Disarmament Diplomacy

Enhanced Participation and Politicking: Report on the 2005 UN First Committee

Including: 2005 First Committee Resolutions: Summary and Explanations

Rebecca Johnson

An efficient, if politically dispirited 60th session of the United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), dealt with 54 resolutions and 6 draft decisions in New York, October 3-November 2, 2005. Chaired with great openness and efficiency by Ambassador Choi Young-Jin, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, this was a serious and subdued First Committee. It took place in the shadow of the failures of the NPT Review Conference and World Summit Outcome, at a time when the UN-related disarmament machinery such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and Disarmament Commission (UNDC) continue to be paralysed by the obstructive actions of a tiny minority of the more heavily-armed states.

Following general debates, thematic debates, lunches, seminars and meetings packed into small basement rooms, the Committee adopted whatever got put in front of it. Despite controversy over some and bored ritual over many more, no substantive text was actually rejected, though a few did not make the leap to formal resolution or reach the voting stage.

The two most controversial political issues this year concerned an aborted attempt from six delegations (Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden) to kick-start disarmament work in Geneva, and the spectacle of Iran desperately seeking the moral high ground with a new resolution on nuclear disarmament - as if this was not already a crowded field, with resolutions covering similar ground from Japan, the New Agenda Coalition, Myanmar/Burma, and Malaysia, not to mention the ones from India on nuclear use and dangers.

Building on the reforms and FC agenda piloted through by last year's Chair, Mexico's Ambassador Luis Alfredo de Alba, Ambassador Choi enhanced participation from both states and civil society and maximised the time and resources for debates and work on resolutions over a wide range of pertinent disarmament and security issues. Representatives of NGOs were again welcomed as partners in building security, with the right to follow the proceedings in full, and restoration of the practice of enabling NGOs to receive Committee documents. Building on de Alba's initiatives in 2004, Choi further increased the level of openness and interactivity in debates on thematic issues.

In a long overdue step, he invited presentations from two disarmament educators, Dr Kathleen Sullivan and Dr Peter Lucas, for the First Committee's 'interactive session' on disarmament and nonproliferation education, an issue that has been strongly promoted by civil society and a number of states, such as Japan, Mexico and New Zealand. A number of states expressed their appreciation and hopes that civil society specialists will be invited to address the Committee in the future.

All adopted drafts were transmitted to the General Assembly, which voted on almost all of them on December 8. As listed below, they cover a range of disarmament and security issues:

13 on nuclear weapons;
6 on nuclear-weapon-free zones;
4 on other weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, radiological) including preventing acquisition by terrorists;
2 on the disarmament aspects of outer space;
9 on conventional weaponry such as landmines; small arms and light weapons (SALW) and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS);
6 on regional disarmament and security;
12 on international security and disarmament measures not covered elsewhere; and
8 on disarmament 'machinery', such as the CD, UNDC, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and regional centres.

These resolutions are indexed and summarised below, together with their votes in both the First Committee and General Assembly, and key points made in the FC explanations of vote (EOV).

All UN member states have the right to sponsor resolutions or amendments and to vote. Though efforts over recent years to rationalise and modernise the work of the First Committee have brought noticeable improvements, many resolutions still appear year after year, often in an atrophied form, with little or no updating. There are always a few, however, that catch the eye, either because of political controversy or because they contain constructive new ideas for moving disarmament progress forward.

Hopes, Repeats and US Exceptionalism

This year saw positive, new (or at least, newish) approaches in several areas, notably conventional arms and space security. Russia put forward a first-time resolution on transparency and confidence-building in outer space, which was opposed in the FC only by the United States (with Israel, as so often, abstaining). France headed an initiative on radiological terrorism and worked with Germany on overcoming US and other objections to a significant first-time resolution to address the problems associated with ammunition stockpiles.

