The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NPT Review Conference 2005

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Overview:
Canada's Approach to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

February 24, 2005

I. CONTEXT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. As of May 2003, an unprecedented 189 States have ratified or acceded to the Treaty. Its members view it as an essential framework in which to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to effect their elimination and to engage in cooperation in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The challenge ahead is to ensure, and reinforce where necessary, the NPT’s continuing authority and effectiveness, while maintaining the balance reflected in the “grand bargain” represented by the Treaty.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) provides the opportunity for States Parties to look back over the past five years since the last Review Conference, to assess changes both positive and negative, and to look forward, applying lessons learned and charting the course for the next five years. The goal should be to emerge from the RevCon reaffirming the Treaty’s continued strength, credibility and relevance; renewing commitment to ensuring its full implementation, taking into account both long-standing obligations and evolution in the security environment since the last Review Conference; reinforcing efforts towards its universality and providing a sounder institutional basis on which to achieve these objectives.

Important achievements

In the past five years, there have been positive achievements related to the NPT, although much of course remains to be achieved. States Parties have reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the vast majority of States Parties have fulfilled their commitments. With the welcome adherence of Timor Leste and Cuba, the Treaty, with 188 States Parties, has come that much closer to universality. The central role of the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system has been reaffirmed; 155 countries have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and 63 countries have now ratified the Additional Protocol. Libya has come clean about its past activities in violation of the NPT and is actively cooperating to regain its good standing under the Treaty. Continuing questions about the nuclear activities of Iraq have been laid to rest. Progress in reducing the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons has been made by a number of the NWS.

The CTBT is regrettably not yet in force, but with 175 States having signed and 120 ratified it enjoys nearly universal support. Its International Monitoring System is functioning, proof of an achievable and effective multilateral verification system. Efforts have been made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the G8 and other fora to address weaknesses concerning the supply of sensitive nuclear material, technology and equipment. Nuclear power continues to play an important role in electricity generation and in diverse fields ranging from medicine to agriculture. The report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel makes numerous useful recommendations in the NPT’s areas of responsibility.

Responding to grave concerns regarding the threat of terrorism and the threat to international peace and security that stem from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, UN Security Council resolution 1540 is a welcome development that reaffirms the international community’s support for multilateral treaties like the NPT and requires all States to take action to strengthen its implementation. The IAEA has made considerable effort to improve nuclear security, steps are being taken to improve the safety and security of radiological sources and efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are finally nearing fruition. The Proliferation Security Initiative, with a growing number of participants, is one promising new instrument in meeting our non-proliferation objectives.

Cooperative threat reduction has emerged as another key development in the post 9/11 environment. The Global Partnership was launched at the G8 Leaders’ Meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002. It has now been joined by other countries and is engaged in practical disarmament endeavours that address security threats facing our world today. The Global Partnership is promoting actual destruction of WMD and dangerous materials derived from their dismantlement, promoting nuclear-related environmental protection, enhancing non-proliferation of WMD-related technology and materials and keeping weapons and materials of mass destruction out of the hands of non-state actors (including terrorist groups). While not all of these efforts fall directly under the ambit of the NPT, they complement it and remain relevant to its goals of enhancing non-proliferation, disarmament and access to the benefits of peaceful use.

Stresses and challenges

The past five years have witnessed unprecedented challenges to the Treaty, and major stresses on its regime that have received intense public attention. Dr. El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has remarked, "The twin crises of compliance with NPT obligations - namely, the engagement of some NNWS in undeclared nuclear activities, coupled with the failure of the NWS to take concrete, verifiable and irreversible steps to eliminate their nuclear arsenals - have led to a crisis of confidence in the NPT regime."

A serious blow was the January 2003 notification by the DPRK of its withdrawal from the Treaty, the first country to do so in the NPT’s 35-year history. This grave development also demonstrated the weaknesses in the current system, which lacks provision for NPT States Parties to meet collectively in a timely fashion to discuss such an issue and send a clear message to the DPRK on behalf of the Treaty’s members. The 2005 Review Conference has no choice but to address these issues.

Several serious instances or apparent instances of non-compliance with non-proliferation and other obligations freely accepted under the Treaty and consequent arrangements with the IAEA have also come to light over the past five years. These have included, among others, circumstances where a program to develop nuclear weapons has been admitted voluntarily and terminated (the case of Libya); another where weapons development has been admitted but so far not renounced (the case of the DPRK); another where weapons development has been denied but where non-conformity with IAEA safeguards was determined and where a process has been set in motion to stop and reverse proliferation-sensitive activities (the case of Iran), to others where non-compliant activities appear to be unintended, inconsequential and/or long-terminated.

