Disarmament Diplomacy

News Analysis

North Korea Nuclear Talks End In Stalemate

By Nicola Butler

Summary & Introduction

Six party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons' programme have ended in stalemate, with both the US and North Korea setting out uncompromising and incompatible sets of demands. As the talks closed, US officials claimed that North Korea threatened to conduct a nuclear test and stepped up plans to conduct military exercises in the area, while China and North Korea blamed the US for the lack of progress.

Talks took place in Beijing on August 27-29 involving China, the United States, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, DPRK), South Korea, Japan and Russia, and included a short bilateral session on the first day between the US and North Korea. Despite some outbursts of angry rhetoric from North Korea, at the time of writing (early September) the parties appear to have agreed to further talks, but no time or place has yet been announced.

The fundamental context for the current crisis is the apparently ill-fated October 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK, under which operations at North Korea's existing, graphite-moderated reactor complex at Yongbyon - suspected by Washington and others of producing weapons-grade fissile material (plutonium) for use in a clandestine nuclear weapons programme - would be frozen in return for the provision of replacement, light-water reactors (LWRs), and the interim supply of alternative sources of energy (heavy fuel oil). The LWRs were to be provided by the New York-based Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), based in New York and operated by an Executive Board consisting of the US, South Korea, Japan and the European Union (EU).

In return for the LWRs, the DPRK was also committed to permitting full IAEA inspections at Yongbyon allowing the Agency to verify the complete extent of North Korea's past production and current stocks of weapons-grade fissile material. In October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang - the most senior Bush administration figure to do so - to discuss progress in implementing the Agreed Framework. At this meeting, according to Kelly, DPRK officials conceded that US suspicions of a clandestine North Korean uranium enrichment programme - at a secret location separate from Yongbyon - were correct.

This sensational revelation, though never confirmed by Pyongyang, led to a rapid escalation of rhetoric, tension and actions, culminating in the expulsion of IAEA officials, and the removal of Agency surveillance equipment, from Yongbyon in December 2002, and North Korea's self-declared (and legally dubious) withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2002.

North Korea has since claimed, though in customarily confused circumstances, to have completed the reprocessing of some 8,000 spent fuel rods previously monitored by the IAEA at Yongbyon. Reprocessing on such a scale could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for a small number of nuclear warheads, perhaps adding to an existing - but, again, unconfirmed and currently unverifiable - fledgling arsenal of one or two warheads.

Background: the Build-Up to the Talks

After a period of diplomatic drift in efforts to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis (see Disarmament Diplomacy No.72, August/September 2003, pp. 50-60), the Washington Post reported on July 17 that North Korea had agreed to drop its demand for "initial one-on-one talks with the United States" following a suggestion from the Chinese government for "three-way talks [US-North Korea-China] as a route out of the standoff".¹ At previous trilateral talks in April, North Korea had refused to give up its nuclear weapons programme until the US satisfied a list of conditions including restoration of full diplomatic relations and the conclusion of a legally-binding non-aggression pact.²

The US position had been to push for six-party talks, as set out in January 2003, when President Bush called for talks on North Korea to "bring the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, and the Japanese to the table".³ Washington's public position has been that it refused to negotiate directly with North Korea as this could be seen to be submitting to blackmail or as granting inducements to the regime to disarm.

Whilst saying that they would continue to press for at least five-party talks (to include Japan and South Korea), US officials did not rule out China's initiative for a three-way meeting.⁴ The following week, in talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, US officials indicated that they would agree to a compromise - talks with North Korea and China that would be immediately followed by six-party talks.⁵

On July 31 Russia's Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea had agreed to "the holding of six-party talks... on settling the current complex situation on the Korean peninsula." Russia stressed the need for "negotiations on the basis of securing a nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula".⁶