In advance of next year's conference to review the 2001 Programme of Action on SALW, there appeared to be more debate and disagreement over conventional weapons than in the past. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Some delegations clearly want to go further than others on issues such as the marking and tracing of conventional weapons and ammunition, while euphemisms surrounding the "illicit trade" in small arms and light weapons are beginning to crack under the growing weight of questions over how to address 'legal' but pernicious aspects of the international arms trade, such as its impact on societies and development, including corruption and human rights.

As developing countries (and inner cities) are still being torn by conflict, drugs, corruption and violence, even seasoned diplomats seemed shocked to see the United States stymie efforts by the Netherlands to achieve consensus on an important new resolution aimed at highlighting the negative impact of small arms on humanitarian and development objectives. While the UN Security Council held an important debate on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, five years after it was adopted on October 31, 2000, it was notable that the Netherlands' resolution was practically the only mention in the First Committee of the role of women, not just as the primary victims of violence (along with children), but as responsible agents in promoting disarmament and security.

2005 has seen the Bush administration's belief in US exceptionalism rise to new heights. This was illustrated in the FC by the United States voting against some 22 resolutions or decisions. Of these, Washington was completely on its own in providing the sole opposition to the resolutions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), prohibition of development of new types of WMD, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, humanitarian impact of SALW, developments in information and telecommunications, observance of environmental norms, and the relationship between disarmament and development. In addition to recording so many votes against, the US abstention rate was also higher than most. On some abstentions or votes against, the United States was joined by only one or two others, often Israel or else Britain and France, especially with regard to nuclear issues.

In the GA, the US's minority club was at times swelled by the sorry votes of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. As small Pacific islands in political or economic thrall to the United States, which has military bases on their territories, such reluctant allies do little to mitigate the naked fact of growing US isolation from international concerns and collective approaches.

In part because of its stance on other resolutions (and, indeed, on some of the treaties that they represented) the United States failed to marshal consensus on its periodic resolution on 'compliance with nonproliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements'. Unlike its last appearance three years ago, when compromises between contrasting positions made it possible for it to be adopted by consensus, Russia insisted on a vote this year, because the resolution had been revised and hardened in line with Bush administration ideology. Contrasting the text unfavourably with its 2002 predecessor, Russia abstained, with several others; China refused to participate in the vote at all. It is understood that in addition to their concerns about the resolution's tone and text, the decision to deny the compliance resolution consensus was also a reaction to US exceptionalism and its opposition to several resolutions sponsored or supported by Russia or its allies.

Nuclear Disarmament

In addition to the resolution on the CTBT (60/95), which received 172 votes in the General Assembly, a large number dealt with nuclear disarmament. The highest vote went to Japan's text, which is based closely on the NPT. Retitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (60/65), this garnered 168 votes in support, with only two against (India and the United States), and seven abstentions. Expressing regret over the lack of agreement on substantive issues at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the elimination of references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation from the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Japan covered the gamut of NPT-related issues, including taking a strong stand on both the CTBT and the necessity for negotiations on a fissile materials ban.

Indeed, since Canada decided this year to avoid confrontation with the US (and Britain) by putting forward a resolution on a fissile materials treaty based on the 1995 Shannon Mandate, Japan's disarmament resolution is left carrying practically the only torch for what used to be a priority nonproliferation objective. Notably, Japan has also emulated recent EU statements by not reiterating the Shannon mandate and by omitting any direct reference to international verification. It emphasises instead the importance of negotiating and concluding negotiations on the treaty, calling also for all nuclear weapon possessors (NPT and non-NPT) to declare moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the treaty.

Since 1998, the New Agenda Coalition has sponsored a challenging call for systematic progress to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament" (60/56), the NAC resolution carried on last year's strategy of focussing in brief on the essential principles underlying the plan of action for nuclear disarmament agreed by NPT parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. They achieved 158 votes in favour, with five against (Britain, France, the United States, India and Israel) and 20 abstentions.