These examples vary in terms of real or potential impact but must all be considered seriously: a pattern of laxity on non-proliferation or other Treaty obligations cannot be allowed to develop. They demonstrate the need for widespread application of a stronger verification mechanism than was in place in those countries. Non-compliance by Iran and Libya have renewed concerns about states seeking to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle without any justifiable reason – a form of “latent deterrence” according to Dr. ElBaradei. This has resulted in a new focus on the search for forms of cooperation that could mitigate proliferation concerns while providing states with assurances of fuel supply, and addressing the need to strengthen controls over the transfers of proliferation sensitive technology.

It meanwhile continues to be unacceptable that 36 States Parties have yet to comply with the explicit requirement of Article III to conclude and bring into force safeguards agreements with the IAEA, in some cases decades after they joined the NPT, despite many calls and the willingness of the IAEA to assist. The Additional Protocol is not yet universal; a number of countries, some with important nuclear activities, have not ratified, despite its demonstrated value in reinforcing states’ non-proliferation commitments and in addressing issues of non-compliance.

A key negative development on the non-proliferation front, which received wide attention, was the revelation of an extensive clandestine black market in nuclear material, technology and equipment associated with Dr. AQ Khan of Pakistan. It revealed the need for constant vigilance and efforts to ensure that nuclear-related trade does not contribute to proliferation. While recognising the important contribution of legitimate nuclear trade, States Parties have undertaken concerted efforts to respond to both State and non-State actors’ attempts to breach international non-proliferation norms through the transfer of weapons technology and know-how.

Similar problems of non-compliance are also evident in the disarmament realm, where key undertakings (the 13 Steps) agreed to by all States Parties at the 2000 Review Conference remain unfulfilled, and some have receded further from realization. Eleven ratifications from among those 44 States whose ratifications are necessary for entry into force remain outstanding nine years after the CTBT's adoption. Negotiation of an FMCT has not yet begun in the CD, nor a body on nuclear disarmament established, since there has been no agreement on a Program of Work for the Conference. With the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, START II failed to enter into force and the START III process was abandoned, replaced by the Moscow Treaty which, while reducing the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons, does not contain provisions for irreversibility, transparency or verifiability. Others of the 13 Steps have been implemented only partially, if at all, and some nuclear-weapon States (NWS) challenge their continued validity.

Not all of the NWS have made the progress that many would like to see in terms of numbers, rate or conditions of nuclear weapons reduction. There is also concern about possible vertical proliferation (in terms of the development or consideration by certain NWS of new or modernised nuclear weapons) and about the adoption or consideration by some such States of security doctrines that ascribe an increased role to nuclear weapons. More fundamentally, there is increasing questioning of the fact that, within the NPT’s “grand bargain”, the implementation of non-proliferation commitments is the subject of an extensive and strict multilateral verification regime (centred on the IAEA and its safeguards system) while disarmament commitments have not so far been subject to such multilateral surveillance.

In the years just before the 2000 Review Conference, the international norm established by the Treaty was also defied by developments outside its membership. In particular, the continued open possession and development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, combined with Israel’s ongoing policy of nuclear ambiguity, and the consequent refusal of these three States to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States has served to prevent the universalisation of the Treaty on terms that would further enhance international peace and security.

While such developments do not vitiate the fundamental value, credibility or viability of the NPT, their cumulative effect is to challenge States Parties to ensure that implementation of the Treaty is complete, and that it evolves to ensure the fulfilment of long-standing obligations, while taking into account new challenges arising from technological, military and geo-political change. In this respect, it is important not just to handle current crises well, but also to take the experience from this process and apply it to strengthening the Treaty regime.

II. REACHING COMMON OBJECTIVES

The outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference will be important to the future directions of the Treaty. This first Review Conference of the 21st century, ten years after the NPT’s indefinite extension, represents a vital opportunity to underline the continued relevance of the Treaty, to uphold the 1995 bargain of “permanence with accountability”, to build on the success of the 2000 Review Conference, to respond effectively to the serious challenges that have arisen and to chart the Treaty’s future course.