US "Twin-Track" Policy

Just as proposals for six-party talks seemed to be coming together, John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, intervened on the issue. On July 28, Bolton called for the "five legitimate nuclear-weapon states" to look at UN Security Council action as an alternative option for proceeding with North Korea.⁷ Then on July 31, speaking in the South Korean capital Seoul, Bolton described the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as a "tyrannical dictator" and called for "appropriate and timely action by the [UN] Security Council" to reinforce the talks process.⁸ Bolton also said that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which includes ten US allies, had put North Korea and Iran at the top of its list of countries of concern. The PSI countries were "working on 'defining actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the air or on land.'"⁹

The North Korean response was quite predictable. The official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang described Bolton as "human scum" and demanded his exclusion from the US delegation to the six-party talks. The US insisted that it would make its own decisions about who to send and that it had never intended to include Bolton in its team.¹⁰

On the eve of the talks, apparent divisions in the US administration started to emerge. On August 26, US media reported that State Department official Jack Pritchard had resigned. Pritchard - a senior official dealing with North Korea in both the Clinton and current administrations - had reportedly told North Korean UN officials that Bolton's speech reflected personal views not official US policy. However, after a letter from Senator Jon Kyl (Republican Arizona), accusing the administration of sending "mixed messages" on North Korea, Secretary of State Colin Powell replied that Bolton's speech was "fully cleared by the State Department and was consistent with administration policy".¹¹

Although there had been some speculation in the US media that the Bush administration might be willing to offer North Korea some kind of "formal guarantees that it will not come under US attack",¹² Powell was uncompromising in the run up to talks. "[W]e're not doing non-aggression pacts," he said.¹³

The US position on proliferation is not without its critics. The day before talks started, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called on the US to set an example to the world by cutting its nuclear arsenal and halting research programmes. "The US government demands that other nations not possess nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, it is arming itself," he told Germany's Stern weekly: "In truth there are no good or bad nuclear weapons. If we do not stop applying double standards we will end up with more nuclear weapons. We are at a turning point."¹⁴

No Compromise As Parties Set Out Positions

As the Washington Post reports, the US and North Korea set out "uncompromising positions" during the talks. US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly demanded that North Korea unconditionally abandon its nuclear weapons' programme, whilst North Korea's vice foreign minister, Kim Yong Il insisted that unless Washington agreed to a non-aggression treaty, it would continue building a nuclear deterrent.¹⁵

Throughout the talks US officials reiterated the key US demand to the media: "complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program".¹⁶ A clear objective for Washington was to put pressure on North Korea by keeping the other four participants united around this demand. Speaking to the media, Colin Powell underlined that the US was "working in concert with all of North Korea's neighbours - Russia, South Korea, China and Japan - to find a peaceful solution."¹⁷

The US also emphasised that it had "no intention of invading North Korea, of attacking North Korea" and said that it had a "comprehensive policy"¹⁸ or a "bold approach" for North Korea, implying the possibility of a package involving some form of aid, trade and diplomatic relations if North Korea dismantled its nuclear weapons programme.¹⁹

Whilst US officials were generally positive about the fact that talks were taking place,²⁰ a number of commentators and officials expressed scepticism through the media. Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute, a US think tank known for its links with the Bush administration, dismissed the "diplomatic illusion" of six-party talks. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, Eberstadt implied that diplomacy was doomed to fail "without fundamental - even revolutionary - changes in outlook and policy on the part of North Korea's leadership."²¹

According to the Washington Post, the US position going into the talks was that any economic or diplomatic progress sought by North Korea must be "preceded by a verifiable commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons program" [emphasis added]. The newspaper cited US officials who stated that, "the first concrete steps must come from North Korea, and they must be followed by an international verification regime far more stringent than the one North Korea halted last year after admitting to conducting a secret uranium enrichment program".²²

In contrast, North Korea suggested that a bilateral non-aggression pact should be concluded by the US and North Korea before it's nuclear programme could be dismantled. According to KCNA, North Korea's delegation leader, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong Il, stated in his opening speech: "We can dismantle our nuclear program if the US makes a switchover in its hostile policy towards us and does not pose any threat to us. The benchmark for our judgement that the US no longer antagonizes us will be provided only when a non-aggression treaty is concluded between the DPRK and the US, diplomatic relations opened between them and the US does not obstruct our economic dealing with other countries."²³

