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See: Rebecca Johnson's full report, Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed.
Issued as NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/1, May 25, 2005.
1. Pursuant to rule 34 of its rules of procedure, the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons established Main Committee I as one of its three Main Committees, and decided to allocate to it the following items for its consideration (see NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1)...
8. The Committee held six formal meetings and a number of informal meetings between 19 and 25 May 2005...
9. The Committee was not able to reach a consensus on the text of the Chairman's working paper of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/CRP.3) and the Chairman's working paper of Subsidiary Body 1 (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SB/CRP.4), as they do not reflect fully the views of all States parties. Nevertheless, the Committee agreed to annex the papers to this report.
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/CRP.3.
1. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.
2. The Conference underscores that the Treaty rests on three pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agrees that these pillars represent a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of States parties.
3. The Conference reaffirms that compliance and implementation of the Treaty need to be assessed comprehensively, taking into account all the pillars of the Treaty and the outcomes of the Review Conferences.
4. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by States parties and reaffirms that the strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to international peace and security. The Conference affirms the importance of strengthening compliance with and enforcement of the Treaty's obligations.
1. The Conference welcomes the accession of Cuba, as well as of Timor-Leste as States Parties to the Treaty, which brings the Treaty closer into its universality.
2. The Conference urges three States that have not yet adhered to the Treaty - India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede promptly to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, without condition and without delay, and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference calls upon States not party to the NPT to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty pending their accession to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.
3. The Conference emphasizes that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is vital to international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that each Article of the Treaty is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.
4. The Conference recognizes that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States and with States not party to the Treaty.
5. The Conference recognizes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference also calls upon the non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any activities designed to develop nuclear weapons capability.
6. The Conference reaffirms the importance of transparency and making available an exchange of information, as appropriate, among States parties on measures related to the implementation and enforcement of their obligations under articles I and II.
7. The Conference expresses grave concerns over the risk that non-State actors may acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and stresses that the most effective way to address this concern is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference notes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and General Assembly resolution 59/80 as measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring such weapons.
8. The Conference encourages States parties to consider a wide range of measures against proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in conformity with national legislation, the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
Item 17...
The Conference recognizes the threat to international peace and security posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In order to address such challenges, the Conference reaffirms its determination to preserve the integrity of and to implement fully the Treaty and to make efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty.
1. The Conference recognizes that disarmament and non-proliferation education can ensure the continuation of institutional knowledge of those working on disarmament and non-proliferation issues and contribute to create understanding on such issues by the general public.
2. The Conference encourages States parties to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session, and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking in this area.
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SB/CRP.4.
1. The Conference remains alarmed by the continued threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, reaffirms the need to make every effort to avert the danger to all mankind of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.
2. The Conference recalls the Principles, Objectives and Undertakings for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament including the principles of irreversibility, transparency, verifiability and undiminished security for all.
3. The Conference recalls the commitments to pursue effective measures and make systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and other steps.
4. The Conference recognizes the importance of the Moscow Treaty and seeks sustained efforts to implement it, and urges its Parties to undertake the reductions by 2012 to the lowest target number of nuclear warheads and by agreed timetables.
5. Building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, the Conference urges more intensified progress by the nuclear-weapon States in reducing or continuing to reduce their non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals.
6. The Conference affirms the value of full implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiative and of the extension of such a mechanism to all States possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons.
7. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to resolve further to restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons, their operational readiness and their potential role as defined in national security doctrines.
8. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to forego any efforts to research and develop new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
9. In looking forward to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Conference welcomes efforts since 2000 against the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through maintenance of the existing moratoria, support for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, progress made in developing the International Monitoring System, and the increased membership of the Treaty.
10. The Conference pledges urgent efforts, especially in the Conference on Disarmament, to pursue and implement options for enhanced multilateral and other action on nuclear disarmament, including compliance aspects, and appeals to all members of the Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate the necessary flexibility to enable adoption of a programme of work that will advance crucial NPT-related tasks.
11. The Conference seeks affirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that they will place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated as no longer required for weapons purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and, welcoming work already undertaken on the development of verification capabilities for nuclear disarmament, urges that such work be initiated by those nuclear-weapon States not already doing so.
12. Reaffirming the importance of reporting, the Conference welcomes the reports and information submitted to the Conference and agrees to provide reports on implementation of article VI on an annual basis.
1. The Conference recognizes that assuring non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons works towards the Treaty's principle of easing international tension and strengthening trust between States, thereby advancing the non-proliferation goals of the Treaty.