Reinforcing the authority and integrity of the NPT and ensuring implementation of its obligations, while promoting its universalisation, continues to be the focus of Canada’s efforts in seeking a nuclear-weapon-free world. The tripartite bargain at the origin of the NPT requires both reaffirmation and tangible supporting action. In addition, the Treaty’s stature needs to be augmented through a major overhaul and upgrade of its institutional arrangements. Much is at stake, and States Parties will need to demonstrate political will, determination and flexibility if they are to arrive at a positive outcome incorporating concrete commitments to guide the next five years.

Framework Questions

A Review Conference by definition is charged with looking back over the past five years to review implementation of past commitments as reflected in the Treaty itself and in decisions taken by past Review Conferences. Canada regards these commitments and decisions as remaining in effect unless and until overtaken by events outside the control of States Parties or overridden by the decisions of future Review Conferences.

That being said, Canada believes that the focus of the Conference should look forward, not back. States Parties should seek agreement on the way ahead and not allow the Conference to get bogged down in analysing the past. Canada seeks a future-oriented, comprehensive outcome document from the RevCon, containing concrete objectives for the 2005-2010 period. This may take the form of a single declaration or a series of stand-alone decisions.

Negotiating a substantive outcome

The essential inter-relationship among the NPT’s three main pillars (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful uses) must be recognized in a balanced outcome document or documents. Canada regards them all as important, inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Substantively, all three require attention; tactically, the current political environment makes progress unlikely based on any one-sided approach. To achieve “balance” will require more than mere mention of each of the three pillars, but also equivalency in the nature of the commitments made in each case. There also should be due recognition of the “permanence with accountability” concept that underpinned the indefinite extension of 1995, and which requires States Parties to better document their implementation of the Treaty. Largely speaking, two broad concepts can be applied to organising the RevCon outcome decisions in practical terms; a third concept is not, however, workable. Specifically:

one possible outcome is a purely declaratory or rhetorical document that reconfirms basic principles, reflects all three pillars in a general fashion and promises further efforts in future in certain aspects of the regime’s mandate, but not in ways that could be considered concrete or measurable. Such a minimalist outcome would at least provide a minimal reinforcement of the Treaty’s work but would not actually advance its objectives in any practical way. Canada does not favour such an approach.
another possible outcome, which Canada does support, would be to seek concrete and measurable new commitments (or specific and practical derivatives of existing commitments) equally on all three pillars. This would be much harder to negotiate but also much more worth the trouble, as it would mean making the hard choices for real action on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use.
The concept that is not realistic is the one that attempts to mix declaratory measures on some pillars with concrete commitments on others. Different States Parties have different objectives linked to their conceptions of national security, and it will be necessary to satisfy all sides to reach a compromise. An outcome that attempted, for example, to trade rhetoric on non-proliferation for new concrete commitments on disarmament and peaceful use would not be accepted by some states; equally, an outcome that attempted to combine concrete new commitments on non-proliferation with rhetoric on disarmament would be unacceptable to others.

Negotiating a balanced concrete outcome will require a strong commitment from all parties and a willingness to begin an intensive exchange of views well before the Conference begins. This overview paper constitutes a Canadian contribution to such an exchange and supplements the Canadian Working papers tabled at all three Preparatory Committee meetings (e.g. on institutional issues). Canada also plans to table further documents on various issues at the RevCon itself, including proposed language and decision elements for the outcome document. Canada encourages the early distribution of position papers and related documents by other States and looks forward to exchanging views in the lead-up to the RevCon, to explore the possibilities of concerted action on a meaningful outcome.

Conference organisation

It will also be important to maintain flexibility with regard to the organisation of the Conference itself, in order to maximise the opportunities for genuine exchange of views. In this regard, in addition to subsidiary bodies for nuclear disarmament and regional issues established at previous Review Conferences, Canada would be open to others, keeping in mind the practice of no more than two simultaneous meetings.

III. SPECIFIC CANADIAN GOALS

In order for the NPT to make its intended contribution to international security, it must continue to be viewed as the authoritative multilateral legal instrument relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is a core objective; if the Treaty is not strong as a whole, it becomes more difficult to ensure implementation of its specific provisions. For this reason, Canada is advocating a comprehensive approach to address these issues, to respond to the strains and challenges the Treaty has recently faced and to ensure it remains an effective and well-functioning instrument. Canada is optimistic that this can be accomplished through renewed political commitment, a new approach to its operation and greater attention to its implementation.

