Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 80, Autumn 2005
Politics and Protection:
Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed
See: Rebecca Johnson's full report, Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review
Conference Failed.
Annex: Selected Documents and Statements from the Review
Conference
Main Committees
Statements and Comment
Report of Main Committee I
Issued as NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/1, May 25, 2005.
Establishment and terms of reference
1. Pursuant to rule 34 of its rules of procedure, the 2005
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons established Main Committee I
as one of its three Main Committees, and decided to allocate to it
the following items for its consideration (see
NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1)...
Work of the Committee
8. The Committee held six formal meetings and a number of
informal meetings between 19 and 25 May 2005...
9. The Committee was not able to reach a consensus on the text
of the Chairman's working paper of Main Committee I
(NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/CRP.3) and the Chairman's working paper of
Subsidiary Body 1 (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SB/CRP.4), as they do not
reflect fully the views of all States parties. Nevertheless, the
Committee agreed to annex the papers to this report.
Chair's Working Paper, Main
Committee I
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/CRP.3.
1. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the
global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential
foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.
2. The Conference underscores that the Treaty rests on three
pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and agrees that these pillars represent a
set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights
of States parties.
3. The Conference reaffirms that compliance and implementation
of the Treaty need to be assessed comprehensively, taking into
account all the pillars of the Treaty and the outcomes of the
Review Conferences.
4. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of
non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by States parties
and reaffirms that the strict observance of the provisions of the
Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of
preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to
international peace and security. The Conference affirms the
importance of strengthening compliance with and enforcement of the
Treaty's obligations.
Articles I and II and preambular paras 1 to 3
1. The Conference welcomes the accession of Cuba, as well as of
Timor-Leste as States Parties to the Treaty, which brings the
Treaty closer into its universality.
2. The Conference urges three States that have not yet adhered
to the Treaty - India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede promptly to
the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, without condition and
without delay, and to place all their nuclear facilities under
comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference calls upon States not
party to the NPT to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the Treaty, and to take practical steps in support
of the Treaty pending their accession to it as non-nuclear-weapon
States.
3. The Conference emphasizes that the full and effective
implementation of the Treaty is vital to international peace and
security. The Conference reaffirms that each Article of the Treaty
is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all
circumstances and that it is imperative that all States be held
fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their
obligations under the Treaty.
4. The Conference recognizes that the nuclear-weapon States
parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The
Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from
nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security
arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States and
with States not party to the Treaty.
5. The Conference recognizes that the non-nuclear-weapon States
parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The Conference also calls upon the non-nuclear-weapon States to
refrain from any activities designed to develop nuclear weapons
capability.
6. The Conference reaffirms the importance of transparency and
making available an exchange of information, as appropriate, among
States parties on measures related to the implementation and
enforcement of their obligations under articles I and II.
7. The Conference expresses grave concerns over the risk that
non-State actors may acquire nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery and stresses that the most effective way to address this
concern is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this
connection, the Conference notes the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1540 (2004) and General Assembly resolution 59/80 as
measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring such
weapons.
8. The Conference encourages States parties to consider a wide
range of measures against proliferation of nuclear weapons and
their means of delivery in conformity with national legislation,
the principles of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations.
Item 17...
The Conference recognizes the threat to international peace and
security posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery. In order to address such challenges, the
Conference reaffirms its determination to preserve the integrity of
and to implement fully the Treaty and to make efforts towards the
achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty.
Disarmament and non-proliferation education
1. The Conference recognizes that disarmament and
non-proliferation education can ensure the continuation of
institutional knowledge of those working on disarmament and
non-proliferation issues and contribute to create understanding on
such issues by the general public.
2. The Conference encourages States parties to undertake
concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the
recommendations of the report of the United Nations
Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education
submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its
fifty-seventh session, and to voluntarily share information on
efforts they have been undertaking in this area.
Working paper of the Chair of
Subsidiary Body 1
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SB/CRP.4.
Article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of
the Treaty
1. The Conference remains alarmed by the continued threat to
humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, reaffirms the
need to make every effort to avert the danger to all mankind of
nuclear war and nuclear terrorism and to take measures to safeguard
the security of peoples.
2. The Conference recalls the Principles, Objectives and
Undertakings for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
including the principles of irreversibility, transparency,
verifiability and undiminished security for all.
3. The Conference recalls the commitments to pursue effective
measures and make systematic and progressive efforts to implement
article VI including the unequivocal undertaking by the
nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals, and other steps.
4. The Conference recognizes the importance of the Moscow Treaty
and seeks sustained efforts to implement it, and urges its Parties
to undertake the reductions by 2012 to the lowest target number of
nuclear warheads and by agreed timetables.
5. Building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review
Conferences, the Conference urges more intensified progress by the
nuclear-weapon States in reducing or continuing to reduce their
non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals.
6. The Conference affirms the value of full implementation of
the Presidential Nuclear Initiative and of the extension of such a
mechanism to all States possessing non-strategic nuclear
weapons.
7. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the
Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to resolve further
to restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons, their operational
readiness and their potential role as defined in national security
doctrines.
8. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to forego
any efforts to research and develop new types of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
9. In looking forward to the early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Conference welcomes
efforts since 2000 against the testing of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, including through maintenance of the
existing moratoria, support for the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, progress made
in developing the International Monitoring System, and the
increased membership of the Treaty.
10. The Conference pledges urgent efforts, especially in the
Conference on Disarmament, to pursue and implement options for
enhanced multilateral and other action on nuclear disarmament,
including compliance aspects, and appeals to all members of the
Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate the necessary flexibility
to enable adoption of a programme of work that will advance crucial
NPT-related tasks.