2. The Conference recalls the unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States as recognized by United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) regarding the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, and the expectations of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference that further steps should be recommended to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
3. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapon States Parties.
4. The Conference reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an effective measure towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, acknowledges that States that engage in creating such zones enhance regional and international security while increasing levels of mutual trust.
5. The Conference welcomes the readiness of nuclear-weapon States to provide future security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States within the context of nuclear-weapon-free-zones, and encourages further steps to be taken to bring into effect the assurances provided by nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties and their protocols.
6. The Conference recognizes that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are conditional and not applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the Treaty.
7. The Conference agrees on the need for further work, in the context of the strengthened review process, to be undertaken during the next review period on how security assurances would be encapsulated in a legally binding instrument with a view to endorsing the outcome of these deliberations at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/CRP.3.
1. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decisions and resolutions of the previous Conferences.
2. The Conference notes that conclusions agreed at previous Conferences for the implementation of Article III provide a basis for States Parties to the Treaty and for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings pursuant to the Treaty.
3. The Conference stresses the importance of preserving the peace and security benefits of the NPT and in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. The Conference notes that the integrity of the NPT depends upon full respect by all States parties of all of their obligations under the Treaty, including relevant safeguards agreements.
4. The Conference notes the importance of addressing all compliance challenges. These challenges pose a significant test for the Treaty and need to be met firmly in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. In addition, intense international concern about nuclear weapons proliferation, including to non-State actors, has added to the importance of the Treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference reaffirms the respective mandates of the Security Council and of the IAEA in relation to States' compliance with the Treaty and with Safeguards Agreements.
5. The Conference underlines that the objectives related to international security issues, including disarmament and non-proliferation, should be achieved through dialogue and cooperation amongst States, through the improvement of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the NPT. States parties further note that all efforts should be deployed to strengthen the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, through multilaterally agreed solutions. In this context, States parties underline the role of the IAEA as the established multilateral mechanism under the NPT to address safeguards issues and other relevant verification questions.
6. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference notes its conviction that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. The Conference commends the IAEA for the extensive verification activities since its establishment and expresses full support for its continuing efforts in this field.
7. The Conference calls upon all States parties, which have not yet done so, to conclude and bring into force comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement without further delay. The Conference affirms the importance of the Additional Protocol as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States, particularly those with significant nuclear activities which have not yet done so, to sign and bring into force additional protocols without further delay. The Conference notes the proposal by several States parties, by the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the Director General of the IAEA that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, now represents the verification standard pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article III of the Treaty. The Conference also notes the view expressed by several other States parties that consider additional protocols to be an excellent confidence building measure.
8. The Conference notes, that some States parties supported a proposal that the ratification of the Additional Protocol be made a condition of supply for nuclear materials, equipment and technologies.
9. The Conference calls on all States not party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols.
10. The Conference welcomes the completion of the conceptual framework by the IAEA for the implementation of integrated safeguards with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and the efficiency of the IAEA's safeguards activities and welcomes the implementation of integrated safeguards by the IAEA in eight States.
11. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
12. The Conference urges the IAEA to address the question of Small Quantities Protocols to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements which has been described by the Director General of the IAEA as a significant weakness of the IAEA safeguards system.
13. The Conference notes the general contribution to non-proliferation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) for removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research reactors, and their conversion into research reactors operating with low enriched uranium (LEU).
14. The Conference reiterates that effective and transparent export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the NPT, in accordance with Article III.2 of the Treaty. In this context the Conference welcomes the adoption by consensus of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). The Conference also acknowledges the important role of the national and international export control frameworks for nuclear materials, equipment and technologies.
15. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations of Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.
16. The Conference notes with serious concern the recent revelations of illicit nuclear supply networks. States parties recognize the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts towards the establishment of improved control mechanisms and enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and international law. The Conference notes the contribution of detecting, monitoring and lawfully banning financial transactions associated to illicit nuclear activities.
17. The Conference stresses the importance of combating nuclear terrorism. In this context the Conference notes the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism by the UN General Assembly and urges all States parties to subscribe to it.
18. The Conference urges all States parties to maintain the highest possible standards of physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, as an element to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The Conference also urges all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to participate in the Conference to be held in July 2005 and to agree on proposed amendments to strengthen the CPPNM.
19. The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles in the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.