More specifically, Canada’s substantive goals for the RevCon include the following: (a) agreement on new concrete and where possible verifiable commitments under each of the three pillars (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) and clarifying their inter-relationships; (b) consideration of how best to deal with concerns involving specific regions and states (including states outside the regime); and (c) strengthening the authority and credibility of the regime, via action relating to overcoming the Treaty’s institutional deficit, such as rearranged meetings, bars to withdrawal, systematic reporting and enhanced civil society participation. These goals are discussed in more detail below.

(a) The Three Pillars

Nuclear disarmament

Reaffirmation of the Treaty’s goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons and a renewed commitment to achieving this goal should be key conclusions of the Review Conference.

Building on the progress made to date by some NWS and the continuing validity of the 13 Steps as benchmarks for assessing progress towards this goal, the Conference should identify concrete new initiatives (or reconfirm existing ones) that can advance nuclear disarmament in practical and measurable ways, with an emphasis on multilateral activity. Among the proposals that Canada would advocate in this regard are the following:

Step 1: renew support for the CTBT and the ongoing development of the International Monitoring System and consider what other recommendations the RevCon can make, in particular to CTBT ratifying States in support of Article XIV.2 Conferences on entry into force, as well as on the efforts of the Special Representative.
Step 2: reaffirm unilateral commitments to a nuclear testing moratorium and their formalization in a politically-binding instrument.
Step 3: commit to an early resumption on work on specified initiatives in the CD (more than just “work toward early agreement on a workplan”), including establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament and negotiation of a verifiable FMCT.
Step 4: reaffirm unilateral commitments of production moratoria by all producing States, pending negotiation of an FMCT.
Step 5: reaffirm the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, and a commitment to their practical application in all nuclear weapons reductions.
Step 6: reaffirmation by each NWS of its unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, providing specific plans and schedules to fulfil this obligation.
Step 7: encourage the US and Russia to apply the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability to the Moscow Treaty, by destroying warheads removed from operational deployment status and providing greater detail on the reductions achieved to date and timetables for achieving the remaining reductions, and how these actions are verified. Encourage a process to formulate plans for reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as was foreseen in the START III framework.
Steps 8+10: reassert the need for implementation of the Trilateral Initiative or its equivalent; welcome specific progress made in placing fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or equivalent international verification and control and reaffirm the need for such action in light of concerns regarding terrorist acquisition of such material.
Step 9: welcome progress achieved since the last Review Conference on steps leading to nuclear disarmament; consistent with efforts that promote international stability and security for all, call on the NWS to undertake and transparently document further efforts in this regard; specify further transparency and reduction measures on non-strategic nuclear weapons; unilateral or agreed measures for operational limitations on all or certain types of nuclear weapons (e.g. deployment and alert status) and call for decreased reliance on the role of nuclear weapons in security policies (note in the latter context Canadian policy that “the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons”);
Step 11: confirm commitment to the objective of general and complete disarmament.
Step 12: see section III (c) below on Canadian proposals for reporting.
Step 13: welcome progress and support further work on development of multilateral verification capabilities, covering both non-proliferation and disarmament activities and flagging the potential contribution of the UN group of experts on verification, to be convened in 2006.

Further action is required pursuant to engagements undertaken in 2000 and to advance and support new activities that have emerged. Among the proposals that Canada would advance or support in this regard are the following:

agree to begin discussions on codifying Negative Security Assurances on a legally-binding basis in either the NPT or the CD context;
concretely support reinforcement of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and their expansion to other regions (such as the Middle East and South Asia);
inaugurate a multilateral dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons in the period leading up to their elimination under the NPT, with the goal of broad agreement on the issue among NWS and NNWS States Parties;
renew focus in the NPT and elsewhere on the issue of delivery systems for nuclear weapons (as raised in the preamble to the NPT), and enhanced support (including participation) in that regard for the Hague Code of Conduct and other missile-related measures;
underline the importance of cooperative threat reduction activities, including the Global Partnership, in securing and then eliminating the weapons legacy and encourage broader participation;
for broader geographic application, establish a special voluntary fund for the destruction of nuclear weapons and derived materials under multilateral supervision.