11. The Conference seeks affirmation by the nuclear-weapon
States that they will place, as soon as practicable, fissile
material designated as no longer required for weapons purposes
under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and,
welcoming work already undertaken on the development of
verification capabilities for nuclear disarmament, urges that such
work be initiated by those nuclear-weapon States not already doing
so.
12. Reaffirming the importance of reporting, the Conference
welcomes the reports and information submitted to the Conference
and agrees to provide reports on implementation of article VI on an
annual basis.
Negative security assurances
1. The Conference recognizes that assuring non-nuclear-weapon
States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons works towards the Treaty's principle of easing
international tension and strengthening trust between States,
thereby advancing the non-proliferation goals of the Treaty.
2. The Conference recalls the unilateral declarations by the
nuclear-weapon States as recognized by United Nations Security
Council resolution 984 (1995) regarding the provision of security
assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, and
the expectations of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and
the 2000 Review Conference that further steps should be recommended
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
3. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to
respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security
assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated
legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapon
States Parties.
4. The Conference reaffirms that the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones is an effective measure towards
strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, acknowledges
that States that engage in creating such zones enhance regional and
international security while increasing levels of mutual trust.
5. The Conference welcomes the readiness of nuclear-weapon
States to provide future security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon
States within the context of nuclear-weapon-free-zones, and
encourages further steps to be taken to bring into effect the
assurances provided by nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties and their
protocols.
6. The Conference recognizes that assurances against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons are conditional and not applicable
if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own
non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the Treaty.
7. The Conference agrees on the need for further work, in the
context of the strengthened review process, to be undertaken during
the next review period on how security assurances would be
encapsulated in a legally binding instrument with a view to
endorsing the outcome of these deliberations at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.
Back to the top of page
Report of Main Committee II, Chair's
Draft
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/CRP.3.
I. (Technical Part)
II. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decisions and
resolutions of the previous Conferences.
2. The Conference notes that conclusions agreed at previous
Conferences for the implementation of Article III provide a basis
for States Parties to the Treaty and for the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation
regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation
undertakings pursuant to the Treaty.
3. The Conference stresses the importance of preserving the
peace and security benefits of the NPT and in preventing nuclear
weapons proliferation. The Conference notes that the integrity of
the NPT depends upon full respect by all States parties of all of
their obligations under the Treaty, including relevant safeguards
agreements.
4. The Conference notes the importance of addressing all
compliance challenges. These challenges pose a significant test for
the Treaty and need to be met firmly in order to uphold the
Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system.
In addition, intense international concern about nuclear weapons
proliferation, including to non-State actors, has added to the
importance of the Treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The Conference reaffirms the respective mandates of the Security
Council and of the IAEA in relation to States' compliance with the
Treaty and with Safeguards Agreements.
5. The Conference underlines that the objectives related to
international security issues, including disarmament and
non-proliferation, should be achieved through dialogue and
cooperation amongst States, through the improvement of
international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and in accordance
with the United Nations Charter and the NPT. States parties further
note that all efforts should be deployed to strengthen the existing
nuclear non-proliferation regime, through multilaterally agreed
solutions. In this context, States parties underline the role of
the IAEA as the established multilateral mechanism under the NPT to
address safeguards issues and other relevant verification
questions.
6. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent
authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance
with its Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with
its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in
fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of
the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. The Conference notes its conviction that nothing
should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this
regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance
with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties
should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and
information to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions
and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. The
Conference commends the IAEA for the extensive verification
activities since its establishment and expresses full support for
its continuing efforts in this field.
7. The Conference calls upon all States parties, which have not
yet done so, to conclude and bring into force comprehensive IAEA
safeguards agreement without further delay. The Conference affirms
the importance of the Additional Protocol as an integral part of
the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States, particularly those
with significant nuclear activities which have not yet done so, to
sign and bring into force additional protocols without further
delay. The Conference notes the proposal by several States parties,
by the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the Director
General of the IAEA that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement,
together with the Additional Protocol, now represents the
verification standard pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article III of
the Treaty. The Conference also notes the view expressed by several
other States parties that consider additional protocols to be an
excellent confidence building measure.
8. The Conference notes, that some States parties supported a
proposal that the ratification of the Additional Protocol be made a
condition of supply for nuclear materials, equipment and
technologies.
9. The Conference calls on all States not party to the Treaty to
accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States promptly and
without conditions and to bring into force the required
comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional
protocols.
10. The Conference welcomes the completion of the conceptual
framework by the IAEA for the implementation of integrated
safeguards with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and the
efficiency of the IAEA's safeguards activities and welcomes the
implementation of integrated safeguards by the IAEA in eight
States.
11. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards
to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under
the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements in the most
economic and practical way possible, taking into account the
availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive
safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied
once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been
achieved.
12. The Conference urges the IAEA to address the question of
Small Quantities Protocols to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
which has been described by the Director General of the IAEA as a
significant weakness of the IAEA safeguards system.
13. The Conference notes the general contribution to
non-proliferation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
for removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research
reactors, and their conversion into research reactors operating
with low enriched uranium (LEU).
14. The Conference reiterates that effective and transparent
export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime
under the NPT, in accordance with Article III.2 of the Treaty. In
this context the Conference welcomes the adoption by consensus of
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). The
Conference also acknowledges the important role of the national and
international export control frameworks for nuclear materials,
equipment and technologies.
15. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should
be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to
the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear
energy, for peaceful purposes in conformity with the
non-proliferation obligations of Articles I, II and III of the
Treaty.
16. The Conference notes with serious concern the recent
revelations of illicit nuclear supply networks. States parties
recognize the increased need for all States to reinforce their
efforts towards the establishment of improved control mechanisms
and enhanced coordination among States and among international
organizations, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and
international law. The Conference notes the contribution of
detecting, monitoring and lawfully banning financial transactions
associated to illicit nuclear activities.
