News Review Special Edition

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International Developments, May 1 - July 10, 2003

International Efforts Intensify for Common Non-Proliferation Strategy

Introduction

The period under review saw fresh, concerted efforts to coordinate international responses to the threat of international terrorism involving weapons or materials of mass destruction. Central to these efforts is the search for a common perspective on both the major challenges involved and the most effective policy options available. In light of the political and philosophical gulf in outlook exposed by the Iraq crisis, finding and securing such common ground may itself be one of the priority tasks facing states as they wrestle with the convulsive consequences of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

The Search for Common Ground: Meetings, Discussions and Initiatives

• I. The G-8 Summit & The Global Partnership
• II. EU/US Discussions
• III. The Proliferation Security Initiative
• Challenges & Responses: Selected Comment

I. The G-8 Summit & The Global Partnership

The key initiative in the post-9/11 era to date has been the 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction', launched by the G-8 at its June 2002 summit of heads of state and government in Kananaskis, Canada. The Partnership - open to non-Group states and organisations - is structured around the 'ten-plus-ten-over-ten' programme: a range of non-proliferation activity, centred on ensuring WMD safety and security in Russia, to take place over the next ten years (2002-2012), jointly funded by the United States ($10 billion) and the G-8 as a whole ($10 billion).

At their 2003 gathering - in Evian, France, from June 1-3 - G-8 leaders reviewed progress in building the Partnership and assessed priorities for its near-term development. On June 2, three related documents were issued: a 'Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', an 'Action Plan' on the Global Partnership, and a statement on 'Securing Radioactive Sources'.

The Declaration opens: "We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security." The complexity of the issue, almost as great as its urgency, is then addressed: "This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. ... We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat: international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international cooperation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments." The Declaration concludes: "We call on all states to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all states to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed."

The 'Action Plan' to advance the Global Partnership opens in self-congratulatory tone, detailing the "significant progress" made since Kananaskis: "substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to $20 billion over ten years; the Russian government has made welcomed decisions to ensure implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed; the recent conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme [MNEPR] for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into concrete actions; all Partners have actively engaged in determining cooperation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis; outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors." (Note: on June 11, the Netherlands declared its interest in joining the Partnership.)

The main goals of the Action Plan, to be achieved by the 2004 summit, are then listed: "to pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles; to reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to $20 billion over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from Partners; to significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already underway. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, and to oversee co-ordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities; to resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our cooperative approach; to expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents...; to inform other organisations, parliamentary representatives, and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership."

With regard to a specific Partnership challenge - securing radioactive sources in order to prevent a radiological attack (the 'dirty bomb' threat) - the leaders stated: "We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end. We welcome the findings of the [March] 2003 Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long-term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement the IAEA's activities as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists." In more detail, the "Group of Eight will:

1. Identify elements of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources.

2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. ...

3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004.

4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved.

5. Enhance international cooperation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources.

6. Support and advance the IAEA's programs to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application.

7. In conjunction with the IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to further discuss and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources.

8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action...at the 2004 G8 Summit."

Meeting in Paris on June 30, senior G-8 officials discussed priority issues for the Global Partnership in the wake of the Evian summit. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement (July 4) placed the discussions in the context of Moscow's own list of main concerns: "[T]he main attention...was paid for implementing the [Evian] Action Plan... The signing of the bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in the course of the recent visit of President...Vladimir Putin to Britain, and the conclusion of the Agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Agreement, the implementation agreement with Japan, and the contacts with Norway on the disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines - all these recent events were noted as a success of the Global Partnership. Nevertheless, it was emphasised that a lot still had to be done for the complete realisation of the tasks set in Kananaskis and Evian. As before, the criterion for the success of the Global Partnership, we believe, is the successful implementation of existing, and launching of new, projects in the priority areas of cooperation. For Russia it is the destruction of chemical weapons and disposition of nuclear submarines. ... A discussion was continued on the question of broadening the range of participants in the Global Partnership programmes. Taking into account the tasks at this stage, the necessity was underscored of enlisting new donor states."