The traditional omnibus resolution promoting the long-time call of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament (60/70), sponsored (as in past years) by Myanmar/Burma, managed 113 votes in favour, including China. In accordance with past practice, NATO voted against and a mixture of states, including Russia abstained. Similarly, Malaysia's resolution (60/76), which follows up on the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and calls for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, also split largely along group lines, achieving 126 votes in favour. Most significantly, however, 165 states voted in favour of the paragraph that underlines the unanimous ICJ conclusion that there exists an obligation to pursue and bring to conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Only Israel, Russia and the United States voted against this conclusion, while five states, including Britain and France abstained.

Iran plays politics with nuclear disarmament

In a move reminiscent of India's 1998 resolution on reducing nuclear danger, tabled within months of India and Pakistan exploding nuclear bomb tests to prove their weapon capabilities, Iran surprised the 2005 Committee with a new resolution, lengthily entitled "Follow up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (60/72).

A month after the IAEA had found Iran to be in breach of its NPT safeguards and amid growing international anxiety over its nuclear fuel cycle plans, the initiative was designed to deflect attention from Iran's own failure to live up to its treaty obligations. Focussing almost exclusively on the P-5, Iran hoped to capture anger among the non-nuclear weapon countries about the failure of the weapon states to live up to their obligations. Yet another move in its convoluted and potentially deadly chess contest with the IAEA, UN, EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany), and especially the United States, the resolution united the Western block but divided the NAM.

Many supporters of nuclear disarmament were furious with Iran for putting them in the position of either giving succour and the appearance of support to Iran, at a delicate stage of international efforts to prevent any possible nuclear weapons programme, or having to vote against a nuclear disarmament text with which they essentially agreed. Alluding to this dilemma, some of those that chose to vote in favour underscored that they voted solely on the basis that the language was consistent with their national policies (and so, they implied, should not be construed as support for the resolution's sponsor). Enjoying the discomfort of nuclear disarmament advocates, the US delegation milked the moment by commenting that it was "pleased to find itself in such good company". After the solitary US objections on so many other votes, that must indeed have made a nice change!

The early text introduced an institutional contradiction (requiring the GA to follow up on implementation of a treaty that some GA members were not party to) that gave states a technical excuse for not voting for the resolution. It is understood that Iran did not consult with NAM colleagues before tabling the resolution, which caused consternation and divisions. Civil society and some NAM and Western delegations urged Iran to withdraw the resolution and not risk discrediting the cause of nuclear disarmament through this kind of nationalist politicking.

Instead, Iran kept revising the resolution to meet the stated objections of NAM states it needed to win: first it amended the main operative paragraph from a decision to establish an ad hoc committee of the GA to review NPT obligations, instead merely urging NPT states parties to follow up on implementation within the framework of the 2010 review conference, which they are, in any case, bound to do. Even after two rounds of revisions, Iran could not be sure of getting the resolution adopted. When the vote, scheduled for Friday, was suddenly postponed, it gave some hope that Iran would withdraw the resolution. But Iran's diplomats were under heavy pressure from the capital, so after intensive consultations over the weekend to shore up the weak support from NAM states, Iran orally introduced a new amendment, strengthening the preamble with explicit language on universality and the Middle East. Confronted with this fait accompli, wavering NAM and Arab states were outmanoeuvred. The tactic nearly backfired, shocking observers (including the Arab states) when the FC tally on the new preambular paragraph was only four votes short of defeat. The last minute revisions proved to be enough for the resolution to squeak through the GA by 87 votes, with 56 states against and 27 abstentions.

Iran was also at the forefront of the argument over how to address missiles. Together with Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia, Iran proposed three amendments to the resolution on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), which the Philippines had introduced on behalf of the HCoC members. All three amendments were defeated. When the HCoC resolution (60/62) was adopted in the GA by an overwhelming 158 votes, Iran was the sole vote against, while a handful of non-HCoC members, including Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia, abstained.