North Korea called for a "package solution", based on the "principle of simultaneous actions". This was spelled out as follows by KCNA: the "US should conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK, establish diplomatic relations with it and guarantee the economic cooperation between the DPRK and Japan and between the north and the south of Korea. And it should also compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision of light water reactors and complete their construction. For [i.e. in exchange for] this, the DPRK should not make nuclear weapons and allow the nuclear inspection, finally dismantle its nuclear facility, put on ice the missile testfire and stop its export. According to the order of simultaneous actions, the US should resume the supply of heavy fuel oil, sharply increase the humanitarian food aid while the DPRK should declare its will to scrap its nuclear program. According to this order, we will allow the refreeze of our nuclear facility and nuclear substance and monitoring and inspection of them from the time the US has concluded a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK and compensated for the loss of electricity. We will settle the missile issue when diplomatic relations are opened between the DPRK and the US and between the DPRK and Japan. And we will dismantle our nuclear facility from the time the LWRs [light-water reactors] are completed."²⁴

More ominously, Reuters reported Kim as stating that, "If the United States continues to demand we drop the nuclear program first and ignores our appropriate proposals, we have no choice but to beef up our nuclear deterrent power."²⁵

China, which has been widely praised for its role in bringing North Korea to the table and for hosting the talks, was initially upbeat on the outcome emphasising the (somewhat limited) "common ground" between the participants and the role they had played in preparing the way for further talks in the same format.²⁶ Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Head of the Chinese Delegation, told reporters that the "most urgent matter at present is to keep the dialogue momentum that does not come by easily and keep the Beijing-initiated process moving forward." Wang called for the DPRK and the United States to "resolve each other's concerns simultaneously, and in a good order".²⁷ The New York Times reports that both the US and North Korea have told China privately they may be prepared to be flexible on some of the issues.²⁸

Lee Soo-hyuck, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation, emphasised that there had been a "consensus that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be achieved by all means, and that there is a need to address the security concerns of North Korea". However, in a warning that could apply equally to North Korea and the right wing of the Republican Party, he added: "no further action should be taken that will aggravate the situation."²⁹

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that it had been co-ordinating with the United States and South Korea going into the talks. Press spokesperson Hatsuhisa Takashima said that "the issue of what to do with this North Korean request for assurance of security and how to deal with it will be one of the main subjects to be discussed among the three delegations," but wouldn't give any details.³⁰ Like the US and South Korean officials, Takashima demanded that North Korea "respond positively" to the call for a denuclearised Korean peninsula. Japan also demanded that North Korea resolve the issue of abduction cases involving Japanese nationals before it would extend any assistance such as food or energy to the country.³¹

The meeting took place against a background of tensions between Japan and North Korea. Shortly before talks were due to start, Japan detained a North Korean ferry for a day for what it said were safety violations. However, the New York Times, reports that many believe hostility to North Korea - or the desire to send a strong signal to Pyongyang - lay behind the incident.³²

Immediately after the talks, and despite the calls to avoid provocative action, Japan's Defence Agency announced "plans to seek $1.2 billion for US-designed systems to defend against ballistic missiles", widely viewed as an expression of concern about the nuclear threat from North Korea.³³

Nonetheless, Japan strongly ruled out the use of military force against North Korea: "The North Korean regime or its form of administration has to be decided by the people of North Korea. It should not be decided by outside forces," said Mr. Takashima.³⁴