By far the major 'donor state' supporting Russian non-proliferation efforts since the end of the Cold War has been the United States. As frequently detailed in Disarmament Diplomacy, this relationship has proved a difficult one for both sides, with US concerns over Russian mismanagement, incompetence, secrecy and even duplicity over the full extent of its WMD programmes and stocks matching by Russian concerns over US interference and unreasonable expectations and demands.

To judge by a June 5 statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the air of mutual unease is not yet being dispelled by the new atmosphere at the G-8. First the bright side: "Moscow has received with satisfaction news of the approval by both Houses of the US Congress of the full amount of funds - $450 million dollars - asked [for] by the US administration for rendering assistance to Russia and the CIS under Pentagon auspices (the [Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), or] Nunn-Lugar program) in the financial year 2004. The Russian side has positively noted the fact that the Senate and the House of Representatives in their versions of the defense spending bill for one more year - until September 30, 2004 - gave the US president the right to authorize financing for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) in Shchuchye. We welcome these important decisions reflecting the expansion of genuinely partner relations between our two countries, directed to a joint fight against common threats, including on the basis of the historic accords of the Group of Eight leaders with regard to the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of WMDs. The ongoing and predictable financing by the US of disarmament and non-proliferation projects in Russia, undoubtedly, can become an important contribution to the implementation of the GP Action Plan, just adopted at the Group of Eight summit in Evian."

Then the shadow: "At the same time, we could not but take note of the fact that the American side continues the policy of setting forth additional unjustified conditions pertaining to the expansion of its assistance to the Russian projects. Particularly disquieting is the fact that the list of these conditions is not decreasing, but on the contrary increasing. Here is but one example: in 2004 there is to be 'suspended' an amount of $100 million for the financing of the CWDF in Shchuchye until Russia or some 'third' country allocates for this project $50 million, even though previously the American side had more than once favorably noted the considerable buildup of the financial participation of Russia in dealing with GP problems, in the first place in the destruction of Russia's stockpiles of chemical weapons."

The statement concludes: "The American decisions are creating some additional difficulties for us, as what is involved here are not only the plans for the construction of the facility in Shchuchye, but also our cooperation with other G-8 countries to which we have offered individual projects. The US is essentially inducing partners to work only on the project in Shchuchye, leaving without adequate financing the other important projects in this field. We have repeatedly voiced concern over the unrhythmical development of Russian-American cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons, pointing to the counter-productiveness of political linkages. We would like to hope that a pragmatic approach will prevail in Washington towards the solution of such chronic problems of Cold War vintage problems creating obstacles to full-format Russian-American cooperation in questions of non-proliferation and the elimination of weapons subject to reduction."

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II. EU/US Discussions

Meeting in Luxembourg on June 16, the fifteen foreign ministers of the European Union (EU) endorsed a landmark document setting out the 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'. The document - formally adopted by EU heads of state and government at their summit meeting in Thessaloniki, Greece, on June 19-20 - identifies ten "key elements" guiding Union strategy:

"[1] Pursuing universalisation of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements while stressing the importance of effective national implementation thereof;

[2] Ensuring compliance with non-proliferation commitments by making the best use of, and, when appropriate, strengthening international inspection/verification mechanism;

[3] Strengthening export control policies;

[4] Introducing a stronger non-proliferation element in relationships with some partners;

[5] Having a focused dialogue both with countries suspected of proliferation activities and with those whose cooperation is vital to effective policies against proliferation;

[6] Expanding cooperative threat reduction initiatives and assistance programmes;

[7] Ensuring that appropriate resources and support are allocated to international organisations and arrangements active in non-proliferation such as the IAEA, the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons], the CTBTO PrepCom [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission] and the HCOC [Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missile proliferation];

[8] Promoting close coordination with the United States;

[9] Pursuing an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

[10] Considering, in case political and diplomatic measures have failed, coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter."

