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News Review Special EditionBack to the Contents of News Review Special Edition International Developments, May 1 - July 10, 2003Moscow Treaty Enters into ForceThe US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), commonly known as the Moscow Treaty, entered into force with the exchange of instruments of ratifications by President George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on June 1. The controversial agreement - signed by the two leaders in the Russian capital on May 24, 2002 - sets December 31, 2012 as the date for lowering the ceiling for operationally-deployed strategic warheads to 2,200-1,700 each side. The last such treaty between the two nuclear superpowers to enter into force - the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), in force since 1994 - specified a ceiling of 6,000 warheads each side, a target reached on schedule in 2001. The stringent implementation and verification regime established by START I - including the supervised elimination of delivery systems (missiles, launchers and bombers) and the placement of strict limits on the permissible configuration of remaining systems (i.e. warheads per missile) - remains in effect until 2009. START II, signed in 1993 but destined never to enter into force, mandated reductions to 3,500-3,000 warheads each side by 2007, again backed by comprehensive verification and implementation measures. In 1997, the outlines of a far-reaching START III accord were agreed in principle by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin - by the end of 2007, overriding the START II timetable, a ceiling of 2,500-2,000 warheads each side would be established, backed by the customarily stringent verification and implementation regime, supplemented by unprecedented measures to ensure the elimination of warheads as well as delivery systems. Placed against the START process, the 3-page Moscow Treaty is starkly minimal, containing no verification or implementation dimension and requiring the elimination of no warheads or delivery systems. This contrast - justified by the Bush administration as a sign of the transformed post-Cold War environment between the two former enemies - has raised widespread concerns in both countries, and internationally, about the practical value of the accord in effectively advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda. Since May 2002, the Russian government - which pressed hard for a more substantive and solid agreement, in particular one reflecting a balance between the scope of offensive reductions and limits on potentially destabilising missile defences - has portrayed SORT as a critical first step in redefining the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow. Russia also points to the Bilateral Implementation Commission established by the treaty as evidence of a joint commitment to build on the new, post-START platform. In a joint statement on June 1, Bush and Putin noted that the treaty "codifies...deep reductions of strategic nuclear warheads" and thus stands as "another indication of the transformed relationship between our two countries." Speaking to reporters, Bush looked forward to a reduction in "both our nuclear arsenals to the lowest level in decades". Putin claimed: "Yet again, we've demonstrated that the United States and Russia are two champions of mutually advantageous cooperation on the basis of partnership, openness, and transparency." The preceding ratification process was comparatively smooth. The US Senate - despite the lukewarm, better-than-nothing attitude of many Democrats - adopted the accord by 95 votes to 0 on March 6. On March 18, the Russian Duma, the Lower House of Parliament, postponed its ratification debate in face of the impending US-led invasion of Iraq (see last issue). On May 14, however, the Duma took the issue and, in a reportedly heated closed-door debate, voted in favour of ratification by 294 votes to 134. According to reports, the ratification legislation identifies two possible scenarios in which Russia should consider activating its right to withdraw from the treaty (a step permissible upon the service of three months notice): a "significant build-up in strategic offensive forces of some nation or a group of nations"; deployment by another state or states of a missile defence system "capable of significantly reducing the efficiency of Russia's nuclear arsenals." Shortly before the vote, the House was addressed by President Putin. As quoted in the Russian media, Putin stated that the provisions of the treaty would "enable us to develop our strategic forces at a level of reasonable sufficiency, in line with the country's economic capabilities and the dynamics of the military and politics in the world." After the vote, opposition Communists deputies voiced bitter disappointment. According to party leader Gennady Zyuganov, "this treaty is a gift to Bush"; his colleague Nikolai Kolomeitsev predicted a "catastrophic decline of Russia's security". A Russian Foreign Ministry statement (May 14) noted with some relief: "This decision was preceded by a comprehensive discussion of the Treaty, as well as of the likely implications of its implementation in the political, military, economic and other fields... The SOR Treaty is called upon to become an important landmark on the road of a drastic reduction of the strategic offensive arms of Russia and the United States and in the historic process of nuclear disarmament as a whole. ... The SOR Treaty fully meets the national interests of the Russian Federation and will serve as a weighty contribution to the cause of strengthening international security and strategic stability." The Duma's ratification coincided with a visit to Moscow by US Secretary of State Colin Powell; the vote itself delayed Powell's meeting with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who rather breathlessly told the Secretary, and waiting reporters: "I would like to inform you that the State Duma...has ratified this treaty by a vast majority of votes. We believe that entering the force of this treaty will become one more very important step in the