Disarmament Diplomacy

Enhanced Participation and Politicking: Report on the 2005 UN First Committee

Back to the main article.

2005 FIRST COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS

Summary and Explanations

Below is a comprehensive summary and analysis of the 54 resolutions and 6 decisions adopted by the 60th First Committee and General Assembly. Voting is given as for: against: abstention. The votes in the First Committee took place between October 24 and November 1, 2005. The General Assembly adopted all the resolutions and draft decisions featured here on December 8, 2005.

'Consensus' denotes that a resolution was adopted without a vote. Some countries state that they have not participated in the consensus, while others prefer not to vote at all and be counted absent, along with those who are in serious arrears with the payment of their UN dues. A draft decision may be requested instead of a resolution, either when there is too much controversy to enable a resolution to go forward or to ensure the issue is on the UNGA agenda for a future year.

The First Committee votes are shown first, followed by voting figures from the UN General Assembly. GA numbers are given for the resolutions but were not available for the decisions. 'Rev' denotes an agreed revision incorporated before action was taken. Where possible we identify the state that introduces a resolution - normally this state has also taken the lead in negotiating with others on the text. For lists of all co-sponsors, check the UN documents.

Some resolutions were taken in parts. In this case, PP refers to preambular paragraph and OP refers to operative paragraph. The preambular paragraphs normally provide background and context, while the operative paragraphs underline obligations that have not yet been met or contain requests or instructions.

Numbers given here are from the official records. With regard to General Assembly votes, states that are in serious arrears with their payments to the UN are recorded as absent, whether or not they voted, which explains why even the co-sponsors of some resolutions are not recorded in the votes. There may also be discrepancies in voting figures due to requests by delegations for their votes to be recorded after missing or making mistakes during the electronic voting procedure. For full details of UNGA action on the texts, see the UN/DDA website http://disarmament.un.org/ga/60/first.

Index

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

Conventional Weapons

Regional Disarmament & Security

Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Disarmament Machinery

Nuclear Weapons

UNGA 60/95 (L.26/Rev.1)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Introduced by Mexico, in accordance with tradition on behalf also of Australia and New Zealand, with overwhelming, cross-group co-sponsorship and endorsement.

Updating the resolutions of 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004, this CTBT resolution welcomes the Final Declaration of the fourth conference on Facilitating CTBT Entry into Force, September 21-23, and underlines the continuing urgency of the treaty and its entry into force. It notes that 176 states have signed, including 41 of the 44 needed for entry into force, and that 125 states have ratified, including 33 of the 44. Remaining states, especially the necessary 11, are urged to accelerate their ratification process to enable the treaty to enter into force. The resolution urges all states to maintain their existing moratoria and to refrain from doing anything that would defeat the CTBT's object and purpose in the meanwhile (such as conducting a nuclear explosion). The first draft of the resolution was revised to omit a preambular paragraph that had reaffirmed "the importance of the Treaty for the continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

First Committee: 149-1-4
UNGA: 172-1-4

Yet again, the CTBT resolution was overwhelmingly adopted, receiving 172 GA votes in favour, with only the United States voting against, as it has done for the Bush administration's 5 years. As in 2004 and 2003, there were 4 abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius and Syria).

A large number of states mentioned support for the CTBT during the FC debates. Since entry into force does not look imminent, these often emphasised the importance of adhering to the commitment to abide by moratoria and not conduct nuclear tests, and the necessity to continue to provide sufficient funds for the CTBTO and for the verification regime to be completed. Israel, which has signed but not ratified, explained that it voted in favour because it was committed to the CTBT's objectives and was playing an active role with regard to practical procedures for verification (especially the OSI operational manuals). Israel, however, had reservations about the wording of OP1, which urged signature and ratification "without delay and without conditions" and said that the completion of the verification regime was a "prerequisite" for entry into force; that verification should be "effective but immune to abuse", and that remaining "salient political issues" should be resolved. Pakistan, which is not yet a signatory, explained that it voted in favour of the resolution because it supports the CTBT's objectives, but considered that the goal of promoting signatures and ratifications leading to CTBT's entry into force will be facilitated when "erstwhile supporters of the CTBT" [clearly meaning the United States] restore their support, as well as "acceptance of the CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia" [i.e. India].

In terms familiar from previous years' explanations of Colombia's abstention, reference was made to a "constitutional difficulty" with regard to ratifying the CTBT, which had not yet been resolved through discussions with the CTBTO. It is understood that Colombia's national laws preclude its payment for a treaty until it ratifies; since September 1996, in accordance with the UN resolution adopting the CTBT, states have been paying towards the establishment of the CTBTO. Colombia is concerned that when it deposits its ratification it will be hit with a large bill for backdated contributions which, according to its domestic law, it is not permitted to pay.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/65 (L.28**)
Renewed Determination Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Japan, with significant co-sponsorship

Japan has substantially strengthened and targeted its traditional omnibus resolution, which expressed regret "over the lack of agreement on substantive issues" at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and "the elimination of references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the 2005 World Summit Outcome". In 13 operative paragraphs, the resolution calls for a series of further steps to be taken, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, with clear reference to the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

In addition to paragraphs on reducing the operational status and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, the resolution takes a strong stand on the CTBT and fissile materials ban. However, in OP9, Japan emulated recent EU statements by not reiterating the Shannon mandate and by omitting any direct reference to international verification, emphasising instead: "the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion, and calls upon all nuclear weapon states and states not parties to the [NPT] to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the Treaty". The resolution also calls for the "universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Model [Additional] Protocol..." (OP11), as well as providing a strong endorsement for implementation of the recommendations of the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (OP12).

First Committee: 166-2-7
UNGA: 168-2-7

For the first time since 2000, the NAC states jointly voted in favour of Japan's resolution, as did the EU, including France and Britain. India and the United States opposed. Abstainers were China, North Korea, Israel, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, Bhutan and Cuba.

Speaking on behalf of the NAC, South Africa explained that the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the failures of the 2005 NPT Conference and World Summit Outcome had underscored the need for a stronger, more united effort to achieve nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding the NAC's expressed reservations that Japan's resolution should have contained stronger references to the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons and to the practical steps agreed in 2000, all seven voted in favour. NAC member Egypt, which has abstained on Japan's resolution for several years, made an additional statement explaining its support even though the resolution "does not meet all Egypt's positions". In particular, Egypt highlighted its different position on the Additional Protocol, noting that though it does not oppose fostering a stronger safeguards system, it has reservations about focussing on its universalisation, especially since the Additional Protocol "is optional" and that Egypt was "not prepared to take on additional obligations when one state in the region [Israel] insists on remaining outside the NPT".

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/56 (L.4)
Towards a Nuclear-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments

Introduced by South Africa on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition

The NAC put forward a relatively short resolution based (as last year's) on the principles adopted by the 2000 NPT review conference, including the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals". Unlike its resolutions of 2000-03, it did not seek to specify or update all the practical steps identified in the 2000 disarmament programme of action. In just 5 operative paragraphs, it reaffirms the 2000 review conference outcome, calls on the nuclear weapon states to accelerate implementation of the practical steps, calls on states to comply fully with all their nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation obligations and "not to act in any way that may be detrimental to either cause or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race". In OP4 it calls for universality and urges by name "India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the Treaty, to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon states promptly and without conditions."

First Committee: OP4, 148-3-9
Whole resolution: 144-5-19
UNGA: OP4, 158-2-11
Whole resolution: 153-5-20

OP4 on universality was taken separately and overwhelmingly adopted. The GA vote on this was: 158-2-11. Unsurprisingly, India and Israel opposed (Pakistan changed its vote against in the FC to abstention in the GA). The United States, France and Britain abstained together with Pakistan. Surprisingly, Australia joined Bhutan, Cameroon, Federated States of Micronesia, Jamaica, Marshall Islands and Mauritius in abstaining too.

In the GA, 153 supported, including a significant number of NATO states, up from 151 last year. Opposition was registered by Britain, France, the United States, India and Israel. The abstainers included the Russian Federation, Pakistan and Australia, and an odd assortment of European or former Soviet states, including Albania, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia, Spain, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), as well as Bhutan, Palau and Micronesia, whose semi-colonial masters seldom permit them to make independent decisions on such votes. The abstention of Slovenia, whose foreign minister had been one of the original eight that together made the New Agenda declaration in June 1998, is a sad reflection of how its NATO aspirations have distorted its foreign policy positions.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/70 (L.36)
Nuclear disarmament

Introduced by Burma/Myanmar with co-sponsorship from some NAM states

With three pages of preamble and 23 OPs, this traditional omnibus resolution on nuclear disarmament evokes past NAM declarations and recommendations, UN Special Sessions on Disarmament and the Millennium Declaration, and the NPT agreements especially from 2000. Its provenance means it is not widely respected, although most NAM countries continue to line up and vote in favour. With similar ritual, based more on politics than text, it is opposed by NATO and its aligned states. China and a few NAC countries joined those in favour, while Russia and other NAC countries abstained. India abstained because of the references to the NPT. Japan abstained, saying it shared the resolution's goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it rejected the approach based on a timebound framework and considered that incremental steps were preferable.

First Committee: 94-42-17
UNGA: 113-45-20

The vote on this ritual nuclear disarmament resolution continues to split unchallengingly along group lines; it is backed by most of the NAM, and opposed by NATO and its aligned states. China and some NAC countries voted in favour; Russia and other NAC countries (Sweden and Ireland) abstained. India said it abstained because of the references to the NPT. Japan abstained because although it shared the resolution's goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it rejected the approach based on a timebound framework and considered that "realistic and progressive" incremental steps were preferable.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/72 (L.38/Rev.2 plus oral amendment)
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Iran

This first-time resolution focused mainly on the NPT disarmament undertakings the nuclear weapon states agreed in 1995 and 2000, and was only adopted after undergoing three revisions to remove any excuse that NAM states might have used to avoid supporting it. After having to remove the main operative purpose of the original text, which had called for an ad hoc GA committee to review NPT implementation, the drafters reworked other parts and then, in desperation, added by oral amendment a paragraph on the Middle East (PP6) a couple of hours before the vote was taken.

