The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage
"The miserable failure of the NPT to contain the nuclear
spectre"?
NPT Review Conference Day 3 (May 4)
Rebecca Johnson
Back to the main page on the NPT
Still no agenda for the NPT Review Conference, despite the best
efforts of the President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who had hoped
to get the agenda agreed by today. The problem still appears to be
the 'chapeau' of paragraph 16 of the agenda, which is viewed as
providing an overarching context for allocating issues to be
discussed in the three main committees. In a nutshell, the United
States opened the can of worms at the 2004 PrepCom by trying to
have reference to the 2000 consensus final document downgraded. By
the time a formula was found that the United States and advocates
of compliance with the 2000 agreements could both accept, Iran
objected to an additional phrase promoted by the US and European
Union referring to subsequent developments. Iran feared that making
this part of an overarching chapeau would legitimise the emphasis
some countries are putting on Iran's nuclear programme,
particularly its years of failure to declare to the IAEA that it
was building uranium enrichment facilities.
Although not necessary for adopting the agenda, it is also
understood that no agreement has been reached on establishing
subsidiary bodies to address specific issues, such as (to name a
few that have been floated as possibilities) practical nuclear
disarmament steps, negative security assurances, nuclear safety and
security, or the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
The Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with Yoko Ono,
Hibakusha representatives and activists from several countries
presented the Conference President in the General Assembly with
petitions signed by millions, calling for "Vision 2020" -
negotiations on the complete abolition of nuclear weapons to be
concluded and in the process of full implementation by 2020.
General Debate
During the first three days, the NPT Conference has now heard
some 58 of the expected 90-plus national and regional/group general
statements. Many major players have spoken, including the United
States, Russia, China, Japan, the New Agenda Coalition
(collectively and singly), the European Union, the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), the CARICOM states, South Pacific Forum, Iran and a
number of other states from the Middle East. Though Germany and
several European countries have given national statements in
addition to being associated with the EU, France and Britain have
not yet spoken - reportedly waiting until Britain's polling
stations close on Thursday.
While many issues are being checklisted, a few are coming to the
fore as of particular importance to a large number of states,
though it is not yet clear whether the level of concern will
translate into agreement or conflict. Most worryingly, unlike in
1995 and 2000, the third day has come and gone without any
electrifying statement or innovative approaches, such as those put
forward in 1995 by South Africa and in 2000 by the New Agenda
Coalition. These had pointed ways forward and contained the basic
ideas, tools, substance and even strategies to help the President
steer each of those previous review conferences to substantial
successes.
Because the United Nations for the first time in NPT history is
providing a timely and easily accessed posting of all statements
(and, indeed, webcasts) on its website at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements.html
it is not necessary for me to give a comprehensive summary. But
over the next few days I will provide an analytical and
impressionistic snapshot of what I see as some of the principal
issues as the General Debate progresses.
CTBT
In the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), almost
every statement has highlighted the necessity for early entry into
force of this multilaterally negotiated treaty, viewed as a prime
objective of the NPT since the treaty first took legal effect in
1970. From Japan and the New Agenda to the NAM, the CTBT has been
extremely strongly endorsed, noting that it was promised in the
NPT's preamble and then underlined as of the highest priority in
1995, when the treaty was indefinitely extended, and again as the
first item in the "13 practical steps" for nuclear disarmament
agreed in 2000. Despite reported attempts by at least one EU member
to water down any reference to the CTBT or replace it with a call
to reaffirm the moratoria on nuclear testing, on the grounds that
this would be more conducive to US acceptance, even the EU gave a
very strong affirmation of the "utmost importance" it attaches to
the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date.
Pending CTBT entry into force, "the EU urges all states to abide by
a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to
the obligations and provisions of the CTBT".