Nuclear non-proliferation

Nuclear non-proliferation, or rather concern about nuclear proliferation both horizontal and vertical, has been the focus of much concern during this review cycle and needs to be addressed by the RevCon. Potentially, there is much that States Parties can do on non-proliferation to both reinforce existing commitments and address new concerns. Specifically:

call upon all States Parties that have not yet done so to comply with their Article III obligations by bringing into force a safeguards agreement with the IAEA forthwith;
recognize that a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC 153) together with an Additional Protocol constitutes the NPT safeguards standard pursuant to Article III of the Treaty;
call upon States Parties to endorse the requirement for a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to all non-nuclear-weapon States;
strengthen the IAEA by enhancing political backing to make fuller use of the verification instruments at its disposal;
support the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors on safeguards;
support Resolution 1540 and its implementation as an important instrument to assure effective measures by all States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and call on all to submit their report;
recognize the need for robust national systems of export licensing and controls;
recognize the crucial role of multilateral export control regimes in creating an international environment conducive to encouraging legitimate nuclear trade among States;
accept the importance of voluntary restraint on the spread of those particularly sensitive nuclear technologies that can directly produce weapons-grade nuclear material and acknowledge the need for stronger controls on transfers of such technologies, especially those related to enrichment and reprocessing;
recognise the contribution that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) can make to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related materials (acting within the scope of national authority and international law), as well as non-proliferation enforcement measures, such as those proposed for a Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The Review Conference needs to restate the important contribution that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology can make to economic and social development, improve and save lives, and advance science and technology, while not contributing to nuclear proliferation, reflecting the inter-related nature of the Treaty’s provisions. States Parties should furthermore indicate they remain committed to supporting peaceful uses of nuclear energy through nuclear cooperation and the sharing of nuclear technology and expertise both bilaterally and multilaterally. The need for activities to be conducted in a safe and secure manner has been reinforced. Specifically:

reaffirm the importance and validity of peaceful nuclear applications and the contribution this can make to overcoming the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries (e.g. in energy, medical and agricultural applications, etc.);
support the development of new international multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives which effectively address both non-proliferation and peaceful uses concerns, noting in particular the work of the IAEA experts group in this regard;
support early conclusion of revisions of CPPNM (if not already agreed) with the goals of enhancing the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials;
stress the importance of nuclear safety and welcome the activities of the IAEA, the Global Partnership and other initiatives in this regard;
reflecting inter alia heightened threat perceptions in the post-9/11 security environment, support IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan and other measures to enhance the safety and security of radiological sources (traditionally outside the NPT mandate but isotopes and other sources are closely linked to its peaceful use objectives).

Linkages between non-proliferation and peaceful use

The RevCon should also clarify the relationship between various obligations under the Treaty. In referring to the “fullest possible” exchange of nuclear expertise, the NPT implicitly recognizes that there may be limitations to such cooperation. The RevCon should clearly establish that States Parties’ rights to access to nuclear technology and expertise cannot, therefore, be considered automatic in the face of unresolved concerns about peaceful intentions or the impact on regional and international security and stability. While all three of the Treaty’s pillars are linked in terms of the original “grand bargain” reinforced in 1995, and while disarmament and non-proliferation are often seen as especially closely linked in terms of reciprocal promises by the NWS and NNWS, it is equally true that non-proliferation and peaceful use are also intertwined, given the overlapping nature of much of the technology used for peaceful purposes and that necessary for development of weapons. Given increased concern during this review period regarding the implications of this overlap, the RevCon will certainly need to carry out a detailed consideration of the issues involved. The possible outcomes range from clarifications of principle to some practical measures, including:

recognition that rights of peaceful use under Article IV are not absolute but rather conditioned by the obligations in Articles II and III (i.e. rights balanced by obligations for both supplier and recipient states);
acknowledge the logical linkage between proposals for restriction on transfers of sensitive nuclear technology and the creation of new multilateral or multinational nuclear fuel cycle arrangements which obviate the need for a State to acquire the full fuel cycle where such an acquisition is not justified;
ensuring that proliferation-resistance is a major criteria in the design and construction of all new nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

(b) Regional dimensions and universalisation

The RevCon will have to discuss and comment on developments affecting specific countries and regions, including both those inside the regime and those remaining outside. While attention will need to note developments (or lack of them) over the past five years, the focus should be primarily on forward-looking elements. In each case, the RevCon will need to assess progress that may have been made and determine useful future steps. Canada would support the establishment of a subsidiary body as the best means to address the regional issues

As in previous Review Conferences, the Middle East and related areas remain significant, as reflected in the 1995 Middle East resolution, on which we encourage all States Parties to report. Israel will continue to be a focus of many other regional states in particular, and others will place an equal or greater focus on developments in Iran (details depending on the status of the IAEA’s examinations of the case at the time of the RevCon). Canada will continue to urge all sides to make the maximum efforts to join the regime (Israel), to re-establish a relationship of confidence in association with the IAEA (Iran) and to bring themselves under comprehensive safeguards (a significant number of regional states). Developments on Libya and Iraq, while ending comparatively positively from an NPT perspective, will have to be considered as well, particularly in terms of lessons learned and examples offered to other States Parties.

