The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT Review Conference 2005
Back to the main page on the NPT
Overview:
Canada's Approach to the 2005 NPT Review Conference
February 24, 2005
I. CONTEXT
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone
of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
As of May 2003, an unprecedented 189 States have ratified or acceded
to the Treaty. Its members view it as an essential framework in which
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to effect their elimination
and to engage in cooperation in the development of the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. The challenge ahead is to ensure, and reinforce where
necessary, the NPT’s continuing authority and effectiveness, while maintaining
the balance reflected in the “grand bargain” represented by the Treaty.
- The 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) provides the opportunity for
States Parties to look back over the past five years since the last
Review Conference, to assess changes both positive and negative, and
to look forward, applying lessons learned and charting the course for
the next five years. The goal should be to emerge from the RevCon reaffirming
the Treaty’s continued strength, credibility and relevance; renewing
commitment to ensuring its full implementation, taking into account
both long-standing obligations and evolution in the security environment
since the last Review Conference; reinforcing efforts towards its universality
and providing a sounder institutional basis on which to achieve these
objectives.
Important achievements
- In the past five years, there have been positive achievements related
to the NPT, although much of course remains to be achieved. States Parties
have reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the
multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the
vast majority of States Parties have fulfilled their commitments. With
the welcome adherence of Timor Leste and Cuba, the Treaty, with 188
States Parties, has come that much closer to universality. The central
role of the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system has been reaffirmed;
155 countries have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and
63 countries have now ratified the Additional Protocol. Libya has come
clean about its past activities in violation of the NPT and is actively
cooperating to regain its good standing under the Treaty. Continuing
questions about the nuclear activities of Iraq have been laid to rest.
Progress in reducing the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons has been
made by a number of the NWS.
- The CTBT is regrettably not yet in force, but with 175 States having
signed and 120 ratified it enjoys nearly universal support. Its International
Monitoring System is functioning, proof of an achievable and effective
multilateral verification system. Efforts have been made by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the G8 and other fora to address
weaknesses concerning the supply of sensitive nuclear material, technology
and equipment. Nuclear power continues to play an important role in
electricity generation and in diverse fields ranging from medicine to
agriculture. The report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel
makes numerous useful recommendations in the NPT’s areas of responsibility.
- Responding to grave concerns regarding the threat of terrorism and
the threat to international peace and security that stem from the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, UN Security Council resolution 1540 is a welcome
development that reaffirms the international community’s support for
multilateral treaties like the NPT and requires all States to take action
to strengthen its implementation. The IAEA has made considerable effort
to improve nuclear security, steps are being taken to improve the safety
and security of radiological sources and efforts to strengthen the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are finally nearing fruition.
The Proliferation Security Initiative, with a growing number of participants,
is one promising new instrument in meeting our non-proliferation objectives.
- Cooperative threat reduction has emerged as another key development
in the post 9/11 environment. The Global Partnership was launched at
the G8 Leaders’ Meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002. It has now been
joined by other countries and is engaged in practical disarmament endeavours
that address security threats facing our world today. The Global Partnership
is promoting actual destruction of WMD and dangerous materials derived
from their dismantlement, promoting nuclear-related environmental protection,
enhancing non-proliferation of WMD-related technology and materials
and keeping weapons and materials of mass destruction out of the hands
of non-state actors (including terrorist groups). While not all of these
efforts fall directly under the ambit of the NPT, they complement it
and remain relevant to its goals of enhancing non-proliferation, disarmament
and access to the benefits of peaceful use.
Stresses and challenges
- The past five years have witnessed unprecedented challenges to the
Treaty, and major stresses on its regime that have received intense
public attention. Dr. El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has
remarked, "The twin crises of compliance with NPT obligations - namely,
the engagement of some NNWS in undeclared nuclear activities, coupled
with the failure of the NWS to take concrete, verifiable and irreversible
steps to eliminate their nuclear arsenals - have led to a crisis of
confidence in the NPT regime."
- A serious blow was the January 2003 notification by the DPRK of its
withdrawal from the Treaty, the first country to do so in the NPT’s
35-year history. This grave development also demonstrated the weaknesses
in the current system, which lacks provision for NPT States Parties
to meet collectively in a timely fashion to discuss such an issue and
send a clear message to the DPRK on behalf of the Treaty’s members.