China, which (like the US) has so far failed to ratify the CTBT,
lamented that the entry into force of the CTBT had been diluted and
declared, "China supports an early-entry-into-force of the CTBT and
is now working actively on its internal legal proceedings for
ratifying the treaty." This might be more believable if China had
not used a similar excuse five years ago, telling the 2000 Review
Conference that it was awaiting the decision of the People's
National Congress. Russia ratified just before the 2000 Conference
and Britain and France ratified together in April 1998. The CTBT
currently has 175 signatories, of which 120 have ratified,
including 33 of the 44 states listed as necessary for entry into
force. While it is clear that everyone except the United States
wants the NPT RevCon to give a strong endorsement to CTBT entry
into force, some may be hoping to find compromise language that
Washington can accept. Sweden took the view, as expressed on Day 2
by Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, that at
the very least, "The fact that an overwhelming majority of states
parties support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive
Test-ban Treaty should be duly reflected in the final
document".
Fissile materials ban
A large number of states are also mentioning the necessity to
negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material
(highly-enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons purposes. The
chief controversy over this is about the failure of the Conference
on Disarmament to get negotiations underway and whether (if they
ever take place) they should be on the basis of the 'Shannon
mandate' agreed by the CD in 1995 (see http://www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/shannon.htm
for details), which called for negotiations on "a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty" or on a different basis, in view of
the US determination to push for a treaty without verification.
This unilateral decision, which followed a yearlong interagency
review in the United States, was announced at the CD by Ambassador
Jackie Sanders in July 2004, to the shock of many CD delegations
and the gratitude (whether expressed or not) of at least India,
Israel and Pakistan, who all had misgivings about the proposed
Fissban (or cut-off treaty), since they were its primary targets.
Four of the declared nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, Russia
and the United States) already abide by their unilateral moratoria
on production and France is in the process of dismantling its
military fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte and
Marcoule.
Most NAM statements continue to call for a "a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty", while many west-leaning statements
are more likely to fudge the question of verification, calling in
shorthand just for an (undifferentiated) treaty or FMCT. The EU,
for example (from which many others appear to have taken their cue)
calls for negotiations on "a non-discriminatory and universal
treaty". Nevertheless, verification or no-verification, the urgency
of halting fissile material production has appeared in almost all
the statements.
North Korea
As noted in Day 1's update, almost all
the statements have raised concerns about North Korea, which
announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (after previously
announcing an intention to withdraw in 1993, which was subsequently
halted by the Framework Agreement with the United States). NPT
states and international lawyers are in disagreement about whether
North Korea has legally accomplished its withdrawal and is no
longer a party to the NPT, or whether it is still bound by its
treaty obligations and needs to be brought back into compliance.
After intensive consultations, Ambassador Duarte received agreement
to follow the procedure first used by the Chair of the 2003
PrepCom, Ambassador Laszlo Mólnár, in which the DPRK
nameplate was held by the Secretariat in the Conference room
"without prejudice to ongoing negotiations". This was done early on
Day 1. While not opening a debate among states parties into the
specific status of the DPRK, he did acknowledge that many states
wanted to have a general discussion at the RevCon about the
withdrawal provision (Article X) and indicated that space
would be found for this to take place.
Judging from the serious concerns raised by many states during
the first three days, this was a necessary decision. Amid newspaper
articles (reportedly informed from US intelligence sources)
suggesting that North Korea may be preparing a nuclear test to
prove its much-bragged-about nuclear weapons capability, very many
statements have called for resumption of the six party talks, with
the clear objective being North Korea's renunciation and
dismantling of any nuclear weapon programme, under full IAEA
safeguards. Stephen Rademaker, US assistant secretary of state
said, "we are attempting to bring together the regional players in
the Six Party Talks to convince Pyongyang that its only viable
option is to negotiate an end to its nuclear ambitions. We have
tabled a proposal that addresses the North's stated concerns and
also provides for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
elimination of North Korean nuclear programmes."
Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, devoted several
paragraphs to what it called "a direct threat to the peace and
stability of Northeast Asia", calling on the NPT RevCon to deliver
a clear message to the DPRK that it must return to the Six Party
Talks without preconditions, "completely dismantle all of its
nuclear programmes, including its enrichment programmes, subject to
credible international verification". South Korea's Deputy
Minister, Chun Yung-woo, castigated the NPT's "inherent
limitations" and bluntly argued that "the Korean peninsula suffers
from diminished security because of the miserable failure of the
NPT to contain the nuclear spectre".