This last element was widely reported as a 'shift' in EU policy towards Washington's proven commitment to 'coercive disarmament' and 'pre-emptive non-proliferation' as a legitimate dimension of strategy, likely to grow in importance in an age of non-state terrorism and 'rogue state' disregard for traditional diplomacy. This 'shift', however, may also reflect the ambiguity of language designed in part to bridge divisions within the EU, most notably between those member states which regarded the US-led invasion of Iraq as precisely such a legitimate coercive action, consonant with the UN Charter, and those which regarded it as legally dubious and certainly more premature than pre-emptive. Likewise, element No. 8 can be viewed as evidence of a move closer to Washington's basic policy outlook, or as an attempt to moderate and temper the Bush administration's approach.

The EU foreign ministers also adopted an 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles'. The Plan, "intended to provide an initial work programme to allow a practical implementation of the Basic Principles", is divided into two sections: (A) Measures for Immediate Action; (B) Measures for the Coming Months or the Longer Term. Section A contains seven items: 1) drawing up a "detailed plan of diplomatic action"; 2) adopting "a firm engagement for the promotion of the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements"; 3) extending the 1999 "Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the Russian Federation"; 4) achieving "rapid ratification and implementation by all member states and acceding countries of the IAEA Additional Protocols"; 5) "providing the IAEA with [an] adequate budget increase for implementing its safeguard tasks"; 6) promoting "challenge inspections in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention"; and 7) making "the EU a leading cooperative player in the export control regimes".

Section B contains no less than 15 items: 1) "mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU's wider relations with third countries"; 2) increasing "EU cooperative threat reduction funding in the light of financial perspectives beyond 2006"; 3) sustaining a "special focus on WMD proliferation at the Mediterranean Level"; 4) encouraging the "adoption by member states of common policies related to criminal sanctions for illegal export or brokering of WMD-related material"; 5) "retaining the verification and inspection expertise of UNMOVIC"; 6) supporting "a stronger role for the UN Security Council in handling the threat of WMD"; 7) "setting up...a monitoring centre on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation"; 8) improving "the control of high activity radioactive sources"; 9) instituting a "policy not to export nuclear-related materials and equipment to countries not having ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol"; 10) "reinforcing the BTWC and the CWC"; 11) "strengthening...national legislation and control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins"; 12) encouraging "EU-US (biological) industry dialogue"; 13) reinforcing "the efficiency of export controls in an enlarged Europe"; 14) instituting "'peer review' of member states' and acceding countries' export control systems"; and 15) "setting up...a programme of assistance to states in need of technical knowledge in the field of export control".

At the close of the Thessaloniki summit (June 20), EU leaders issued a ringing 'Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Drawing "on the Basic Principles already established", the statement expresses a commitment "to further elaborate before the end of the year a coherent EU strategy to address the threat of proliferation, and to continue to develop and implement the EU Action Plan as a matter of priority."

The Thessaloniki Declaration continues: "Our starting point will be a comprehensive and regularly updated threat analysis. Our approach will be guided by our commitment to uphold and implement the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements; our support for the multilateral institutions charged respectively with verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties; our commitment to strong national and internationally-coordinated export controls; and our commitment to cooperate with the United States and other partners who share our objectives. We recognise that appropriate steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can contribute to furthering non-proliferation objectives; and we are determined to play our part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum."

The US and EU held their annual summit meeting in Washington on June 25. Following discussions reportedly dominated by the WMD issue, a joint statement on the subject was issued by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis and European Commission President Romano Prodi. Pledging "to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow", the statement commits both sides to: (1) "work together to strengthen the international system of treaties and regimes against the spread of WMD. This implies the development of new regimes, as appropriate, and reinforcement of existing regimes"; (2) "seek to ensure strict implementation and compliance. We are willing to work with all those who respect international non-proliferation norms; we are committed to dealing effectively with those who ignore them or cheat"; (3) "support, when necessary, non-routine inspections"; (4) "recognise that, if necessary, other measures in accordance with international law may be needed to combat proliferation"; (5) "work together to deploy our combined political and diplomatic influence most effectively in support of our non-proliferation objectives"; and (6) "work together to develop further a common assessment of global proliferation threats."

