decision to put forward a resolution on compliance with arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The wording of this resolution, which had not been put forward since 1997, caused concern among many and, although it was eventually adopted without a vote, served to reinforce the prevailing scepticism regarding the disarmament commitments of the NWS.
Other resolutions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remained much the same as last year. The resolution on biological weapons put forward by Hungary remained as a procedural decision for the second year. Chemical weapons were once again addressed in a resolution co-sponsored by Canada and Poland, which was again adopted without a vote.
The following report comprises an overview of the whole of the First Committee's meeting, from the General Debate to a general synopsis of the main resolutions and discussions. Attached is an appendix which incorporates a summary of the fifty resolutions and two procedural decisions, the outcome of the votes in both the First Committee and General Assembly, where relevant, a brief discussion of any debate which followed their adoption or rejection.
Last year, the UN First Committee met in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Although more than a year has now passed, the events of September 11th once again permeated the Committee's General Debate (September 30-October 10). Terrorism, thematically speaking, made an appearance in nearly all of the 91 statements - in particular, the possibility of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a threat powerfully addressed at the outset of the debate by Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala. Of perhaps greater significance, however, was the palpable concern that, in the desire to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists, multilateral regimes, institutions and the underlying tenets of multilateralism itself were being sacrificed on the altar of what might be termed "selective unilateralism" - a willingness to exercise arbitrary military might and political pressure when frustrations arise in the multilateral sphere. Numerous delegations were thus careful to emphasise their conviction that multilateralism provided the best framework for confronting these issues, and to warn of the dangerous contradiction between support, on the one hand, for non-proliferation regimes and, on the other, unilateral solutions to the problems facing these regimes.
There was, equally, recognition that the situation was not completely gloomy and that headway had been made. Cuba's decision, announced at the General Assembly on September 14, to accede to the NPT and to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was welcomed by almost every delegation. Notable exceptions were the United States and those three states - Israel, India and Pakistan - who continue to remain outside the NPT, and who were naturally subjected to a fresh barrage of exhortation urging them to join it. Also in the nuclear arena, many delegations welcomed the reductions set out in the Moscow Treaty signed by Russia and the US in May of this year, while generally also adverting to concerns that the agreement does not adequately address issues of transparency, irreversibility or verification.
The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, held in New York in April this year, was generally welcomed as a success, while general applause also greeted the news - breaking as the General Debate opened on September 30 - that agreement had been reached by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (CANWFZ).
Elsewhere, the Programme of Action to tackle the illicit trade on small arms and light weapons continued to be seen as an encouraging step. A sense of tentative optimism also reigned regarding the effective future functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) following the difficulties of the previous year.
Nonetheless, it was generally accepted that however welcome such progress it could not conceal or compensate for an alarming degree of stalemate and impasse in other areas. The Thirteen Steps on nuclear disarmament - whose agreement had allowed for the successful conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference - remain far from being even marginally implemented. The CD remained mired in disagreement over its programme of work, thus preventing negotiations to achieve a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (FM(C)T). Prospects for bringing the CTBT into force remain elusive, due to the refusal - much lamented in the debate - of thirteen key states to ratify it. In the wake of fears that nuclear weapons were not only being retained but, at least in one case, were actually being reasserted as a key element of strategic doctrine, such calls for the implementation of Article VI were made with little confidence that they would prompt the desired response. The US delegation, however, took the opportunity to assert that the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had not plunged the world into an arms race, as had been widely anticipated, and that the Moscow Treaty not only demonstrated this fact but constituted a step in accordance with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
An issue fast emerging in recent years - the need to prevent the weaponisation of outer space - was alluded to by many delegations, and appeared for the first time in a New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution. It would, however, be premature to say it has yet entered into mainstream diplomatic consciousness as an urgent matter requiring more multilateral attention than that provided by the annual, somewhat ritual resolution urging the establishment of an ad hoc committee at the CD under the agenda item on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (CWC and BWC) also inspired comment. In both cases, their lack of universality was regretted, and the seeming collapse in July 2001 of efforts to negotiate a verification and compliance protocol for the BWC, followed by the unprecedented and embittering suspension of the Fifth Review Conference in December 2001, was widely cited as a major concern, requiring urgent remedial action. The resumption of the Review Conference was thus seen as a vital (if unlikely) opportunity to restart meaningful discussions on strengthening the Convention - and, in the process, as one delegation noted, to reinforce the multilateral character of disarmament and non-proliferation.