As adopted, the final resolution, with 9 preambular paras and 5 OPs, recalls a series of NAM resolutions and decisions, including those welcoming the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference outcomes. OP2 reproduces sub-paragraph 9 of para 15 of the section on Article VI (the so-called 13 Steps) from the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. This emphasised the disarmament obligations by the nuclear weapon states, notably to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; increased transparency; the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used; and the engagement of all the NWS in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

PP6 wooed Arab states that were thinking of abstaining. It reaffirmed the Resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995, and "also reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of the universal adherence to the Treaty and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards". OP3 reminds about security assurances. In its original form OP4 reiterated the proposal put forward at the General Assembly by new President Ahmadinejad, which would have had the United Nations establish "an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly in 2006 to hold three one-week sessions to review the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations" from 1995 and 2000 and "submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms". Such a muddling of treaty and UN oversight attracted considerable criticism, so the resolution was revised to remove this operative component, instead just urging NPT parties to follow up their implementation "within the framework of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and its preparatory committees".

First Committee: PP6: 58-54-22
Whole resolution: 70-52-22
UNGA: PP6: 78-56-27
Whole resolution: 87-56-26

From the start, this resolution attracted controversy. In view of Iran's unresolved problems in allaying concerns that its own nuclear programme was being configured in order to provide a nuclear weapon capability in the future, many diplomats were appalled to see Iran hold this nuclear disarmament banner aloft, fearing that it would discredit disarmament initiatives and play into the hands of the nuclear weapon states.

The vote in the First Committee was very tense. Even after two significant revisions, Iran was not sure of getting the resolution adopted. The vote, scheduled for Friday, was suddenly postponed, which gave some hope that Iran would withdraw the resolution. But Iran's diplomats were under heavy pressure not to withdraw, so after intensive consultations over the weekend to shore up the weak support from NAM states, Iran orally introduced a new amendment, strengthening the language of PP6 with the following language: "Reaffirming the resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995 by the parties to the Treaty in which it also reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of the universal adherence to the Treaty and placement of nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards".

After a short break so that some states could consult on this, the resolution was then taken. Revealing the high risk of this game playing by Middle East and NAM voters, a separate vote on this new PP6 only just avoided being defeated. It passed by 58-54-22. Egypt, which was reportedly angry to have been forced into the corner by Iran's tactics, said that the very close vote on PP6 had come as a "shocking surprise". Putting a brave face on a near debacle that has weakened its own position, Egypt was "extremely disappointed" that 54 states had voted against what was "one of the main pillars of the NPT", adding that this showed the "polarisation of these issues" since the 2005 review conference. Iran's oral amendment and the vote on PP6 had taken the First Committee by surprise. The weeks between this and the vote in the GA were used to build up support for this paragraph, resulting in a slightly stronger representation of 78 in favour, with 56 against and 27 abstainers.

The vote on the whole resolution was 87-56-26, far more divided than even the Myanmar/Burma resolution despite the fact that there was hardly anything in the text for states to disagree with. In explanation of vote, the United States argued that the resolution had "completely missed its mark" and that Iran had sought to "conceal itself under the cloak of concerns about nuclear disarmament", and was compromising everyone's security. The US said that "the last thing the First Committee needed was another resolution on nuclear disarmament; what the world did need was sincere, serious commitments to compliance". In voting no, the US said it was "pleased to find itself in such good company!" After the solitary US objections on so many other votes, ranging from small arms to PAROS to the CTBT, that must indeed have made a nice change for the US diplomats! The UK announced that the EU would vote against PP6 as it would against the whole resolution.

A few NAM states argued that they had supported the resolution because its text reflected their own positions on nuclear disarmament by the weapon states and that it was important to uphold the principle that resolutions should not be considered in terms of their origin provenance, but only with regard to whether their language and substance reflects national positions. Statements along these lines were made, for example, by South Africa, Mexico and Sri Lanka. India said it abstained because the resolution was framed by the NPT, which it is not a party to. India abstained on the whole resolution, saying it had voted against PP6 because it could not accept the call for universality, but that it supported the general goal of the resolution.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/76 (L.46)
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Malaysia with co-sponsorship from over 50 NAM states

First tabled after the ICJ advisory opinion of July 1996 on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this resolution underlines the ICJ's major unanimous conclusion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (OP1) and links it with a call for "commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination" (OP2). It recalls many international obligations, including the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the 2000 Review Conference thirteen steps, the various nuclear-weapons-free zones, and traditional NAM positions, such as a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, it stresses that the CD should "commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time" (PP12).

First Committee: OP1: 142-3-5
Whole resolution: 103-29-21
UNGA: OP1: 165-3-4
Whole resolution: 126-29-24

This laudable resolution has become too compromised by ritual and group-think to be of any real political significance as it currently stands. As always, there was a separate vote on OP1, which received overwhelming support from 165 states, with 3 against and 5 abstentions. Identically with last year, Israel, Russia and the United States voted against. Belarus, France, Latvia, and the United Kingdom abstained. Uzbekistan, which had abstained last year, joined those in favour.

As in previous years, the main argument employed by countries supporting OP1, but not the resolution as a whole, was that the ICJ opinion should not have been quoted "selectively" or that it was premature to call on states to negotiate a nuclear weapon convention. The vote falls off by around forty for the whole resolution, in large part because OP2 explicitly calls for negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention. China, most NAM and all the NAC states supported, while most NATO and Western-aligned states opposed. It must be noted, however, that Germany voted in favour and Canada abstained.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/79 (L.52)
Reducing Nuclear Danger

Introduced by India with co-sponsorship from several NAM states

First introduced in 1998, just after India heralded in the nuclear weaponisation of South Asia by conducting explosions in May (which Pakistan quickly emulated), this dealerting resolution is in its eighth year and has become somewhat of a ritual. It focuses on the adoption of measures to prevent accidents arising from computer or other technical malfunctions, as well as nuclear postures based on "hair-trigger alert". In addition to general exhortations for all member states to work to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament, It calls for a review of nuclear doctrines (OP1), specifically by the five NWS (OP2), and requests the Secretary-General to intensify efforts to implement the seven recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Millennium Declaration, including creating consensus for an international conference on reducing nuclear dangers and the risks of nuclear war.

First Committee 94-45-14
UNGA: 115-49-15

Though many agree that more must be done to reduce nuclear danger, this resolution's provenance and political context result in a split along NAM-Western lines, with China, Japan, South Korea and a few Eastern European/Central Asian states abstaining. The high number of negative votes from NATO-EU aligned states reflects their deep scepticism about India's real motives for this resolution. Furthermore, de-alerting, which was promoted as an interim step by the Canberra Commission and others during the 1990s, is less popular with disarmament advocates since the 2002 Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty - SORT) effectively presented the withdrawal of weapons from deployment as a substitute for irreversible, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Neither India nor Pakistan have the technology yet for hair-trigger alert, so it also serves as a criticism of certain nuclear weapon states without running the risk of being applied to India itself. Unless the issue gets taken up internationally, we can expect the resolution to be ignominiously dropped if India's nuclear arsenal becomes sufficiently sophisticated.

Back to the top of page

A/60/463 (L.11) Decision
United Nations Conference to Identify Ways of Eliminating Nuclear Dangers in the Context of Nuclear Disarmament

Introduced by Mexico

This decision puts the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" onto the agenda of the 61st session of the General Assembly.

First Committee: 108-5-39
UNGA: 128-5-40

Mexico continues to do its utmost to get this conference off the ground. The US, UK, France voted against, together with Poland and Israel. The New Agenda states voted in favour, as did most of the NAM. Many European countries abstained.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/88 (L.54)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by India with the co-sponsorship of a number of NAM states

India, despite its own nuclear testing and weapons capabilities, continues to take the lead in sponsoring this resolution on nuclear use, which evokes the July 1996 ICJ opinion and various past UN resolutions, and argues that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the total elimination of nuclear threats. Despite regretting the CD's inability to agree any kind of a work plan, the two OPs continue to request the CD to commence negotiations on an international convention "prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances" and to report the results to the General Assembly.

First Committee 97-46-11
UNGA: 111-49-13

This is a further example of an important issue being given short shrift because of the resolution's provenance and ritualistic appearance year after year. The vote divided along traditional lines, with most NAM states and China voting in favour, and the EU/NATO aligned bloc, Australia and New Zealand voting against. Russia and Japan were among the handful that abstained, together with Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/53 (L.45)
Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons [NSA]

Introduced by Pakistan with co-sponsorship from a handful of NAM states

Pakistan's traditional resolution on security assurances, tabled since 1990, has been carried forward with few changes over the years, despite Pakistan's own nuclear tests and assertion of nuclear weapon possession and status. In a text almost identical with last year's, it evokes numerous past UN and NAM meetings and declarations, asserts the need to safeguard the "independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty" of non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and argues that, until nuclear disarmament has been achieved universally, a common approach on security assurances needs to be negotiated. Among the six OPs, three refer to the CD, which is called on to "actively continue intensive negotiations" on effective international arrangements.