17. The Conference stresses the importance of combating nuclear
terrorism. In this context the Conference notes the adoption of the
Convention on Nuclear Terrorism by the UN General Assembly and
urges all States parties to subscribe to it.
18. The Conference urges all States parties to maintain the
highest possible standards of physical protection of nuclear
material and facilities, as an element to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime. The Conference also urges all States
parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (CPPNM) to participate in the Conference to be held in
July 2005 and to agree on proposed amendments to strengthen the
CPPNM.
19. The Conference urges all States parties to implement the
principles in the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidelines on the
Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board
of Governors in 2004.
20. The Conference expresses support for the concept of
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States in the
regions concerned and in accordance with the relevant principles
and guidelines of the report of the UN Disarmament Commission
adopted 30 April 1999. The Conference supports proposals for the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and/or zone free of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, where they
do not exist, especially in regions of tension. The Conference
considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones
created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and
Pelindaba enhances global and regional peace and security,
strengthens the non-proliferation regime and contributes towards
realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties
note the convening of the international conference of States
parties and signatories to the treaties that establish
nuclear-weapon-free zones, held from 26 to 28 April 2005, in
Tlatelolco, Mexico. States parties welcome Cuba's accession to the
Tlatelolco Treaty, as it completes the nuclear-weapon-free zone in
Latin America and the Caribbean. The Conference also notes
Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. States parties welcome the
progress on the negotiation by the Central Asian States to
establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
21. The Conference welcomes the accession to the NPT of Cuba and
Timor Leste since 2000, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of
achieving the universality of the Treaty.
Institutional issues
22. The Conference agrees that: the next Review Conference shall
be held in 2010 and that its Preparatory Committee will start its
work in 2007 and should produce a consensus report for the Review
Conference on procedural arrangements for the Conference and on
recommendations on matters of substance reflecting the view of all
States; the first session should make the procedural preparations
for the Preparatory committee and the last session should finalize
as its first priority all the procedural preparations for the 2010
Review Conference; and, the Preparatory Committee should also
consider the possibility of establishing a standing Bureau,
comprised of the Chair of each session of the Preparatory Committee
and the President of the Review Conference, that could convene an
extraordinary session of the Conference on issues important to the
implementation of the Treaty.
23. States parties encourage further facilitating and optimizing
the participation of intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations.
24. The Conference reaffirms the importance of reporting and
agrees that the Preparatory Committee should consider this matter
further and make recommendations.
Report by the Chair of
Subsidiary Body II to Main Committee II
Regional issues
The subsidiary body on "regional issues, including with
respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle
East Resolution" held two meetings within the overall time
allocated to Main Committee II. This report was not agreed, adopted
or transmitted to the Drafting Committee.
The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East:
1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on
the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
and recognizes that the resolution remains valid until the goals
and objectives are achieved. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored
by the depositary States (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) is
an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of
the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.
2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and
objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that
efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to,
inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as
other weapons of mass destruction. The Conference further
recognizes that the establishment of such a zone would also
contribute to the aims and objectives of the Middle East
process.
3. The Conference recalls that in paragraph 4 of the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East the Conference "calls upon all States
of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to
accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear
facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards". The Conference further recalls that in paragraph 16.3
of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference "the Conference
notes [...] that [...] all States of the region of the Middle East,
with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". [The Conference notes
the adoption by the General Assembly without a vote, as has been
the case since its thirty-fifth session, of a resolution proposing
the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East
as a means that would greatly enhance international peace and
security. The Conference also notes the adoption by the General
Assembly at its 59th session of a resolution entitled "The Risk of
Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East". The Conference calls
upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under
comprehensive IAEA safeguards without conditions and as soon as
possible.]
4. The Conference notes the requirement under article III of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties
to conclude agreements with IAEA to meet the requirements of the
statute of IAEA. In this regard the Conference notes from paragraph
... of the review of article III that four States parties in the
region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements
with IAEA and invites those States to negotiate such agreements and
bring them into force as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes
the entry into force of an Additional Protocol by Jordan and Kuwait
and invites all other States in the Middle East, whether or not
party to the Treaty, to participate in IAEA's strengthened
safeguards system.
5. The Conference requests all States parties[, particularly the
nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other
interested States,] to report through the United Nations
Secretariat to the 2010 Review Conference and to its Preparatory
Committee meetings on the steps that they have taken to promote the
achievement of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems and the realization of the goals and objectives of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and of the recommendations
on the Middle East contained in the Final Document of the 2000
Review Conference. It requests that the Secretariat prepare a
compilation of those reports in preparation for consideration of
these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2010
Review Conference.
6. The Conference notes the decision adopted by the 44th General
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
(GC(44)/DEC/12), which requested "the Director General to make
arrangements to convene a forum in which the participants from the
Middle East and other interested Parties could learn from the
experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence
building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free
zone". The Conference considers the organization of this forum can
contribute to the fulfillment of the objectives set forth in the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East and, therefore, calls upon all
states in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the
Director General in fulfilling the mandate in (GC(44)/DC/12).
7. The Conference welcomes Libya's decision to abandon its
weapons of mass destruction programs and longer-range missiles. The
Conference further welcomes Libya's decision to comply fully with
the Treaty, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and its
commitment to eliminate Missile Technology Control Regime-class
missiles. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Libya's
continued cooperation with IAEA efforts to maintain verification of
the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations.