The subject of conventional weapons was approached with a cautious optimism, at least relative to the discontent that infused the discussion of WMD. It was noted several times that illicit SALW are responsible for many thousands of deaths yearly, particularly in developing countries, as well as forming a major link in the international chain of terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. The implementation of the Programme of Action, agreed by consensus at the historic July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, was therefore identified - most forcefully by the South African delegation - as evidence of growing political will to address this problem. In addition, the expanding membership of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty was viewed as an indication that the norms against these weapons were becoming ingrained and likely to prove - given ongoing support and effective implementation - irreversible.
In parallel with the formal work of the First Committee, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) hosted a series of seminars and panel discussion featuring governmental and non-governmental speakers. These included consideration of 'Disarmament in Conflict Resolution' (October 1), 'The Impact of 11 September 2001 on the Disarmament Agenda for the 21st Century' (October 3), 'The Outer Space Treaty at Thirty-five' (October 14), the 'Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms' (October 15), and also, importantly, a high level launch of the 'UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education' (October 9).
To the concern of many, the discussion of nuclear disarmament in this year's First Committee was increasingly steered in the direction of, and thus overshadowed by, an emphasis on terrorism rather than on arms control objectives, particularly with respect to compliance with existing treaties. The resolution put forward by the United States entitled Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements best reflects its palpable desire to redirect the First Committee towards a greater emphasis on proliferation and "rogue" regimes at the expense of disarmament. This resolution was tabled for the first time since 1997 and contained certain alterations that caused anxiety to some. In particular, references to a programme of future work, which had been present in 1997, were now left out, despite concerns expressed at the outset about this absence. The fact that it was eventually adopted by consensus does not therefore indicate any widespread satisfaction with the resolution as it stands. Also indicative of the submerging of disarmament initiatives, a recorded vote was again requested on a draft decision put forward by Mexico calling for implementation of the UN Secretary-General's Millennium proposal for a UN conference on eliminating nuclear dangers. In addition, conflicting views between and within certain groups of states appears to be increasing, with potentially serious implications for the future.
The United States astonished the First Committee last year by calling for a vote on a procedural decision on the CTBT, which had been expected to go through on consensus. This year Mexico introduced a CTBT resolution that welcomed the Final Declaration of the Conference on Measures to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Article XIV), held in New York in November 2001. The United States, as last year, cast the only negative vote declaring that while it takes seriously its obligations under Article VI of the NPT, it "does not support the CTBT." India, a prominent opponent of the test ban, abstained, along with Syria, Mauritius and, to the surprise of many, Colombia - whose explanation after the vote left the First Committee none the wiser.
The two largest NWS, the United States and Russia, sought to emphasise that they take their disarmament obligations seriously by jointly sponsoring a resolution entitled Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework, the main purpose of which was to parade the Moscow Treaty. During the course of the general debate concerns were voiced that, however welcome such reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this was not genuine, irreversible disarmament. The New Agenda Coalition was particularly vociferous in raising such concerns, and prior to the text's adoption by consensus reiterated its belief that although the resolution acknowledged a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation and de-alerting, this should not be considered a substitute for disarmament. Concerns regarding the privileging of terrorism and non-proliferation over disarmament were also expressed in response to the resolution's operative paragraph (OP) 5, which in its original form "calls upon all countries" to join the 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction', an initiative launched by the Group of Eight (G-8) at the June 2002 Kananaskis summit in Canada, with the primary objective of internationalising efforts to thwart terrorist acquisition and use of WMD. This was subsequently revised to "invite" all countries, "as appropriate," to do the same, and the resolution was adopted by consensus.
Once again, there were competing resolutions on nuclear disarmament, with both Japan and the New Agenda claiming to be the real bearers of the NPT 2000 torch in the future. This continuing lack of unity was viewed by many as a regrettable lost opportunity to present the kind of challenge to the NWS that cohesion between such parties would better have represented. Two other Nuclear Disarmament resolutions, put forward by Myanmar (Burma) and Malaysia (launching a call for a nuclear weapon convention to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice), were considered from the outset to be unlikely to find significant support from states outside the NAM.
The NAC resolution on Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons met with considerable support, although a wide swathe of NATO allies abstained. Some complained that the resolution failed to acknowledge actions towards the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons which had already occurred. Others, such as the United States, were unreceptive to the call in OP4 for the creation of formal, legal instruments to bring about such reductions.