The 2005 Review Conference has no choice but to address these issues.
- Several serious instances or apparent instances of non-compliance
with non-proliferation and other obligations freely accepted under the
Treaty and consequent arrangements with the IAEA have also come to light
over the past five years. These have included, among others, circumstances
where a program to develop nuclear weapons has been admitted voluntarily
and terminated (the case of Libya); another where weapons development
has been admitted but so far not renounced (the case of the DPRK); another
where weapons development has been denied but where non-conformity with
IAEA safeguards was determined and where a process has been set in motion
to stop and reverse proliferation-sensitive activities (the case of
Iran), to others where non-compliant activities appear to be unintended,
inconsequential and/or long-terminated.
- These examples vary in terms of real or potential impact but must
all be considered seriously: a pattern of laxity on non-proliferation
or other Treaty obligations cannot be allowed to develop. They demonstrate
the need for widespread application of a stronger verification mechanism
than was in place in those countries. Non-compliance by Iran and Libya
have renewed concerns about states seeking to acquire the full nuclear
fuel cycle without any justifiable reason – a form of “latent deterrence”
according to Dr. ElBaradei. This has resulted in a new focus on the
search for forms of cooperation that could mitigate proliferation concerns
while providing states with assurances of fuel supply, and addressing
the need to strengthen controls over the transfers of proliferation
sensitive technology.
- It meanwhile continues to be unacceptable that 36 States Parties have
yet to comply with the explicit requirement of Article III to conclude
and bring into force safeguards agreements with the IAEA, in some cases
decades after they joined the NPT, despite many calls and the willingness
of the IAEA to assist. The Additional Protocol is not yet universal;
a number of countries, some with important nuclear activities, have
not ratified, despite its demonstrated value in reinforcing states’
non-proliferation commitments and in addressing issues of non-compliance.
- A key negative development on the non-proliferation front, which received
wide attention, was the revelation of an extensive clandestine black
market in nuclear material, technology and equipment associated with
Dr. AQ Khan of Pakistan. It revealed the need for constant vigilance
and efforts to ensure that nuclear-related trade does not contribute
to proliferation. While recognising the important contribution of legitimate
nuclear trade, States Parties have undertaken concerted efforts to respond
to both State and non-State actors’ attempts to breach international
non-proliferation norms through the transfer of weapons technology and
know-how.
- Similar problems of non-compliance are also evident in the disarmament
realm, where key undertakings (the 13 Steps) agreed to by all States
Parties at the 2000 Review Conference remain unfulfilled, and some have
receded further from realization. Eleven ratifications from among those
44 States whose ratifications are necessary for entry into force remain
outstanding nine years after the CTBT's adoption. Negotiation of an
FMCT has not yet begun in the CD, nor a body on nuclear disarmament
established, since there has been no agreement on a Program of Work
for the Conference. With the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, START II
failed to enter into force and the START III process was abandoned,
replaced by the Moscow Treaty which, while reducing the numbers of deployed
nuclear weapons, does not contain provisions for irreversibility, transparency
or verifiability. Others of the 13 Steps have been implemented only
partially, if at all, and some nuclear-weapon States (NWS) challenge
their continued validity.
- Not all of the NWS have made the progress that many would like to
see in terms of numbers, rate or conditions of nuclear weapons reduction.
There is also concern about possible vertical proliferation (in terms
of the development or consideration by certain NWS of new or modernised
nuclear weapons) and about the adoption or consideration by some such
States of security doctrines that ascribe an increased role to nuclear
weapons. More fundamentally, there is increasing questioning of the
fact that, within the NPT’s “grand bargain”, the implementation of non-proliferation
commitments is the subject of an extensive and strict multilateral verification
regime (centred on the IAEA and its safeguards system) while disarmament
commitments have not so far been subject to such multilateral surveillance.
- In the years just before the 2000 Review Conference, the international
norm established by the Treaty was also defied by developments outside
its membership. In particular, the continued open possession and development
of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, combined with Israel’s ongoing
policy of nuclear ambiguity, and the consequent refusal of these three
States to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States has served to prevent
the universalisation of the Treaty on terms that would further enhance
international peace and security.
