Disarmament Diplomacy

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Addressing Iran's Nuclear Programme: the US, IAEA, and European Foreign Ministers

Following serious questions raised in the September 12 IAEA report on Iran's uranium conversion and enrichment programmes, laser research and development, and heavy water reactor, there have been several further developments. Most notably, a joint statement following meetings between the Iranian government and the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany on October 21 (text attached) committed Iran: to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540), allowing more intrusive "without notice" inspections; to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities; and to cooperate with the IAEA and resolve all outstanding issues relating to its compliance under the NPT.

Reinforcing this welcome development, the IAEA issued a hard hitting report on November 10 (see excerpts below), which was followed by a further, strongly-worded resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors on November 26 (text attached). This noted "with deep concern that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities"; noted "with the gravest concern, that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards"; and also referred to "a pattern of concealment resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations" and Iran's "contradictory" provision of information. The resolution stopped just short of accusing Iranian officials of lying or declaring Iran to have been in violation of its NPT obligations. Most importantly, the resolution underlined Iran's agreement "to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities" and to sign the Additional Protocol, and that, "pending its entry into force, Iran will act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol"

Though their message was clear, the IAEA governors did not support the US demand that Iran's nuclear programme be taken to the UN Security Council and declared in breach of the NPT. Though the US insists that the clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production programmes are evidence of Iran's intent to develop nuclear weapons, ElBaradei has pointed out that the quantities involved were grammes rather than kilogrammes, consistent with the exposed research programmes but far too little to be weapon-significant at this stage.

Though the US drive to have Iran condemned by the Security Council has so far been defeated, the British-French-German Foreign Ministers' initiative and suspension of much cooperation with Iran by the EU, Japan and even Russia over the past few months have made it possible for the US to acquiesce in a more moderate line, at least for the time being.

The IAEA governors also called for a further comprehensive report on the implementation of the November 26 resolution by mid- February 2004. At time of going to press, Iran had not yet signed the Additional Protocol, despite making a public commitment to do so.

Background

As reported in Disarmament Diplomacy 73, when the IAEA adopted the September 12 resolution, initiated by Canada, Australia and Japan, Iranian representatives walked out of the Board of Governors meeting, and hardline clerics publicly demanded that Tehran should ignore the agency and pull out of the NPT. The IAEA report and resolution gave Iran until October 31 to come clean on its nuclear programme.

During the following month, the Middle East Newsline reported that Israel had assessed that the Bushehr nuclear reactor would be ready by 2004. On October 13, ITAR-TASS reported that the launch of the Bushehr nuclear reactor would be delayed from 2004 to 2005 because 15 percent of the required technical equipment, which Iran was supposed to buy from "third countries" has not yet been delivered to the building site. A Russian official was quoted saying that this delay was in no way connected with the dispute over returning spent nuclear from Iran to Russia. No agreement on the return of spent fuel for reprocessing and storage had yet been signed, and Moscow has said that it would not supply fuel for Bushehr until such an agreement was signed.

As noted by Brenda Shaffer in her authoritative analysis of "Iran at the Nuclear Threshold" in Arms Control Today (http://www.armscontrol.org) Iran is hedging its bets by pursuing three potential routes to obtain nuclear materials: "Tehran could use the spent fuel from either the light-water reactor at Bushehr or the heavy-water reactor at Arak to obtain plutonium or it could opt for a uranium-based program employing the enrichment facilities at Natanz and domestic mining and processing of uranium ore." These three potential routes "complicate certain strategies" that might be employed to curb Iran's nuclear programme.

Despite periodic media reports of impolite remarks traded between US and Iranian officials, both have sides moderated their stance in the weeks that followed. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US cannot convincingly rattle its military sabres for the time being. Iran's leaders cannot risk a showdown with the international community over its less-than-transparent nuclear programme.