[8. Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference notes the statement of 29
February 2005 by the IAEA Director General that, "in view of the
past undeclared nature of significant aspects of Iran's nuclear
program, a confidence deficit has been created, and it is therefore
essential that Iran work closely with the Agency in a proactive
manner [...] to build confidence." The Conference notes that Iran
has signed an Additional Protocol, and has committed itself to full
transparency, to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve
outstanding questions and to suspend fully all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities, under IAEA supervision, pending
negotiation of long term arrangements. The Conference reaffirms the
importance of Iran's full and continuous cooperation with IAEA and
compliance with its international obligations and commitments. The
Conference calls upon Iran to ratify and fully implement the
Additional Protocol, to meet all the relevant resolutions of the
IAEA Board of Governors and to provide objective guarantees that
its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes through
the cessation and dismantlement of its enrichment and reprocessing
programs. The Conference fully supports the process to resolve the
Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means led by France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the EU High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the basis
of the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004, and calls upon Iran to
respect the Paris agreement and the relevant resolutions of the
IAEA Board of Governors, in particular the full suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as foreseen by the
Paris agreement.]
[9. The Conference notes that several States parties, including
the main sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East,
proposed at the Conference the following measures to be undertaken
by States parties to the Treaty towards fulfillment of the
objective of Israel's accession to the Treaty:
- Not to transfer nuclear related material, technology and
information to Israel, notwithstanding prior engagements.
- Deny access to nuclear related facilities and laboratories to
scientists and researchers from Israel.
- Report on their fulfillment of the above measures to the 2010
Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.
- Establish a standing committee within the framework of the
Treaty's Review mechanism that would initiate contacts with Israel
and report on progress to the 2010 Review Conference and its
Preparatory Committee meetings.]
DPRK and South Asia
[10. DPRK: Under discussion. Note: States participating
at the Six-Party Talks will try to present some consensus language
at tomorrow's meeting.]
11. Notwithstanding India's and Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear
tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon
States. The Conference regrets the decisions made by India and
Pakistan to test. The Conference recalls Security Council
resolution 1172 (1998), adopted unanimously, and calls upon both
States to take all the measures set out therein. The Conference
urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear
facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions
and delay. The Conference further urges both States to strengthen
their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies,
material and equipment that can be used for the production of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and, in this regard,
encourages both States to continue to take steps to ensure prompt
and full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540
(2004).
12. The Conference notes that India and Pakistan have declared
moratoria on further testing and their willingness to enter into
legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by
signing and ratifying the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
The conference urges both States to sign and ratify the Treaty, in
accordance with their pledges to do so. The Conference notes the
willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the
negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal
instrument, the Conference urges both countries to observe a
moratorium on the production of such material. The Conference
further notes that India and Pakistan have recently taken steps to
improve relations and reduce the risk of war. The Conference urges
India and Pakistan to discuss and implement confidence-building and
other measures to diminish further regional tensions and also to
reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons use.
Back to the top of page
Report of Main Committee III (draft)
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/CRP.4.
Establishment and terms of reference...
5. The Committee held four meetings and the Subsidiary Body held
two meetings between 19 and 25 May 2005...
Conclusions and Recommendations [not agreed, adopted or
transmitted to the Drafting Committee]
Articles III (3) and IV, preambular pps 6 and 7
1. The Conference reaffirms the commitments made under
the Treaty, and the decisions of previous Conferences,
including
(a) that all Parties to the Treaty have the inalienable right to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I,
II and III of the Treaty;
(b) that all Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and
have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, bearing in mind the needs
of the developing states Parties and the objectives of the
Treaty.
2. The Conference underlines
(a) that the Treaty fosters the development of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and provides an essential basis for technological
transfer and co-operation by laying the framework for ensuring that
nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to
proliferation;
(b) that Article IV constitutes a fundamental pillar of the
Treaty and that the exercise of the rights under Article IV must
conform with the obligations under Articles I, II and III and the
pursuit of peaceful purposes in good faith.
(c) that nuclear energy and technical co-operation activities of
the IAEA contribute in an important way to meet energy needs,
improve health, combat poverty, develop agriculture, manage the use
of water resources and optimize industrial processes, thus helping
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and that these
activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral
co-operation, contribute to the fulfillment of the obligations set
forth in article IV of the Treaty.
3. The conference notes
(a) the continuous efforts by the IAEA and its member States to
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's technical
co-operation programs in partnership and in the light of changing
circumstances and needs of recipient member states;
(b) concerns raised over the proliferation risks associated with
sensitive fuel cycle activities;
(c) the report of the expert group on multilateral approaches to
the nuclear fuel cycle (NPT/CONF.2005/18) submitted by the
IAEA.
4. The Conference expresses its determination to
strengthen the implementation of the Treaty provisions related to
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agrees that states Parties
will
(a) actively co-operate, among themselves and with the IAEA, for
the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, conditional upon
adherence to IAEA safeguards agreements and NPT commitments, and
make every effort to ensure that IAEA's financial and human
resources, including for technical co-operation activities, are
predictable and sufficient to meet its objectives, bearing in mind
the shared responsibility and the need to pay the contributions in
full and on time;
(b) suspend nuclear co-operation with States found to be in
violation with their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards
obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for
such decisions rests with the NPT states Parties or the UN Security
Council, or in the case of safeguards violations with the IAEA
Board of Governors;
(c) uphold the highest international standards on nuclear
safety, including radiation and transport safety inter alia through
the adherence to, and implementation of the relevant international
conventions as well as, where appropriate, guidelines and action
plans in this area;
(d) examine further, together with the IAEA, the nuclear
industry and other nuclear organizations, proposals and options
related to the nuclear fuel cycle, including those outlined in the
recent report of the IAEA expert group;
(e) seek to further the development of a new generation of
proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors and to minimize the
need for highly enriched uranium for peaceful purposes;
(f) promote transparency in their peaceful nuclear activities to
help build confidence that the commitments to the undertakings
under the Treaty are upheld.