- While such developments do not vitiate the fundamental value, credibility
or viability of the NPT, their cumulative effect is to challenge States
Parties to ensure that implementation of the Treaty is complete, and
that it evolves to ensure the fulfilment of long-standing obligations,
while taking into account new challenges arising from technological,
military and geo-political change. In this respect, it is important
not just to handle current crises well, but also to take the experience
from this process and apply it to strengthening the Treaty regime.
II. REACHING COMMON OBJECTIVES
- The outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference will be important to
the future directions of the Treaty. This first Review Conference of
the 21st century, ten years after the NPT’s indefinite extension, represents
a vital opportunity to underline the continued relevance of the Treaty,
to uphold the 1995 bargain of “permanence with accountability”, to build
on the success of the 2000 Review Conference, to respond effectively
to the serious challenges that have arisen and to chart the Treaty’s
future course.
- Reinforcing the authority and integrity of the NPT and ensuring implementation
of its obligations, while promoting its universalisation, continues
to be the focus of Canada’s efforts in seeking a nuclear-weapon-free
world. The tripartite bargain at the origin of the NPT requires both
reaffirmation and tangible supporting action. In addition, the Treaty’s
stature needs to be augmented through a major overhaul and upgrade of
its institutional arrangements. Much is at stake, and States Parties
will need to demonstrate political will, determination and flexibility
if they are to arrive at a positive outcome incorporating concrete commitments
to guide the next five years.
Framework Questions
- A Review Conference by definition is charged with looking back over
the past five years to review implementation of past commitments as
reflected in the Treaty itself and in decisions taken by past Review
Conferences. Canada regards these commitments and decisions as remaining
in effect unless and until overtaken by events outside the control of
States Parties or overridden by the decisions of future Review Conferences.
- That being said, Canada believes that the focus of the Conference
should look forward, not back. States Parties should seek agreement
on the way ahead and not allow the Conference to get bogged down in
analysing the past. Canada seeks a future-oriented, comprehensive outcome
document from the RevCon, containing concrete objectives for the 2005-2010
period. This may take the form of a single declaration or a series of
stand-alone decisions.
Negotiating a substantive outcome
- The essential inter-relationship among the NPT’s three main pillars
(disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful uses) must be recognized in
a balanced outcome document or documents. Canada regards them all as
important, inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Substantively, all
three require attention; tactically, the current political environment
makes progress unlikely based on any one-sided approach. To achieve
“balance” will require more than mere mention of each of the three pillars,
but also equivalency in the nature of the commitments made in each case.
There also should be due recognition of the “permanence with accountability”
concept that underpinned the indefinite extension of 1995, and which
requires States Parties to better document their implementation of the
Treaty. Largely speaking, two broad concepts can be applied to organising
the RevCon outcome decisions in practical terms; a third concept is
not, however, workable. Specifically:
- one possible outcome is a purely declaratory or rhetorical document
that reconfirms basic principles, reflects all three pillars in a
general fashion and promises further efforts in future in certain
aspects of the regime’s mandate, but not in ways that could be considered
concrete or measurable. Such a minimalist outcome would at least provide
a minimal reinforcement of the Treaty’s work but would not actually
advance its objectives in any practical way. Canada does not favour
such an approach.
- another possible outcome, which Canada does support, would be to
seek concrete and measurable new commitments (or specific and practical
derivatives of existing commitments) equally on all three pillars.
This would be much harder to negotiate but also much more worth the
trouble, as it would mean making the hard choices for real action
on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use.
- The concept that is not realistic is the one that attempts to mix
declaratory measures on some pillars with concrete commitments on
others. Different States Parties have different objectives linked
to their conceptions of national security, and it will be necessary
to satisfy all sides to reach a compromise. An outcome that attempted,
for example, to trade rhetoric on non-proliferation for new concrete
commitments on disarmament and peaceful use would not be accepted
by some states; equally, an outcome that attempted to combine concrete
new commitments on non-proliferation with rhetoric on disarmament
would be unacceptable to others.
