 Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 78, July/August 2004
In the News
IAEA Censure as Iran Moves Closer to the Brink
Report from Stephen Pullinger
During the summer of 2004, there were further developments in
the long-running saga on Iran's nuclear programme, with a
strongly-worded resolution from the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and growing speculation about possible military
action from either Israel or the United States to remove the threat
once and for all.1
On June 18, 2004 the governing board of the IAEA adopted a
resolution that censured Iran over its lack of full cooperation
with the agency.2 Nevertheless, it avoided the
imposition of any deadlines for improved Iranian co-operation and
did not contain any "trigger mechanism," by which Iran's case could
be referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for violating the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This upset the US, which
continued to insist that Iran's non-compliance should be reported
to the Security Council.
Iran's deputy energy minister, Reza Amrollahi, responded that
Iran should suspend its participation in the NPT and the process of
adopting the Additional Protocol in response to the IAEA
resolution.3 Within days Iran announced that it would
resume producing parts for uranium centrifuges, a component
essential for uranium enrichment.4 At the same time,
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was at pains to say that Iran had
not resumed actually enriching uranium.5 While the US
accused Iran of reneging on the commitments it had made to the
Europeans, Britain expressed its disappointment and regret at the
Iranian decision.
By the end of July information was emerging to suggest that Iran
was moving closer to resuming uranium enrichment through certain
activities, including producing uranium hexafluoride
gas.6 Diplomats, citing an intelligence report, told the
Associated Press that Iran was trying to make or buy
deuterium gas, a substance that, although it does have peaceful
uses, can also be used as a coolant for heavy water nuclear
reactors or to boost the power of a nuclear
explosion.7
While officials from the EU-38 - Britain, France and
Germany - met their Iranian counterparts to discuss developments,
the IAEA announced that it would submit a new report on Iran's
nuclear activities during the organisation's next board meeting on
September 13, 2004. The United States may well take this
opportunity to ask that meeting to declare Iran in breach of the
NPT, a prelude to seeking punitive UN sanctions.
During further talks between Iranian diplomats and the EU-3 in
Paris in August, Iran not only refused to suspend its uranium
enrichment programme, but also made a series of demands of the EU
governments. It wanted their support for Iran's quest for advanced
[nuclear] technology and said that they should "remove impediments"
preventing Iran from having such technology, and stick to these
commitments even if faced with pressure from the Americans. Tehran
also demanded security assurances against a nuclear attack on
Iran.9
On August 22, 2004, Assadollah Sabouri, the deputy chief of the
Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said that the Bushehr reactor
would be started by October 2006, seven months after the Russians
hand over the keys.10 He also indicated that Iran
intended to build more nuclear power plants with Russian aid and
that two other European countries had expressed interest in the
projects; although he declined to identify them. Sabouri said that
under the revised schedule, Iran would need to receive nuclear fuel
from Russia by the end of 2005, and that Iran had agreed to return
the spent fuel to Russia. "There is no ambiguity on returning the
spent fuel... What we have not agreed on with Russia is the
expenses..." he said, adding that Iran is still many years away
from making its own fuel.11
In light of its lengthening charge sheet against Iran, some
commentators are speculating that a US declaration that Iran is in
breach of the NPT in September may presage a pre-election
confrontation this autumn, perhaps involving "surgical strikes" or
covert action by special forces.12 Others remain more
sceptical about such a possibility. An article in the Washington
Times, for example, reported that the Bush administration has
concluded that a US air attack against Iran would trigger a major
Iranian campaign to destabilise Iraq.13 International
reaction against such an attack would almost certainly put an end
to growing moderate dissent, and rival Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims in
Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain would close ranks against US
interests. While a surprise attack to disarm the Iranian nuclear
threat might help President Bush's election prospects, the blowback
of unintended consequences would further destabilise the Middle
East, the paper concluded. The New York Times believes that
Tehran has concluded that it has little to fear for now from a US
government whose diplomatic credibility has been damaged and whose
military capacities have been stretched by the war in
Iraq.14 Given Washington's unsatisfactory options right
now, the paper concludes that the best choice is to support
Britain, France and Germany as they search for a diplomatic
settlement, even though the chances of success do not look
good.