The Review Conference must address the issue of DPRK withdrawal squarely. In Canada’s view, Pyongyang’s status is clear if unfortunate: it has left the NPT. The goal of the NPT regime should be twofold: to convince the DPRK to destroy any nuclear explosive devices and related materials and equipment it may possess, and to bring it back into the international community as a member of the NPT fully covered by IAEA safeguards. This message, and particularly the importance to the regime of the second aspect, should be conveyed by the RevCon to all members of the six-party talks. Beyond that point, action by the RevCon will need to reflect the exact negotiating in the six-party talks at the time the RevCon ends. See also section III (c) below concerning implications of the DPRK case on the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty.

As in the past, South Asia will again require particular attention, given its two nuclear capable States outside the NPT. Continuation of nuclear weapons and associated missile development programs in India and Pakistan and concerns about their impact on regional stability are reinforced by a worrying tendency on the part of some States to ignore the decisions reflected in UN Security Council resolution 1172, to adopt an increasingly “business as usual” attitude in relations with these States and in some cases treat them as de facto NWS. The RevCon will need to express a clear statement of principle on the importance of the Treaty’s universalization (which would have to cover Israel and the DPRK in some fashion as well), to affirm States Parties’ commitment to work strenuously to achieve this goal and to confirm the fact that the Treaty is not open to new nuclear weapon states.

That being said, it may also be time to consider adopting a more flexible attitude on the issue of India and Pakistan – not to alter in the least the principled goal of achieving their entry into the NPT as NNWS, but to recognise that such a goal may well be reached in steps. Very much in the spirit of the “benchmarks” set out in UNSCR 1172, these steps could relate to further acceptance by these States of multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament norms that inform the Treaty (perhaps in the form of unilateral declarations), as expressed particularly in practical commitments to non-proliferation; in the benefits of accepting and fully implementing the CTBT and other nuclear-related treaties; in reaffirming a positive approach to negotiation of an FMCT and (on another flank) by separating civilian and military programs, fuel cycles and activities, and placing all their civilian nuclear under IAEA safeguards.

(c) Strengthening the Treaty

A key Canadian objective for the Review Conference, in addition to real progress in each of the three pillars, is to enhance the NPT’s overall credibility and effectiveness, so that the Treaty’s benefits are maintained and its obligations implemented. This also reflects the “permanence with accountability” concept that underlay the Treaty’s indefinite extension, and which is a complementary bargain to the “grand bargain” of the Treaty’s inception.

Withdrawal

The DPRK’s withdrawal has brought to light the ease with which a State Party, having benefited from its membership in the Treaty and acquisition of nuclear material, technology and equipment, can leave it with little or no consequence. It is certainly to be hoped that this will not recur, but the possibility needs to be addressed squarely by the RevCon, both to discourage any who may be considering such a move and to develop understandings on how to deal with such a situation if it arose again. There seems little realistic prospect of making it impossible for a State to withdraw from the Treaty, at least as it is currently drafted. A State, however, should not be allowed to withdraw in a way that enables it to retain the fruits of its adhesion to the Treaty while abandoning its obligations. It must be noted that the NPT does not impose conditions on withdrawal in addition to the ones already found in international law; any additional conditions imposed would therefore not be legally binding, unless the NPT were amended, which is not a feasible or desirable option. On the other hand, understandings of a different order might be considered.

It could, for example, be agreed by a consensus decision of the RevCon that a State Party needs to be in compliance with its NPT obligations prior to exercising its right to withdraw under Article X. In cases of withdrawal, it could moreover be agreed that existing safeguards obligations should continue on all material, equipment and technology received while the country was a State Party and on resulting products. To give fuller coverage, it could also be agreed that comprehensive safeguards agreements would remain in force indefinitely, regardless of the country’s Treaty status and that there would be no further nuclear-related cooperation from any NPT State party; other options could include withdrawal of IAEA technical assistance and rights, and recommendation from the regime for action by the Security Council. In short, States Parties should send a clear message that withdrawal would entail significant political and economic cost. At the same time, the desirability of establishing a mechanism through which States Parties would be able to meet in timely fashion, inter alia to consider a notice of withdrawal has led several countries, including Canada, to propose arrangements covering extraordinary meetings of States Parties (see next section).