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III. The Proliferation Security Initiative

Meeting in Madrid on June 12, eleven states - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US - held the inaugural meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), designed primarily to staunch the flow of WMD-related materials and equipment either to would-be state proliferators or from proliferant states to terrorist groups.

The Initiative was unveiled by President Bush in a speech in Krakow, Poland, on May 31: "When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies...have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies."

A second meeting of the PSI was held in Brisbane on July 9-10. A July 10 'Chairman's Statement', issued by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, summarised the focus and outcome of the Madrid/Brisbane discussions:

"The Madrid meeting was unanimous on the need to take active measures to stop the flow of WMD, missiles and related items to and from proliferators. This reflected the international alarm at the growing trade in WMD, missiles and related items, including the risk that these might fall into the hands of terrorists. Under Australian chairmanship, the Brisbane meeting built on the results from the Madrid meeting and moved forward in translating the collective political commitment of PSI members into practical measures. The Brisbane meeting focused on defining actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the air or on land. Participants emphasised their willingness to take robust and creative steps now to prevent trafficking in such items, while reiterating that actions taken would be consistent with existing domestic and international frameworks.

The Brisbane meeting made good progress in considering interdiction modalities, particularly in the information sharing and operational arenas. Participants emphasised that effective information sharing is vital to interdiction, and agreed to strengthen and improve capabilities for the exchange of information and analysis between participants as a basis for cooperative action to impede WMD and missile trade. Participants acknowledged that although interdiction efforts have been under way for some time, there is a need to further develop and enhance the capabilities of PSI nations to conduct actual air, ground and maritime interdiction operations in partnership against WMD and delivery systems. To that end, they agreed in principle to the concept of a series of interdiction training exercises, utilising both military and civilian assets as appropriate, and that such exercises should take place as soon as practicable.

Participants agreed on the importance of building a broad and effective partnership of countries prepared to play a part in disrupting and stopping the trafficking in WMD, missiles and related items. They agreed effective implementation of the PSI will require the active involvement of countries around the world. As the PSI moves forward, they aim to involve all countries that have the will and ability to take action to address this menace. It also will be crucial to involve countries that are key flag, coastal or transit states, and others that are used by proliferators in their WMD and missile trafficking efforts.

Participants underlined that the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials and equipment is a serious threat to national, regional and global security. Participants expressed concern that WMD and missiles are increasingly being acquired by states of concern which reject international standards against the acquisition, use and proliferation of such weapons. ...

The Brisbane meeting strongly supported the strengthening of the existing framework of national laws and export controls, multilateral treaties and other tools which remain the international community's main means for preventing the spread of WMD and missiles. They emphasised that the increasingly aggressive and sophisticated efforts by proliferators to circumvent or thwart existing non-proliferation norms, and to profit from the trade of WMD and missiles or related items, requires new and stronger enforcement action by law-abiding nations. The PSI was therefore welcomed as a necessary and innovative approach to the problem of countries which cheat on their international obligations, refuse to join existing regimes or do not follow international norms, and for non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD.

Participants acknowledged that the PSI is a fast-track initiative that will require continued interaction among experts and policy makers in the days and weeks ahead, and agreed to a next high-level meeting in early September."

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Challenges & Responses: Selected Comment

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, essay in Le Monde, May 5: "As the war in Iraq comes to an end, a central question the international community will have to face is whether the pre-emptive use of force should be the model to address threats of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, or whether alternatives exist that are less unpredictable in outcome and less costly in terms of human life. ... [M]ust we conclude that it is futile to try to try to combat the spread of WMD through a collective, rule-based system of international security - and that we have to acquiesce to living in a world plagued with the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust or other disasters?"