On October 16, while travelling to Iran for further meetings, AFP reported the IAEA Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei, as saying: "We have been making progress but not with the speed we would like to see... Iran has been offering us additional information, additional access, but not the 100 percent transparency and not the proactive cooperation I would like to see if we were to be able to get full information we need by the end of the month." By contrast, on December 8, AFP reported that ElBaradei "expressed satisfaction over Iran's cooperation" since the IAEA's heavily-critical report of November 10. Alternatively, Iran's ostensible cooperation with the European foreign ministers and the IAEA may be interpreted as "an attempt to politically outmanoeuvre Washington" (Asia Times, December 8, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EL06Ak02.htm. )

On concluding his agreement with the European foreign ministers, Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the High National Security Council and a principal architect of Iran's nuclear policy was quoted saying "it could last for one day or one year; it depends on us". (IRNA, October 21, quoted in Shaffer, http://www.armscontrol.org)

European Foreign Ministers visit Tehran

Given the stalemate between the US, Iran and the IAEA, all welcomed the visit to Tehran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany on 21 October, ten days before the IAEA deadline. The meetings resulted in an agreed statement (reproduced below).

According to a written Ministerial Statement by the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, October 23, the three foreign ministers met with President Khatami, Foreign Minister Kharrazi and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Committee Hassan Rouhani. Their discussions were aimed at "underlining to the Iranian authorities the concerns of the international community regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the necessity for Iran to comply fully with the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution adopted on 12 September." Following the meeting, Straw continued: Iran had undertaken to comply with the three key elements of the IAEA Board's resolution:

• to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve, through full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency, and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA;
• to sign the IAEA additional protocol, and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions, the Iranian Government states that it would continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification;
• to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, as defined by the IAEA.

Characterising this joint statement as "a good start to the process of resolving international concerns over Iran's nuclear programme" Straw said that Iran must clearly understand "that the real test will be full and early implementation of the commitments". Recognising that, while implementation of the steps outlined should enable the IAEA board to resolve the immediate problem with Iran, there is also a longer-term issue, "Britain, France and Germany remain ready to address that issue through dialogue with Iran on a basis for longer term co-operation, which would provide all parties with satisfactory assurances about Iran's nuclear power generation programme. We made clear that it is only once international concerns are fully resolved that Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies."

In final remarks that seemed to evoke both the US's intemperate approach and the divisions among the Europeans over the war on Iraq, Straw concluded: "The visit has demonstrated the value of a united approach between Britain, France and Germany, working to uphold the decisions of the IAEA and its board of governors, and consistent with the common approach to Iran agreed by several European Councils."

The Europeans and IAEA are now waiting for confirmation of Iran's fulfilment of its promise to sign the Additional Protocol and cease its uranium enrichment and plutonium processing programmes. Repeatedly stressing that nuclear weapons would be incompatible with Islam and against Iran's interests, the Iranian leadership has, for the time being, avoided condemnation in a Security Council resolution, but Washington is far from satisfied, and is expected to continue pushing for Iran to be declared in violation of the NPT.

The remainder of this news brief consists of the statement following the European Foreign Ministers demarche to Iran, excerpts from the IAEA report, and the November 26 IAEA Board of Governors' Resolution.

Agreed Statement at the End of a Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France And Germany, October 21, 2003

Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk

1. Upon the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany paid a visit to Tehran on 21 October 2003. The Iranian authorities and the Ministers, following extensive consultations, agreed on measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding IAEA issues with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme and at enhancing confidence for peaceful cooperation in the nuclear field.

2. The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence doctrine and that its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and informed the Ministers that:

(a) The Iranian Government has decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve, through full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency, and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.

(b) To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field: (i) Having received the necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions, the Iranian Government will continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification. (ii) While Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.

3. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government and informed the Iranian authorities that:

(a) Their Governments recognize the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT.

(b) In their view, the Additional Protocol is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity or national security of its States Parties.

(c) In their view, the full implementation of Iran's decisions, confirmed by the IAEA Director-General, should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA Board.

(d) The three Governments believe that this will open the way to a dialogue on a basis for longer term cooperation, which will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating to Iran's nuclear power generation programme. Once international concerns, including those of the three Governments, are fully resolved, Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.

(e) They will co-operate with Iran to promote security and stability in the region. including the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.

IAEA Report November 10

Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003, Derestricted 26 November 2003.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org

Excerpts of key findings:

46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

47. Based on all information currently available to the Agency, it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.

50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment continued until last month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.