20. The Conference expresses support for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States in the regions concerned and in accordance with the relevant principles and guidelines of the report of the UN Disarmament Commission adopted 30 April 1999. The Conference supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and/or zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, where they do not exist, especially in regions of tension. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties note the convening of the international conference of States parties and signatories to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, held from 26 to 28 April 2005, in Tlatelolco, Mexico. States parties welcome Cuba's accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty, as it completes the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Conference also notes Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. States parties welcome the progress on the negotiation by the Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
21. The Conference welcomes the accession to the NPT of Cuba and Timor Leste since 2000, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.
22. The Conference agrees that: the next Review Conference shall be held in 2010 and that its Preparatory Committee will start its work in 2007 and should produce a consensus report for the Review Conference on procedural arrangements for the Conference and on recommendations on matters of substance reflecting the view of all States; the first session should make the procedural preparations for the Preparatory committee and the last session should finalize as its first priority all the procedural preparations for the 2010 Review Conference; and, the Preparatory Committee should also consider the possibility of establishing a standing Bureau, comprised of the Chair of each session of the Preparatory Committee and the President of the Review Conference, that could convene an extraordinary session of the Conference on issues important to the implementation of the Treaty.
23. States parties encourage further facilitating and optimizing the participation of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
24. The Conference reaffirms the importance of reporting and agrees that the Preparatory Committee should consider this matter further and make recommendations.
The subsidiary body on "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution" held two meetings within the overall time allocated to Main Committee II. This report was not agreed, adopted or transmitted to the Drafting Committee.
1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognizes that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.
2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. The Conference further recognizes that the establishment of such a zone would also contribute to the aims and objectives of the Middle East process.
3. The Conference recalls that in paragraph 4 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East the Conference "calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards". The Conference further recalls that in paragraph 16.3 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference "the Conference notes [...] that [...] all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". [The Conference notes the adoption by the General Assembly without a vote, as has been the case since its thirty-fifth session, of a resolution proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East as a means that would greatly enhance international peace and security. The Conference also notes the adoption by the General Assembly at its 59th session of a resolution entitled "The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East". The Conference calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards without conditions and as soon as possible.]
4. The Conference notes the requirement under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude agreements with IAEA to meet the requirements of the statute of IAEA. In this regard the Conference notes from paragraph ... of the review of article III that four States parties in the region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and invites those States to negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of an Additional Protocol by Jordan and Kuwait and invites all other States in the Middle East, whether or not party to the Treaty, to participate in IAEA's strengthened safeguards system.
5. The Conference requests all States parties[, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States,] to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the 2010 Review Conference and to its Preparatory Committee meetings on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and of the recommendations on the Middle East contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. It requests that the Secretariat prepare a compilation of those reports in preparation for consideration of these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2010 Review Conference.
6. The Conference notes the decision adopted by the 44th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, (GC(44)/DEC/12), which requested "the Director General to make arrangements to convene a forum in which the participants from the Middle East and other interested Parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone". The Conference considers the organization of this forum can contribute to the fulfillment of the objectives set forth in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and, therefore, calls upon all states in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the Director General in fulfilling the mandate in (GC(44)/DC/12).
7. The Conference welcomes Libya's decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and longer-range missiles. The Conference further welcomes Libya's decision to comply fully with the Treaty, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and its commitment to eliminate Missile Technology Control Regime-class missiles. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Libya's continued cooperation with IAEA efforts to maintain verification of the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations.
[8. Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference notes the statement of 29 February 2005 by the IAEA Director General that, "in view of the past undeclared nature of significant aspects of Iran's nuclear program, a confidence deficit has been created, and it is therefore essential that Iran work closely with the Agency in a proactive manner [...] to build confidence." The Conference notes that Iran has signed an Additional Protocol, and has committed itself to full transparency, to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions and to suspend fully all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, under IAEA supervision, pending negotiation of long term arrangements. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Iran's full and continuous cooperation with IAEA and compliance with its international obligations and commitments. The Conference calls upon Iran to ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol, to meet all the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes through the cessation and dismantlement of its enrichment and reprocessing programs. The Conference fully supports the process to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means led by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the basis of the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004, and calls upon Iran to respect the Paris agreement and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, in particular the full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as foreseen by the Paris agreement.]
[9. The Conference notes that several States parties, including the main sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, proposed at the Conference the following measures to be undertaken by States parties to the Treaty towards fulfillment of the objective of Israel's accession to the Treaty:
[10. DPRK: Under discussion. Note: States participating at the Six-Party Talks will try to present some consensus language at tomorrow's meeting.]