Iran's own draft decision, putting the general issue of 'missiles' on the GA agenda for next year, was passed by 120, with two against (Israel and the United States), and 53 abstentions (EU, NATO and allies). Support was weakened because two panels of government experts have been convened already, failing to reach substantive agreement,

Among the more ritualistic resolutions, India got 111 votes in support of its call for a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons; Pakistan garnered 120 votes on security assurances; Nigeria got consensus for opposing the dumping of radioactive waste; and Mexico continues to try to get its UN Conference on nuclear disarmament and eliminating nuclear dangers off the ground.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

There were no surprises in the routine resolutions on NWFZs. As usual, a moderately-worded text on establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East received consensus, while a stronger one targeted against Israel garnered 164, with 5 against (including Israel and the US), and 5 abstentions. A number of states, including ones which had abstained or voted in favour, expressed concern that there was no reference to other proliferation activities in the Middle East, specifically Iran.

Resolutions supporting the NWFZ treaties of Pelindaba and Tlatelolco and a NWFZ in Central Asia, were adopted by consensus, though not without Spain's familiar concern being raised about some of its territories being included in the Pelindaba map of the African NWFZ. The resolution calling for a nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas (60/58), traditionally led by Brazil and New Zealand, was overwhelmingly adopted by 167 votes, but aroused its usual opposition from Britain, France and the United States, and controversy over the mention of South Asia.

Other WMD

Resolutions backing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) were adopted by consensus, together with a relatively recent contribution from India on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. In supporting these resolution, many stressed the importance of universality, verification and inspections, and controlling emerging technologies that could enhance mass destructive capabilities.

With regard to a resolution sponsored by Belarus on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of WMD (60/46), with text unchanged since 1996, and which has previously received consensus, the United States, insisted on voting against. Belarus raised concerns about nanotechnology and other technologies that might contribute to new types of WMD, and also argued that apart from their direct destructive effects, such weapons could create an illusion of military supremacy and "tempt the powers-that-be to use them and this in turn might lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons". In opposing the resolution, the US claimed that there were no new types of WMD on the horizon. This is interesting to hear, since last year the US government itself sponsored an international seminar with scientists on preventing new types of WMD. The resolution received 180 votes in favour.

Outer Space Security

For the first time, the traditional resolution on PAROS, sponsored by Sri Lanka and Egypt, was not alone in outer space. Russia put forward a cautiously worded new resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, which paves the way for a future initiative to establish a group of governmental experts to study ways to enhance space security.

Regardless of US opposition, both space security resolutions were adopted overwhelmingly: in the FC, the US voted against both and Israel abstained. Israel switched to vote against the PAROS resolution in the GA, where the traditional PAROS resolution (60/54) received 180 in favour, but maintained its absention on the Russian resolution on transparency and confidence-building (60/66), which garnered 178. Explaining its negative vote on both resolutions, the US claimed that it took international law and the exploration of space seriously, but there already existed an extensive and comprehensive system covering certain uses of outer space, and the US saw no reason for further international institutions to address "a non-existent arms race in outer space".

Egypt and Sri Lanka were initially dismayed when the US changed its abstention to a vote against, despite reportedly giving a promise in the past that it would not alter its stance providing the PAROS resolution remained unchanged. Looking on the brighter side, the moves by the US and Russia could open up possibilities for further initiatives to be taken at the First Committee in the arena of space security.

A few days after the First Committee held a rather lack-lustre thematic debate on PAROS, a very interesting discussion on 'international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space' took place in the Fourth Committee. On that occasion, Canada noted that the 40th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty would be celebrated in 2007 and encouraged all that had not yet done so to ratify or accede to this "Magna Carta of space". Canada also called for the "establishment of 'crosswalks' between the space-related work of the GA's First and Fourth Committees". This important recommendation, which I have been pushing for many years, was also raised by Sweden in its intervention on Disarmament Machinery. Sweden argued for greater flexibility "in utilising the inter-relationship and possible interaction between the various parts of the machinery and between different UN fora", saying that the handling of space weaponisation issues "could... benefit from a better understanding of the work of COPUOS and UNISPACE III".