Draft Report of Main Committee
III, excerpt concerning Article X (from Subsidiary Body III)
[III. Article X
The Conference re-affirms that:
1. Withdrawal remains a sovereign right for States Parties under
Article X and International Law. Article X subjects this sovereign
right to conditions and a time framework.
2. Recalling the NPT's role as a cornerstone of international
peace and security and in order to preserve the Treaty's objective
of universality, Depositaries and States Parties should undertake
consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort to convince the
withdrawing Party to reconsider its sovereign decision. In doing
so, States Parties should also address the legitimate security
needs of the withdrawing Party. Regional diplomatic initiatives
should be encouraged and supported.
3. Withdrawal may pose threats to international peace and
security. These are to be assessed by the Security Council
according to the UN Charter.
4. Under International Law, the withdrawing Party remains liable
for Treaty violations perpetrated prior to the notification of
withdrawal.
5. Nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by a
State for peaceful purposes before withdrawal must remain subject
to peaceful use under IAEA safeguards.
6. Nuclear supplying States Parties should consider negotiating
the incorporation of dismantling and/or return clauses in the event
of withdrawal, in arrangements or contracts concluded with other
States Parties, as appropriate in accordance with International Law
and national legislation.]
Back to the top of page
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan
Address to the NPT Review Conference, May 2, 2005 (excerpts)
In 1945, the year that the United Nations was founded, our world
entered the nuclear age with the horrific explosions in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Soon after, the Cold War was upon us, and the threat
of nuclear annihilation hung over humankind. That dangerous epoch
may have ended, but nuclear threats remain. Indeed, in the five
years since you last met, the world has reawakened to nuclear
dangers, both new and old.
I firmly believe that our generation can build a world of
ever-expanding development, security and human rights - a world "in
larger freedom". But I am equally aware that such a world could be
put irrevocably beyond our reach by a nuclear catastrophe in one of
our great cities.
In the chaos and confusion of the immediate aftermath, there
might be many questions. Was this an act of terrorism? Was it an
act of aggression by a state? Was it an accident? These may not be
equally probable, but all are possible. Imagine, just for a minute,
what the consequences would be. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands
of people would perish in an instant, and many more would die from
exposure to radiation.
The global impact would also be grave. The attention of world
leaders would be riveted on this existential threat. Carefully
nurtured collective security mechanisms could be discredited.
Hard-won freedoms and human rights could be compromised. The
sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful uses could halt.
Resources for development would likely dwindle. And world financial
markets, trade and transportation could be hard hit, with major
economic consequences. This could drive millions of people in poor
countries into deeper deprivation and suffering. As shock gave way
to anger and despair, the leaders of every nation represented here
at this conference - as well as those who are not here - would have
to ask: How did it come to this? Is my conscience clear? Could I
have done more to reduce the risk by strengthening the regime
designed to do so?
In our interconnected world, a threat to one is a threat to all,
and we all share responsibility for each other's security. If this
is true of all threats, it is particularly true of the nuclear
threat. We are all vulnerable to the weakest link in nuclear
security and safety and in our efforts to promote disarmament and
prevent proliferation. And we all bear a heavy responsibility to
build an efficient, effective, and equitable system that reduces
nuclear threats.
Thirty five years ago, our forebears found the wisdom to agree
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent proliferation
and advance disarmament while assuring the right to peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. Ever since, it has been a cornerstone of global
security, and has confounded the dire predictions of its
critics.
Nuclear weapons have not spread to dozens of States. Indeed,
more States have given up their ambitions for nuclear weapons than
have acquired them. States have joined nuclear-weapon-free-zones,
and I welcome recent progress to establish a new one in Central
Asia. The global non-proliferation norm has been firmly established
- and it has been reaffirmed in your last two review conferences. A
watchful eye has been kept on the supply of materials necessary to
make [nuclear weapons]. Many States have been able to enjoy the
benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have also seen
steps, such as the recent Moscow Treaty, to dismantle weapons and
reduce stockpiles.
Important multilateral action has also been taken to reduce the
risk of nuclear terrorism. In resolution 1540, the Security Council
has affirmed the responsibility of all states to secure sensitive
materials and control their export. And I am sure you take heart,
as I do, from the decision of the General Assembly, last month, to
adopt the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot afford to
be complacent. The plain fact is that the regime has not kept pace
with the march of technology and globalization, and developments of
many kinds in recent years have placed it under great stress.
International regimes do not fail because of one breach, however
serious or unacceptable. They fail when many breaches pile one on
top of the other, to the point where the gap between promise and
performance becomes unbridgeable. As you meet to review the NPT,
your urgent task is to narrow that gap...
I have no doubt that we will hear many truths about this
conference. Some will stress the need to prevent proliferation to
the most volatile regions. Others will argue that we must make
compliance with, and enforcement of, the NPT universal. Some will
say that the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology poses an
unacceptable proliferation threat. Others will counter that access
to peaceful uses of nuclear technology must not be compromised.
Some will paint proliferation as a grave threat. Others will argue
that existing nuclear arsenals are a deadly danger.
But I challenge each of you to recognize all these truths. I
challenge you to accept that disarmament, non-proliferation and the
right to peaceful uses are all vital. I challenge you to agree that
they are all too important to be held hostage to the politics of
the past. And I challenge you to acknowledge that they all impose
responsibilities on all States.
