Disarmament Documentation

IAEA Director General Report on Iran, February 27, 2006

'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.

Full text of the IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei's latest report on Iran is available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0602/GOV_2006_15.pdf.

Excerpts

B. Current overall assessment

46. A detailed overall assessment of Iran's nuclear programme and the Agency's efforts to verify Iran's declarations with respect to that programme was provided by the Director General in November 2004[22] and again in September 2005.[23] As indicated in those reports, Iran has made substantial efforts over the past two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and, to that end, has conducted experiments to acquire the know-how for almost every aspect of the fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment continued until October 2003, and resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement, as summarized in the Director General's report of September 2005.[24]

47. Since October 2003, Iran has taken corrective actions with respect to those breaches. The Agency has been able to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations, in particular in connection with uranium conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme, which the Agency has been following up as routine implementation matters under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and, until 6 February 2006, its Additional Protocol.

48. Two important issues were identified in the Director General's November 2004 report as relevant to the Agency's efforts to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran, specifically: the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.

49. With respect to the first issue - contamination - as indicated above, based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of the environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. It is still not possible at this time, however, to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the contamination, particularly the LEU contamination. This underscores the importance of additional information on the scope and chronology of Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, which could greatly contribute to the resolution of the remaining contamination issues.

50. With respect to the second issue - the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes - although some progress has been made since November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding the chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency has not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's statements concerning those programmes. While Iran has provided further clarifications, and access to additional documentation, concerning the 1987 and mid- 1990s offers related to the P-1 design, the Agency's investigation of the supply network indicates that Iran should have additional supporting information that could be useful in this regard. Iran has also been asked to provide additional details on the process that led to Iran's decision in 1985 to pursue centrifuge enrichment and on the steps leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987. However, Iran maintains that no information, other than that already provided to the Agency, exists.

51. No additional information or documentation has been provided with respect to Iran's statement that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. As indicated above, Iran has been requested to search for more information, and any supporting documentation, relevant to the P-2 programme, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer in connection with the P-2 centrifuge design and Iran's acquisition of items linked to that programme. Iran, however, maintains that no such information exists.

52. The Agency continues to follow up on all information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities. Although absent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited, the Agency has continued to seek Iran's cooperation as a matter of transparency in following up on reports related to equipment, materials and activities which have applications both in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. In this regard, Iran has permitted the Agency to visit defence related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan and Parchin. The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited at Kolahdouz and Parchin, and the results of environmental sampling did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations. The Agency is still assessing the available information, and awaiting other additional information, in relation to the Lavisan site and the PHRC.

53. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process even with an Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusion can be expected to take even longer in light of the undeclared nature of Iran's past nuclear programme, and in particular because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment programme, the existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme, including, as mentioned above, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that could involve nuclear material.

54. It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above uncertainties related to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive Agency verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties, Iran's full transparency is still essential. Without full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - transparency that could only be achieved through Iran's active cooperation - the Agency's ability to reconstruct the history of Iran's past programme and to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge enrichment programme, will be limited, and questions about the past and current direction of Iran's nuclear programme will continue to be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to, and cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation related to procurement and dual use equipment; and access to certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the Agency may need to visit in the future as part of its investigation.

55. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear programme, and the Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate.

Footnotes

22. GOV/2004/83, paras 106-114.

24 GOV/2005/67, paras 4-8.

23. GOV/2005/67, paras 42-52.

Source: Arms Control Wonk, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com.

Back to the Top of the Page