In a very hard-hitting statement that condemned North Korea's
"complete disregard for and defiance of all nuclear
non-proliferation norms" and called for Pyongyang to take "the
strategic decision to abandon and dismantle once and for all its
entire nuclear weapons programmes", South Korea welcomed the
exposure of the A.Q. Khan network and the adoption of UNSC
resolution 1540 but warned that of themselves, these will not put
an end to trafficking: "One should never underestimate the
resourcefulness of black market peddlers and determined
proliferators to outsmart and outmanoeuvre governments." South
Korea favoured a much tougher approach to the fuel cycle,
safeguards and export controls and said it was open to various
options to make withdrawal from the treaty more difficult,
including requiring Security Council approval. Recognising the
importance also of addressing security concerns, South Korea argued
for the crisis to be resolved peacefully and for the incentive of
better security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states that are
in compliance with their NPT obligations.
Enhancing the NPT's decision-making powers
Most notably, given its position on the proliferation front
line, South Korea joined Ireland, Canada, Sweden and a growing
number who advocate giving the NPT more powers for enforcement,
including annual meetings and 'emergency' powers.
Building on the Irish initiative from 2000 and its own paper on
addressing the NPT's "institutional deficit" that was circulated at
the 2004 PrepCom, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright
gave the following argument, which due to its complexity and
importance is quoted in detail: "More sustained attention is
required, as well as greater opportunity for States Parties to
discuss and promote implementation, to express their views on
critical issues affecting the Treaty's health and authority and to
take decisions on pressing matters. It is no longer adequate to do
this only once every five years. The existing preparatory process,
with its inherent limitations, fails to provide for an annual forum
worthy of this Treaty and our collective interests in it. Hence,
our proposal to have the NPT membership adopt a new arrangement for
its meetings within the existing time envelope we currently devote
to the Treaty's gatherings. We propose an annual one week Meeting
of States Parties, to provide us with a regular policy forum, a
feature now standard in the operation of most other treaties in the
disarmament field. Our proposal would retain the necessary time for
preparing the Review Conferences. Recent experiences have
demonstrated that States Parties also require a rapid reaction
capacity, the ability to come together and take necessary action in
cases of extraordinary circumstances involving threats to the
Treaty, its norms and its authority, such as an announcement of
withdrawal. The outside world expects no less of us. The ability to
call such meetings would be vested in a standing bureau. This rapid
reaction capability would not detract from the mandate of the IAEA
nor the role of the UN Security Council, but rather be
complementary to any action by these bodies, conveying the
strongest possible messages on behalf of the Treaty's members."
Iran
Unlike North Korea, Iran is in the room. Toning down some of the
US rhetoric in evidence at the 2003 and 2004 PrepComs, as well as
from various Washington podia, Stephen Rademaker said, "Britain,
France, and Germany, with our support, are seeking to reach a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, a solution that
given the history of clandestine nuclear weapons work in that
country, must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and
reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and
facilities related to such activity. Iran must provide such
objective and verifiable guarantees in order to demonstrate that it
is not using a purportedly peaceful nuclear program to hide a
nuclear weapons program or to conduct additional clandestine
nuclear work elsewhere in the country." Varying in degree rather
than kind, while trying to avoid explicitly accusing or jumping to
conclusions, a significant number of other states called on Iran to
suspend its uranium enrichment and fully and transparently
cooperate with the IAEA to reassure the world that its programmes
were indeed peaceful. On behalf of the EU, Nicolas Schmit,
Luxembourg's Minister delegate for Foreign Affairs said it was
important "for Iran to re-establish trust", making clear that the
EU was "united in its determination not to allow Iran to obtain
military nuclear capabilities, and to see the proliferation
implications of its nuclear programme resolved." Iran was enjoined
to strictly respect the Paris
Agreement provisions (November 15, 2004) and the relevant
resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, especially regarding
the suspension of its enrichment related and reprocessing
activities.