Conventional Weapons

Nigeria commented that though nuclear and certain other weapons have mass destructive capacity, "it is conventional weapons... that are actually killing people worldwide". The up-coming conference to review the 2001 Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW has sharpened interest and brought different views on conventional weapons into the limelight. Although there were accolades for the hard work done by the Open-Ended Working Group on Marking and Tracing, chaired by Ambassador Thalmann, there was also great disappointment that the instrument was not legally binding and contained no operational provisions on ammunition and peacekeeping operations.

After a mini-revolt in the First Committee by states that wanted a more robust approach to brokering and a legally binding instrument on marking and tracing, the main resolution on the illicit trade in SALW (60/81), traditionally co-sponsored by Japan, South Africa and Colombia, was agreed by consensus in the GA. A draft decision on the international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit SALW, proposed by Switzerland, was divided, with 151 votes in favour. The 25 abstentions, almost all from Mercosur, registered their concerns about the "inadequacy" of the voluntary instrument, underscoring the view that this was only a first step and that a stronger, more legally binding instrument would be necessary. Others, including a number of Europeans, agreed with these complaints, although they voted in favour of the Japanese resolution and Swiss draft decision.

An ECOWAS-sponsored resolution focussing on Africa and an Argentinean resolution on information exchange and confidence-building on conventional armaments were both adopted by consensus. By contrast, as noted above, the United States opposed a Dutch-led resolution intended to highlight the terrible human and development costs arising from SALW (60/68). Responding to the US criticism that humanitarian concerns have no place in the First Committee, the resolution sponsor argued that it took a legitimate, "broad approach to security and disarmament" that reflected the "interconnectedness of issues which our heads of state and government underlined".

A new Franco-German initiative on surplus ammunition and illicit trading in ammunition (60/74) met with some resistance, notably from the United States; but after being watered down a bit, it was able to be adopted by consensus. In introducing the resolution, France and Germany argued that combating ammunition was a "pressing task", and that surplus ammunition could be diverted from military stockpiles into conflict zones, or get into the hands of criminal gangs or terrorists. This moderate, first-step initiative sought to get states to declare and secure their surpluses and examine the possibility of developing and implementing measures to combat illicit trafficking in ammunition, by means of national, regional and sub-regional frameworks.

It is a tribute to the vision and courage of the partnership between civil society and a small core group of states that the resolution supporting universality and implementation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty is barely controversial these days. With the force of an international norm and common law, this treaty, which bans the use, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, has 147 states parties and garnered 158 votes in the GA. Only 17 hold-outs abstained, including the United States, Russia and a few NAM and former Soviet-bloc states.

The traditional resolution supporting the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) received its usual consensus (60/93). This restricts the use of mines, incendiary weapons, and blinding laser weapons; in 2003 parties agreed a protocol on explosive remnants of war (ERW), which has not yet entered into force. It was noted that the CCW is now focussed on the humanitarian, developmental and economic concerns posed by Mined Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM).

A resolution on MANPADS, now in its second year, was adopted by consensus (60/77). Led by Australia, though Israel and others were instrumental behind the scenes, the resolution highlights the terrorist potential of MANPADS and promotes more effective ways of restricting access and exercising controls, while accepting a 'legitimate' use for governmental authorities to use these weapons.

After four paragraph votes, the Netherlands' resolution on transparency in armaments was adopted in the FC by 122 votes, but at time of writing has not yet been decided in the GA. It is understood that the vote was postponed pending a review of the programme budget implications by the Fifth Committee. In addition to various Arab states, opposition in the Fifth Committee reportedly centres on the United States, which voted for the resolution, but against a reference to the 2003 Secretary-General's report from the group of governmental experts (GGE). At the same time, the US complained that GGEs were requested with greater and greater frequency, and without due regard for expense or usefulness.

Getting Disarmament Machinery to Work

Throughout the First Committee it was clear that there is immense frustration with the inadequacies of virtually all the available international disarmament mechanisms and machinery. Though a number of resolutions contained requests or recommendations that the CD consider or commence working on specific issues, the Geneva conference has been paralysed for most of the decade. Despite the best efforts of the Chair of the UN Disarmament Commission, Sylvester Rowe of Sierra Leone, the UNDC resolution was only adopted at the eleventh hour, and without agreement on the priority issues for it to discuss in 2006.