- Negotiating a balanced concrete outcome will require a strong commitment
from all parties and a willingness to begin an intensive exchange of
views well before the Conference begins. This overview paper constitutes
a Canadian contribution to such an exchange and supplements the Canadian
Working papers tabled at all three Preparatory Committee meetings (e.g.
on institutional issues). Canada also plans to table further documents
on various issues at the RevCon itself, including proposed language
and decision elements for the outcome document. Canada encourages the
early distribution of position papers and related documents by other
States and looks forward to exchanging views in the lead-up to the RevCon,
to explore the possibilities of concerted action on a meaningful outcome.
Conference organisation
- It will also be important to maintain flexibility with regard to the
organisation of the Conference itself, in order to maximise the opportunities
for genuine exchange of views. In this regard, in addition to subsidiary
bodies for nuclear disarmament and regional issues established at previous
Review Conferences, Canada would be open to others, keeping in mind
the practice of no more than two simultaneous meetings.
III. SPECIFIC CANADIAN GOALS
- In order for the NPT to make its intended contribution to international
security, it must continue to be viewed as the authoritative multilateral
legal instrument relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation
and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is a core objective; if
the Treaty is not strong as a whole, it becomes more difficult to ensure
implementation of its specific provisions. For this reason, Canada is
advocating a comprehensive approach to address these issues, to respond
to the strains and challenges the Treaty has recently faced and to ensure
it remains an effective and well-functioning instrument. Canada is optimistic
that this can be accomplished through renewed political commitment,
a new approach to its operation and greater attention to its implementation.
- More specifically, Canada’s substantive goals for the RevCon include
the following: (a) agreement on new concrete and where possible verifiable
commitments under each of the three pillars (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation
and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) and clarifying their inter-relationships;
(b) consideration of how best to deal with concerns involving specific
regions and states (including states outside the regime); and (c) strengthening
the authority and credibility of the regime, via action relating to
overcoming the Treaty’s institutional deficit, such as rearranged meetings,
bars to withdrawal, systematic reporting and enhanced civil society
participation. These goals are discussed in more detail below.
(a) The Three Pillars
Nuclear disarmament
- Reaffirmation of the Treaty’s goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons
and a renewed commitment to achieving this goal should be key conclusions
of the Review Conference.
- Building on the progress made to date by some NWS and the continuing
validity of the 13 Steps as benchmarks for assessing progress towards
this goal, the Conference should identify concrete new initiatives (or
reconfirm existing ones) that can advance nuclear disarmament in practical
and measurable ways, with an emphasis on multilateral activity. Among
the proposals that Canada would advocate in this regard are the following:
- Step 1: renew support for the CTBT and the ongoing development of
the International Monitoring System and consider what other recommendations
the RevCon can make, in particular to CTBT ratifying States in support
of Article XIV.2 Conferences on entry into force, as well as on the
efforts of the Special Representative.
- Step 2: reaffirm unilateral commitments to a nuclear testing moratorium
and their formalization in a politically-binding instrument.
- Step 3: commit to an early resumption on work on specified initiatives
in the CD (more than just “work toward early agreement on a workplan”),
including establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament
and negotiation of a verifiable FMCT.
- Step 4: reaffirm unilateral commitments of production moratoria
by all producing States, pending negotiation of an FMCT.
- Step 5: reaffirm the principles of irreversibility, verifiability
and transparency, and a commitment to their practical application
in all nuclear weapons reductions.
- Step 6: reaffirmation by each NWS of its unequivocal commitment
to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, providing specific plans
and schedules to fulfil this obligation.
- Step 7: encourage the US and Russia to apply the principles of irreversibility,
transparency and verifiability to the Moscow Treaty, by destroying
warheads removed from operational deployment status and providing
greater detail on the reductions achieved to date and timetables for
achieving the remaining reductions, and how these actions are verified.
Encourage a process to formulate plans for reducing non-strategic
nuclear weapons, as was foreseen in the START III framework.
- Steps 8+10: reassert the need for implementation of the Trilateral
Initiative or its equivalent; welcome specific progress made in placing
fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes
under IAEA or equivalent international verification and control and
reaffirm the need for such action in light of concerns regarding terrorist
acquisition of such material.