Russia was more downbeat than the other participants on the outcome of the talks. Whilst Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that "the very holding of the talks on Korean problems in a six-nation format is an important element in the efforts of the international community",³⁵ Aleksandr Losyukov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation, described the process as fragile: "So far, the countries have put forward a number of preliminary demands, which are blocking the developing of these talks," he told Russian reporters in Beijing. "I would not say that I am feeling great optimism."³⁶ Losyukov repeated his concerns to the ITAR-Tass news agency: "The sides have advanced a number of preliminary conditions which block the development of the talks." He said North Korea declared that it wishes to be nuclear-free but expressed concern about "menaces from the US".³⁷ Russia stressed the need to elaborate "a just package solution based on the principles of a stage-by-stage process and a parallel, synchronized implementation of coordinated measures".³⁸

Although not present at the talks, both UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei broadly welcomed the meeting. Annan said he was "hopeful that this process, however challenging and complicated it may be, will lead to solutions to your mutual and bilateral concerns, reducing tensions, and strengthening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region."³⁹ ElBaradei also said that he was "encouraged" by the talks, which were a "first step in the right direction", and called on Pyongyang to make the first move by dismantling its facilities that produce weapons-grade plutonium. In an interview with the BBC, ElBaradei stated: "It is the most dangerous (situation) in many ways, because they have the capability, if not already the weapons... But not only that, they are using it as blackmail and I think it sets a very dangerous precedent." "I don't think any settlement should be reached without a full, verified dismantlement of their nuclear capability," he said, adding: "I think North Korea has to understand that they cannot blackmail and they need to come back to (the NPT)."⁴⁰

North Korea Nuclear Test Claim

As talks drew to a close on August 29, the US media reported unnamed Bush administration sources as saying that North Korea had threatened to conduct a nuclear test in response to "perceived US hostility". According to the Washington Post, a cable from the US negotiating team stated that a North Korean delegate told diplomats during an informal session that Pyongyang had "no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons" and "conduct a nuclear weapons test."⁴¹

The New York Times claimed that the remarks had been made in a statement from Kim Yong Il, North Korea's deputy foreign minister. It quoted a US official as saying, "Maybe they are bluffing, but if so, it raises the bluff to a new level ."⁴²

The official US deputy spokesperson on the talks Claire Buchan played down the significance of these reports: "North Korea has a long history of making inflammatory comments... The talks are continuing."⁴³ Japan also played down the threat: "You want to know whether we were all so frightened that we had to go back to Tokyo to hide behind our beds? The answer is no," said a Japanese official.⁴⁴

Although Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov denied that North Korea made any such threat, US Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted that North Korea had made the comments. At a press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan, Powell confirmed: "That's what they said, I don't know if it was a promise or just a statement."⁴⁵ Powell warned North Korea that "the way forward is not helped by threats and truculent statements that are designed to try to frighten the international community or try to frighten us. We will not be frightened nor will be (caused) by such threats to take actions that we do not believe are in our interest or the interest of our partners."⁴⁶

Many analysts expressed scepticism about whether North Korea would actually conduct a nuclear test or whether the remarks were a negotiating ploy. BBC News Online quoted Gary Samore of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) as saying that a North Korean nuclear test would "make it easier for the US to mobilise international support to sanction North Korea". Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute said the test warning was "not a bluff, but also not necessarily a near-term threat. Rather, a way to kick Russia and China in the shins to get them to bring the US to the table with a credible roadmap of what they get if they trade in their nuclear deterrent."⁴⁷

We'll Meet Again...

Reuters reported on August 29 that talks had ended with "what participants had hoped would be the best possible outcome - agreement to meet again".⁴⁸ South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck confirmed that the "six nations agreed to continue the talks... The countries will continue discussions through diplomatic channels on where and when the next round of talks will take place."⁴⁹ China's Foreign Ministry also indicated that it expected further talks within 2 months and stated that the parties had "pledged to keep talking in a bid to expand common grounds between them".⁵⁰