If you are to rise to these challenges, action is required on
many fronts. First, you must strengthen confidence in the integrity
of the treaty, particularly in the face of the first withdrawal
announced by a State. Unless violations are directly addressed, the
most basic collective reassurance on which the treaty rests will be
called into question. Second, you must ensure that measures for
compliance are made more effective, to maintain confidence that
States are living up to their obligations. For example,
universalization of the Model Additional Protocol is long overdue.
It has to be made the new standard for verifying compliance. Third,
you must act to reduce the threat of proliferation not only to
States, but to non-state actors. As the dangers of such
proliferation have become clear, so has the universal obligation
for all States to establish effective national controls and
enforcement measures. Fourth, you must come to grips with the
Janus-like character of nuclear energy. The regime will not be
sustainable if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases
of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce
nuclear weapons on short notice - and, of course, each individual
State which does this only will leave others to feel that they must
do the same. This would increase all the risks - of nuclear
accident, of trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by states
themselves.
To prevent that, you must find durable ways to reconcile the
right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation.
States that wish to exercise their undoubted right to develop and
use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must not insist that they
can only do so by developing capacities that might be used to
create nuclear weapons. But, equally, those same States should not
be left to feel that the only route to enjoying the benefits of
nuclear energy is a domestic fuel cycle capability.
A first step must be to expedite agreement to create incentives
for states to voluntarily forego the development of fuel cycle
facilities. I commend the IAEA and its Director-General, Mohamed
ElBaradei, for working to advance consensus on this vital question,
and I urge all States to do the same... These steps would
materially reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. But,
ultimately, the only guarantee that they will never be used is for
our world to be free of such weapons.
If we are truly committed to a nuclear weapon free world, we
must move beyond rhetorical flourish and political posturing, and
start to think seriously how to get there. Some of the initial
steps are obvious. Prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff
treaty for all states is vital and indispensable. All States should
affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and to early
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The
High-Level Panel has also wisely endorsed the recommendation that
all nuclear weapon states should de-alert their existing
weapons, and give negative security assurances to the non-nuclear
weapon States.
But you must go further. Many states still live under a nuclear
umbrella, whether of their own or an ally. Ways must be found to
lessen, and ultimately overcome, their reliance on nuclear
deterrence. An important step would be for former Cold War rivals
to commit themselves - irreversibly - to further cuts in their
arsenals, so that warheads number in the hundreds, not in the
thousands. We can only hope to achieve such major reductions if
every State has a clear and reliable picture of the fissile
material holdings of every other State, and if every State is
confident that this material in other States is secure.
The obligation therefore falls on all States - nuclear and
non-nuclear alike - to increase transparency and security. Indeed,
unless all States recognize that disarmament, like
non-proliferation, requires action from everyone, the goal of
general and complete disarmament will remain a distant dream. We
must, at the same time, take heed of the fact that the attitude of
States to the NPT is unavoidably linked to broader questions of
national, regional and global security. The more we work to resolve
regional conflicts, the less incentives States will have to go
nuclear. The more confidence States have in our collective security
system, the more prepared they will be to rely on a strengthened
non-proliferation regime, rather than on deterrence. And thus the
nearer we will be to the vital goal of universal membership of the
treaty.
In my report, "In larger freedom", I have offered Member States
a vision of a revitalized system of collective security for the
21st century. When world leaders meet here in September, they must
take bold decisions and bring that vision closer to reality... This
is an ambitious agenda. But the consequences of failure are too
great to aim for anything less. At the same time, the promise of
success is plain for all to see: a world of reduced nuclear threat,
and, ultimately, a world free of nuclear weapons.
Our world will not come close to this vision if you accept only
some of the truths that will be uttered during this
conference. As custodians of the NPT, you must come to terms with
all the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity. Indeed, the
detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki long ago made your burden
abundantly clear. As J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the fathers of
the first bomb, warned: "The peoples of this world must unite, or
they will perish...The atomic bomb has spelled [this] out for all
men to understand."
Back to the top of page
IAEA Director-General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei
Statement to the NPT Review Conference, May 2, 2005
(excerpts)
The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons can be summed up in two words: "Security" and
"Development". While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing
priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals:
development for all through advanced technology; and security for
all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear
threat.
These shared goals were the foundation on which the
international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They
agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They
agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make
the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all.
Folded together, these agreements - these commitments - are
mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were
first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident
is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the
development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the
result of this Conference will be inaction...
Five years ago, I addressed the 2000 NPT Review Conference -
hopeful that the new millennium would bring renewed vigour to these
commitments. Many of you were here, and many shared this hope. Are
we more or less hopeful now? In five years, the world has changed.
Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation - whatever the cause -
have been reawakened. In part, these fears are driven by new
realities. The rise in terrorism. The discovery of clandestine
nuclear programmes. The emergence of a nuclear black market. But
these realities have also heightened our awareness of
vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The acquisition by more and more
countries of sensitive nuclear know-how and capabilities. The
uneven degree of physical protection of nuclear materials from
country to country. The limitations in the IAEA's verification
authority - particularly in countries without additional protocols
in force. The continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence. The
ongoing perception of imbalance between the nuclear haves and
have-nots. And the sense of insecurity that persists, unaddressed,
in a number of regions, most worryingly in the Middle East and the
Korean Peninsula.
If we, the global community, accept that the benefits of
peaceful nuclear technology are essential to our health, our
environment, and our social and economic development, then we owe
it to ourselves to ensure that we have a framework in place that
can effectively prevent the military applications of this
technology from leading to our self-destruction.
The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard
it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to
match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave
us vulnerable and unprotected... While our twin goals - security
and development - remain the same, our mechanisms for achieving
those goals must evolve.