- Step 9: welcome progress achieved since the last Review Conference
on steps leading to nuclear disarmament; consistent with efforts that
promote international stability and security for all, call on the
NWS to undertake and transparently document further efforts in this
regard; specify further transparency and reduction measures on non-strategic
nuclear weapons; unilateral or agreed measures for operational limitations
on all or certain types of nuclear weapons (e.g. deployment and alert
status) and call for decreased reliance on the role of nuclear weapons
in security policies (note in the latter context Canadian policy that
“the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others
of nuclear weapons”);
- Step 11: confirm commitment to the objective of general and complete
disarmament.
- Step 12: see section III (c) below on Canadian proposals for reporting.
- Step 13: welcome progress and support further work on development
of multilateral verification capabilities, covering both non-proliferation
and disarmament activities and flagging the potential contribution
of the UN group of experts on verification, to be convened in 2006.
- Further action is required pursuant to engagements undertaken in 2000
and to advance and support new activities that have emerged. Among the
proposals that Canada would advance or support in this regard are the
following:
- agree to begin discussions on codifying Negative Security Assurances
on a legally-binding basis in either the NPT or the CD context;
- concretely support reinforcement of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and
their expansion to other regions (such as the Middle East and South
Asia);
- inaugurate a multilateral dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons
in the period leading up to their elimination under the NPT, with
the goal of broad agreement on the issue among NWS and NNWS States
Parties;
- renew focus in the NPT and elsewhere on the issue of delivery systems
for nuclear weapons (as raised in the preamble to the NPT), and enhanced
support (including participation) in that regard for the Hague Code
of Conduct and other missile-related measures;
- underline the importance of cooperative threat reduction activities,
including the Global Partnership, in securing and then eliminating
the weapons legacy and encourage broader participation;
- for broader geographic application, establish a special voluntary
fund for the destruction of nuclear weapons and derived materials
under multilateral supervision.
Nuclear non-proliferation
- Nuclear non-proliferation, or rather concern about nuclear proliferation
both horizontal and vertical, has been the focus of much concern during
this review cycle and needs to be addressed by the RevCon. Potentially,
there is much that States Parties can do on non-proliferation to both
reinforce existing commitments and address new concerns. Specifically:
- call upon all States Parties that have not yet done so to comply
with their Article III obligations by bringing into force a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA forthwith;
- recognize that a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC 153)
together with an Additional Protocol constitutes the NPT safeguards
standard pursuant to Article III of the Treaty;
- call upon States Parties to endorse the requirement for a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol as a condition of
supply to all non-nuclear-weapon States;
- strengthen the IAEA by enhancing political backing to make fuller
use of the verification instruments at its disposal;
- support the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board of
Governors on safeguards;
- support Resolution 1540 and its implementation as an important instrument
to assure effective measures by all States to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery, and call on all to submit their report;
- recognize the need for robust national systems of export licensing
and controls;
- recognize the crucial role of multilateral export control regimes
in creating an international environment conducive to encouraging
legitimate nuclear trade among States;
- accept the importance of voluntary restraint on the spread of those
particularly sensitive nuclear technologies that can directly produce
weapons-grade nuclear material and acknowledge the need for stronger
controls on transfers of such technologies, especially those related
to enrichment and reprocessing;
- recognise the contribution that the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) can make to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and related materials (acting within the scope of national authority
and international law), as well as non-proliferation enforcement measures,
such as those proposed for a Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- The Review Conference needs to restate the important contribution
that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology can
make to economic and social development, improve and save lives, and
advance science and technology, while not contributing to nuclear proliferation,
reflecting the inter-related nature of the Treaty’s provisions. States
Parties should furthermore indicate they remain committed to supporting
peaceful uses of nuclear energy through nuclear cooperation and the
sharing of nuclear technology and expertise both bilaterally and multilaterally.