Mohamed ElBaradei, remarks to the Di Vittorio Foundation Seminar, Rome, July 5: "Clearly, a new approach is needed - an approach that applies to all WMD, with a number of essential features: universal adherence to conventions that ban WMD; a clear road map and the determination to eliminate all WMD in all States, to abolish over time the divide between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots'; new doctrines of security that do not rely on the deterrent effect or the actual use of nuclear weapons; and reliable enforcement measures, under the aegis of the Security Council, to effectively counter efforts by any country or transnational group to illicitly acquire WMD. These enforcement measures could include the possibility of holding a small arsenal of nuclear weapons under the collective custody of the permanent members of the Security Council to deal with such situations. And the overall approach must be supported by robust and intrusive systems of verification for all WMD conventions..."

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, addressing the Second Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brisbane, July 9: "Proliferators...seek to advance their WMD programmes in intangible ways, including through advanced studies abroad in fields applicable to weapons development purposes. We have known of these problems for years, and have put in place multilateral systems to constrain the threat of wholesale WMD proliferation. Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of nations behave responsibly - they have joined and adhered to the various multilateral regimes. But the handful of maverick states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles needed to deliver them are a real and growing menace. ... Such states defy the non-proliferation disciplines most countries accept. Their behaviour undermines international security and causes deep concern to the broader international community. I don't have to tell anyone here that there is no room for complacency. The consequences of a single WMD event such as a nuclear explosion in a city would be the ultimate nightmare."

US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, June 26: "We don't ever want to have to deal with the proliferation issue again the way we dealt with Iraq... If you don't want a made-in-America solution, then let's find out how to resolve the North Korean case and the Iranian case... I don't think we can speculate about where an interdiction initiative [such as envisaged in the PSI] should lead, but it's extremely important that countries like North Korea recognise that if they are going to flout their international obligations, there will be a cost for it...We want multilateral solutions - but we want solutions. Post-9/11, the sense of urgency in the United States to have solutions to these problems has grown."

John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, testifying before the House International Relations Committee, June 4: "We aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to eliminate or 'roll back' such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so. While we stress peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the proliferation threat, as President Bush has said repeatedly, we rule out no options. To do so would give the proliferators a safe haven they do not deserve, and pose a risk to our innocent civilian populations and those of our friends and allies. Principles of non-proliferation are known and formally accepted around the world. But, they are too often ignored and flagrantly violated by determined states that view WMD as integral to their survival and international influence. Many of these states are nearly immune to conventional diplomatic dialogue. While we pursue diplomatic dialogue wherever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as (1) economic sanctions; (2) interdiction and seizure, as I outlined earlier; and (3) as the case of Iraq demonstrates, pre-emptive military force where required. The pursuit of WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems cannot be cost free. Proliferators - and especially states still deliberating whether to seek WMD - must understand that they will pay a high price for their efforts. In short, if the language of persuasion fails, these states must see and feel the logic of adverse consequences. Moreover, the logic of adverse consequences must fall not only on the states aspiring to possess these weapons, but on the states supplying them as well."

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, speech at the George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, June 11: "If free nations do not come to grips with the proliferation problem, it's possible that not so many years from now...we could be living in a world with up to twice the number of nuclear powers - and the reality that a number of those new nuclear powers could be terrorist states. The fact is, we face three intersecting dangers today: the growing arsenal of rogue, failed or failing states; the exponential growth in trade among those states in WMD-related materials, technologies and delivery capabilities; and the relationship between these states and terrorist networks that are seeking to obtain chemical and biological and nuclear material. If we are to deal with these new dangers, we need new tools of international cooperation, including new authorities to prevent - and, if necessary, interdict - the import, the export and the transhipment of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and WMD-related materials from and between and to terrorist states."

