| Acronym Institute Home Page | Calendar | UN/CD | NPT/IAEA | UK | US | Space/BMD |
| CTBT | BWC | CWC | WMD Possessors | About Acronym | Links | Glossary |
Issue No. 78, July/August 2004
Report from Stephen Pullinger
During the summer of 2004, there were further developments in the long-running saga on Iran's nuclear programme, with a strongly-worded resolution from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and growing speculation about possible military action from either Israel or the United States to remove the threat once and for all.1
On June 18, 2004 the governing board of the IAEA adopted a resolution that censured Iran over its lack of full cooperation with the agency.2 Nevertheless, it avoided the imposition of any deadlines for improved Iranian co-operation and did not contain any "trigger mechanism," by which Iran's case could be referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This upset the US, which continued to insist that Iran's non-compliance should be reported to the Security Council.
Iran's deputy energy minister, Reza Amrollahi, responded that Iran should suspend its participation in the NPT and the process of adopting the Additional Protocol in response to the IAEA resolution.3 Within days Iran announced that it would resume producing parts for uranium centrifuges, a component essential for uranium enrichment.4 At the same time, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was at pains to say that Iran had not resumed actually enriching uranium.5 While the US accused Iran of reneging on the commitments it had made to the Europeans, Britain expressed its disappointment and regret at the Iranian decision.
By the end of July information was emerging to suggest that Iran was moving closer to resuming uranium enrichment through certain activities, including producing uranium hexafluoride gas.6 Diplomats, citing an intelligence report, told the Associated Press that Iran was trying to make or buy deuterium gas, a substance that, although it does have peaceful uses, can also be used as a coolant for heavy water nuclear reactors or to boost the power of a nuclear explosion.7
While officials from the EU-38 - Britain, France and Germany - met their Iranian counterparts to discuss developments, the IAEA announced that it would submit a new report on Iran's nuclear activities during the organisation's next board meeting on September 13, 2004. The United States may well take this opportunity to ask that meeting to declare Iran in breach of the NPT, a prelude to seeking punitive UN sanctions.
During further talks between Iranian diplomats and the EU-3 in Paris in August, Iran not only refused to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, but also made a series of demands of the EU governments. It wanted their support for Iran's quest for advanced [nuclear] technology and said that they should "remove impediments" preventing Iran from having such technology, and stick to these commitments even if faced with pressure from the Americans. Tehran also demanded security assurances against a nuclear attack on Iran.9
On August 22, 2004, Assadollah Sabouri, the deputy chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said that the Bushehr reactor would be started by October 2006, seven months after the Russians hand over the keys.10 He also indicated that Iran intended to build more nuclear power plants with Russian aid and that two other European countries had expressed interest in the projects; although he declined to identify them. Sabouri said that under the revised schedule, Iran would need to receive nuclear fuel from Russia by the end of 2005, and that Iran had agreed to return the spent fuel to Russia. "There is no ambiguity on returning the spent fuel... What we have not agreed on with Russia is the expenses..." he said, adding that Iran is still many years away from making its own fuel.11
In light of its lengthening charge sheet against Iran, some commentators are speculating that a US declaration that Iran is in breach of the NPT in September may presage a pre-election confrontation this autumn, perhaps involving "surgical strikes" or covert action by special forces.12 Others remain more sceptical about such a possibility. An article in the Washington Times, for example, reported that the Bush administration has concluded that a US air attack against Iran would trigger a major Iranian campaign to destabilise Iraq.13 International reaction against such an attack would almost certainly put an end to growing moderate dissent, and rival Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain would close ranks against US interests. While a surprise attack to disarm the Iranian nuclear threat might help President Bush's election prospects, the blowback of unintended consequences would further destabilise the Middle East, the paper concluded. The New York Times believes that Tehran has concluded that it has little to fear for now from a US government whose diplomatic credibility has been damaged and whose military capacities have been stretched by the war in Iraq.14 Given Washington's unsatisfactory options right now, the paper concludes that the best choice is to support Britain, France and Germany as they search for a diplomatic settlement, even though the chances of success do not look good.