11. Notwithstanding India's and Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States. The Conference regrets the decisions made by India and Pakistan to test. The Conference recalls Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), adopted unanimously, and calls upon both States to take all the measures set out therein. The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and delay. The Conference further urges both States to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and, in this regard, encourages both States to continue to take steps to ensure prompt and full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
12. The Conference notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoria on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The conference urges both States to sign and ratify the Treaty, in accordance with their pledges to do so. The Conference notes the willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, the Conference urges both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of such material. The Conference further notes that India and Pakistan have recently taken steps to improve relations and reduce the risk of war. The Conference urges India and Pakistan to discuss and implement confidence-building and other measures to diminish further regional tensions and also to reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons use.
Excerpts from NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/CRP.4.
5. The Committee held four meetings and the Subsidiary Body held two meetings between 19 and 25 May 2005...
Conclusions and Recommendations [not agreed, adopted or transmitted to the Drafting Committee]
Articles III (3) and IV, preambular pps 6 and 7
1. The Conference reaffirms the commitments made under the Treaty, and the decisions of previous Conferences, including
(a) that all Parties to the Treaty have the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty;
(b) that all Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, bearing in mind the needs of the developing states Parties and the objectives of the Treaty.
2. The Conference underlines
(a) that the Treaty fosters the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provides an essential basis for technological transfer and co-operation by laying the framework for ensuring that nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to proliferation;
(b) that Article IV constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Treaty and that the exercise of the rights under Article IV must conform with the obligations under Articles I, II and III and the pursuit of peaceful purposes in good faith.
(c) that nuclear energy and technical co-operation activities of the IAEA contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve health, combat poverty, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral co-operation, contribute to the fulfillment of the obligations set forth in article IV of the Treaty.
3. The conference notes
(a) the continuous efforts by the IAEA and its member States to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's technical co-operation programs in partnership and in the light of changing circumstances and needs of recipient member states;
(b) concerns raised over the proliferation risks associated with sensitive fuel cycle activities;
(c) the report of the expert group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (NPT/CONF.2005/18) submitted by the IAEA.
4. The Conference expresses its determination to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty provisions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agrees that states Parties will
(a) actively co-operate, among themselves and with the IAEA, for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, conditional upon adherence to IAEA safeguards agreements and NPT commitments, and make every effort to ensure that IAEA's financial and human resources, including for technical co-operation activities, are predictable and sufficient to meet its objectives, bearing in mind the shared responsibility and the need to pay the contributions in full and on time;
(b) suspend nuclear co-operation with States found to be in violation with their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with the NPT states Parties or the UN Security Council, or in the case of safeguards violations with the IAEA Board of Governors;
(c) uphold the highest international standards on nuclear safety, including radiation and transport safety inter alia through the adherence to, and implementation of the relevant international conventions as well as, where appropriate, guidelines and action plans in this area;
(d) examine further, together with the IAEA, the nuclear industry and other nuclear organizations, proposals and options related to the nuclear fuel cycle, including those outlined in the recent report of the IAEA expert group;
(e) seek to further the development of a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors and to minimize the need for highly enriched uranium for peaceful purposes;
(f) promote transparency in their peaceful nuclear activities to help build confidence that the commitments to the undertakings under the Treaty are upheld.
[III. Article X
The Conference re-affirms that:
1. Withdrawal remains a sovereign right for States Parties under Article X and International Law. Article X subjects this sovereign right to conditions and a time framework.
2. Recalling the NPT's role as a cornerstone of international peace and security and in order to preserve the Treaty's objective of universality, Depositaries and States Parties should undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort to convince the withdrawing Party to reconsider its sovereign decision. In doing so, States Parties should also address the legitimate security needs of the withdrawing Party. Regional diplomatic initiatives should be encouraged and supported.
3. Withdrawal may pose threats to international peace and security. These are to be assessed by the Security Council according to the UN Charter.
4. Under International Law, the withdrawing Party remains liable for Treaty violations perpetrated prior to the notification of withdrawal.
5. Nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by a State for peaceful purposes before withdrawal must remain subject to peaceful use under IAEA safeguards.
6. Nuclear supplying States Parties should consider negotiating the incorporation of dismantling and/or return clauses in the event of withdrawal, in arrangements or contracts concluded with other States Parties, as appropriate in accordance with International Law and national legislation.]
In 1945, the year that the United Nations was founded, our world entered the nuclear age with the horrific explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soon after, the Cold War was upon us, and the threat of nuclear annihilation hung over humankind. That dangerous epoch may have ended, but nuclear threats remain. Indeed, in the five years since you last met, the world has reawakened to nuclear dangers, both new and old.
I firmly believe that our generation can build a world of ever-expanding development, security and human rights - a world "in larger freedom". But I am equally aware that such a world could be put irrevocably beyond our reach by a nuclear catastrophe in one of our great cities.