Sam Nunn, Co-Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and former US Democratic Senator, speech in Paris, May 28: "Global cooperation is essential to reduce the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - not because cooperation gives us a warm feeling, but because every other method will fail. Terrorists determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction will go anywhere in the world to get them. A series of national, bilateral or regional plans will not provide a seamless global defence; it will leave holes and gaps that offer dangerous opportunities for our adversaries. ... We are already working hard on the demand side of the problem - by targeting the terrorists who are seeking these weapons. But we need to do far more on the supply-side - securing the sites that might supply these weapons. As we intensify efforts to destroy terrorist networks, they will intensify efforts to destroy us. We must overcome our disbelief that there are terrorists dedicating their time, energy and money to acquiring weapons of mass destruction so they can kill millions of people."

Note: Nunn was speaking at a meeting to launch the 'Joint Declaration Strengthening the Global Partnership', signed by over 20 non-proliferation organisations from 16 countries. The Declaration, addressed primarily to G-8 leaders in advance of the Evian Summit, identifies eight priority actions: 1) "increased pledges to the Global Partnership that reach the $20 billion goal"; 2) "expanding the G-8 Partnership to include all nations with something to contribute, and eventually all nations with something to safeguard"; 3) "working with the Russian Federation to remove obstacles to implementation in areas such as tax exemptions, liability protections, and access to worksites"; 4) the "appointment of a very senior official in each government responsible for coordinating and promoting Global Partnership programmes"; 5) "securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials through short-term emergency upgrades"; 6) "accelerating the blend-down of the world's excess highly-enriched uranium"; 7) "stepping up the dismantlement of Russia's general-purpose nuclear submarines"; 8) "increasing assistance to Russia to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention to destroy its entire chemical arsenal by 2012".

Related material on Acronym website:

• EU-US Summit, Washington, June 25,
• EU Summit, Thessaloniki, June 19-20,
• EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting, June 16,
• G-8 Summit, Evian, June 1-3

Reports: Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction - some reflections, by Mohamed ElBaradei, Le Monde, May 5; International coalition seeks chem., bio, nuke threat reduction, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) News Release, May 28, http://www.csis.org; Evian and Beyond - priorities for the Global Partnership, by Sam Nunn, Paris, May 28, NTI website; Transcript - Bush urges NATO nations to unite in fight against terrorism, Washington File, May 31; Text - G-8 nations declare support for WMD non-proliferation regime, Washington File, June 2; Text - G-8 Partnership makes progress in effort to prevent spread of WMD, Washington File, June 2; Text - G-8 works to block terrorist access to radioactive materials, Washington File, June 2; Regarding decisions by Houses of US Congress on assistance to Russia in elimination of weapons, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1330-05-06-2003, June 5; Australia, Japan and US in push for global action to halt N. Korean smuggling, Agence France Presse, June 11; Text - Rumsfeld at Marshall Center - new tools needed against threats, Washington File, June 13; EU backs possible use of force against WMD threats, Reuters, June 16; EU Foreign Ministers' meeting. Luxembourg, June 16, 2003, EU Council website; Basic principles for an EU strategy against weapons of mass destruction, endorsed by EU Foreign Ministers, June 16, EU Council website; Presidency Conclusions (excerpts), EU Summit, Thessalonki, June 19-20, 2003, EU Council website; Joint statement by European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and US President George W. Bush on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 25, 2003, EU website; US calls nuclear monitoring urgent, Associated Press, June 26; Russia - European Union to provide CW disposal equipment next year, Global Security Newswire, June 27; On the session of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1521-01-07-2003, July 1; On the course of the implementation of the Global Partnership agreement against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1554-04-07-2003, July 4; International peace and security, speech by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, Di Vittorio Foundation Seminar, Rome, July 5, IAEA website; Weapons of mass destruction - the greatest threat, speech by Alexander Downer, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brisbane, July 9, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au; Chairman's Statement - Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Brisbane Meeting, 9-10 July 2003, Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.dfat.gov.au.

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