On August 30, however, the fragility of the process was underlined by a statement from North Korea's Foreign Ministry claiming that "the US has neither willingness to improve relations with the DPRK nor any intention to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK and does not want to co-exist with the DPRK in peace but seeks its invariable sinister aim to totally disarm the DPRK at any cost. The talks, therefore, were reduced to armchair argument quite contrary to our expectation and offered only an occasion of demanding the DPRK disarm itself. This made it impossible for the DPRK to have any interest or expectation for the talks, as they are not beneficial to it."⁵¹

North Korea characterised the US demand for it to "abandon its nuclear weapons program first" as "a trick": "The talks only reinforced our confidence that there is no other option for us but to further increase the nuclear deterrent force as a self-defensive measure to protect our sovereignty," the Foreign Ministry stated.⁵² The New York Times reported a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson as saying: "We are not interested at all in this kind of talks and do not have any hopes" for continuing the negotiations.⁵³

On September 2, however, North Korea appeared to have reversed its position on future talks, with a statement from KCNA that its "will to peacefully settle the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the US through dialogue remains unchanged."⁵⁴

US Steps Up Military Plans

Despite calls from many of the parties to avoid provocative words or actions, on September 4 the Associated Press reported that the US and ten other Proliferation Security Initiative countries, meeting in Paris, had reached an agreement outlining steps for uncovering shipments of weapons of mass destruction, "including boarding ships, forcing suspected planes to land and inspecting cargoes."

Speaking in the French capital, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton reportedly commented that "the fruits of such cooperation were apparent in Taiwan's interception in August of a North Korean-registered vessel and seizure of 158 barrels of phosphorous pentafulfide, which US officials said is a chemical weapons precursor."⁵⁵

Four PSI members - the United States, Australia, Japan and France - also plan to carry out controversial military exercises to prepare for interdictions on sea, land and air off the northeast of Australia from September 13 to 14. Bolton described these exercises as "a very clear demonstration that what we're involved in here is not a diplomatic exercise."⁵⁶ China has reportedly warned that the exercises may be illegal. However, Bolton insisted: "What we intend to do is consistent with national and international authorities". "Where we think we may have gaps in that authority, we are willing to consider seeking additional authorization,"⁵⁷ he added, referring to the possibility of going to the UN Security Council.

China Says US Is The "Main Problem"

On September 1, China's Vice Foreign Minister Wang was quoted as describing the United States as the "main problem" in the six-party talks. Asked what the main obstacles to the talks were, Wang replied, "America's policy toward the DPRK - that is the main problem we are facing." Wang called for the US to elaborate on its commitment to consider North Korea's security concerns: "We want US to make clear its position... I believe if we can continue the process, we can have more and more common ground despite the huge difference now that we're facing."⁵⁸

US officials described Wang's comments as a negotiating ploy, designed to bring North Korea back to the table,⁵⁹ but the remarks echoed those of chief Russian negotiator Losyukov. Losyukov told the BBC: "A very big distance separates the positions of the DPRK and the USA. There is a perception among Russian diplomats that Washington ought to go the extra mile on certain aspects to solve the problem."⁶⁰

Pressure for movement in the US position has also started to emerge from within the US. In a New York Times op-ed, former US Ambassador to South Korea James Laney and KEDO adviser Jason T. Shaplen wrote, "The United States will demand that Pyongyang make difficult concessions. It must be willing to provide something in return."⁶¹

Former President Carter - who is widely credited with defusing the 1994 standoff with North Korea - also criticised the Bush administration's approach: "This paranoid nation and the United States now are facing what I believe to be the greatest threat in the world to regional and global peace. ... Unfortunately both sides have violated some of those agreements... At the same time, the United States has refused direct talks, has branded North Korea as an axis of evil, has declared an end of no first use of atomic weapons, has invaded Iraq and has been intercepting North Korean ships at sea."⁶²

Postscript

As this edition of News Review goes to print, there are reports of a moderation in the Bush administration's position. The New York Times reports that President Bush has authorised US officials to offer a range of steps from easing sanctions to an eventual peace treaty, but these inducements would only be phased in slowly if North Korea started to surrender its nuclear weapons.⁶³ "We are willing to discuss a sequence of denuclearization measures with corresponding measures on the part of both sides," a senior State Department official is quoted as saying.⁶⁴

Notes and References

1. Glenn Kessler, 'N. Korea Open to 3-Way Talks, Officials Say, Chinese Inform US Of New Conditions', Washington Post, July 17.