In the chaos and confusion of the immediate aftermath, there might be many questions. Was this an act of terrorism? Was it an act of aggression by a state? Was it an accident? These may not be equally probable, but all are possible. Imagine, just for a minute, what the consequences would be. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would perish in an instant, and many more would die from exposure to radiation.
The global impact would also be grave. The attention of world leaders would be riveted on this existential threat. Carefully nurtured collective security mechanisms could be discredited. Hard-won freedoms and human rights could be compromised. The sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful uses could halt. Resources for development would likely dwindle. And world financial markets, trade and transportation could be hard hit, with major economic consequences. This could drive millions of people in poor countries into deeper deprivation and suffering. As shock gave way to anger and despair, the leaders of every nation represented here at this conference - as well as those who are not here - would have to ask: How did it come to this? Is my conscience clear? Could I have done more to reduce the risk by strengthening the regime designed to do so?
In our interconnected world, a threat to one is a threat to all, and we all share responsibility for each other's security. If this is true of all threats, it is particularly true of the nuclear threat. We are all vulnerable to the weakest link in nuclear security and safety and in our efforts to promote disarmament and prevent proliferation. And we all bear a heavy responsibility to build an efficient, effective, and equitable system that reduces nuclear threats.
Thirty five years ago, our forebears found the wisdom to agree to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent proliferation and advance disarmament while assuring the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Ever since, it has been a cornerstone of global security, and has confounded the dire predictions of its critics.
Nuclear weapons have not spread to dozens of States. Indeed, more States have given up their ambitions for nuclear weapons than have acquired them. States have joined nuclear-weapon-free-zones, and I welcome recent progress to establish a new one in Central Asia. The global non-proliferation norm has been firmly established - and it has been reaffirmed in your last two review conferences. A watchful eye has been kept on the supply of materials necessary to make [nuclear weapons]. Many States have been able to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have also seen steps, such as the recent Moscow Treaty, to dismantle weapons and reduce stockpiles.
Important multilateral action has also been taken to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. In resolution 1540, the Security Council has affirmed the responsibility of all states to secure sensitive materials and control their export. And I am sure you take heart, as I do, from the decision of the General Assembly, last month, to adopt the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot afford to be complacent. The plain fact is that the regime has not kept pace with the march of technology and globalization, and developments of many kinds in recent years have placed it under great stress.
International regimes do not fail because of one breach, however serious or unacceptable. They fail when many breaches pile one on top of the other, to the point where the gap between promise and performance becomes unbridgeable. As you meet to review the NPT, your urgent task is to narrow that gap...
I have no doubt that we will hear many truths about this conference. Some will stress the need to prevent proliferation to the most volatile regions. Others will argue that we must make compliance with, and enforcement of, the NPT universal. Some will say that the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology poses an unacceptable proliferation threat. Others will counter that access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology must not be compromised. Some will paint proliferation as a grave threat. Others will argue that existing nuclear arsenals are a deadly danger.
But I challenge each of you to recognize all these truths. I challenge you to accept that disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to peaceful uses are all vital. I challenge you to agree that they are all too important to be held hostage to the politics of the past. And I challenge you to acknowledge that they all impose responsibilities on all States.
If you are to rise to these challenges, action is required on many fronts. First, you must strengthen confidence in the integrity of the treaty, particularly in the face of the first withdrawal announced by a State. Unless violations are directly addressed, the most basic collective reassurance on which the treaty rests will be called into question. Second, you must ensure that measures for compliance are made more effective, to maintain confidence that States are living up to their obligations. For example, universalization of the Model Additional Protocol is long overdue. It has to be made the new standard for verifying compliance. Third, you must act to reduce the threat of proliferation not only to States, but to non-state actors. As the dangers of such proliferation have become clear, so has the universal obligation for all States to establish effective national controls and enforcement measures. Fourth, you must come to grips with the Janus-like character of nuclear energy. The regime will not be sustainable if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice - and, of course, each individual State which does this only will leave others to feel that they must do the same. This would increase all the risks - of nuclear accident, of trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by states themselves.
To prevent that, you must find durable ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation. States that wish to exercise their undoubted right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must not insist that they can only do so by developing capacities that might be used to create nuclear weapons. But, equally, those same States should not be left to feel that the only route to enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy is a domestic fuel cycle capability.
A first step must be to expedite agreement to create incentives for states to voluntarily forego the development of fuel cycle facilities. I commend the IAEA and its Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei, for working to advance consensus on this vital question, and I urge all States to do the same... These steps would materially reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. But, ultimately, the only guarantee that they will never be used is for our world to be free of such weapons.