development of partnership-based relations between Russia and the United States... Some deputies asked me whether it was about giving a gift, a present to Colin Powell... I believe that the ratification is a present to the peoples of our two countries...because this document is intended to serve the interests of security of our peoples." Powell responded: "It's a great pleasure to be back in Moscow, especially on this day when we can celebrate Duma ratification of the treaty that leads to fewer nuclear weapons in the world. And I can assure you that I am pleased that our meeting started late. As you said, Mr. Minister, this was a present to our people. It was a present to the world. Not only does it reduce our overall levels of nuclear weapons - more importantly, I think, it shows how the United States and the Russian Federation can work together on areas of mutual interest." Later in the day, Powell met with President Putin. In a brief press availability, the Russian leader expressed his pleasure at the "convincing way" the Duma acted to embrace the Moscow Treaty. Powell likewise voiced "deep satisfaction" at an outcome which "demonstrates the strength of our bilateral relationship". Back in Washington, Republican Senator Richard Lugar, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, commented (May 14): "The Moscow Treaty charts a course towards greater security for both the United States and Russia... I well remember visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The US and the Soviet Union faced off against each other across conference tables for years. They produced multi-volume treaties and verification annexes that described in minute detail the requirements mandated by the treaties. ... The Moscow Treaty recognizes that the US-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged in a worldwide Cold War. Our agreements need not be based on mutual suspicion or an adversarial relationship. We are partners in the war against terrorism and we continue to build a strong military and security relationship. The Moscow Treaty reflects the changing nature of our relationship." Speaking to reporters on May 15, Georgy Mamedov, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs reflected - and was quizzed - at some length about the significance of the Duma's move. In Mamedov's view: "In essence, the discussion of the Treaty in the Russian Parliament had developed into a kind of referendum on just what is to be the strategic basis on which to build relations with the US. ... We consider that as a result of a very frank discussion in the State Duma the Russian parliamentarians have passed a convincing vote of confidence in the policy being pursued by President Vladimir Putin towards an equal partnership with the US." The following exchange then took place: "Question: 'Reports have appeared that Russia and the US may enter into a new agreement concerning strategic offensive potentials in development of the SOR Treaty. What is now the situation in Russian-American relations in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile] field? Is the issue of concluding a new agreement on this problem conclusively closed or is the possibility still there?' Mamedov: 'I would like to say that our task now is not to at once begin to work out a new agreement but to come to an understanding about the most effective implementation of the SOR Treaty already signed and ratified. There is a special body for its realization - the Bilateral Commission. As soon as the ratification is completed...the Treaty will enter into force. Whereupon the Commission will begin to work, determining the procedure for the implementation of the Treaty. ... I shall...[refer you] to the [May 2002] Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, which states that the conclusion of the SOR Treaty is a major step in the direction of carrying out strategic offensive reductions by the sides to the lowest possible levels. That is, one more, but not the last step. I shall also mention the US Senate resolution on the ratification of the SOR Treaty, it contains a direct call upon the American administration to continue to reduce strategic offensive arms to the lowest necessary level. Let us recall that the Russian side at the negotiations had suggested the figure of 1,500; now we have settled on the 1,700-2,200 bracket. Thus, in principle both we and the American side do not regard the SOR Treaty as the last agreement, we are ready to work on a new one, but at this stage it is more important for us to achieve the most effective implementation of a specific agreement... On the matter of our ABM dialogue I can again refer to the need to implement the Joint Declaration. It has a whole section dedicated to Russian-American cooperation in the ABM field. The two sides have now, at last, got the wish to set out these agreed-upon measures in a separate document. An ad hoc Russian-US working group on missile defense has been created. It is meeting at regular intervals. The group has come up close to the elaboration of an accord which also provides for the protection of confidential information. It would have a great significance not only for Russia and the US, so we will do our best to carry this undertaking to its logical end.' ... Question: 'Was the question of the number of stockpiled and destroyed warheads discussed in the course of Colin Powell's visit?' Mamedov: 'I would like to refer you to the text of the SOR Treaty. The very important Article II of the Treaty states that the START I Treaty remains in force. Upon unilateral withdrawal by the US from the ABM Treaty the question had also arisen of the fate of the START I Treaty, in which all the definitions and procedures for the reduction of strategic offensive arms are written down in detail. Now, as the SOR Treaty has confirmed, until December 2009 everything is in force that was written down in START I - including the counting rules and verification and reduction procedures for strategic offensive arms. What will [the situation] be if START I is not extended until 2012? This is what we shall now discuss with the US representatives - and, by the way, are already discussing. There