2. Glenn Kessler, 'Proposals To N. Korea Weighed, US Might Offer No-Attack Pledge', Washington Post, July 22.

3. 'White House Briefing', Washington File (US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/products/washfile.html) September 5.

4. 'N. Korea Open to 3-Way Talks, Officials Say, Chinese Inform US Of New Conditions', op.cit., endnote 1.

5. 'Proposals To N. Korea Weighed, US Might Offer No-Attack Pledge', op.cit., endnote 2.

6. 'On the Meeting of Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Yuri Fedotov with DPRK Ambassador to Moscow Pak Ui Chun', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1747-31-07-2003, July 31; Russian Foreign Ministry website, http://www.mid.ru. See also the 'Disarmament Documentation' of the website of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc20.htm.

7. John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Press Conference at the US Embassy in Beijing, Washington File, July 28.

8. 'A Dictatorship at the Crossroads', speech by John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Seoul Hilton, Seoul, South Korea, July 31; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc21.htm.

9. The eleven Proliferation Security Initiative countries are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US. Statements from the July Proliferation Security Initiative meeting in Brisbane can be found in 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc04.htm.

10. Peter Slevin, 'Arms Control Hard-Liner Won't Attend Sessions on N. Korea', Washington Post, August 13.

11. 'Powell Defends Aide's N. Korea Criticism', Associated Press, August 26.

12. 'Proposals To N. Korea Weighed, US Might Offer No-Attack Pledge', op.cit., endnote 2.

13. US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, interview with regional US news syndicates, Washington, Washington File, August 1; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc02.htm.

14. 'ElBaradei: US Should Set Nuclear Disarm Example', Reuters, August 26.

15. John Pomfret, 'US, North Korea Don't Bend on Arms', Washington Post, August 28.

16. See for example, 'Press briefing by Claire Buchan', White House Deputy Press Secretary, Crawford, Texas, August 28; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

17. 'US Committed to Close Relationship with South Korea', Washington File, September 3.

18. Ibid.

19. 'State Department Noon Briefing', Washington File, September 5.

20. 'US Optimistic on North Korea Talks', Associated Press, September 2.

21. Nicholas Eberstadt, 'A Deal With North Korea? Dream On', Washington Post, August 26.

22. Peter Slevin, 'US to Urge N. Korea Nuclear Disarmament Commitment', Washington Post, August 24.

23. 'Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks', summary provided by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Pyongyang, August 29; KCNA website, http://www.kcna.co.jp.

24. Ibid.

25. 'N. Korea List Demands, End to US "Hostile Policy" Key', Reuters, August 29. See also: 'KCNA on Six-way Talk and DPRK's principled stand', Statement by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Pyongyang, September 2; KCNA website.

26. 'The six-party talks ended', Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, August 29. Chinese Foreign Ministry website, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#01.

27. 'Vice FM Wang Yi, Head of Chinese Delegation to the Six-party Talks Gives a Press Conference, August 30, 2003', Chinese Foreign Ministry Transcript, August 30. Chinese Foreign Ministry; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#01.

28. Joseph Kahn, 'North Koreans and Americans Begin Dialogue', New York Times, August 28.

29. Audra Ang, 'Korea Nuke Summit Delegates to Meet Again', Associated Press, August 29.

30. Press Conference by Hatsuhisa Takashima, Press Secretary, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, August 26. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.mofa.go.jp; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#05.

31. Press Conference by Hatsuhisa Takashima, Press Secretary, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, August 26; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

32. James Brooke, 'Japan Frees North Korean Ferry After Holding It for Day in Port', New York Times, August 27.

33. John Pomfret, 'N. Korea Retreats From Further Talks on Weapons', Washington Post, August 31.

34. Press Conference by Hatsuhisa Takashima, Press Secretary, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., endnote 30.