If we are truly committed to a nuclear weapon free world, we must move beyond rhetorical flourish and political posturing, and start to think seriously how to get there. Some of the initial steps are obvious. Prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty for all states is vital and indispensable. All States should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and to early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The High-Level Panel has also wisely endorsed the recommendation that all nuclear weapon states should de-alert their existing weapons, and give negative security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States.
But you must go further. Many states still live under a nuclear umbrella, whether of their own or an ally. Ways must be found to lessen, and ultimately overcome, their reliance on nuclear deterrence. An important step would be for former Cold War rivals to commit themselves - irreversibly - to further cuts in their arsenals, so that warheads number in the hundreds, not in the thousands. We can only hope to achieve such major reductions if every State has a clear and reliable picture of the fissile material holdings of every other State, and if every State is confident that this material in other States is secure.
The obligation therefore falls on all States - nuclear and non-nuclear alike - to increase transparency and security. Indeed, unless all States recognize that disarmament, like non-proliferation, requires action from everyone, the goal of general and complete disarmament will remain a distant dream. We must, at the same time, take heed of the fact that the attitude of States to the NPT is unavoidably linked to broader questions of national, regional and global security. The more we work to resolve regional conflicts, the less incentives States will have to go nuclear. The more confidence States have in our collective security system, the more prepared they will be to rely on a strengthened non-proliferation regime, rather than on deterrence. And thus the nearer we will be to the vital goal of universal membership of the treaty.
In my report, "In larger freedom", I have offered Member States a vision of a revitalized system of collective security for the 21st century. When world leaders meet here in September, they must take bold decisions and bring that vision closer to reality... This is an ambitious agenda. But the consequences of failure are too great to aim for anything less. At the same time, the promise of success is plain for all to see: a world of reduced nuclear threat, and, ultimately, a world free of nuclear weapons.
Our world will not come close to this vision if you accept only some of the truths that will be uttered during this conference. As custodians of the NPT, you must come to terms with all the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity. Indeed, the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki long ago made your burden abundantly clear. As J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the fathers of the first bomb, warned: "The peoples of this world must unite, or they will perish...The atomic bomb has spelled [this] out for all men to understand."
The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: "Security" and "Development". While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat.
These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements - these commitments - are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction...
Five years ago, I addressed the 2000 NPT Review Conference - hopeful that the new millennium would bring renewed vigour to these commitments. Many of you were here, and many shared this hope. Are we more or less hopeful now? In five years, the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation - whatever the cause - have been reawakened. In part, these fears are driven by new realities. The rise in terrorism. The discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes. The emergence of a nuclear black market. But these realities have also heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The acquisition by more and more countries of sensitive nuclear know-how and capabilities. The uneven degree of physical protection of nuclear materials from country to country. The limitations in the IAEA's verification authority - particularly in countries without additional protocols in force. The continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence. The ongoing perception of imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots. And the sense of insecurity that persists, unaddressed, in a number of regions, most worryingly in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula.
If we, the global community, accept that the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology are essential to our health, our environment, and our social and economic development, then we owe it to ourselves to ensure that we have a framework in place that can effectively prevent the military applications of this technology from leading to our self-destruction.
The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected... While our twin goals - security and development - remain the same, our mechanisms for achieving those goals must evolve.
What, then, can we hope for from this Conference? We should, first of all, re-affirm the goals we established for ourselves in 1970. We should send a clear-cut message that our commitment to these goals has not changed. We remain committed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. We have zero tolerance for new States developing nuclear weapons. And we will ensure that all countries have the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Without these commitments, our presence here and our efforts become a meaningless exercise. Second, we must strengthen the IAEA's verification authority. In recent years, the additional protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements has proven its worth. With better access to information and locations, we get better results. I would welcome an acknowledgement by this Conference that the additional protocol is an integral part of Agency safeguards in every country party to the NPT.
Effective verification consists of four aspects: adequate legal authority; state-of-the-art technology; access to all available information; and sufficient human and financial resources. Moreover, verification is but one part of the non-proliferation regime. For the regime as a whole to function effectively, we must ensure not only effective verification but also effective export controls, effective physical protection of nuclear material and effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of non-compliance. It is imperative that these components are well integrated. The whole purpose of verification is to build confidence. In cases where proliferation concerns exist, I will continue to urge States to be open and transparent. Even if such measures go beyond a State's legal obligations, they pay valuable dividends in restoring the confidence of the international community.