Meanwhile, on August 11, Iran tested an upgraded version of its
Shahab-3 ballistic missile, two weeks after Israel tested its Arrow
II anti-missile missile, the official IRNA news agency
reported.15 A report published by the Monterey Institute
for International Studies (MIIS) in August 2004 concluded that an
attack on Iran's nuclear facilities could have various adverse
effects on regional and international security.16
Instead of removing the threat, the report concludes that such an
attack "would likely embolden and enhance Iran's nuclear prospects
in the long term..." and "...provide Iran with the impetus and
justification to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent
programme, without the inconvenience of IAEA inspections".
Moreover, after an attack the US would find it difficult to
convince the Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran, without
which Tehran would be able to allocate greater financial and human
resources to its nuclear programme.
If attacked, Iran could well seek retaliation through a missile
counter-attack on Israel and US bases, "followed by a very serious
effort to destabilize Iraq and foment all-out confrontation between
the United States and Iraq's Shi'a majority". It might also choose
to "destabilise Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states with a
significant Shi'a population, and induce Lebanese Hizbullah to
launch a series of rocket attacks on Northern Israel". The domestic
political ramifications within Iran are likely to see the hawks
prevail and intensify their crackdown on dissidents and moderates.
Finally, the Monterey Report concludes that the absence of
intrusive inspections or threat of UNSC sanctions, "the only way to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability would be
to occupy Iran, a very unlikely occurrence given the serious
challenges already faced by the United States in a smaller, weaker
Iraq".
Notes
1. See, for example, Dilip Hiro,
"Washington won't get far by threatening Tehran", International
Herald Tribune, August 17, 2004; and Martin van Crevald "Is
Israel planning to attack Iran?" International Herald
Tribune, August 21-22, 2004.
2. "IAEA Board Criticizes Iran; New
Evidence Raises Cover-Up Suspicions", GSN Week in Review,
June 18, 2004.
3. Ibid. The original report was credited
from Agence France-Presse/Borneo Bulletin, June
18.
4. Joe Fiorill, "Iran Announces Resumption
of Centrifuge Production", GSN Week in Review, June 25,
2004.
5. "Iran resumes centrifuge building",
BBC News Online, July 31, 2004.
6. "Iran Moving Toward Uranium Enrichment,
Diplomats Say", GSN News Review, July 29, 2004.
7. "Envoys: Iran May Have Resumed Nuke
Program", ABC News Online, The Associated Press, July 28,
2004.
8. The term EU-3 refers back to the
October 21, 2003 initiative of the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany. See Rebecca Johnson, "Addressing Iran's Nuclear
Programme: the US, IAEA and European Foreign Ministers", Disarmament Diplomacy 74 (December 2003) pp
51-56.
9. Anton La Guardia, "Hand over nuclear
weapons and know-how, Iran tells Britain", Daily Telegraph,
August 11, 2004.
10. Nazila Fathi, "Iran delays start of
first nuclear reactor until 2006", San Francisco Chronicle,
August 23, 2004.
11. Ibid.
12. See, for example, Simon Tisdall,
"Diplomacy sidelined as US targets Iran", Guardian, August 10,
2004; and Brenda Schaffer "If Iran is not checked, nuclear terror
is next", International Herald Tribune, August 10,
2004.
13. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Iran in
bombsights?, Washington Times, July 5, 2004.
14. "Iran"s Nuclear Challenge", New
York Times, Editorial, August 4, 2004.
15. "Iran Tests Latest Shahab 3 Missile",
GSN, August 11, 2004.
16. Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, "A
Preemptive Attack on Iran"s Nuclear Facilities: Possible
Consequences", CNS Research Story, August 12,
2004.
Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards: Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran
Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of
Governors, GOV/2004/49, June 18 2004.