Overcoming the NPT’s Institutional Deficit

The Strengthened Review Process, initiated at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, has permitted a more substantive preparatory process for Review Conferences. But it remains only a preparatory process, with its inherent limitations. The recent shocks to the system suggest that it is time for States Parties to assume greater ownership and responsibility for the working of their Treaty. In particular, experience with the current PrepCom process (for example vis-a-vis India/Pakistan nuclear testing and the DPRKs withdrawal) has shown its unsuitability as a forum in which to consider such serious and urgent issues, as its circumscribed mandate lends itself to putting off issues, even if highly topical, to the next quinquennial Review Conference, with the result that such issues are addressed neither effectively nor in a timely fashion.

Canada will therefore recommend to the RevCon the establishment of a revised and strengthened operation of the Treaty. This proposed re-arrangement would bring the NPT into greater conformity with other multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, most of which have provisions for or the practice of annual substantive meetings and other inter-sessional mechanisms. It can be accomplished within current parameters of time and resources devoted to the NPT, and would still work to provide for the preparation of the quinquennial Review Conference. As noted in Canada’s Working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.1), the main elements are:

An Annual Conference of States Parties of one week’s duration would he held, to consider and where necessary take decisions on all matters relating to the Treaty. Such a meeting would empower the members of the regime, provide an annual forum in which to comment on its state of health, promote implementation, discuss/promote compliance, raise concerns and carry forward commitments. In the last year or two prior to a RevCon, the annual meeting would be extended by a week, to undertake preparatory work; overall, the meeting time would be the same as at present (six weeks of meetings between each Review Conference), but distributed in a different fashion.
Recent experiences demonstrate that States Parties require a rapid reaction capacity, the ability to come together in case of extraordinary circumstances involving threats to the Treaty, its norms and its authority. Extraordinary meetings would enable the Treaty membership to consult in a timely fashion and take necessary action. This need not affect either the IAEA's mandate or the role of the UNSC, but would complement any action by these bodies, by focussing and reflecting the views of the entire Treaty membership.
A small standing Bureau would be elected at each RevCon with tenure until the subsequent one. The Chair could be the President of the incoming Review Conference, with members being the Chairs of the annual meetings leading up to the subsequent Review Conference. Such a group would provide improved continuity, reflect geographic representation (through selection by each of the five regional groups of the UN) and be empowered to convene extraordinary meetings when circumstances warrant.
The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs would support this reconfigured process, as it does the existing preparatory process, within existing resources.

Reporting

Reflecting the “permanence with accountability” concept, Canada has advocated acceptance by the regime of a system of annual reports to the Treaty membership as a whole. Following up on its Working papers at the PrepComs (eg NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III.WP.2) and widespread consultations, Canada will propose at the Review Conference to make regular reporting by all States Parties a permanent feature. This proposal is rooted in the 12th of the 13 Steps, but goes beyond its focus on Article VI. Based on the conviction that all States Parties are responsible for promoting the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty, the Canadian proposal would call for reports from all States Parties and encourage that these cover all articles of the Treaty and related obligations. Combining this with the previous proposal, it is suggested that the reports would ideally be submitted prior to each of the annual meetings, contributing a crucial factual basis for the discussion. On the other hand, the Canadian proposal does not specify any pre-determined format or content for the reports, which could be tailored to reflect inter alia the extent to which individual States parties had substantive items to report.

Public Awareness/Civil Society

The role of the NPT in eliminating nuclear weapons, addressing nuclear non-proliferation and supporting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy is little understood outside a small community of government and NGO officials. Its overall objectives would be well served by building broader awareness beyond the offices of government experts. The active and engaged community of civil society and non-governmental organizations can make a constructive contribution to the NPT and to States Parties’ deliberations on nuclear issues broadly. Their capacity to contribute (and the willingness of States to consult with them) varies from country to country, but can in various cases include supplementing States’ knowledge, providing different perspectives and fresh concepts and working as informal intermediaries to generate broad public support for NPT implementing actions. Canada would propose that the Review Conference act to enhance the participation of civil society in its endeavours, and will be proposing outcome language to this end.

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