Tired of having the CD obstructed by the nationalistic vetoes of only one or two countries, six CD members launched a draft resolution on "initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues". This draft, sponsored by Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, called for four open-ended ad hoc committees to be convened under First Committee auspices but in Geneva, to "negotiate" on a fissile material treaty and on security assurances from the nuclear to the non-nuclear states, and to "deal with" the issues of nuclear disarmament and PAROS. The draft made clear that these committees were to be convened "pending agreement on a Conference on Disarmament programme of work" on these four issues, which CD ambassadors in the recent past had identified as the priorities. As underlined by its proposers, the initiative was clearly intended not to undermine the CD but to exert pressure to get the CD working. Even so, the three Western nuclear powers conducted demarches to the governments of the six initiators and lobbied NATO and EU members and other countries that wanted to support the proposal.

In a nuclear-weapon-based alliance that is becoming sadly familiar, the P-5 were vociferously joined in their opposition to the jump-start initiative by India and Pakistan (and no doubt by Israel as well, although it typically kept a low profile). This was all the more ironic, because the key protagonists in obstructing attempts to get a CD work programme over the past decade have also been drawn from this nuclear-weapon possessing pool. A US brief sent to capitals and a number of UN delegations used a battery of arguments to scare governments with the threat that the initiative would destroy the CD, the First Committee and, to listen to some of the wilder rhetoric, diplomatic civilisation as we know it.

Though such opposition arguments were far from convincing, the six partners decided not to table their proposal as a formal resolution, in large part in deference to requests from the designated presidents of the CD for 2006 (Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal and Slovakia). These six ambassadors, who will serve for around a month each, are aiming to get agreement on a joint initiative to try to get the CD to discuss (at least) the major substantive issues next year. Most, however, continue to despair of the possibility of getting a work programme that would permit the CD to begin negotiating in earnest. In withdrawing the six-nation proposal for ad hoc committees, Canada and Mexico gave the CD notice that the proposal could be put back on the First Committee table in Autumn 2006 if sufficient progress is not made to address these important issues during the CD's 2006 session.

Conclusion

Despite some good initiatives and effective leadership from Ambassador Choi, the mood at the First Committee was generally flat, with many states admitting that they do not think progress can be made on any of the most important issues until there is a change in US attitudes towards multilateral security and international treaties, laws and mutually-applied controls. The dynamic at the First Committee has also confirmed fears that the counter-productive US posture is providing cover for other states that prefer to see a weak United Nations and ineffective international security instruments and measures, so that they can continue to sell arms or pursue national military objectives with relative impunity.

This report was written and compiled by Dr Rebecca Johnson, who attended the First Committee from October 5 to November 2, 2005. I wish to thank the diplomats for sharing their insights, Nicola Butler at the Acronym Institute for help with compiling the General Assembly votes, and Jennifer Nordstrom and her Reaching Critical Will team for work at the First Committee and excellent website, at which most resolutions, statements and documents can be found.

This report has also benefited from Ambassador Choi's decision to continue the practice of greater openness instituted by his predecessor, Ambassador de Alba, enabling NGOs to hear all the debates, including the thematic debates, and receive First Committee documentation without being hassled. Their respect and openness has been greatly welcomed, as was the continued right of NGOs to be present during the voting. I would especially like to thank the Chair for his initiative to enable civil society to address the First Committee, and express my appreciation to Kathleen Sullivan and Peter Lucas for their excellent presentations, thereby removing any excuse for not inviting civil society specialists to present and participate in the future.

Most importantly I thank Ms Cheryl Stoute, her Secretariat and DDA for their support and friendship. Four weeks is a long time, and much has of necessity been left out, but I hope I've captured the major issues and developments. Any mistakes in this report are of course my own, so please let me know.

Link to: 2005 First Committee Resolutions: Summary and Explanations

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© 2005 The Acronym Institute.