Third, we need better control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle: activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. As experience has shown, effective control of nuclear materials is the "choke point" to preventing nuclear weapons development. Without question, improving control over facilities capable of producing weapon-usable material will go a long way towards establishing a better margin of security. We should be clear: there is no incompatibility between tightening controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear technology. In fact, by reducing the risks of proliferation, we could pave the way for more widespread use of peaceful nuclear applications.
I cannot tell you what the optimum fuel cycle control mechanism should look like, but I am convinced it should be different from what we have today. And above all, it must be equitable and effective. I should note that the recent High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change urged negotiations without delay on an arrangement, under the IAEA Statute, for the Agency to serve as a guarantor of two fuel cycle related services: the supply of fissile material for fuel, and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The assurance of supply - the guaranteed provision of reactor technology and nuclear fuel to users that satisfy agreed non-proliferation requirements - is clearly a prerequisite for any additional controls on the fuel cycle to be accepted. The High-Level Panel also urged that, while this arrangement is being negotiated, a voluntary time-limited moratorium on new fuel cycle facilities be put in place - a proposal I have also previously made. Such a moratorium would signal the willingness of the international community to address this vulnerability in the regime. It would also provide an opportunity for analysis and dialogue among all parties.
Last year I appointed an international group of experts to examine various approaches for the future management of the fuel cycle. You will have their report. They have made a good start. If requested, I would be pleased to pursue more detailed work on the relevant legal, technical, financial and institutional aspects of the fuel cycle - perhaps beginning with the development of approaches for providing assurance of supply.
Fourth, we must secure and control nuclear material. Multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries improve their physical protection of nuclear material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism has just been adopted by the General Assembly. Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are working to amend the Convention to broaden its scope. Efforts have also been initiated to minimize, and eventually eliminate, the use of high enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear applications. This Conference should voice its support for such initiatives.
Fifth, we must show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm. As long as some countries place strategic reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries will emulate them. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking otherwise. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States agreed to an "unequivocal undertaking" to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is vital that they continue to demonstrate this commitment through concrete action. Given current realities, I believe it is also essential that disarmament discussions include States not party to the NPT, namely India, Israel and Pakistan. Nuclear disarmament can only succeed if it is universal. It is not my role to set forth what a disarmament roadmap should look like. But as many have suggested, it is clear that nuclear-weapon States could make further irreversible reductions in their existing arsenals. In addition, confidence in disarmament commitments clearly would be enhanced if nuclear-weapon States were to take concrete action to reduce the strategic role currently given to nuclear weapons.
Sixth, our verification efforts must be backed by an effective mechanism for dealing with non-compliance. In this, both the NPT and the IAEA Statute make clear our reliance on the Security Council. Whether it is a case of non-compliance or of withdrawal from the NPT, the Council must consider promptly the implications for international peace and security, and take the appropriate measures.
Seventh, and finally, we should use all mechanisms within our reach to address the security concerns of all. Clearly, not every State sees its security as assured under the current NPT regime. As we have seen, the means to achieving security are often region specific. In some regions, security has been advanced by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This Conference should encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones - in parallel with the resolution of longstanding conflicts - in areas such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The use of security assurances would also help to reduce security concerns. The DPRK is a clear case in point.
In the broader context, these measures to improve security must be accompanied by an unequivocal commitment to the development component. Nuclear science plays a key role in economic and social development. Nuclear energy generates 16% of the world's electricity in 30 countries - including seven developing countries - with almost no greenhouse gas emissions. Radiotherapy is widely used to combat cancer. Other nuclear techniques are used to study child malnutrition and fight infectious diseases. Nuclear research produces higher yielding, disease resistant crops for farmers. We cannot abandon the promise that these and other advanced nuclear technologies hold for addressing the needs of the developing world. The Conference should reaffirm the commitment by all Parties to ensure the assistance and funding necessary to support peaceful nuclear applications in developing countries... As I mentioned at the outset, it is clear that, as States Party to this Treaty, your priorities and perceptions of security or insecurity differ - and sometimes differ sharply. But the only way to address all of our security concerns is through joint and collective action.
Nuclear-weapon States continue to rely on nuclear weapons, in part because they have as yet developed no alternative to nuclear deterrence. However, we must seek a solution. In order to accelerate the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, we must channel our creativity and resources towards the development of an alternative system for collective security, in which nuclear deterrence does not figure. For non-nuclear-weapon States, one of two conditions can exist. In some cases, they have become dependent on their alliances with nuclear-weapon States - under a security umbrella that also rests on nuclear deterrence. In other cases, States feel insecure and unprotected because of the absence of such an alliance or umbrella. Here, too, we must find a solution. We must do our utmost to create a collective security system that is inclusive and equitable.