First Committee 98-0-55
UNGA: 120-0-59

Despite widespread scepticism about this resolution and the contradiction of its lead sponsor being determined to become accepted as a new nuclear power, such is the ritual importance of the issue of security assurances, that no states vote against. Changing little over the years, Pakistan's resolution sees most of the NAM voting in favour, with NATO and European states abstaining en bloc. Although some may be dissatisfied with the security assurances contained in UNSC 984 (1995), many view this issue as more appropriately dealt with in the context of the NPT, rather than the CD.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/62 (L.22)

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Introduced by the Philippines on behalf of most of the HCoC's members

With 8 preambular paragraphs and 4 Ops, this second-time resolution welcomes the adoption of the HCoC in November, 2002 and notes with satisfaction that 122 states have already joined it. Describing the code of conduct as a "practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery", the resolution invites all remaining states to subscribe to the Code, while also encouraging "further ways and means" to deal with ballistic missiles. In its preamble, it expresses concern about the increasing regional and global security challenges, relating them to "the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction", and references both the UN and regional and international efforts. As happened last year, Iran, supported by Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia, tabled three amendments emphasising a role for the UN, which were heavily defeated.

First Committee 151-1-11
UNGA: 158-1-11

Iran's three amendments (L.62) did not on paper appear very radical, but they were treated by the co-sponsors as killer amendments, so the co-sponsors voted against. The amendment to replace PP8 was defeated 26-105-7; the insertion of the word 'first' before 'practical step' in OP1 was defeated by 19-108-10; and an amendment to OP3 that would have narrowed the resolution's 'encourages the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively' with ballistic missile proliferation with an explicit reference to encouraging 'the United Nations to explore...' was defeated by 24-106-7.

Once the draft amendments had been defeated, the unamended HCoC resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by 151-1-11 in the FC, rising to 158-1-11 in the GA. Only Iran voted against. The other proposers of the amendments, together with a handful of non-HCoC members abstained: Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Syria.

Back to the top of page

A/60/463 (L.5) Decision
Missiles

Introduced by Iran, together with Egypt and Indonesia

In its seventh year, following two panels of government experts, this draft decision merely puts the issue on the UN's agenda for next year.

First Committee: 101-2-50
UNGA: 120-2-53

Israel and the United States voted against, while there was a block abstention by the EU and rest of NATO. There have been two previous panels on missiles. The first, which reported back in 2002, provided a useful overview, but irreconcilable differences of approach among the panellists and the states they represented meant that the panel could not agree on recommendations. The second was able to go no further than the first. The US objected to this issue having been put back on the agenda after the failure of the second panel to reach agreement. The US commended the diligent work of the experts, and US argued that the report of the second panel should be the basis of continuing work: to walk away and "waste their efforts" would be "unfortunate and irresponsible".

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/57 (L.9)
Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States

With 11 PPs and 9 OPs, this periodic resolution highlights the hazards of radioactive waste, particularly in the event of their use for radiological warfare, and calls on states to prevent "any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of states" (OP3). It reflects various agreements, including the IAEA code of practice of the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste and the Bamako Convention banning the import of hazardous wastes into Africa and controlling their transboundary movements within Africa. Most specifically, it requests the CD to "intensify efforts towards an early conclusion" of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons (a topic that remains part of the CD's Decalogue, but which has never got off the ground), and if and when it does so, to consider radioactive waste.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

UNGA 60/52 (L.3)
Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East

Introduced by Egypt on behalf of the League of Arab States

This traditional resolution, which goes back to 1974, cites the need for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, while at the same time reaffirming the right of states to develop and acquire nuclear energy for so-called peaceful purposes. It invites all countries of the region to declare their support for establishing such a zone.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

The language of this resolution is deliberately kept moderate to enable it to be adopted without a vote. Israel said that it had joined consensus, as it has done for over 20 years, "notwithstanding substantive and important reservations regarding certain elements in the resolution". Repeating the mantra that a NWFZ must be based on "arrangements freely arrived at among all the states in the region concerned", Israel believed that "the political realities in the Middle East mandate a practical step-by-step approach", with the first step focussing on "modest CBMs followed by the establishment of peaceful relations". Noting that of the four "recognised cases of noncompliance with the NPT", three were in the Middle East [presumably meaning Libya, Iraq and Iran], Israel underscored the need for "mutual verification arrangements and effective enforcement measures". Israel said it had responded positively to confidence-building initiatives but harboured no illusions: "realising this vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances and not least, without a significant transformation in the attitude of states in the region towards Israel". By way of illustration, Israel noted that out of the eight delegations that called for a NWFZ in the Middle East in the FC thematic debate, six did not have diplomatic relations with Israel, and "two still call for the destruction of my country". [This was a pointed reference to the outburst a few days earlier by Iran's President Ahmadinejad.]

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/92 (L.6)
The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

Introduced by Egypt on behalf of the League of Arab States

This annual resolution is the less consensual sibling of the previous, and names Israel, while stressing the need for universality of the NPT. PP6, on which there was a separate vote, emphasises the conclusions on the Middle East adopted by NPT parties in 2000. Noting that Israel is now the only state in the region that remains outside the NPT it calls upon that state "to accede... without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under fullscope" IAEA safeguards. In addressing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the resolution does not mention the IAEA additional protocol or raise concerns about the activities of any states other than Israel.

First Committee: PP6, 145-2-5
Whole resolution: 149-2-4
UNGA: PP6, 162-2-6
Whole resolution: 164-5-5

As in past years, there was a split vote on PP6, which made reference to the final document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference and called for universal adherence to the Treaty, as well as strict compliance by all parties with their obligations: PP6 was adopted in the GA by 162-2-6. Israel and India opposed, while Bhutan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan and the United States abstained. The whole resolution was then adopted by 164 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions, three more than in the FC vote of 149-2-4. This time the US joined Israel in voting against, and insisted that Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands do likewise. Australia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, India and Tonga abstained.

Varying its familiar explanation a little, Israel agreed that a risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East exists, but said that the resolution did not reflect the evidence, facts and realities: it chose to ignore evidence of noncompliance and the "profound hostility of states in the region towards Israel" and instead "focuses entirely and by name, on one country that has never threatened its neighbours nor abrogated its obligations under any disarmament treaty". Israel argued that the resolution conferred no credibility on the UN First Committee and urged other delegations to vote against. While the EU voted en bloc in favour of the resolution, some explained that they supported a NWFZ in the Middle East and had consistently called on Israel to accede to the NPT, but were concerned that there was no reference to other proliferation activities in the region, notably the IAEA's findings on Iran. Australia, which abstained, made a similar explanation.

Back to the top of page

A/60/463 (L.7) Decision
Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

Introduced by Uzbekistan, on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

With negotiations still unresolved, the Central Asian states proposed a draft decision to keep the issue on the UN agenda.

First Committee consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/49 (L.8)
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States

This resolution, which goes back to 1996, when the Pelindaba Treaty was signed in Cairo, supports the establishment of the African NWFZ, calls on the relevant states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Pelindaba Treaty so that it can enter into force without delay (OP1), and also to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as required (OP4). It expresses its appreciation to the NWS that have signed the Protocols that concern them and calls on those that have not yet ratified the Protocols concerning them to do so as soon as possible (OP2). Because the Canary Islands, which are legally part of Spain, lie within the zone mapped out by the Treaty, Spain put in an amendment (L.58) which would have slightly amended OP2 and deleted OP3. OP3 calls upon states "contemplated in Protocol III....to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty."

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Spain allowed this to go through with consensus, but made a very long speech warning that unless the anomalous situation with regard to its "territories" (Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, which lie within the map identifying African NWFZ) is resolved, Spain will refuse to join consensus again. Spain stressed that it supports the general objectives of the Pelindaba Treaty, but that [notwithstanding physical geography] "Spanish territory" should not have been politically included in the zone of the African NWFZ. Spain complained that this had not been appropriately addressed in accordance with NWFZ guidelines established by the UNDC, including the necessity that they be a "well defined geographical region" by agreement freely arrived at by the states concerned. Spain complained that OP3 singled it out unacceptably, and that it would not regard itself as bound by consensus on OP3. The United States, and Britain on behalf of the EU, made additional statements agreeing that Spain had "legitimate concerns" and should not have been singled out in the resolution. The EU welcomed efforts undertaken to preserve consensus, but considered that "every zone is the outcome of specific circumstances and must reflect the diversity of situations existing within it". They therefore called on the parties concerned to resume efforts to find an acceptable solution.

Spain's statement stressed that all "Spanish territory" had been denuclearised in 1976, by agreement with the US, but that it was not appropriate for Spain to join Protocol III because it "would lead to redundant safeguards over Spanish territory already subject to comprehensive safeguards", since Spain already adheres to Euratom and the NPT-related IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. Spain referred also to its membership of NATO (which, in view of NATO's nuclear doctrine, would be more likely to contribute to the problem than ameliorate it), and mentioned other relevant agreements, including the INF and CFE treaties, underlining that all its nuclear facilities were exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that Spain already abided by obligations "that go well beyond Pelindaba".

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/50 (L.25)
Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Introduced by Mexico on behalf of all the states in the region

This resolution notes with satisfaction the leadership of OPANAL in convening the first Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish NWFZs, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, April 26-28, 2005. It welcomes that the Tlatelolco Treaty is in force for all states in the region, as officially acknowledged at OPANAL's meeting in Havana, November 5-6, 2003, takes note of the adoption of the Havana Declaration, and also urges all relevant countries to deposit their ratification of agreed amendments.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/58 (L.12/Rev.1)
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas

Introduced by New Zealand, together with Brazil, with the co-sponsorship of a wide cross-group of states in the southern hemisphere

The resolution, which has been led by Brazil and New Zealand since 1996, places its calls for the ratification of all nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols, as relevant, in the context of the determined pursuit of "the total elimination of nuclear weapons" and "the important role of NWFZ in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime." It also recalls "the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space", including UNCLOS, but as the votes reflect, this paragraph has failed to bring the sceptical NWS on board. Using the traditional language associated with NWFZs, OP5 "welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, and calls upon all states to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones in the Middle East and South Asia". A new preambular paragraph (PP8) welcomes Mexico's decision to host a conference of states parties signatories to all the NWFZs in 2005.

First Committee: OP5 (last three words of): 140-2-7
OP5: 141-1-9
Resolution as a whole: 144-3-6
UNGA OP5 (last three words of): 162-2-7
UNGA OP5: 162-1-9
UNGA Resolution as a whole: 167-3-8

The conduct and votes on this resolution have become familiar ritual, including India's insistence on separate votes on OP5, and the last three words of OP5 (..."and South Asia.") and the opposition by Britain, France and the United States, who cite concerns about conflict with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS) or other norms and international laws relating to navigation.

The sole votes in opposition came from Britain, France and the United States, who regularly transport nuclear weapons or materials through the oceans of the Southern Hemisphere. Making their familiar objections, they reiterated that they had no objection to NWFZs in principle, but feared that the real goal of the resolution was the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone that would cover the high seas.

India insisted on a vote to remove specific mention of the need for a NWFZ in South Asia (the words "and South Asia") from OP5. Together with Pakistan, India voted against this. India then voted against OP5 altogether, while Pakistan shifted to an abstention. Finally, having yet again failed to achieve any modification of the resolution, as in past years, India and Pakistan both abstained, together with Bhutan, Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau, the Russian Federation and Spain. Practically duplicating its statement of previous years, India, declared that OP5 was inconsistent with the understanding that NWFZ must be freely arrived at by the states concerned, and queried why South Asia was singled out.

Back to the top of page

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNGA 60/46 (L.10*)
Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons

Introduced by Belarus

This short resolution, which has previously been adopted without a vote was last introduced in 2002. It contains 5 OPs which express the determination to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and requests the CD to keep the matter under review "with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons" and report on its considerations to the GA.

First Committee: 150-1-1
UNGA: 180-1-1

Belarus had hoped for consensus, stressing that the resolution was meant to multilateralise the international community's ability to address potential developments in weapons that could have mass destructive properties, such as nanotechnology. Unlike previous years, the United States decided to break consensus and vote against, while Israel abstained. In its explanation, the United States argued that no new types of WMD have appeared on the horizon: the international community should focus its efforts on known types of WMD and no useful purpose would be served by diverting attention to such hypotheticals.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/67 (L.31)
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction [CWC]

Introduced by Poland on behalf of CWC states parties

This now-traditional resolution noted with satisfaction that seven more states have brought the parties to the CWC up to 174. The 12 OPs underline the importance of the CWC and the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The resolution welcomes progress towards implementation of the various articles and calls for the CWC's "full, universal and effective implementation" so as to exclude completely the possibility of any further use of chemical weapons. It underscores the contribution of this treaty to the "global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations" and reaffirms the key points in the First Special Session's Political Declaration, such as universalisation, effective application of the verification system, fulfilment of financial obligations, economic and technological development and peaceful international cooperation.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

During the debates, supportive statements were made about the work of the OPCW, with calls for universalisation and full implementation of the CWC.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/96 (L.33/rev.1)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [BTWC]

Introduced by Hungary with support from BTWC states parties.

Noting with satisfaction the increase in BTWC membership to 155 states parties, the resolution underlines the Treaty's effective prohibition of the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling under all circumstances. It notes that the Sixth Review Conference will be held in Geneva at a date in 2006 to be determined by the PrepCom, which will meet for a week April 24-28, 2006. It also records the decisions of the Fifth Review Conference to discuss and promote common understanding and effective action: explicitly, in 2003, the "adoption of necessary national measures to implement" the Convention, "including the enactment of penal legislation, and national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins; in 2004 "enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, and strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants"; and in 2005 "on the topic of the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists", finally calling on all BWC parties to participate in its implementation. The resolution calls for further signatures and ratification, increased information exchange and resources to implement the BWC states parties' decisions.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Following many expressions of support for strengthening the BTWC regime's implementation, this resolution went through more smoothly than in recent years. On behalf of the EU and associated states, the UK welcomed the consensus and reiterated its commitment to the BTWC review process and support for all the decisions of the Fifth Review Conference, "including that the 2006 Review Conference will consider the work of the meetings of States parties and meetings of experts and decide on any further action."

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/78 (L.51)
Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduced by India

This resolution builds on last year's text, recognising the international community's determination to combat terrorism and expressing concern about the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and WMD. With careful wording so as to enable adoption by consensus, the resolution "is cognizant of the steps" taken by states to implement UNSC Resolution 1540 (April 2004) on WMD, and welcomes adoption by consensus of two further instruments: the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (April 13, 2005) and amendments to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by the IAEA (July 8, 2005). It also notes the Final Documents of the NAM heads of State and Ministers from 2003 and 2004, as well as the G-8, EU and ASEAN initiatives , and makes specific reference to the IAEA resolution adopted on September 30, 2005 (GC(49)/RES/10. In 6 OPs it calls on all states to support international efforts and to undertake and strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery, as well as the materials and technologies related to their manufacture. In a new OP2, it invites states to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, to ensure its early entry into force. The resolution also encourages regional and international cooperation to strengthen national capacities, and requests the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures and seek states' views of further measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of WMD.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

This resolution now has wide support, with co-sponsorship from both NAM and European countries. Though its 2002 origins were as much about India's concerns about the role of Pakistan in Kashmir-related violence, the resolution now goes far wider, acting as a medium for promoting UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) on WMD and further developments in international laws and agreements relating to terrorism.

Back to the top of page

Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

UNGA 60/54 (L.27)
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Introduced by Sri Lanka, together with Egypt

In identical text to that of previous years, the resolution notes "the importance and urgency" of the issue and that "the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security". It reaffirms that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes only and should be carried out "for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development". The resolution underlines the importance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other international instruments but recognises that the current "legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and that "there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness and that it is important to comply strictly with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral". It emphasises the need for "further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space", recognises "the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space", and calls on the Conference on Disarmament to complete examining and updating its mandate from 1992 and establish an ad hoc committee on PAROS in its 2005 session.

First Committee: 160-1-1
UNGA: 180-2-0

Sri Lanka introduced the traditional PAROS resolution this year. Even though its text was unchanged from last year's apart from updating the date to 2006 in its call for PAROS work to commence in the CD, the United States this year decided to vote against, to the surprise of the co-sponsors, who had received an assurance that the US would continue to abstain if they did not tamper with the consensus text. Israel maintained its usual abstention in the FC (perhaps also taken by surprise when the US changed to a no-vote). By the time the GA voted, Israel had also moved from abstention to no, keeping Washington company, as on so many occasions!

Following the vote, the US said there was no arms race in outer space, no arms control problem to address, and that the existing outer space arms control regime already dealt adequately with this issue. In a statement intended to cover both space resolutions, the US claimed that it took international law and the exploration of space seriously, but there already existed an extensive and comprehensive system covering certain uses of outer space and the US saw no reason for further international institutions to address "a non-existent arms race in outer space". The US said it was committed to peaceful purposes, but included among these appropriate defence activities in pursuit of national security and other goals.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/66 (L.30/Rev.1)
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space

Introduced by Russia

In an interesting development, Russia introduced a new resolution on outer space issues. Originally entitled Measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space, this first-time resolution was substantially revised after Russia had conducted a round of consultations and re-emerged as Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. Reaffirming that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international peace and security and recalling a UN document from twelve years ago containing a study by governmental experts on confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305 and Corr.1), Russia's revised resolution invites [weaker than the original requests] UN Member States to inform the Secretary-General before [the GA's] sixty-first session [i.e. 2006] of their views concerning the advisability of further developing international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Russia's intention to pursue this further is clearly indicated in the final paragraph, which puts this issue on the GA's agenda for next year.

First Committee: 158-1-1
UNGA: 178-1-1

Though Russia apparently hoped for consensus on its resolution, and had many discussions with the US which resulted in the resolution being modified (some would say weakened), Russian diplomats were neither surprised nor especially upset that the US voted against, since the resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by a margin that was practically as good as that of the traditional PAROS resolution. The United States insisted on a vote and voted against, while Israel abstained. In the GA, the US again opposed, but was further isolated when Israel did not join it, but maintained its abstention. The US argued that there was unprecedented cooperation in civil and commercial activities, as illustrated by UN cooperation with China over its recent manned space mission. This is likely to be the first step towards establishing a group of governmental experts to conduct a further study into transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.

Back to the top of page

Conventional Weapons

UNGA 60/81 (L.57*)
The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects [SALW]

Introduced by Japan, with Colombia and South Africa and a wide cross-group co-sponsorship

Now in its fifth year, this substantive and practical resolution expresses its support for the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action (PoA) and the work of various meetings and working groups, including regional and subregional efforts and the contributions on civil society, taking into account the relevant paragraphs on SALW in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. With reference to the report of the open-ended working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable states "to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons" (A/60/88 and Corr.2), the resolution in OP2 calls on all states to implement this international instrument. In 8 OPs, the resolution encourages all initiatives and the mobilising of resources and expertise to ensure implementation of the Programme of Action and the successful conclusion of the UN conference to review progress, which will be held from June 26 to July 7, 2006, in New York (OP1), as well as a two-week PrepCom January 9-20, 2006. It also decides to establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) to commence after the review conference to consider further steps. The Secretary General is further requested to provide the GGE with necessary assistance and services and to "continue to collate and circulate data and information" on a voluntary basis.

First Committee: OP2 162-0-2
Whole resolution: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Japan, the main sponsor, expressed dismay when consensus was broken for the first time on OP2 of the principal general SALW resolution, which called on all states to "implement the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons". The abstentions by Mexico and Jamaica were not against marking and tracing per se, but were intended to register protest that this instrument had not been made legally binding (and that their amendments had not been accepted by the co-sponsors, who had refused to reopen the draft). Uruguay said that the Mercosur states had an unequivocal preference for a legally binding instrument that would cover marking and tracing and also ammunition. Mercosur viewed the PoA as a roadmap, but underscored the necessity to move forward and take advantage of political momentum on this issue to adopt wider reaching instruments to address the scourge of SALW. Jamaica said it supported the position of Mercosur, and that, like Mexico, was profoundly disappointed that the conference had not produced a more effective and legally-binding instrument. Though the provisions are in keeping with Jamaica's policy, she feared that by not being legally-binding, the instrument would become ineffectual. Guyana agreed, though it had not broken consensus, and referred to the suffering caused by SALW used in drug crimes. France acknowledged that some states were concerned that adopting an instrument that is not legally binding might weaken pressure, but said it supported the principle of consensus on SALW, and accused those who had insisted on a vote of creating a "more noxious precedent". It should also be noted that the US, which used the occasion also to raise concerns about the process of informing states when resolutions required an allocation of UN resources, for example for GGEs, deliberately did not participate in the vote on OP2. Once dissent had been registered on OP2 in the FC, the resolution was allowed to go through without a vote in the General Assembly.

Back to the top of page

A/60/463 (L.55) decision
International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

Introduced by Switzerland

By this short resolution, the General Assembly decides to adopt the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons contained in the annex to the report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/60/88 and Corr.2).

First Committee: 145-0-25
UNGA: 151-0-25

The abstainers were from Mercosur: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. Margaret Hughes Ferrari, Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, placed on record CARICOM's "deep disappointment at the outcome of the negotiations of the Open Ended Working Group and the recommendation placed before this Committee". Though formally the statement was only on behalf of the CARICOM states, but since it represents concerns shared by others, including many who supported this and also the Japanese-sponsored resolution on SALW, it is worth reproducing in full:

"CARICOM supports the Programme of Action adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons but takes the view that this document is but a first step in the process of controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The PoA is a political document that addresses only part of the problem and is complied with on a voluntary basis, since it does not impose legal obligations on States. CARICOM States are strongly committed to the implementation of the PoA but believe that there is need for further action to address gaps in existing policy implementation at all levels. The failure of the OEWG to reach consensus on a strong and substantial instrument is a cause for regret; such failure was provoked by the obstructive tactics of a very few delegations for reasons which are still unclear to the CARICOM states since all states, large or small, would benefit from greater control of small arms and light weapons. The uncontrolled spread and use of small arms and light weapons poses a dangerous threat to the national security, law enforcement efforts and the economic and social development of many of our small countries as, in spite of our best efforts, we continue to face the spread of illicit weapons throughout our territories, most often through illegal diversion of such weapons. The nexus between small arms and light weapons and other forms of criminal activity is therefore one of the most serious threats to security in our region. International action to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons remains a priority for CARICOM states. The inadequate instrument should not be the end of the process - but merely a starting point. CARICOM believes that an effective, multilateral, legally binding international instrument on identifying and tracing illicit small arms, light weapons and ammunition would have been an important contribution to existing national, bilateral and regional efforts to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which so heavily taxes the human and financial resources of the region. Such an instrument should have been based on firm obligations so as to enable states to trace and interdict existing lines of supply of illegal weapons, prevent the creation of new lines of supply and prevent the diversion of weapons from the legal trade thus providing effective controls to curtail the spread and use of small arms and light weapons."

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/68 (L.34/Rev.1)
Addressing the Negative Humanitarian and Development Impact of the Illicit Manufacture, Transfer and Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their excessive accumulation

Introduced by The Netherlands with wide, cross-regional support

The Netherlands characterised this new and progressive initiative as a 'one-time resolution'. It supports the PoA on SALW, and seeks to draw attention to the "wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences" that exacerbate poverty and pose a "serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels". Its operative paragraph calls on states to explore ways to address the humanitarian and development impact, particularly in conflict or post conflict situations by: developing programmes to reduce poverty and prevent armed violence; assisting initiatives to prevent, combat and eradicate the "illicit trade" in SALW; encouraging UN peacekeeping operations to address the safe storage and disposal of SALW as an integral part of their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes; including national measures on SALW in post-conflict peacebuilding strategies and programmes; and ensuring that women are fully taken into account and participate in such programmes, which must address the needs of women and girls and also promote and protect the rights and welfare of children in armed conflicts.

First Committee: 160-1-0
UNGA: 177-1-0

Only the United States opposed the Netherlands' initiative to address the humanitarian consequences of SALW, further underscoring how out of step the Bush administration is from the world's concerns. It should also be noted that this is one of the few resolutions to incorporate the recognition of women's roles in disarmament and security, as required under UNSC Resolution 1325. The Netherlands had characterised the resolution as taking a broad and interconnected approach to disarmament and security, but the US still opposed this resolution, on grounds that it focused on humanitarian and social consequences, which are "not relevant to the First Committee". According to the US view, the FC should only be about disarmament. The US said it supported the SALW PoA but complained that this resolution "pre-empts planning" for the 2006 conference. In a long and philosophical explanation, Egypt said that it had voted in favour and participated in the drafting of this resolution despite reservations, including that it might go beyond the FC's mandate and that it risked blurring the demarcation between licit and illicit SALW.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/71 (L.37/Rev.1)
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them

Introduced by Mali on behalf of ECOWAS, co-sponsored by African states and others

This resolution is now firmly on the FC agenda, and emphasises the problems caused by small arms and light weapons (SALW) for security and development in Africa, most particularly in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion. It supports the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of SALW, encouraging the international community to support its implementation. It welcomes the progress made so far, including the 2000 Bamako Declaration on an African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the 2001 UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, the conclusion of the African Conference on the implementation of the Programme of Action in March 2002. In 10 OPs, the resolution encourages further regional cooperation and collaboration, among governments, civil society and international organisations, and invites the Secretary-General and states and organisations to provide assistance in curbing the proliferation and trafficking in SALW and collecting them.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

The Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) has in place a voluntary moratorium on the importation and manufacturing of SALW, and this resolution is intended to highlight the difficulties and invite regional and international participation and support.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/74 (L.40/Rev.1 and orally amended)
Problems arising from the Accumulation of Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles in Surplus

Introduced by France and Germany, with Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and others

After last year's decision to put this issue on the GA's agenda, the co-sponsors have consulted widely on this initiative, and were rewarded with consensus. The resolution builds on the PoA and the report of the SALW marking and tracing Working Group (A/60/88 and Corr.2), which referred to the need for ammunition to be comprehensively addressed, and focuses principally on two aspects: ammunition surpluses and illicit trading in ammunition. In 7 OPs, the resolution wants states to strengthen controls on conventional ammunition, declare ammunition surpluses for destruction, and increase the security of ammunition stockpiles. As some explanations from states that joined the consensus underlined, it does not place new obligations on anyone, but its major operative paragraph calls on "all interested states to assess, on a voluntary bases, whether, in conformity with their legitimate security needs, parts of their stockpiles of conventional ammunition should be considered to be in surplus, and recognizes that the security of such stockpiles must be taken into consideration and that appropriate controls with regard to the security and safety of stockpiles of conventional ammunition are indispensable at the national level in order to eliminate the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion" (OP1, as revised).

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

This first time resolution, presented by France and Germany and co-sponsored by EU and various other states, puts on the GA agenda a "pressing task" that has been missing from the debates on conventional weapons so far. During the consultations the resolution was watered down, such that 'calls' were downgraded to 'appeals' and 'appeals' down to ' encourages'. Significantly, an OP in the original, which would have recalled the invitation to Member States to implement the recommendation in paragraph 27 of the Working Group report (A/60/88 and Corr.2), was shifted to the preamble (PP4). Even so, this widely-supported resolution is viewed as an important first-time initiative, which is intended to be built on in the future.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/80 (L.56)
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction [Mine Ban Treaty]

Introduced by Austria with co-sponsorship from Ottawa adherents

This resolution (now in its seventh year) welcomes the entry intro force of the Mine Ban Treaty. The outcome of independent negotiations and government/civil-society partnership, the so-called 'Ottawa Process', this treaty has truly become a success story, with 147 states parties, still rising each year. As in past years, the resolution reaffirms or recalls a host of previous resolutions, decisions and relevant meetings and calls for full and effective implementation of the treaty, inviting all remaining states to accede without delay. In 9 OPs, it renews its call for states and other relevant parties to work together to remove and destroy anti-personnel mines throughout the world, help mine victims in all necessary ways, and undertake mine risk education programmes. It invites and encourages "all interested states, the United Nations, other relevant international organisation or institutions, regional organisations the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relevant non-governmental organizations" to participate in the programme of intersessional work established at the first meeting and developed at subsequent meetings.

First Committee: 147-0-15
UNGA: 158-0-17

An ongoing tribute to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the courage of the core group of states that brought this treaty to fruition in 1994-97, the vote on the Mine Ban Treaty is now overwhelming, as one by one the hold-outs accede to the treaty and leave the abstainers behind. This year, the abstainers in the GA were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palau, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam. Most notably, this year China voted in favour for the first time, although it has not yet managed to accede to the Treaty. In explanation, China said that it recognises the humanitarian concerns caused by anti-personnel landmines and endorses the objectives and purposes of the Mine Ban Treaty. Though not yet a party, China "keeps in contact" and has made unremitting efforts, including participating in demining. Egypt said the Mine Ban Treaty had "substantial imbalances". Though not a signatory, Morocco voted in favour because it supports the humanitarian principle underlying the treaty. As in previous years, countries like South Korea, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia and Myanmar/Burma explained their abstentions in terms of their defence requirements, long borders etc. Cuba abstained again, underlining that though it attached "due importance" to legitimate humanitarian concerns, Cuba has been subject to "continuing aggression and hostility from the American superpower". India said it supported the vision of a world free of mines and had discontinued production of non-detectable mines and engaged in mine clearance, training, rehabilitation of victims, but was unable to accede to the Treaty because of its long border and security concerns. India said that the goal of eliminating landmines would be facilitated by the development of militarily-effective alternatives that are non-lethal.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/93 (L.48)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [CCW]

Introduced by Sweden with co-sponsorship from the EU and others

This routine resolution supports the CCW and its Protocols, covering non-detectable fragments (protocol I), restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices (protocol II), prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (protocol III), blinding laser weapons (protocol IV) etc, as well as the decision by the Second Review Conference in December 2001 to extend the scope of the CCW to include "armed conflicts of a non-international character", i.e. civil wars and intra-state uses. In 13 OPs, the resolution calls upon all states who remain outside the CCW to becomes parties as soon as possible and also to be bound by the Protocols of the Convention. It welcomes with satisfaction the adoption of Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) in 2003 and calls on states to express their consent and be bound by this protocol. It also encourages additional work on related issues, with the possibility of future protocols, and requests the Secretary-General to render any necessary assistance as may be required for the meeting of CCW states parties on November 24-25, 2005, and for follow-up work, as decided by the Second Review Conference.

First Committee consensus
UNGA: consensus

The most important CCW-related development mentioned by many states has been the 2003 agreement on a protocol on explosive remnants of war (ERW - encompassing cluster bombs and other unexploded munitions and submunitions, as well as landmines and abandoned ordnance), with calls for its entry into force. There is also support for the CCW's present focus on the humanitarian, developmental and economic concerns posed by Mined Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM), with calls for agreement on a legally binding instrument on MOTAPM as soon as possible.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/77 (L.49/Rev.1)
Prevention of the Illicit Transfer and Unauthorised Access to and Use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)

Introduced by Australia, with Argentina, Kenya, Thailand, Turkey and others

Now in its second year, this resolution recognises an authorised government-government trade in MANPADS, the threat posed to civil aviation and peacekeeping, and the problem of MANPADS in the context of "the intensified international fight against global terrorism", because they are "easily carried, concealed, fired and, in certain circumstances, obtained". In a revised preambular paragraph, it acknowledges "the considerable efforts of some Member states to collect, secure and destroy voluntarily surplus" MANPADS. In 7 OPs, the resolution urges full implementation of the SALW Programme of Action, and support for international, regional and national efforts to prevent illicit transfers. It stresses the importance of "effective and comprehensive national controls on the production, stockpiling, transfer and brokering" of MANPADS, and encourages states to enact or improve legislation, regulations and practices etc, as well as encouraging "initiatives to exchange information and to mobilise resources and technical expertise" to assist states in combating unauthorised use and transfer of MANPADS. The main addition is acknowledgement of the role of unauthorised transfer of materials and information in assisting the illicit manufacture of MANPADS.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

The UN Register on Conventional Arms (now in its 13th year), covers imports and exports of major weapons. It was expanded last year to include MANPADS, which can potentially shoot down civilian as well as military aircraft, while remaining portable and easily acquired. The resolution builds on experiences in developing the PoA on SALW and is intended to complement both the SALW approach and measures undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (including resolution A35-11) and the establishment of a secure website for exchanging information on MANPADS. Co-sponsored principally by Australia and a cross-regional group of four, though Israel was very instrumental in the initiative behind the scenes, the resolution is intended to highlight the terrorist potential of MANPADS and promote more effective ways of restricting access and exercising controls. The co-sponsors were emphatic that MANPADS were "a legitimate weapon system in authorised hands" and the resolution safeguarded "authorised trade between governments".

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/82 (L.58)
Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms

Introduced by Argentina with a large group of co-sponsors.

This second-time resolution encourages member states to provide information and engage in dialogue on CBMs in conventional arms, and requests the Secretary-General to establish "with the financial support of states in a position to do so, an electronic database containing information" on these issues.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

Regional Disarmament and Security

UNGA 60/63 (L.23)
Regional Disarmament

Introduced by Pakistan

This routine resolution takes note of recent proposals for disarmament at both the regional and subregional levels and maintains the need for efforts to promote regional disarmament to incorporate the specific characteristics and requirements of each region. It innocuously asserts that efforts towards disarmament must be taken both regionally and globally and welcomes initiatives already taken, and then supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at various levels as well as easing regional tensions.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/87 (L.43/Rev.1)
Regional Confidence-building Measures: Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

Introduced by the Congo on behalf of the Central African states

This resolution supports the work of the Standing Advisory Committee and promotes CBMs at regional and subregional levels to ease tensions and conflicts and further peace, stability and sustainable development in Central Africa. It supports the establishment of a network of parliamentarians and the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa, and requests voluntary funding from governmental and nongovernmental organisations to provide assistance and implementation of the programme of work.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/75 (L.44)
Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Subregional Levels

Introduced by Pakistan

Another customary resolution from Pakistan, this stresses the special responsibility of "militarily significant" states "with larger military capabilities" in promoting conventional arms control and regional peace and security. The resolution requests the CD to consider developing principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements, and requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of member states on the subject.

First Committee: 147-1-1
UNGA: 174-1-1

This one is more obviously targeted at India, so - as in the past - India voted against and Bhutan abstained. However, the issue has wider implications for all other regions that should not become obscured by the resolution's provenance. In Europe the extraordinarily complex Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was concluded by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990, has continued to demonstrate its usefulness, despite the fact that it now limits the number of forces and deployments for several countries that have dramatically changed their configurations and politics.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/48 (L.19)
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM

This periodic resolution, last submitted in 2003, supports the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and argues that the participation of all permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean "would greatly facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue to advance peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region".

First Committee: 121-3-44
UNGA: 132-3-46

The NAM voted in favour, the United States, Britain and France voted against, and the abstainers mainly comprised a bloc of NATO/EU aligned states.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/94 (L.47)
Strengthening of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Introduced by Algeria and co-sponsored by a wide cross-group of states in the Mediterranean region and in Europe

This regular resolution takes note of the "indivisible nature" of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean states created benefits in the form of economic and social development. It also asserts that the prospects for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation would be enhanced by positive developments in Europe, the Maghreb and in the Middle East. It continues to make note of the need for such states to cooperate in combating terrorism, crime, illicit arms transfers and drug trafficking and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the means to strengthen security and cooperation in the region.

First Committee consensus
UNGA: consensus

Though accepting consensus, certain key Mediterranean states, including Israel, Syria and Libya, were not among the co-sponsors.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/47 (L.60)
Question of Antarctica

Introduced by the First Committee Chair

This Chair's resolution generated an interesting debate on the last day of the First Committee, with long statements by Malaysia and Sweden on different aspects. Essentially reaffirming that Antarctica should "continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become the scene or object of international discord, the resolution recognises the importance of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol on Environmental Protection, which entered into force on January 14, 1998. It takes account of debates and meetings on Antarctica since its 38th session in 1983 and welcomes the increasing awareness and continuing cooperation, including the establishment of the secretariat for the Antarctic Treaty, which became operational on September 1, 2004, based in Buenos Aires. In 5 OPs, it welcomes ongoing work, and encourages further cooperation, especially the international sharing of scientific data and information relating to Antarctica, including the research activities conducted by various states.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

UNGA 60/55 (L.1/Rev.1 orally amended)
Compliance with Non-proliferation, Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements

Introduced by The United States

This US-initiated resolution, which received consensus in 1999 and 2002, had been substantially revised and hardened in line with Bush administration perspectives. It was then moderated somewhat during consultations in the hope of achieving consensus this year as well, but it failed to do so. It raises concerns about noncompliance, welcomes Libya's decision to "come back into compliance with its non-proliferation obligations and commitments and commends its approach to those States not currently in compliance with their obligations". As revised, it underscores that compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements are "essential for regional and global peace, security and stability" (Interestingly, the word 'peace' was orally inserted just before the resolution was adopted by the FC.) The resolution also stresses that failure to comply with obligations "not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks..." As a condition for supporting this resolution, a number of states insisted that verification should be mentioned, resulting in the following paragraph being inserted into the revised text: "Noting that verification and compliance, and enforcement in a manner consistent with the [UN] Charter, are integrally related". In 6 OPs, it urges all states to implement and to comply fully with their respective obligations and calls on "all Member states to take concerted action in a manner consistent with relevant international law to encourage, through bilateral and multilateral means, the compliance by all States with their respective non-proliferation, arms limitation, and disarmament agreements and other agreed obligations and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations". Without specifically naming Iran, North Korea, or UNSC Resolution 1540 on WMD, the US resolution "encourages efforts by all States parties, the United Nations and other international organizations, pursuant to their mandates, to take action consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to prevent serious damage to international security and stability arising from non-compliance by States with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament obligations".

First Committee: 137-0-11
UNGA: 163-0-10

The US had hoped that by accepting a number of amendments to modify its compliance resolution with references to international law, respective mandates, the UN Charter and verification, it would be adopted without a vote. This was not to be. Unlike three years ago, when negotiations between contrasting positions were able to be resolved sufficiently for a consensus to be obtained, Russia insisted on a vote and abstained, with several others. It is understood that few had expected this. The large number of co-sponsors ensured that it was nevertheless overwhelmingly passed, achieving 163-0-10 in the GA. Barbados, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Russian Federation, South Africa, and Venezuela all abstained.

In its FC explanation of vote, Russia contrasted this year's resolution unfavourably with the earlier consensus resolution on the same subject [UNGA res 57/86 from 2002] and said it was "disappointed that the authors did not take into account some of our amendments and comments", which meant that the draft had "lost its objectivity and purpose of ensuring the integrity of non-proliferation and disarmament agreements." Russia could not support the resolution although its position had remained completely unchanged with regard to being in favour of the most strict compliance by states with their non-proliferation and arms limitation obligations. Russia said it fully shared the view on the need to ensure compliance with agreements, especially with regard to WMD and disarmament: "This is the goal that Russia is guided by in fulfilling its own obligations and in its efforts to ensure compliance by its partners... however, this draft abounds with provisions that give grounds for arbitrary interpretations... not necessarily associated with the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament." Russia said it believed that "claims about non-compliance, not substantiated by facts, are too serious to be formally recorded in a UN GA resolution", and said "it is difficult to support faceless accusations". In Russia's views, the conclusions about non-compliance with obligations should be made, in the first place, within the framework of relevant disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, that is, following their established procedures." After giving a more detailed breakdown of its objections to specific parts of the resolution (which will be reported on in Acronym's longer analysis), Russia regretted that the sponsors did not restore mention in the operative part of the resolution on the "need to ensure measures for verification of compliance with disarmament agreements".

China stated that it did not participate in the vote at all: despite fully supporting the importance of full compliance, China felt that principles enshrined in the 2002 resolution had not been properly reaffirmed. Pakistan also stated that it did not participate in the vote. A number of NAM states, including Indonesia, Venezuela and Iran also explained that they had abstained because the resolution was selective in its approach. Cuba gave six points of objection, complaining that the 2005 version had eliminated "a number of positives" from UNGA res 57/86. Egypt gave a compelling critique of the resolution based on international and treaty law.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/471 (L.13) Decision
Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM

By decision, this issue was placed on the GA's agenda in 2006.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/59 (L.14*)
Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM

Following on from similar resolutions in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, this resolution, though refraining from naming names, reflects serious international concerns about the Bush Administration's undermining of multilateral arms control, and emphasises the centrality of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. It pointedly refers to "the existence of a broad structure of disarmament and arms regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory and transparent multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries regardless of their size and power. While recognising "the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament", it expresses concern at the "continuous erosion of multilateralism" in arms regulation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and says "that a resort to unilateral actions by Member states... would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine confidence... as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself..." In 9 OPs it characterises multilateralism as "the core principle" in disarmament and non-proliferation concerns and negotiations. It underlines the importance of preserving existing agreements, calls on states to renew and fulfil their commitments to multilateral cooperation. In its most controversial paragraph, OP6, it requests the states parties to relevant instruments on WMD "to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of noncompliance as well as on implementation..." and "to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified noncompliance against one another to resolve their concerns". It also requests the Secretary General to seek states views and report back next year.

First Committee: 116-6-48
UNGA: 122-8-50

The NAM voted in favour, as did Russia and China. France changed its vote from abstention in the FC to a vote against in the GA, joining Albania, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Latvia, Marshall Islands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The rest, which included the EU except for Britain and France, abstained. Canada, which spoke also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, explained that they had abstained because their concerns were not taken into account. Though they have long promoted multilateralism, they consider it to be a core principle [one of] but not the core principle [sole] as stated in the resolution.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/60 (L.15)
Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Control

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM

This resolution, first put forward by Cuba in 1994, emphasises the need to observe environmental norms in both the negotiation and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements. It explicitly refers to "the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons". It calls for unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral measures to ensure that environmental and sustainable development considerations are taken into account in relation to scientific and technological progress applied to international security, disarmament and related spheres, and invites states to inform the Secretary-General of measures they have adopted in this regard.

First Committee: 167-1-3
UNGA: 176-1-4

The vote was almost exactly the same as last year, with the United States in opposition. In the GA, little Palau joined France, Israel and the United Kingdom in abstaining. Explaining its vote in the FC, the United States said that it believed environmental concerns to be important, but that they should not be allowed to overburden the critical negotiations' phase. The US claimed that the UN should not set standards for arms control and disarmament agreements - that is for the states concerned to do.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/73 (L.39/Rev.1 and orally amended)
Preventing the Risk of Radiological Terrorism

Introduced by France

This new and somewhat controversial resolution expresses concern over the risk that terrorists might use radioactive materials in radiological dispersion devices (so-called 'dirty bombs') or attack nuclear plants or facilities, which would result in radioactive releases. The resolution starts by referring to the "benefits" and "essential contribution of radioactive materials and sources to social and economic developments" and the need to prevent terrorists acquiring, trafficking in or using radioactive materials for radiological dispersion devices. It makes reference to the IAEA and various agreements relevant to the safety and security of radioactive sources, as well as the need to strengthen controls in accordance with international law, national legal principles and UNSC Resolution 1540. In 6 OPs, it calls on states to support international efforts, cooperate and strengthen national capacities, as well as taking and strengthening their national measures. States are invited to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the IAEA's 2006-2009 nuclear safety plan. States are also urged to follow the guidance in the IAEA's code of conduct, consult with and keep the IAEA informed, and consider establishing a formalised process for periodic exchange of information, lessons learned and evaluation of progress.

First Committee: 162-0-0
UNGA: consensus

France had to undertake considerable consultations and significant revisions before it was adopted without a vote (an administrative confusion meant that a recorded vote was taken in the First Committee, but no-one either voted against or abstained). India commended France for this initiative, which it said complemented India's own resolution on terrorism. Kazakhstan said it vigorously supported this and UNSC Resolution 1540 and had done everything it could, including joint projects and cooperative threat reduction (CTR) with the United States.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/61 (L.16)
Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf on the NAM

This traditional NAM resolution emphasises the importance of the "symbiotic relationship" between disarmament and development. Concerned about increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs, it underscores the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship, and request the Secretary-General to strengthen this role further, with particular reference to the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, in order to assure continued and effective coordination and close cooperation between the relevant UN departments, agencies and sub-agencies. The resolution encourages the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to make reference to the contribution that disarmament could provide in meeting them when it reviews progress in 2006, as well as to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities.

First Committee: 164-1-2
UNGA: 177-1-2

The United States voted against, while Israel and France abstained. The US reiterated its well-known belief that disarmament and development are two distinct issues. Since the US did not participate in the 1987 conference on Disarmament and Development, it did not regard itself as bound by any of its decisions. Emphasising that it was speaking for itself and not the EU this time, the UK said it did not believe there was an automatic link, but had supported the resolution because it agreed with many of the conclusions of the recent expert group on disarmament and development, particularly relating to mainstreaming, demobilisation, small arms and light weapons, anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war. The UK considered that the resolution did not adequately reflect the complexity of the issue or reflect progress and positive unilateral and bilateral initiatives.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/64 (L.24)
Confidence-building Measures in the Regional and Sub-regional context

Introduced by Pakistan.

On its second outing, this resolution links CBMs with regional concerns, builds on UN resolution 57/337 (July 3, 2003), entitled "Prevention of armed conflict", which calls for states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, including using the ICJ more effectively. It relates disarmament to development, commenting that resources released by disarmament could be devoted to economic and social development and the protection of the environment, and welcomes the peace processes "already initiated in regions to resolve their disputes through peaceful means bilaterally or through mediation by third parties, regional organisations or the UN", noting also that continuing regional disputes may endanger international peace and security and contribute to an arms race. In 9 OPs, the resolution calls for states to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in the settlement of disputes; it calls for dialogue, compliance with bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament agreements, and the promotion of bilateral and regional CBMs to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. Finally, the UN is requested to consult with states in the (unnamed) "regions concerned" to explore further CBM efforts in "regions of tension".

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

In 2003, the vote for this resolution was split, with the NAM voting in favour, outweighed by the combined negative votes and abstentions. Interesting therefore to find that it has been modified and represented in a way that has now been adopted without a vote.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/45 (L.29**)
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security

Introduced by the Russian Federation

This resolution was first introduced in 1998 with the intention of highlighting concerns provoked by US plans for missile defence and space control. Though it attracted some reservations, it was adopted without a vote, establishing a group of government experts (GGE) under UN auspices in 2004 to study "relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems". Calling on member states to consider the range of threats to information security, it notes that scientific and technological developments can have dual-use, civilian and military applications, and expresses concern regarding the abuse of information resources and technologies in ways that may "adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of states to the detriment of their security in both civil and military fields". The resolution takes note of the report of the GGE (A/60/202) and calls on states to promote further consideration of existing and potential threats relating to information security at multilateral levels. It invites states to inform the Secretary General of their views on the issue, efforts taken to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation and possible measures to strengthen information security at the global level. Most controversially, this resolution requests establishment of a further GGE on this issue in 2009.

First Committee: 163-1-0
UNGA: 177-1-0

Though it appears that the US gave no explanation, it is understood to have objected most strongly to the proposal to establish another GGE on this issue in 2009, considering this a waste of time and money.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/51 (L.53)
Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament

Introduced by India with co-sponsorship of some thirty NAM states

This routine resolution highlights both the civilian and military potential of scientific and technological developments and stresses the importance of encouraging civilian applications. Though it acknowledges the role of dual-use items in the development and upgrading of weapons of mass destruction, the resolution mainly reflects the concerns of a number of NAM states regarding export control regimes with emphasis on a perceived threat by a self-selected cartel of developed states to the peaceful development rights of others. Declares that the benefits of advances in the civilian sphere should be available to all and urges member states to undertake multilateral negotiations towards this end, with the encouragement of the relevant UN bodies.