Meanwhile, on August 11, Iran tested an upgraded version of its Shahab-3 ballistic missile, two weeks after Israel tested its Arrow II anti-missile missile, the official IRNA news agency reported.15 A report published by the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in August 2004 concluded that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities could have various adverse effects on regional and international security.16 Instead of removing the threat, the report concludes that such an attack "would likely embolden and enhance Iran's nuclear prospects in the long term..." and "...provide Iran with the impetus and justification to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent programme, without the inconvenience of IAEA inspections". Moreover, after an attack the US would find it difficult to convince the Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran, without which Tehran would be able to allocate greater financial and human resources to its nuclear programme.
If attacked, Iran could well seek retaliation through a missile counter-attack on Israel and US bases, "followed by a very serious effort to destabilize Iraq and foment all-out confrontation between the United States and Iraq's Shi'a majority". It might also choose to "destabilise Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states with a significant Shi'a population, and induce Lebanese Hizbullah to launch a series of rocket attacks on Northern Israel". The domestic political ramifications within Iran are likely to see the hawks prevail and intensify their crackdown on dissidents and moderates. Finally, the Monterey Report concludes that the absence of intrusive inspections or threat of UNSC sanctions, "the only way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability would be to occupy Iran, a very unlikely occurrence given the serious challenges already faced by the United States in a smaller, weaker Iraq".
1. See, for example, Dilip Hiro, "Washington won't get far by threatening Tehran", International Herald Tribune, August 17, 2004; and Martin van Crevald "Is Israel planning to attack Iran?" International Herald Tribune, August 21-22, 2004.
2. "IAEA Board Criticizes Iran; New Evidence Raises Cover-Up Suspicions", GSN Week in Review, June 18, 2004.
3. Ibid. The original report was credited from Agence France-Presse/Borneo Bulletin, June 18.
4. Joe Fiorill, "Iran Announces Resumption of Centrifuge Production", GSN Week in Review, June 25, 2004.
5. "Iran resumes centrifuge building", BBC News Online, July 31, 2004.
6. "Iran Moving Toward Uranium Enrichment, Diplomats Say", GSN News Review, July 29, 2004.
7. "Envoys: Iran May Have Resumed Nuke Program", ABC News Online, The Associated Press, July 28, 2004.
8. The term EU-3 refers back to the October 21, 2003 initiative of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany. See Rebecca Johnson, "Addressing Iran's Nuclear Programme: the US, IAEA and European Foreign Ministers", Disarmament Diplomacy 74 (December 2003) pp 51-56.
9. Anton La Guardia, "Hand over nuclear weapons and know-how, Iran tells Britain", Daily Telegraph, August 11, 2004.
10. Nazila Fathi, "Iran delays start of first nuclear reactor until 2006", San Francisco Chronicle, August 23, 2004.
11. Ibid.
12. See, for example, Simon Tisdall, "Diplomacy sidelined as US targets Iran", Guardian, August 10, 2004; and Brenda Schaffer "If Iran is not checked, nuclear terror is next", International Herald Tribune, August 10, 2004.
13. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Iran in bombsights?, Washington Times, July 5, 2004.
14. "Iran"s Nuclear Challenge", New York Times, Editorial, August 4, 2004.
15. "Iran Tests Latest Shahab 3 Missile", GSN, August 11, 2004.
16. Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, "A Preemptive Attack on Iran"s Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences", CNS Research Story, August 12, 2004.
Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/49, June 18 2004.