Canada once again introduced a resolution on banning the production of fissile material (fissban), as usual calling on the CD to agree on a programme of work that "includes the immediate commencement of negotiations." As was the case last year, the United States did not co-sponsor the resolution, despite having done so in previous years, and in its statement during the general debate noted that its support for an FMCT was contingent on such negotiations "advanc[ing] the security interests of the negotiating parties."2 Nonetheless, the resolution was adopted by consensus.
Concerns regarding the weaponisation of space have escalated in the discussions of the First Committee, creating predictable divisions between certain states. The customary PAROS resolution was introduced this year by Egypt. As in years past, there was a general anxiety that this important issue remained largely outside existing treaties and regimes, a sentiment forcefully expressed by the Russian Federation prior to the vote. The resolution passed, all states voting in its favour except the United States and Israel, which abstained.
With the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, the traditional resolution was omitted. The remaining resolution was Iran's, tabled for a third consecutive year and simply called Missiles. In spite of the widespread agreement with its general goals, the resolution once again inspired a significant number of abstentions, while the United States and Israel up-graded their 2001 abstentions to votes against. This lack of support stemmed from a dissatisfaction with the resolution's continuing failure to make explicit mention of the proliferation of ballistic missiles or to the draft International Code of Conduct (ICoC), whose importance was considered to have been inappropriately overlooked. Such concerns existed despite the participation of some of the abstaining countries in the Panel of Governmental Experts, established two years ago by the initial version of this resolution, and charged with preparing a report, duly submitted this year, on "the issue of missiles in all its aspects".
The resolutions on chemical and biological weapons again reflected the blend of optimism and pessimism that pervaded the Committee. There is hope that the accession of the new Director-General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina, may enable the problems of the previous year to be overcome, and that the Organisation may now receive sufficient support and funding to enjoy a timely and much-needed renaissance. The expansion of the number of signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention to 145 has contributed to the perception that this regime is becoming embedded. The resolution on chemical weapons was introduced as usual by Poland and co-sponsored by Canada. It urged all states to meet their obligations under the CWC and support the OPCW. Once again the resolution was adopted without a vote.
Continuing US opposition to a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention and the suspension of the last Review Conference limited the extent of action in this area. The text relating to the Convention was downgraded from a resolution to a procedural decision for the second year in a row to the disappointment, if not surprise, of many. Last year, the proposed draft resolution had to be withdrawn following a lack of agreement on the language and the much more modest procedural decision submitted in its place. The fragile optimism that exists with respect to the CWC did not appear to be present during discussions of the BWC. The suspension of the Review Conference last December prompted the belief that any attempt to return to a resolution would be doomed to failure and that a procedural decision should be tabled once again. This decision, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, was again introduced by Hungary, due to the role of Ambassador Tibor Tóth, as President of the Review Conference and Chair of the ill-fated efforts of the ad hoc group (AHG) to draft a protocol. The adoption of this draft decision without a vote was accompanied by expressions of hope (albeit lacking much conviction) that the reconvened Review Conference in November would bring about change for the better.
As noted previously, much of the discussion in the general debate was infused by concerns about terrorism, particularly the acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups. Last year's resolution on terrorism was introduced by the Chair. This year, India opportunistically introduced a resolution entitled Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. While the preamble of the initial draft of the resolution spoke of the urgent need to address this threat within the UN framework, this was amended following consultations with other states to invoke both the UN and international cooperation generally. Several states also expressed concern with the failure of the initial draft to incorporate the need for export controls. The revised draft duly urged all member states "to undertake and strengthen national measures" to prevent the acquisition of WMD by terrorists. The substantial changes that were made to the initial draft resolution allowed the resolution's adoption by consensus.
The Netherlands submitted a new resolution entitled National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology. This resolution was proposed last year, but was withdrawn in the face of objections and concerns about the number of NAM states likely to vote against it. This time, objections to the initial draft of the resolution were successfully addressed, including the failure of the first draft to mention the right of states to use technology for peaceful development. In addition, there were calls to incorporate the enshrined right of states to self-defence and the voluntary nature of the disclosure of information regarding arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology. These changes were duly integrated into the revised resolution. A separate vote was nonetheless held on a preambular paragraph (PP2), which Iran and many Arab States considered provided "ambiguous" justification to export controls. Although there were abstentions in the vote on PP2, when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote it was, to general satisfaction, unanimously adopted.