In an era of globalization and interdependence, security strategies founded merely on the priorities of individual countries or groups of countries can only be a short term solution. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently stated: "Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as the most urgent are in fact equally so for all."
This Review Conference is an important opportunity. We can acknowledge the vulnerabilities of all of us, and focus on the goals which we all share. We can put in place a paradigm of a new collective security system that will achieve these goals and enable us to live in freedom and dignity. This multilateral dialogue in which we are engaging is much like democracy. It is slow, unwieldy, and at times frustrating - but it is far superior to any other approach, in terms of the prospects of achieving equitable and therefore durable security solutions. In short, it remains the best - if not the only - option.
This opportunity comes only once every 5 years. If we fail to act, the NPT framework may be the same in 2010, but the world certainly will be different. If recent history is any teacher, by 2010, would-be proliferators will continue to innovate, and sensitive nuclear technology will continue to spread. The arsenals of nuclear-weapon States will continue to be modernized. And extremist groups will continue their hunt to acquire and use a nuclear explosive device - or, even worse, succeed. Obviously, we cannot accomplish everything in one month. But we must set the wheels of change in motion. Humanity deserves no less.
Excerpts from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan op-ed, published after the Review Conference closed, International Herald Tribune, May 30, 2005.
UNITED NATIONS, New York - Regrettably, there are times when multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend, deep rifts over how to confront the threats we face. The review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which ended on Friday with no substantive agreement, was one of these....
...Failure of a review conference to come to any agreement will not break the NPT-based regime. The vast majority of countries that are parties to the treaty recognize its enduring benefits. But there are cracks in each of the treaty's pillars - nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology - and each of these cracks requires urgent repair.
Since the review conference last met, in 2000, North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the treaty and declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons. Libya has admitted that it worked for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program. And the International Atomic Energy Agency has found undeclared uranium enrichment activity in Iran. Clearly, the NPT-based regime has not kept pace with the march of technology and globalization. Whereas proliferation among countries was once considered the sole concern of the treaty, revelations that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan and others were extensively trafficking in nuclear technology and know-how exposed the vulnerability of the nonproliferation regime to non-state actors.
The treaty's framers could hardly have imagined that we would have to work tirelessly to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons and related materials. And while progress toward disarmament has taken place, there are still 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, many of which remain on hair-trigger alert.
At the same time, the intergovernmental bodies designed to address these challenges are paralyzed.... In my opening address to the conference, I argued that success would depend on coming to terms with all the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity. I warned that the conference would stall if some delegates focused on some threats instead of addressing them all. Some countries underscored proliferation as a grave danger, while others argued that existing nuclear arsenals imperil us. Some insisted that the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle technology posed an unacceptable proliferation threat, while others countered that access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology must not be compromised.
In the end, delegations regrettably missed the opportunity to endorse the merits of all of these arguments. As a result, they were unable to advance security against any of the dangers we face. How, then, can we overcome this paralysis?
When multilateral forums falter, leaders must lead. This September, more than 170 heads of state and government will convene in New York to adopt a wide-ranging agenda to advance development, security and human rights for all countries and all peoples. I challenge them to break the deadlock on the most pressing challenges in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. If they fail to do so, their peoples will ask how, in today's world, they could not find common ground in the cause of diminishing the existential threat of nuclear weapons.
To revitalize the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, action will be required on many fronts. To strengthen verification and increase confidence in the regime, leaders must agree to make the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol the new standard for verifying compliance with nonproliferation commitments.
Leaders must find ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the imperative of nonproliferation. The regime will not be sustainable if scores more countries develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle, and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.
A first step would be to create incentives for countries to voluntarily forgo the development of fuel-cycle facilities. I commend the nuclear agency and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, for working to advance consensus on this vital question, and I urge leaders to join him in that mission.
Leaders must also move beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of disarmament. Prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty for all countries is indispensable. All countries also should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and to early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. And I hope leaders will think seriously about what more can be done to reduce - irreversibly - the number and role of nuclear weapons in the world.
Bold commitments at the September meeting would breathe new life
into all forums dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation. They
would reduce all the risks we face - of nuclear accidents, of
trafficking, of terrorist use and of use by countries themselves.
It is an ambitious agenda, and probably daunting to some. But the
consequences of failure are far more daunting. Solutions are within
are reach; we must grasp them.
[IHT, May 30, 2005]
© 2005 The Acronym Institute.