IAEA Resolution on Iran, November 26

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

'Resolution adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003' International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, GOV/2003/81.

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69), in which the Board, inter alia:

- expressed concern over failures by the Islamic Republic of Iran to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obliged to report pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement;

- decided it was essential and urgent, in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material, that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003;

- requested Iran to work with the Secretariat to promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol, and, as a confidence-building measure, to act thenceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol; and

- called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and any reprocessing activities,

(b) Welcoming the Agreed Statement between the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council issued in Tehran on 21 October,

(c) Noting with appreciation the Director General's report of 10 November 2003 (GOV/2003/75), on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,

(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement with Iran and to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues in Iran, in pursuance of the Agency's mandate and of the implementation, inter alia, of the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69),

(e) Acknowledging that Vice-President Aghazadeh of the Islamic Republic of Iran has reaffirmed his country's decision to provide a full picture of its nuclear activities and has also reaffirmed his country's decision to implement a policy of cooperation and full transparency,

(f) Noting with deep concern that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored, as set out in paragraph 48 of the Director General's report,

(g) Noting in particular, with the gravest concern, that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards,

(h) Noting also, with equal concern, that there has been in the past a pattern of concealment resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations and that the new information disclosed by Iran and reported by the Director General includes much more that is contradictory to information previously provided by Iran,

(i) Noting that the Director General, in his opening statement, indicated that Iran has begun cooperating more actively with the IAEA and has given assurances that it is committed to a policy of full disclosure,

(j) Recognising that, in addition to the corrective actions already taken, Iran has undertaken to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections,

(k) Emphasising that, in order to restore confidence, Iranian cooperation and transparency will need to be complete and sustained so that the Agency can resolve all outstanding issues and, over time, provide and maintain the assurances required by Member States,

(l) Noting with satisfaction that Iran has indicated that it is prepared to sign the Additional Protocol, and that, pending its entry into force, Iran will act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol,

(m) Noting that the Director General, in his opening statement, reported that Iran has decided to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,

(n) Stressing that the voluntary suspension by Iran of all its uranium enrichment-related activities and reprocessing activities remains of key importance to rebuilding international confidence,

(o) Recognising the inalienable right of States to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries,

(p) Stressing the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements, and underlining the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

1. Welcomes Iran's offer of active cooperation and openness and its positive response to the demands of the Board in the resolution adopted by Governors on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and underlines that, in proceeding, the Board considers it essential that the declarations that have now been made by Iran amount to the correct, complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme, to be verified by the Agency;

2. Strongly deplores Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement, as reported by the Director General; and urges Iran to adhere strictly to its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement in both letter and spirit;

3. Notes the statement by the Director General that Iran has taken the specific actions deemed essential and urgent and requested of it in paragraph 4 of the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69);

4. Requests the Director General to take all steps necessary to confirm that the information provided by Iran on its past and present nuclear activities is correct and complete as well as to resolve such issues as remain outstanding;

5. Endorses the view of the Director General that, to achieve this, the Agency must have a particularly robust verification system in place: an Additional Protocol, coupled with a policy of full transparency and openness on the part of Iran, is indispensable;

6. Reiterates that the urgent, full and close co-operation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme;

7. Calls on Iran to undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the Agency in implementing Iran's commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work necessary to provide and maintain the assurances required by Member States;

8. Decides that, should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in the light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's Safeguards Agreement;

9. Notes with satisfaction the decision of Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, and re-emphasises the importance of Iran moving swiftly to ratification and also of Iran acting as if the Protocol were in force in the interim, including by making all declarations required within the required timeframe;

10. Welcomes Iran's decision voluntarily to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and requests Iran to adhere to it, in a complete and verifiable manner; and also endorses the Director General's acceptance of Iran's invitation to verify implementation of that decision and report thereon;

11. Requests the Director General to submit a comprehensive report on the implementation of this resolution by mid- February 2004, for consideration by the March Board of Governors, or to report earlier if appropriate; and

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency http://www.iaea.org.

Rebecca Johnson

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.