Iran responded with a combative speech from Dr Kamal Kharrazi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he declared that Iran "is
determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology,
including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes..." Stating
that "arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding
proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and
countries can and will only undermine the Treaty", Kharrazi argued
that Iran "has been eager to offer assurances and guarantees that
[its programme] remain[s] permanently peaceful." Moreover, he
warned, "Cessation of legal activity is no objective guarantee
against so-called break-out; it is indeed a historically tested
recipe for one." Most of Iran's statement was devoted to trying to
turn the tables on the nuclear powers by first identifying issues
of concern such as the research and development of new nuclear
weapons and missile defences that could instigate a new arms race
in outer space, and then suggesting that the RevCon take decisions
on: universality; a legally binding instrument codifying the
commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; ensuring
and promoting "the basic rights of states parties to unhindered
access to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without
discrimination"; and implementation of the 13 practical disarmament
steps. Though its expressed concerns about new nuclear weapons and
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines by codifying a
commitment not to use or threaten to use them are shared by many of
those who have castigated the inadequate progress on nuclear
disarmament since 2000, it is unlikely that such devices will
distract the other NPT parties from the serious concerns many of
them have raised about Iran's programme and intentions.
Shorts and Tasters
In addition to those listed in Day 1's briefing, such as the
fuel cycle, further themes that are recurring frequently, but which
will need to be addressed more fully in future briefings are:
- non-strategic nuclear weapons - raised by a growing number of
states, including Germany, although Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher
did not make the announcement about NATO nuclear sharing that
several NGOs had hoped for after he had been quoted on the subject
recently in the German newspapers.
- terrorists/non-state actors, general endorsement of UNSC 1540
and the recently agreed Convention for the suppression of acts of
terrorism, the G-8 Global Partnership, global and cooperative
threat reduction (CTR) approaches, physical safety and preventing
access to nuclear materials or weapons by terrorists - the Kyrgyz
Republic, for example, has made a useful proposal for securing and
reducing stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium;
- nuclear weapon free zones, especially with regard to supporting
the Central Asian NWFZ and calling for a NWFZ (or zone free of WMD)
in the Middle East, as well as various supportive mentions of the
NWFZ conference held in Mexico the week before the NPT opened,
- universality - while this issue is accorded little more than
lipservice by many, it has been raised strongly by a number of Arab
states (with pointed references to Israel). From a different
perspective, Sweden made the practical suggestion that India and
Pakistan should simultaneously sign and then ratify the CTBT as a
confidence-building measure and first step.
Finally, as this is getting long and late, I will devote much
more briefing space to the claims and counter claims relating to
nuclear disarmament when Main Committee 1 gets underway, but much
has been said in the General Debate about the need for genuine
progress and fulfilment of the so-called 13 steps (actually 13
paragraphs containing some 18 specific principles and measures) for
the practical and systematic pursuit of nuclear disarmament under
article VI. One point needs clarification however.
In their efforts to be fair to the nuclear weapon states, a
number of parties - notably Sweden and the New Agenda Coalition -
have commended Britain for taking its nuclear weapons off alert.
This is not strictly the case. In 1998, the UK announced a 'reduced
notice to fire', and in 2000, confirmed that its weapons were now
de-targeted (the latter being a commitment undertaken with the rest
of the P-5). As UK officials have been at pains to explain to me,
reducing the notice to fire from hours to days is not de-alerting:
it is an operational procedure relating to command and control and
not a physical procedure relating to the weapons. Though to be
welcomed as a marginal improvement on the cold war posture, this
does not amount to de-alerting because it can be reversed at a
moment's notice. It has further been explained that de-alerting the
UK nuclear weapons would not be practical because it is necessary
to the UK's doctrine of deterrence that when Trident goes to sea,
the warheads are firmly attached to the delivery missiles and that
they are in an ever-ready condition to be targeted and fired as
soon as the order is given. Under reduced notice to fire, however,
the UK anticipates taking a leisurely few days to transmit and act
on any order to annihilate the chosen target with a nuclear strike,
unlike during the cold war, when they expected that such decisions
would have to be extremely fast. Therefore, though the UK
delegation has no doubt been basking in the commendations it has
been receiving on de-alerting from states such as they are not yet
fully deserved.
05.05.05
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