The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling the resolutions
adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November
2003 (GOV/2003/81), and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and the
statement by the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072),
(b) Noting with appreciation the
Director General's report of 1 June 2004 (GOV/2004/34), on the
implementation of safeguards in Iran,
(c) Reiterating its appreciation
that Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol were
in force, and noting with satisfaction that Iran has
submitted to the Agency the initial declarations pursuant to that
Protocol,
(d) Noting, however, that Iran has
yet to ratify the Protocol as called for in previous Board
resolutions,
(e) Recalling Iran's voluntary
decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities and to permit the Agency to verify that suspension;
noting with concern that, as detailed in the Director
General's report, this verification was delayed in some cases, and
that the suspension is not yet comprehensive because of the
continued production of centrifuge equipment; also noting
with concern that Iran's decision to proceed with the generation of
UF6 is at variance with the Agency's previous understanding as to
the scope of Iran's decision regarding suspension; and further
noting that Iran has withheld 10 assembled centrifuge rotors
for research activities,
(f) Encouraged by the Director
General's assessment that there has been good progress on the
actions agreed during the Director General's visit to Tehran in
early April 2004 and that the Agency continues to make progress in
gaining a comprehensive understanding of Iran's nuclear programme,
but noting with concern that after almost two years from
when Iran's undeclared programme came to the Agency's knowledge a
number of questions remain outstanding, and in particular two
questions that are key to understanding the extent and nature of
Iran's enrichmentprogramme: the sources of all HEU contamination in
Iran and the extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of
the P-2 advanced centrifuge design,
(g) Noting in this context with
serious concern that important information about the P-2 centrifuge
programme has often been forthcoming only after repeated requests,
and in some cases has been incomplete and continues to lack the
necessary clarity and also that the information provided to date
relating to contamination issues has not been adequate to resolve
this complex matter,
(h) Noting with appreciation that
the Agency has received some information from other states that may
be helpful in resolving some contamination questions,
(i) Noting with concern that the
Agency's investigations have revealed further omissions in the
statements made by Iran, including in the October declaration, in
particular concerning the importation of P-2 components from abroad
and concerning laser enrichment tests, which have produced samples
enriched up to 15%, and also that Agency experts have raised
questions and doubts regarding the explanations provided by Iran
concerning those programmes, which require further
clarification,
(j) Recognising the inalienable
right of states to the development and practical application of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of
electric power, consistent with their treaty obligations, with due
consideration for the needs of the developing countries,
(k) Stressing the need for
effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear
material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards
agreements and underlining the vital importance of effective
safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of nuclear
energy, and
(l) Acknowledging the statement by
the Director General on 14 June that it is essential for the
integrity and credibility of the inspection process to bring these
issues to a close within the next few months,
1. Acknowledges that Iranian
cooperation has resulted in Agency access to all requested
locations, including four workshops belonging to the Defence
Industries Organisation;
2. Deplores, at the same time, the
fact that, overall, as indicated by the Director General's written
and oral reports, Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely
and proactive as it should have been, and, in particular, that Iran
postponed until mid-April visits originally scheduled for mid-March
- including visits of Agency centrifuge experts to a number of
locations involved in Iran's P-2 centrifuge enrichment programme -
resulting in some cases in a delay in the taking of environmental
samples and their analysis;
3. Underlines that, with the
passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work
proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of
Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information,
as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data
and persons; and calls on Iran to continue and intensify its
cooperation so that the Agency may provide the international
community with required assurances about Iran's nuclear
activities;
4. Calls on Iran to take all
necessary steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding
questions, especially that of LEU and HEU contamination found at
various locations in Iran, including by providing additional
relevant information about the origin of the components in question
and explanations about the presence of a cluster of 36% HEU
particles; and also the question of the nature and scope of Iran's
P-2 centrifuge programme, including by providing full documentation
and explanations at the request of the Agency;
5. Welcomes Iran's submission of
the declarations under Articles 2 and 3 of its Additional Protocol;
and stresses the importance of Iran complying with the
deadlines for further declarations required by Articles 2 and 3 of
the Protocol, and that all such declarations should be correct and
complete;
6. Emphasises the importance of
Iran continuing to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol to provide reassurance to the international
community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme; and
urges Iran to ratify without delay its Protocol;
7. Recalls that in previous
resolutions the Board called on Iran to suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; welcomes
Iran's voluntary decisions in that respect; regrets that
those commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and
calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining
shortcomings, and to remove the existing variance in relation to
the Agency's understanding of the scope of Iran's decisions
regarding suspension, including by refraining from the production
of UF6 and from all production of centrifuge components, as well as
to enable the Agency to verify fully the suspension;
8. In the context of Iran's voluntary
decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, calls on Iran, as a further confidence-building
measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production
testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and also, as an
additional confidence building measure, to reconsider its decision
to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy
water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for
Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports
of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
9. Recalls that the full and prompt
cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in
the clarification of certain outstanding questions, notably
contamination;
10. Commends the Director General
and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to
implement Iran's safeguards agreement, and, pending its entry into
force, Iran's Additional Protocol, as well as to verify Iran's
suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and
to investigate supply routes and sources;
11. Requests the Director General
to report well in advance of the September Board - or earlier if
appropriate - on these issues as well as on the implementation of
this and prior resolutions on Iran; and
12. Decides to remain seized of the
matter.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf.
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© 2004 The Acronym Institute.
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