The need for activities to be conducted in a safe and secure manner
has been reinforced. Specifically:
- reaffirm the importance and validity of peaceful nuclear applications
and the contribution this can make to overcoming the technological
and economic disparities between developed and developing countries
(e.g. in energy, medical and agricultural applications, etc.);
- support the development of new international multilateral nuclear
fuel cycle initiatives which effectively address both non-proliferation
and peaceful uses concerns, noting in particular the work of the IAEA
experts group in this regard;
- support early conclusion of revisions of CPPNM (if not already agreed)
with the goals of enhancing the physical security of nuclear facilities
and materials;
- stress the importance of nuclear safety and welcome the activities
of the IAEA, the Global Partnership and other initiatives in this
regard;
- reflecting inter alia heightened threat perceptions in the post-9/11
security environment, support IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan and
other measures to enhance the safety and security of radiological
sources (traditionally outside the NPT mandate but isotopes and other
sources are closely linked to its peaceful use objectives).
Linkages between non-proliferation and peaceful use
- The RevCon should also clarify the relationship between various obligations
under the Treaty. In referring to the “fullest possible” exchange of
nuclear expertise, the NPT implicitly recognizes that there may be limitations
to such cooperation. The RevCon should clearly establish that States
Parties’ rights to access to nuclear technology and expertise cannot,
therefore, be considered automatic in the face of unresolved concerns
about peaceful intentions or the impact on regional and international
security and stability. While all three of the Treaty’s pillars are
linked in terms of the original “grand bargain” reinforced in 1995,
and while disarmament and non-proliferation are often seen as especially
closely linked in terms of reciprocal promises by the NWS and NNWS,
it is equally true that non-proliferation and peaceful use are also
intertwined, given the overlapping nature of much of the technology
used for peaceful purposes and that necessary for development of weapons.
Given increased concern during this review period regarding the implications
of this overlap, the RevCon will certainly need to carry out a detailed
consideration of the issues involved. The possible outcomes range from
clarifications of principle to some practical measures, including:
- recognition that rights of peaceful use under Article IV are not
absolute but rather conditioned by the obligations in Articles II
and III (i.e. rights balanced by obligations for both supplier and
recipient states);
- acknowledge the logical linkage between proposals for restriction
on transfers of sensitive nuclear technology and the creation of new
multilateral or multinational nuclear fuel cycle arrangements which
obviate the need for a State to acquire the full fuel cycle where
such an acquisition is not justified;
- ensuring that proliferation-resistance is a major criteria in the
design and construction of all new nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
(b) Regional dimensions and universalisation
- The RevCon will have to discuss and comment on developments affecting
specific countries and regions, including both those inside the regime
and those remaining outside. While attention will need to note developments
(or lack of them) over the past five years, the focus should be primarily
on forward-looking elements. In each case, the RevCon will need to assess
progress that may have been made and determine useful future steps.
Canada would support the establishment of a subsidiary body as the best
means to address the regional issues
- As in previous Review Conferences, the Middle East and related areas
remain significant, as reflected in the 1995 Middle East resolution,
on which we encourage all States Parties to report. Israel will continue
to be a focus of many other regional states in particular, and others
will place an equal or greater focus on developments in Iran (details
depending on the status of the IAEA’s examinations of the case at the
time of the RevCon). Canada will continue to urge all sides to make
the maximum efforts to join the regime (Israel), to re-establish a relationship
of confidence in association with the IAEA (Iran) and to bring themselves
under comprehensive safeguards (a significant number of regional states).
Developments on Libya and Iraq, while ending comparatively positively
from an NPT perspective, will have to be considered as well, particularly
in terms of lessons learned and examples offered to other States Parties.
- The Review Conference must address the issue of DPRK withdrawal squarely.
In Canada’s view, Pyongyang’s status is clear if unfortunate: it has
left the NPT. The goal of the NPT regime should be twofold: to convince
the DPRK to destroy any nuclear explosive devices and related materials
and equipment it may possess, and to bring it back into the international
community as a member of the NPT fully covered by IAEA safeguards. This
message, and particularly the importance to the regime of the second
aspect, should be conveyed by the RevCon to all members of the six-party
talks. Beyond that point, action by the RevCon will need to reflect
the exact negotiating in the six-party talks at the time the RevCon
ends. See also section III (c) below concerning implications of the
DPRK case on the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty.