35. 'Transcript of the Interview Granted by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov to Russian and Foreign Media, September 1, 2003', Russian Foreign Ministry transcript, Ministry Document 1878-01-09-2003, Russian Foreign Ministry website; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#06.

36. 'North Koreans and Americans Begin Dialogue', op.cit., endnote 28.

37. Yuri Kageyama, 'US, N. Korea Won't Hold Formal Talks', Associated Press, August 28.

38. 'On the Six-Nation Talks Held in Beijing', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1869-29-08-2003, August 29, Russian Foreign Ministry website; Russian Foreign Ministry website.

39. 'Secretary-General welcomes six-party talks in Beijing, hopes process strengthens peace on Korean peninsular', message of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the participants of the six-party talks in Beijing, UN Press SG/SM/8832, August 27; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#07.

40. 'IAEA's ElBaradei: N. Korea Can't Be Trusted', Reuters, August 29.

41. Peter Slevin and John Pomfret, 'N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test', Washington Post, August 29.

42. Joseph Kahn with David W. Sanger, 'North Korea Says It May Test an A-Bomb', New York Times, August 29.

43. Slevin and Pomfret, op.cit., endnote 41.

44. John Pomfret, 'N. Korea Nuclear Talks End With Agreement to Meet Again', Washington Post, August 30.

45. 'North Koreans did threaten to test nukes in Beijing talks: Powell', Agence France Presse/Yahoo News, September 4, http://sg.news.yahoo.com/030904/1/3dx4x.html.

46. Elise Labott, 'US dismisses NK's nuke threats', CNN, September 4, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/
east/09/03/nkorea.nukes.powell/index.html.

47. Sarah Buckley, 'N Korea's nuclear brinksmanship', BBC News Online, September 5.

48. Paul Eckert and Brian Rhoads, 'N. Korea Crisis Talks End, New Round Planned', Reuters, August 29.

49. Audra Ang, 'Korea Nuke Summit Delegates to Meet Again', Associated Press, August 29.

50. 'The six-party talks ended', Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, August 29. Chinese Foreign Ministry website; 'Disarmament Documentation', http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc10.htm#03.

51. John Pomfret, 'N. Korea Retreats From Further Talks on Weapons', Washington Post, August 31; 'DPRK Foreign Ministry On Six-way Talks, Pyongyang, August 30, 2003'; KCNA, September 1.

52. 'DPRK Foreign Ministry On Six-way Talks, Pyongyang, August 30, 2003'; KCNA, September 1.

53. Joseph Kahn with David E. Sanger, 'North Korea Ends Disarmament Talks', New York Times, August 31.

54. Joseph Kahn, 'North Korea Says It Will Continue Nuclear Talks', New York Times, September 2.

55. 'US, Other Nations OK Weapons Policing', Associated Press, September 4.

56. Ibid.

57. 'US and Allies Pursue a Plan to Block Ships Carrying Arms', Reuters, September 5.

58. Joseph Kahn, 'Chinese Aide Says US Is Obstacle in Korean Talks', Associated Press, September 2.

59. Jonathan Ansfield and Nick Macfie, 'N.Korea Crisis Talks End After 'Frank' Exchanges', Reuters, August 29.

60. 'In quotes - N. Korea talks end', BBC News Online, August 29, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3191389.stm.

61. James Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, 'Talking is better than Fighting', New York Times, September 2.

62. James Brooke, 'North Korean Standoff Poses "Greatest Threat", Carter Says', New York Times, September 5.

63. David E. Sanger, 'US Said to Shift Approach in Talks With North Korea', New York Times, September 5.

64. Glenn Kessler, 'US Moderates Position on Incentives for North Korea, Issue of Aid Could Be Discussed Before Arms Programs Ended', Washington Post, September 5.

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