is already the working group for strategic offensive arms. Both sides did not want to wait until the Treaty was ratified and the implementation body began to operate. That was why the Russian-US group was created, which is meeting in parallel with the related working group on missile defense. The group incorporates the representatives of all the concerned agencies, and it is they who must discuss what number of warheads are to be stockpiled, and so on. Furthermore, we treat the US military specialists with great respect. We understand perfectly well that, like our military, for simply political aims, for the aims of propaganda they will not take chances, will not squander the money necessary for storing an excess number of warheads. When we were entering into the Treaty, we had an absolutely clear idea (from independent sources as well) how the US strategic nuclear forces will evolve and be built up to the year 2012, both with and without the Treaty. We even received certain written materials from the American side that do not bear the character of an agreement but clearly show what will be with the American strategic arms subject to reduction, including warheads, missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, and so on. It is understandable that the American side has exactly the same perception about our plans as well. It was only on the basis of such exhaustive information, predictability and transparency that that Treaty became possible. No one has ever relied "on faith" in questions of nuclear containment. Perhaps, up until now, we have insufficiently clearly shown this to our public. We shall do our best to remedy this omission. Both the Russian and the US side in the course of the development and reduction of their respective strategic nuclear forces will liquidate a part of them, and will stockpile another part. This was implied by the operative START I Treaty and the inoperative START II Treaty alike, and so will it be with the SOR Treaty.'" Notes: the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, followed the Duma in endorsing the Moscow Treaty on May 28. The ratification motion passed by 145 votes to 5. According to Mikhail Margelov, Chair of the Council's Foreign Affairs Committee, the treaty's entry-into-force will fill "a legal vacuum in the sphere of strategic stability", created by the collapse of the START process and the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. On May 21, the RAND Corporation released a major study into the US-Russia nuclear relationship. The study - Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: a Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and US-Russian Relations, by David E. Mosher, Lowell H. Schwartz, David R. Howell and Lynn E. Davis - was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). In a statement praising the study, NTI co-chair and former US Democratic Senator Sam Nunn commented (May 21): "I think there is a fundamental question that Presidents Bush and Putin need to discuss when they meet later this month - given the US-Russian relationship today...what requires us to continue to live with the risk of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear launch? The answer would appear to be largely circular - as long as Russia can launch nuclear ballistic missiles on short notice against the United States, the United States must maintain a similar capability against Russia. And vice versa... During the Cold War, our weapons were in support of our policy... Today, Presidents Bush and Putin must ask the question - are our weapons driving our policy? Have the machines taken over?" To break this vicious policy circle, the authors recommend that the two states "take immediate actions to begin the process of improving nuclear safety as part of what we call a 'Nuclear Safety Initiative'." Specifically, this Initiative should seriously and urgently consider the merits of the following ten options: "1. Provide assistance for improving Russia's early-warning radars or satellites. 2. Establish a joint, redundant early-warning system by placing sensors outside US and Russian missile silos. 3. Immediately stand down all nuclear forces to be eliminated under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. 4. Pull US strategic ballistic missile submarines away from Russia. 5. Keep US attack submarines away from Russia. 6. Remove W-88 warheads from [US] Trident missiles. 7. Reduce day-to-day launch readiness of 150 ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] in silos. 8. Reduce day-to-day launch readiness of all nuclear forces. 9. Install destruct-after-launch (DAL) mechanisms on ballistic missiles. 10. Deploy limited US missile defenses." Related material on Acronym website:
Reports: On the adoption by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of a Federal Law on Ratification of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1148-14-05-2003, May 14; Transcript - Putin, Powell welcome ratification of Moscow Treaty, Washington File, May 14; Transcript - Moscow Treaty demonstrates US-Russian cooperation, Washington File, May 14; Russian Duma ratifies Moscow Treaty, statement by Senator Richard Lugar, May 14, http://lugar.senate.gov; Russia's lower house Oks US arms deal, Associated Press, May 14; Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov remarks to Russian and foreign media, Moscow, May 15, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry; Beyond the Nuclear Shadow, RAND Report, released May 21, http://www.rand.org; Nunn urges Presidents Bush and Putin to address nuclear dangers, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Press Release, May 21, http://www.nti.org; On the RAND report - beyond the nuclear shadow, statement by Sam Nunn, May 21, NTI website; Nunn urges US, Russia to ease hair-trigger nuclear alerts, Washington Post, May 22; US-Russia nuclear treaty clears hurdle, Associated Press, May 28; Transcript - Bush, Putin complete ratification of strategic arms treaty, Washington File, June 1; Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic partnership, White House text, June 1. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |