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IAEA Director General Report on Iran, February 27, 2006
'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, IAEA
Board of Governors, GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.
Full text of the IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei's
latest report on Iran is available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0602/GOV_2006_15.pdf.
Excerpts
B. Current overall assessment
46. A detailed overall assessment of Iran's nuclear programme
and the Agency's efforts to verify Iran's declarations with respect
to that programme was provided by the Director General in November
2004[22] and again in September 2005.[23] As indicated in those
reports, Iran has made substantial efforts over the past two
decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and, to that
end, has conducted experiments to acquire the know-how for almost
every aspect of the fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran's nuclear fuel
cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of
uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had
not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran's
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of
concealment continued until October 2003, and resulted in many
breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement, as
summarized in the Director General's report of September
2005.[24]
47. Since October 2003, Iran has taken corrective actions with
respect to those breaches. The Agency has been able to confirm
certain aspects of Iran's current declarations, in particular in
connection with uranium conversion activities, laser enrichment,
fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme,
which the Agency has been following up as routine implementation
matters under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and, until 6 February
2006, its Additional Protocol.
48. Two important issues were identified in the Director
General's November 2004 report as relevant to the Agency's efforts
to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment
activities in Iran, specifically: the origin of LEU and HEU
particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the
extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges
of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.
49. With respect to the first issue - contamination - as
indicated above, based on the information currently available to
the Agency, the results of the environmental sample analysis tend,
on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of
most of the observed HEU contamination. It is still not possible at
this time, however, to establish a definitive conclusion with
respect to all of the contamination, particularly the LEU
contamination. This underscores the importance of additional
information on the scope and chronology of Iran's P-1 and P-2
centrifuge programmes, which could greatly contribute to the
resolution of the remaining contamination issues.
50. With respect to the second issue - the P-1 and P-2
centrifuge programmes - although some progress has been made since
November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding
the chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency
has not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of
Iran's statements concerning those programmes. While Iran has
provided further clarifications, and access to additional
documentation, concerning the 1987 and mid- 1990s offers related to
the P-1 design, the Agency's investigation of the supply network
indicates that Iran should have additional supporting information
that could be useful in this regard. Iran has also been asked to
provide additional details on the process that led to Iran's
decision in 1985 to pursue centrifuge enrichment and on the steps
leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology in
1987. However, Iran maintains that no information, other than that
already provided to the Agency, exists.
51. No additional information or documentation has been provided
with respect to Iran's statement that it did not pursue any work on
the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. As indicated above, Iran has
been requested to search for more information, and any supporting
documentation, relevant to the P-2 programme, in particular with
regard to the scope of the original offer in connection with the
P-2 centrifuge design and Iran's acquisition of items linked to
that programme. Iran, however, maintains that no such information
exists.
52. The Agency continues to follow up on all information
pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities. Although
absent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency's legal authority
to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related
activity is limited, the Agency has continued to seek Iran's
cooperation as a matter of transparency in following up on reports
related to equipment, materials and activities which have
applications both in the conventional military area and in the
civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. In this
regard, Iran has permitted the Agency to visit defence related
sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan and Parchin. The Agency did not observe
any unusual activities in the buildings visited at Kolahdouz and
Parchin, and the results of environmental sampling did not indicate
the presence of nuclear material at those locations. The Agency is
still assessing the available information, and awaiting other
additional information, in relation to the Lavisan site and the
PHRC.
53. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in
September 2005, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been
accounted for. Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of
nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, the Agency is not at this point in time in a position to
conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, under
normal circumstances, is a time consuming process even with an
Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusion
can be expected to take even longer in light of the undeclared
nature of Iran's past nuclear programme, and in particular because
of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge
enrichment programme, the existence of a generic document related
to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack of
clarification about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear
programme, including, as mentioned above, about recent information
available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that
could involve nuclear material.
54. It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above
uncertainties related to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear
programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive
Agency verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties,
Iran's full transparency is still essential. Without full
transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of
the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - transparency
that could only be achieved through Iran's active cooperation - the
Agency's ability to reconstruct the history of Iran's past
programme and to verify the correctness and completeness of the
statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge
enrichment programme, will be limited, and questions about the past
and current direction of Iran's nuclear programme will continue to
be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to,
and cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation
related to procurement and dual use equipment; and access to
certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the
Agency may need to visit in the future as part of its
investigation.
55. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining
outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear programme, and the
Director General will continue to report to the Board as
appropriate.
Footnotes
22. GOV/2004/83, paras 106-114.
24 GOV/2005/67, paras 4-8.
23. GOV/2005/67, paras 42-52.
Source: Arms Control Wonk, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com.
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