Israel, in a general statement on conventional weapons (not related to one specific resolution), emphasised the need for armaments in response to certain situations - especially that posed by the threat of terrorism - and spoke of the need to balance legitimate security needs with unnecessary loss of life.
This year's First Committee included two resolutions dealing with small arms and light weapons. The first, introduced by Mali, dealt with Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. The resolution continues to make particular mention of the illicit proliferation, circulation and traffic of small arms in the states of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion. It was adopted without a vote and without last year's concerns about adequate time being given to consult the sponsor.
The major resolution on this subject, introduced as usual by Japan and entitled Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, was broadly unchanged from last year. It once again calls upon all states fully to implement the measures contained in the Programme of Action. This year's resolution, however, made no mention of the decision taken in the previous year's resolution to convene a conference no later than 2006 to review the progress thus far made in the implementation of the Programme. It was proposed in this year's resolution that the first of the biennial meetings of states would take place in New York in July 2003. The resolution was adopted by consensus.
In 2001, Iraq had introduced a new draft resolution, Effects of the use of depleted uranium. Although adopted by the First Committee, the resolution was overturned and defeated in the General Assembly. Iraq reintroduced the resolution this year, receiving heavy opposition. Clearly the main problem for most states was the resolution's sponsor, whom few wanted to be seen to support. Even those states who privately considered it legitimate to request an examination into the health effects of depleted uranium felt the need to show some scepticism, especially regarding the scientific basis for Iraq's claims regarding the effects of depleted uranium. In addition, many objected to depleted uranium being included among "new types of weapons of mass destruction." This year, instead of progressing to the General Assembly, the resolution was defeated in the First Committee.
This year's controversy over South Africa's resolution on the Relationship between disarmament and development, was also indicative of the conservative shift in attitudes, marking a notable break with previous years. Last year this passed without a vote, although the consensus was facilitated by the decision of the United States not to participate in it. This year, the resolution was forced to a vote, resulting in four abstentions and one negative vote. France, abstaining, felt that the resolution went beyond the more "realistic" approach that underscored the consensus achieved at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. The United States this time decided to participate in order to vote against the resolution, arguing that far from having a "symbiotic relationship", as described in the resolution, disarmament and development were distinct issues "that do not lend themselves to being linked."3
The story of the Chair's resolution on Disarmament, Non-proliferation and International Peace and Security, which ended up being withdrawn on the final day, epitomised some of the basic conflicts of perception represented in the 2002 First Committee. Resolutions sponsored by the Chair are normally expected to command consensus, and this resolution from Kiwanuka was supposed to follow on from last year's consensus resolution by the 2001 First Committee Chair, Ambassador André Erdös (Hungary), on Multilateral cooperation in disarmament, non-proliferation and global terrorism. After incorporating an amendment from Cuba and Iran, however, Kiwanuka's resolution ran into difficulties from the United States (and others), and after swallowing up considerable time trying to find a compromise, it was finally withdrawn in ignominy.
The year which has passed since the shock of the 9/11 attacks has served to deepen international concerns regarding terrorism and the risks of the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist networks, with or without state support or connivance. The subject was ubiquitous in the general debate and, consequently, made its presence felt in many of the resolutions proposed and adopted. While recognising the glaring need to address terrorist threats, however, there was also significant concern that broader questions of disarmament were being subsumed into, and even overridden by, a narrow focus on certain aspects of the global complex of issues relating to WMD. Arms control, for the time being, appears to have trumped disarmament, although the determination to reassert the importance of disarmament remains strong. Sadly, however, the divide that has grown in recent years between some of the NWS and the rest of the international community continued to widen, and there are growing signs of strain among key NNWS. Nonetheless, there were some encouraging signs that the divisions between Japan and NAC were by no means insuperable, in spite of the continued inability of Tokyo and the New Agenda countries to coordinate their disarmament approaches. Moreover, the heartening steps in the arena of NWFZ, the CWC and in tackling the complex and very important problems posed by small arms and light weapons should not be overlooked.
1. For extensive documentation from the First Committee, see the United Nations, http://www.un.org/ga/57/first/, the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/1comindex1.html.
2. Stephen G. Rademaker, US Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, First Committee, October 3, 2002.
3. Sherwood McGinnis, Acting Representative of the United States at the First Committee, October 28, 2002.
This report and appendix was written by Fiona Simpson, with substantial input and assistance from Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard. Dr. Simpson, a recent doctoral graduate in non-proliferation and international relations from St. Andrew's University, Scotland, attended the 2002 annual session of the UN First Committee in New York on behalf of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.