First Committee: 88-49-13
UNGA: 110-53-17

As in previous years, most NAM states voted in favour, while states aligned with the Western caucus opposed, objecting that the resolution side-steps the problems of dual use whereby countries evoke peaceful purposes to gain access to technology. Arguing that this also has serious military or weapons implications, the opponents and abstainers regard the resolution as inadequate and potentially in contradiction with the international system of export controls, in which many of them participate.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/ (L.50/Rev.1)
Transparency in Armaments (TIA)

Introduced by the Netherlands with wide co-sponsorship

Reappearing once more, after being withdrawn in 2004, this regular resolution emphasises the need for an enhanced level of transparency in conventional armaments. Traditionally a small group of NAM states, mainly from the Middle East, abstain because the UN Register does not include nuclear weapons. This year was no exception, and it was adopted only on the last day of the FC, after undergoing five separate paragraph votes. It ran into additional trouble this year over its financial implications. At time of writing, the resolution has not yet been voted on in the GA, reportedly because the US has voiced concerns about the budget increase, notably with regard to establishment of a further GGE in 2006. The budget implications were provided to Member States in a separate document (L.61).

The resolution welcomes the Secretary General's "consolidated report" on the UN Register on Conventional Arms (A/60/160 and Corr. 1) - that is, the 2003 report of the GGE that had been established by a previous TIA resolution. It stresses that it is important to review the continuing operation and development of the Register. OP1 reaffirms determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register. OP2 calls for universal participation, but some states wanted to oppose or abstain on part of the last sentence, which specify "and the recommendations contained in paragraphs 112 to 114 of the 2003 report of the Secretary-General". OP3, the subject of a further paragraph vote, invites member states to provide additional invitation on procurement, including types and models, transfers of SALW and so on. OP4 reaffirms its decision to keep the scope and participation of the Register under review. The second part of this, OP4b, again required a vote because it called for a further GGE to be convened in 2006. OP6 also proves to be controversial and require a separate vote because it invites the Conference on Disarmament to work on TIA, which it did until 2005, but which a number of states consider to be an inappropriate demand given its other priorities.

First Committee:
OP2 reference to paras 112-114 of GGE report: 108-1-16
OP3 (call for further information on procurement etc) 115-0-18
OP4b (call for GGE in 2006): 118-0-16
OP6 (invites CD to work on TIA) 116-0-19
Whole resolution: 122-0-21

UNGA: No voting figures for the GA yet available, after the vote was postponed from December 8, pending a review of its programme budget implications by the Fifth Committee.

The United States voted against the reference in OP2 to paragraphs 112 to 114 of the 2003 GGE report. Abstainers included Algeria, Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. On OP3, which called for further information on procurements, including types and models, the US joined the votes in favour. The abstainers were much the same as before, but joined by China and Djibouti. On OP4b, which called for a further GGE to be convened in 2006, Cuba joined China and the US in voting in favour, leaving the rest of the abstainers. On OP6, which wanted TIA to go back onto the CD's agenda, abstainers were joined again by China, Cuba, Kuwait and Yemen. As regards the whole resolution, the US voted in favour, while China, Cuba, Kuwait and Yemen through their lot in with the regular abstainers.

In explanation, Egypt made a statement on behalf of the Arab League, endorsed by individual statements from additional countries, including Syria and Yemen. They called for the Register to be broadened to include sophisticated weapons, such as nuclear weapons, arguing on the basis of regional security and referring to the need for a "more balanced and non-discriminatory" transparency that would cover all Israel's weapon systems. China abstained because it objected to the US identifying Taiwan as a recipient of US arms sales. The Chinese objection was not to the arms sales per se, but that "the Province of Taiwan" should not be mentioned in a register devoted to arms trading among states. Having voted against a reference to the 2003 report of the Secretary General, the United States made a statement raising concerns that GGEs were requested with greater and greater frequency, and without due regard for expense or usefulness.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/44 (L.42)
Objective Information on Military Matters, including Transparency of Military Expenditures

Introduced by Germany with a large group of cross-group co-sponsors

This resolution, offered biannually in recent years, is aimed at strengthening and broadening participation in the UN system for standardised reporting on military expenditure, as first established in UNGA 35/142B (December 12, 1980) and reinforced in subsequent resolutions. In 7 OPs, it calls on states to report annually, by April 30, on their military expenditures, recommends implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, encourages international and regional bodies to promote transparency on military expenditures and enhance complementarity among reporting systems, and takes notes of various UN reports on these issues. It requests the UN to continue with and augment various procedures and practices related to promoting standardised reporting on military expenditure and encourages states to continue to provide information, views and suggestions and alert the S.G. about any possible problems with the standardised reporting system and their reasons (where relevant) for not submitting the requested data.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/69 (L.35)
National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual Use Goods and Technology

Introduced by the Netherlands

The third year for this resolution, much of the early controversy has been dissipated by the adoption of UNSC 1540. The current resolution evokes 1540 in OP1 and invites member states "that are in a position to do so...to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, while ensuring that such legislation, regulations and procedures are consistent with the obligations of states parties under international treaties." In OP2 states are encouraged to provide the UN, on a voluntary basis, with information on their national legislation, regulations and procedures regarding arms transfers etc.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

Disarmament Machinery

UNGA 60/89 (L.2*)
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR]

Introduced by France and a goodly cross section of states

With 5 OPs, this short resolution welcomes UNIDIR's achievements over the past 25 years and underlines the "particularly relevant contribution of the Institute to thinking and analysis on international security issues in the current context", as well as the "timeliness and high quality" of UNIDIR's work. It takes note of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit report, which had made a positive assessment of the impact of UNIDIR's work and recommended "adequate funding from the regular budget to better meet the costs of its core staff..."

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

This resolution afforded delegations the opportunity to express their appreciation for UNIDIR's excellent work, publications and facilitation of relevant and timely discussions on a range of disarmament-related issues, involving representatives and specialists from governments and civil society.

Back to the top of page

A/60/463 (L.17) Decision
Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [UNSSOD IV]

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM

Decides merely to include this item in the GA's agenda for 2006.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/83 (L.18)
United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament

Introduced by Indonesia on behalf of NAM

Recalls last year's resolution on the maintenance and revitalisation of the three UN regional centres for peace and disarmament, reaffirms the role of educational programmes and the dissemination of information, and appeals to member states to make voluntary contributions to support the regional centres. Also emphasises the importance of the work of the regional branch of DDA and requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support - within existing resources - to these three centres.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/90 (L.20)
Report of the Conference on Disarmament

Introduced by Peru as current President of the CD

The annual CD resolution reaffirms the role of the CD as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community" and takes note of "significant contributions" and "substantive discussions", as well as "active discussions" towards trying to get a programme of work. Since those efforts have been unsuccessful for years, there is something hollow about the resolution noting the "strong collective interest" of the CD in commencing substantive work in 2006. Without going into the specifics, it welcomes the consultations and initiatives of the CD's current and incoming presidents and requests CD members to cooperate with the presidents in their efforts to get work underway.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/84 (L.21)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin American and the Caribbean

Introduced by Argentina on behalf of states in the region

This routine resolution once again expresses its support for the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Lima, Peru and related developments and work, especially in education and promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, disarmament and development at the regional level. In 9 OPs, the resolution congratulates the Regional Centre for the expansion of its activities, encourages further work in disarmament and development, and appeals for additional voluntary funding as well as UN resources to carry out its future programmes.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/85 (L.32/Rev.1)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

Introduced by Nepal on behalf of states in the region

This routine resolution commends the "useful activities" of this Regional Centre in encouraging regional and sub-regional dialogue, and welcomes the report of the Secretary-General regarding the continuing validity of the Centre's mandate. It again welcomes the idea of the possible creation of an educational and training programme for peace and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and highly appreciates Nepal's support as host nation of the Regional Centre's headquarters.. The resolution underlines the importance of the Kathmandu process and, as in other resolutions dealing with Regional Centres, appeals to member states, international governmental and nongovernmental organisations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to support the work of the Regional Centre. As in previous years, it also urges the Secretary-General to ensure "the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement."

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Despite the traditional text urging that the Regional Centre should operate physically from Kathmandu, it continues to operate from New York, in large part because of Nepal's difficulties with regard to accessibility and security.

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/86 (L.41)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African states

This routine resolution commends the activities and reaffirms strong support for the African Regional Centre, , and appeals to states, international governmental organisations, NGOs and Foundations to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen its programmes and activities. It specifically calls for cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, and emphasises the importance of its work in promoting the consistent implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

Back to the top of page

UNGA 60/91 (L.59/Rev.1)
Report of the Disarmament Commission

Introduced by Sierra Leone

This resolution, as always, reaffirms the importance of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and its mandate, dating back to the tenth Special Session of the GA in 1978, as "the specialised, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues". After the failure of intensive negotiations before and during the FC to reach agreement on the UNDC's priority items, the resolution was only able to recommend that the UNDC intensify consultations with a view to reaching "definitive agreements" on work prior to its requested meeting in 2006, earmarked for April 10-28.

First Committee: consensus
UNGA: consensus

The first draft of this resolution included bracketed alternatives for OP5, identifying the priority items for discussion in 2006, based on what the UNDC had practically agreed in 2006. Unfortunately, the United States had reservations that stymied agreement. These alternatives would have recommended that the UNDC address nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects, practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons and/or measures for improving the effectiveness of the UNDC's work; resume substantive discussion on the basis of what had been agreed at its meeting in July 2005; or just encouraging it to adopt an agenda in time to hold substantive discussions in 2006. The resolution as adopted contained only vague language encouraging states to consult and try to reach agreement on priority issues before the actual meeting.

Back to the top of page

© 2005 The Acronym Institute.