- As in the past, South Asia will again require particular attention,
given its two nuclear capable States outside the NPT. Continuation of
nuclear weapons and associated missile development programs in India
and Pakistan and concerns about their impact on regional stability are
reinforced by a worrying tendency on the part of some States to ignore
the decisions reflected in UN Security Council resolution 1172, to adopt
an increasingly “business as usual” attitude in relations with these
States and in some cases treat them as de facto NWS. The RevCon will
need to express a clear statement of principle on the importance of
the Treaty’s universalization (which would have to cover Israel and
the DPRK in some fashion as well), to affirm States Parties’ commitment
to work strenuously to achieve this goal and to confirm the fact that
the Treaty is not open to new nuclear weapon states.
- That being said, it may also be time to consider adopting a more flexible
attitude on the issue of India and Pakistan – not to alter in the least
the principled goal of achieving their entry into the NPT as NNWS, but
to recognise that such a goal may well be reached in steps. Very much
in the spirit of the “benchmarks” set out in UNSCR 1172, these steps
could relate to further acceptance by these States of multilateral non-proliferation
and disarmament norms that inform the Treaty (perhaps in the form of
unilateral declarations), as expressed particularly in practical commitments
to non-proliferation; in the benefits of accepting and fully implementing
the CTBT and other nuclear-related treaties; in reaffirming a positive
approach to negotiation of an FMCT and (on another flank) by separating
civilian and military programs, fuel cycles and activities, and placing
all their civilian nuclear under IAEA safeguards.
(c) Strengthening the Treaty
- A key Canadian objective for the Review Conference, in addition to
real progress in each of the three pillars, is to enhance the NPT’s
overall credibility and effectiveness, so that the Treaty’s benefits
are maintained and its obligations implemented. This also reflects the
“permanence with accountability” concept that underlay the Treaty’s
indefinite extension, and which is a complementary bargain to the “grand
bargain” of the Treaty’s inception.
Withdrawal
- The DPRK’s withdrawal has brought to light the ease with which a State
Party, having benefited from its membership in the Treaty and acquisition
of nuclear material, technology and equipment, can leave it with little
or no consequence. It is certainly to be hoped that this will not recur,
but the possibility needs to be addressed squarely by the RevCon, both
to discourage any who may be considering such a move and to develop
understandings on how to deal with such a situation if it arose again.
There seems little realistic prospect of making it impossible for a
State to withdraw from the Treaty, at least as it is currently drafted.
A State, however, should not be allowed to withdraw in a way that enables
it to retain the fruits of its adhesion to the Treaty while abandoning
its obligations. It must be noted that the NPT does not impose conditions
on withdrawal in addition to the ones already found in international
law; any additional conditions imposed would therefore not be legally
binding, unless the NPT were amended, which is not a feasible or desirable
option. On the other hand, understandings of a different order might
be considered.
- It could, for example, be agreed by a consensus decision of the RevCon
that a State Party needs to be in compliance with its NPT obligations
prior to exercising its right to withdraw under Article X. In cases
of withdrawal, it could moreover be agreed that existing safeguards
obligations should continue on all material, equipment and technology
received while the country was a State Party and on resulting products.
To give fuller coverage, it could also be agreed that comprehensive
safeguards agreements would remain in force indefinitely, regardless
of the country’s Treaty status and that there would be no further nuclear-related
cooperation from any NPT State party; other options could include withdrawal
of IAEA technical assistance and rights, and recommendation from the
regime for action by the Security Council. In short, States Parties
should send a clear message that withdrawal would entail significant
political and economic cost. At the same time, the desirability of establishing
a mechanism through which States Parties would be able to meet in timely
fashion, inter alia to consider a notice of withdrawal has led several
countries, including Canada, to propose arrangements covering extraordinary
meetings of States Parties (see next section).
Overcoming the NPT’s Institutional Deficit
- The Strengthened Review Process, initiated at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, has permitted a more substantive preparatory process
for Review Conferences. But it remains only a preparatory process, with
its inherent limitations. The recent shocks to the system suggest that
it is time for States Parties to assume greater ownership and responsibility
for the working of their Treaty. In particular, experience with the
current PrepCom process (for example vis-a-vis India/Pakistan nuclear
testing and the DPRKs withdrawal) has shown its unsuitability as a forum
in which to consider such serious and urgent issues, as its circumscribed
mandate lends itself to putting off issues, even if highly topical,
to the next quinquennial Review Conference, with the result that such
issues are addressed neither effectively nor in a timely fashion.