What, then, can we hope for from this Conference? We should,
first of all, re-affirm the goals we established for ourselves in
1970. We should send a clear-cut message that our commitment to
these goals has not changed. We remain committed to ridding the
world of nuclear weapons. We have zero tolerance for new States
developing nuclear weapons. And we will ensure that all countries
have the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Without these commitments, our presence here and our efforts become
a meaningless exercise. Second, we must strengthen the IAEA's
verification authority. In recent years, the additional protocol to
comprehensive safeguards agreements has proven its worth. With
better access to information and locations, we get better results.
I would welcome an acknowledgement by this Conference that the
additional protocol is an integral part of Agency safeguards in
every country party to the NPT.
Effective verification consists of four aspects: adequate legal
authority; state-of-the-art technology; access to all available
information; and sufficient human and financial resources.
Moreover, verification is but one part of the non-proliferation
regime. For the regime as a whole to function effectively, we must
ensure not only effective verification but also effective export
controls, effective physical protection of nuclear material and
effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of non-compliance. It
is imperative that these components are well integrated. The whole
purpose of verification is to build confidence. In cases where
proliferation concerns exist, I will continue to urge States to be
open and transparent. Even if such measures go beyond a State's
legal obligations, they pay valuable dividends in restoring the
confidence of the international community.
Third, we need better control over proliferation sensitive parts
of the nuclear fuel cycle: activities that involve uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation. As experience has shown,
effective control of nuclear materials is the "choke point" to
preventing nuclear weapons development. Without question, improving
control over facilities capable of producing weapon-usable material
will go a long way towards establishing a better margin of
security. We should be clear: there is no incompatibility between
tightening controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the
use of peaceful nuclear technology. In fact, by reducing the risks
of proliferation, we could pave the way for more widespread use of
peaceful nuclear applications.
I cannot tell you what the optimum fuel cycle control mechanism
should look like, but I am convinced it should be different from
what we have today. And above all, it must be equitable and
effective. I should note that the recent High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change urged negotiations without delay on
an arrangement, under the IAEA Statute, for the Agency to serve as
a guarantor of two fuel cycle related services: the supply of
fissile material for fuel, and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The
assurance of supply - the guaranteed provision of reactor
technology and nuclear fuel to users that satisfy agreed
non-proliferation requirements - is clearly a prerequisite for any
additional controls on the fuel cycle to be accepted. The
High-Level Panel also urged that, while this arrangement is being
negotiated, a voluntary time-limited moratorium on new fuel cycle
facilities be put in place - a proposal I have also previously
made. Such a moratorium would signal the willingness of the
international community to address this vulnerability in the
regime. It would also provide an opportunity for analysis and
dialogue among all parties.
Last year I appointed an international group of experts to
examine various approaches for the future management of the fuel
cycle. You will have their report. They have made a good start. If
requested, I would be pleased to pursue more detailed work on the
relevant legal, technical, financial and institutional aspects of
the fuel cycle - perhaps beginning with the development of
approaches for providing assurance of supply.
Fourth, we must secure and control nuclear material. Multiple
international and regional initiatives are underway to help
countries improve their physical protection of nuclear material.
The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism has just been adopted by the General Assembly. Parties to
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material are working to amend the Convention to broaden its
scope. Efforts have also been initiated to minimize, and eventually
eliminate, the use of high enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear
applications. This Conference should voice its support for such
initiatives.
Fifth, we must show the world that our commitment to nuclear
disarmament is firm. As long as some countries place strategic
reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries will
emulate them. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking otherwise.
In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States agreed to an "unequivocal
undertaking" to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. It is vital that they continue to demonstrate this
commitment through concrete action. Given current realities, I
believe it is also essential that disarmament discussions include
States not party to the NPT, namely India, Israel and Pakistan.
Nuclear disarmament can only succeed if it is universal. It is not
my role to set forth what a disarmament roadmap should look like.
But as many have suggested, it is clear that nuclear-weapon States
could make further irreversible reductions in their existing
arsenals. In addition, confidence in disarmament commitments
clearly would be enhanced if nuclear-weapon States were to take
concrete action to reduce the strategic role currently given to
nuclear weapons.
Sixth, our verification efforts must be backed by an effective
mechanism for dealing with non-compliance. In this, both the NPT
and the IAEA Statute make clear our reliance on the Security
Council. Whether it is a case of non-compliance or of withdrawal
from the NPT, the Council must consider promptly the implications
for international peace and security, and take the appropriate
measures.
Seventh, and finally, we should use all mechanisms within our
reach to address the security concerns of all. Clearly, not every
State sees its security as assured under the current NPT regime. As
we have seen, the means to achieving security are often region
specific. In some regions, security has been advanced by the
creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This Conference should
encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones
- in parallel with the resolution of longstanding conflicts - in
areas such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The use of
security assurances would also help to reduce security concerns.
The DPRK is a clear case in point.
In the broader context, these measures to improve security must
be accompanied by an unequivocal commitment to the
development component. Nuclear science plays a key role in
economic and social development. Nuclear energy generates 16% of
the world's electricity in 30 countries - including seven
developing countries - with almost no greenhouse gas emissions.
Radiotherapy is widely used to combat cancer. Other nuclear
techniques are used to study child malnutrition and fight
infectious diseases. Nuclear research produces higher yielding,
disease resistant crops for farmers. We cannot abandon the promise
that these and other advanced nuclear technologies hold for
addressing the needs of the developing world. The Conference should
reaffirm the commitment by all Parties to ensure the assistance and
funding necessary to support peaceful nuclear applications in
developing countries... As I mentioned at the outset, it is clear
that, as States Party to this Treaty, your priorities and
perceptions of security or insecurity differ - and sometimes differ
sharply. But the only way to address all of our security concerns
is through joint and collective action.