The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81), and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and the statement by the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072),
(b) Noting with appreciation the Director General's report of 1 June 2004 (GOV/2004/34), on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,
(c) Reiterating its appreciation that Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol were in force, and noting with satisfaction that Iran has submitted to the Agency the initial declarations pursuant to that Protocol,
(d) Noting, however, that Iran has yet to ratify the Protocol as called for in previous Board resolutions,
(e) Recalling Iran's voluntary decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to permit the Agency to verify that suspension; noting with concern that, as detailed in the Director General's report, this verification was delayed in some cases, and that the suspension is not yet comprehensive because of the continued production of centrifuge equipment; also noting with concern that Iran's decision to proceed with the generation of UF6 is at variance with the Agency's previous understanding as to the scope of Iran's decision regarding suspension; and further noting that Iran has withheld 10 assembled centrifuge rotors for research activities,
(f) Encouraged by the Director General's assessment that there has been good progress on the actions agreed during the Director General's visit to Tehran in early April 2004 and that the Agency continues to make progress in gaining a comprehensive understanding of Iran's nuclear programme, but noting with concern that after almost two years from when Iran's undeclared programme came to the Agency's knowledge a number of questions remain outstanding, and in particular two questions that are key to understanding the extent and nature of Iran's enrichmentprogramme: the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran and the extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the P-2 advanced centrifuge design,
(g) Noting in this context with serious concern that important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has often been forthcoming only after repeated requests, and in some cases has been incomplete and continues to lack the necessary clarity and also that the information provided to date relating to contamination issues has not been adequate to resolve this complex matter,
(h) Noting with appreciation that the Agency has received some information from other states that may be helpful in resolving some contamination questions,
(i) Noting with concern that the Agency's investigations have revealed further omissions in the statements made by Iran, including in the October declaration, in particular concerning the importation of P-2 components from abroad and concerning laser enrichment tests, which have produced samples enriched up to 15%, and also that Agency experts have raised questions and doubts regarding the explanations provided by Iran concerning those programmes, which require further clarification,
(j) Recognising the inalienable right of states to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, consistent with their treaty obligations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries,
(k) Stressing the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements and underlining the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, and
(l) Acknowledging the statement by the Director General on 14 June that it is essential for the integrity and credibility of the inspection process to bring these issues to a close within the next few months,
1. Acknowledges that Iranian cooperation has resulted in Agency access to all requested locations, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organisation;
2. Deplores, at the same time, the fact that, overall, as indicated by the Director General's written and oral reports, Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been, and, in particular, that Iran postponed until mid-April visits originally scheduled for mid-March - including visits of Agency centrifuge experts to a number of locations involved in Iran's P-2 centrifuge enrichment programme - resulting in some cases in a delay in the taking of environmental samples and their analysis;
3. Underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons; and calls on Iran to continue and intensify its cooperation so that the Agency may provide the international community with required assurances about Iran's nuclear activities;
4. Calls on Iran to take all necessary steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding questions, especially that of LEU and HEU contamination found at various locations in Iran, including by providing additional relevant information about the origin of the components in question and explanations about the presence of a cluster of 36% HEU particles; and also the question of the nature and scope of Iran's P-2 centrifuge programme, including by providing full documentation and explanations at the request of the Agency;
5. Welcomes Iran's submission of the declarations under Articles 2 and 3 of its Additional Protocol; and stresses the importance of Iran complying with the deadlines for further declarations required by Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol, and that all such declarations should be correct and complete;
6. Emphasises the importance of Iran continuing to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to provide reassurance to the international community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme; and urges Iran to ratify without delay its Protocol;
7. Recalls that in previous resolutions the Board called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; welcomes Iran's voluntary decisions in that respect; regrets that those commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings, and to remove the existing variance in relation to the Agency's understanding of the scope of Iran's decisions regarding suspension, including by refraining from the production of UF6 and from all production of centrifuge components, as well as to enable the Agency to verify fully the suspension;
8. In the context of Iran's voluntary decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, calls on Iran, as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and also, as an additional confidence building measure, to reconsider its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
9. Recalls that the full and prompt cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of certain outstanding questions, notably contamination;
10. Commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement Iran's safeguards agreement, and, pending its entry into force, Iran's Additional Protocol, as well as to verify Iran's suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and to investigate supply routes and sources;
11. Requests the Director General to report well in advance of the September Board - or earlier if appropriate - on these issues as well as on the implementation of this and prior resolutions on Iran; and
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf.
© 2004 The Acronym Institute.