- Canada will therefore recommend to the RevCon the establishment of
a revised and strengthened operation of the Treaty. This proposed re-arrangement
would bring the NPT into greater conformity with other multilateral
disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, most of which have provisions
for or the practice of annual substantive meetings and other inter-sessional
mechanisms. It can be accomplished within current parameters of time
and resources devoted to the NPT, and would still work to provide for
the preparation of the quinquennial Review Conference. As noted in Canada’s
Working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.1), the main elements are:
- An Annual Conference of States Parties of one week’s duration would
he held, to consider and where necessary take decisions on all matters
relating to the Treaty. Such a meeting would empower the members of
the regime, provide an annual forum in which to comment on its state
of health, promote implementation, discuss/promote compliance, raise
concerns and carry forward commitments. In the last year or two prior
to a RevCon, the annual meeting would be extended by a week, to undertake
preparatory work; overall, the meeting time would be the same as at
present (six weeks of meetings between each Review Conference), but
distributed in a different fashion.
- Recent experiences demonstrate that States Parties require a rapid
reaction capacity, the ability to come together in case of extraordinary
circumstances involving threats to the Treaty, its norms and its authority.
Extraordinary meetings would enable the Treaty membership to consult
in a timely fashion and take necessary action. This need not affect
either the IAEA's mandate or the role of the UNSC, but would complement
any action by these bodies, by focussing and reflecting the views
of the entire Treaty membership.
- A small standing Bureau would be elected at each RevCon with tenure
until the subsequent one. The Chair could be the President of the
incoming Review Conference, with members being the Chairs of the annual
meetings leading up to the subsequent Review Conference. Such a group
would provide improved continuity, reflect geographic representation
(through selection by each of the five regional groups of the UN)
and be empowered to convene extraordinary meetings when circumstances
warrant.
- The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs would support this reconfigured
process, as it does the existing preparatory process, within existing
resources.
Reporting
- Reflecting the “permanence with accountability” concept, Canada has
advocated acceptance by the regime of a system of annual reports to
the Treaty membership as a whole. Following up on its Working papers
at the PrepComs (eg NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III.WP.2) and widespread consultations,
Canada will propose at the Review Conference to make regular reporting
by all States Parties a permanent feature. This proposal is rooted in
the 12th of the 13 Steps, but goes beyond its focus on Article VI. Based
on the conviction that all States Parties are responsible for promoting
the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty, the Canadian proposal
would call for reports from all States Parties and encourage that these
cover all articles of the Treaty and related obligations. Combining
this with the previous proposal, it is suggested that the reports would
ideally be submitted prior to each of the annual meetings, contributing
a crucial factual basis for the discussion. On the other hand, the Canadian
proposal does not specify any pre-determined format or content for the
reports, which could be tailored to reflect inter alia the extent to
which individual States parties had substantive items to report.
Public Awareness/Civil Society
- The role of the NPT in eliminating nuclear weapons, addressing nuclear
non-proliferation and supporting the peaceful applications of nuclear
energy is little understood outside a small community of government
and NGO officials. Its overall objectives would be well served by building
broader awareness beyond the offices of government experts. The active
and engaged community of civil society and non-governmental organizations
can make a constructive contribution to the NPT and to States Parties’
deliberations on nuclear issues broadly. Their capacity to contribute
(and the willingness of States to consult with them) varies from country
to country, but can in various cases include supplementing States’ knowledge,
providing different perspectives and fresh concepts and working as informal
intermediaries to generate broad public support for NPT implementing
actions. Canada would propose that the Review Conference act to enhance
the participation of civil society in its endeavours, and will be proposing
outcome language to this end.
Source: Foreign Affairs Canada, http://www.international.gc.ca/arms/nptoverview-en.asp
Back to the Top of the Page
© 2005 The Acronym Institute.
|