Nuclear-weapon States continue to rely on nuclear weapons, in
part because they have as yet developed no alternative to nuclear
deterrence. However, we must seek a solution. In order to
accelerate the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, we must
channel our creativity and resources towards the development of an
alternative system for collective security, in which nuclear
deterrence does not figure. For non-nuclear-weapon States, one of
two conditions can exist. In some cases, they have become dependent
on their alliances with nuclear-weapon States - under a security
umbrella that also rests on nuclear deterrence. In other cases,
States feel insecure and unprotected because of the absence of such
an alliance or umbrella. Here, too, we must find a solution. We
must do our utmost to create a collective security system that is
inclusive and equitable.
In an era of globalization and interdependence, security
strategies founded merely on the priorities of individual countries
or groups of countries can only be a short term solution. As
Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently stated: "Collective security
today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of
the world perceives as the most urgent are in fact equally so for
all."
This Review Conference is an important opportunity. We can
acknowledge the vulnerabilities of all of us, and focus on the
goals which we all share. We can put in place a paradigm of a new
collective security system that will achieve these goals and enable
us to live in freedom and dignity. This multilateral dialogue in
which we are engaging is much like democracy. It is slow, unwieldy,
and at times frustrating - but it is far superior to any other
approach, in terms of the prospects of achieving equitable and
therefore durable security solutions. In short, it remains the best
- if not the only - option.
This opportunity comes only once every 5 years. If we fail to
act, the NPT framework may be the same in 2010, but the world
certainly will be different. If recent history is any teacher, by
2010, would-be proliferators will continue to innovate, and
sensitive nuclear technology will continue to spread. The arsenals
of nuclear-weapon States will continue to be modernized. And
extremist groups will continue their hunt to acquire and use a
nuclear explosive device - or, even worse, succeed. Obviously, we
cannot accomplish everything in one month. But we must set the
wheels of change in motion. Humanity deserves no less.
Back to the top of page
Break the Nuclear Deadlock
Excerpts from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan op-ed,
published after the Review Conference closed, International
Herald Tribune, May 30, 2005.
UNITED NATIONS, New York - Regrettably, there are times when
multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend, deep
rifts over how to confront the threats we face. The review
conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which ended on
Friday with no substantive agreement, was one of these....
...Failure of a review conference to come to any agreement will
not break the NPT-based regime. The vast majority of countries that
are parties to the treaty recognize its enduring benefits. But
there are cracks in each of the treaty's pillars -
nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear
technology - and each of these cracks requires urgent repair.
Since the review conference last met, in 2000, North Korea has
announced its withdrawal from the treaty and declared itself in
possession of nuclear weapons. Libya has admitted that it worked
for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program. And the
International Atomic Energy Agency has found undeclared uranium
enrichment activity in Iran. Clearly, the NPT-based regime has not
kept pace with the march of technology and globalization. Whereas
proliferation among countries was once considered the sole concern
of the treaty, revelations that the Pakistani nuclear scientist
A.Q. Khan and others were extensively trafficking in nuclear
technology and know-how exposed the vulnerability of the
nonproliferation regime to non-state actors.
The treaty's framers could hardly have imagined that we would
have to work tirelessly to prevent terrorists from acquiring and
using nuclear weapons and related materials. And while progress
toward disarmament has taken place, there are still 27,000 nuclear
weapons in the world, many of which remain on hair-trigger
alert.
At the same time, the intergovernmental bodies designed to
address these challenges are paralyzed.... In my opening address to
the conference, I argued that success would depend on coming to
terms with all the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity. I warned
that the conference would stall if some delegates focused on some
threats instead of addressing them all. Some countries underscored
proliferation as a grave danger, while others argued that existing
nuclear arsenals imperil us. Some insisted that the spread of
nuclear fuel-cycle technology posed an unacceptable proliferation
threat, while others countered that access to peaceful uses of
nuclear technology must not be compromised.
In the end, delegations regrettably missed the opportunity to
endorse the merits of all of these arguments. As a result, they
were unable to advance security against any of the dangers we face.
How, then, can we overcome this paralysis?
When multilateral forums falter, leaders must lead. This
September, more than 170 heads of state and government will convene
in New York to adopt a wide-ranging agenda to advance development,
security and human rights for all countries and all peoples. I
challenge them to break the deadlock on the most pressing
challenges in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament. If they fail to do so, their peoples will ask how, in
today's world, they could not find common ground in the cause of
diminishing the existential threat of nuclear weapons.
To revitalize the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, action will
be required on many fronts. To strengthen verification and increase
confidence in the regime, leaders must agree to make the
International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol the new
standard for verifying compliance with nonproliferation
commitments.
Leaders must find ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses
of nuclear energy with the imperative of nonproliferation. The
regime will not be sustainable if scores more countries develop the
most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle, and are equipped with the
technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.
A first step would be to create incentives for countries to
voluntarily forgo the development of fuel-cycle facilities. I
commend the nuclear agency and its director general, Mohamed
ElBaradei, for working to advance consensus on this vital question,
and I urge leaders to join him in that mission.
Leaders must also move beyond rhetoric in addressing the
question of disarmament. Prompt negotiation of a fissile material
cutoff treaty for all countries is indispensable. All countries
also should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and
to early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty. And I hope leaders will think seriously about what more can
be done to reduce - irreversibly - the number and role of nuclear
weapons in the world.
Bold commitments at the September meeting would breathe new life
into all forums dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation. They
would reduce all the risks we face - of nuclear accidents, of
trafficking, of terrorist use and of use by countries themselves.
It is an ambitious agenda, and probably daunting to some. But the
consequences of failure are far more daunting. Solutions are within
are reach; we must grasp them.
[IHT, May 30, 2005]
Back to the top of page
© 2005 The Acronym Institute.
|
