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Rebecca Johnson
Back to the main page on the NPT
Still no agenda for the NPT Review Conference, despite the best efforts of the President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who had hoped to get the agenda agreed by today. The problem still appears to be the 'chapeau' of paragraph 16 of the agenda, which is viewed as providing an overarching context for allocating issues to be discussed in the three main committees. In a nutshell, the United States opened the can of worms at the 2004 PrepCom by trying to have reference to the 2000 consensus final document downgraded. By the time a formula was found that the United States and advocates of compliance with the 2000 agreements could both accept, Iran objected to an additional phrase promoted by the US and European Union referring to subsequent developments. Iran feared that making this part of an overarching chapeau would legitimise the emphasis some countries are putting on Iran's nuclear programme, particularly its years of failure to declare to the IAEA that it was building uranium enrichment facilities.
Although not necessary for adopting the agenda, it is also understood that no agreement has been reached on establishing subsidiary bodies to address specific issues, such as (to name a few that have been floated as possibilities) practical nuclear disarmament steps, negative security assurances, nuclear safety and security, or the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
The Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with Yoko Ono, Hibakusha representatives and activists from several countries presented the Conference President in the General Assembly with petitions signed by millions, calling for "Vision 2020" - negotiations on the complete abolition of nuclear weapons to be concluded and in the process of full implementation by 2020.
During the first three days, the NPT Conference has now heard some 58 of the expected 90-plus national and regional/group general statements. Many major players have spoken, including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the New Agenda Coalition (collectively and singly), the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the CARICOM states, South Pacific Forum, Iran and a number of other states from the Middle East. Though Germany and several European countries have given national statements in addition to being associated with the EU, France and Britain have not yet spoken - reportedly waiting until Britain's polling stations close on Thursday.
While many issues are being checklisted, a few are coming to the fore as of particular importance to a large number of states, though it is not yet clear whether the level of concern will translate into agreement or conflict. Most worryingly, unlike in 1995 and 2000, the third day has come and gone without any electrifying statement or innovative approaches, such as those put forward in 1995 by South Africa and in 2000 by the New Agenda Coalition. These had pointed ways forward and contained the basic ideas, tools, substance and even strategies to help the President steer each of those previous review conferences to substantial successes.
Because the United Nations for the first time in NPT history is providing a timely and easily accessed posting of all statements (and, indeed, webcasts) on its website at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements.html it is not necessary for me to give a comprehensive summary. But over the next few days I will provide an analytical and impressionistic snapshot of what I see as some of the principal issues as the General Debate progresses.
In the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), almost every statement has highlighted the necessity for early entry into force of this multilaterally negotiated treaty, viewed as a prime objective of the NPT since the treaty first took legal effect in 1970. From Japan and the New Agenda to the NAM, the CTBT has been extremely strongly endorsed, noting that it was promised in the NPT's preamble and then underlined as of the highest priority in 1995, when the treaty was indefinitely extended, and again as the first item in the "13 practical steps" for nuclear disarmament agreed in 2000. Despite reported attempts by at least one EU member to water down any reference to the CTBT or replace it with a call to reaffirm the moratoria on nuclear testing, on the grounds that this would be more conducive to US acceptance, even the EU gave a very strong affirmation of the "utmost importance" it attaches to the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date. Pending CTBT entry into force, "the EU urges all states to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT".
China, which (like the US) has so far failed to ratify the CTBT, lamented that the entry into force of the CTBT had been diluted and declared, "China supports an early-entry-into-force of the CTBT and is now working actively on its internal legal proceedings for ratifying the treaty." This might be more believable if China had not used a similar excuse five years ago, telling the 2000 Review Conference that it was awaiting the decision of the People's National Congress. Russia ratified just before the 2000 Conference and Britain and France ratified together in April 1998. The CTBT currently has 175 signatories, of which 120 have ratified, including 33 of the 44 states listed as necessary for entry into force. While it is clear that everyone except the United States wants the NPT RevCon to give a strong endorsement to CTBT entry into force, some may be hoping to find compromise language that Washington can accept. Sweden took the view, as expressed on Day 2 by Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, that at the very least, "The fact that an overwhelming majority of states parties support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty should be duly reflected in the final document".
A large number of states are also mentioning the necessity to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons purposes. The chief controversy over this is about the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to get negotiations underway and whether (if they ever take place) they should be on the basis of the 'Shannon mandate' agreed by the CD in 1995 (see http://www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/shannon.htm for details), which called for negotiations on "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty" or on a different basis, in view of the US determination to push for a treaty without verification. This unilateral decision, which followed a yearlong interagency review in the United States, was announced at the CD by Ambassador Jackie Sanders in July 2004, to the shock of many CD delegations and the gratitude (whether expressed or not) of at least India, Israel and Pakistan, who all had misgivings about the proposed Fissban (or cut-off treaty), since they were its primary targets. Four of the declared nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, Russia and the United States) already abide by their unilateral moratoria on production and France is in the process of dismantling its military fissile material production facilities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.
Most NAM statements continue to call for a "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty", while many west-leaning statements are more likely to fudge the question of verification, calling in shorthand just for an (undifferentiated) treaty or FMCT. The EU, for example (from which many others appear to have taken their cue) calls for negotiations on "a non-discriminatory and universal treaty". Nevertheless, verification or no-verification, the urgency of halting fissile material production has appeared in almost all the statements.
As noted in Day 1's update, almost all the statements have raised concerns about North Korea, which announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (after previously announcing an intention to withdraw in 1993, which was subsequently halted by the Framework Agreement with the United States). NPT states and international lawyers are in disagreement about whether North Korea has legally accomplished its withdrawal and is no longer a party to the NPT, or whether it is still bound by its treaty obligations and needs to be brought back into compliance. After intensive consultations, Ambassador Duarte received agreement to follow the procedure first used by the Chair of the 2003 PrepCom, Ambassador Laszlo Mólnár, in which the DPRK nameplate was held by the Secretariat in the Conference room "without prejudice to ongoing negotiations". This was done early on Day 1. While not opening a debate among states parties into the specific status of the DPRK, he did acknowledge that many states wanted to have a general discussion at the RevCon about the withdrawal provision (Article X) and indicated that space would be found for this to take place.
Judging from the serious concerns raised by many states during the first three days, this was a necessary decision. Amid newspaper articles (reportedly informed from US intelligence sources) suggesting that North Korea may be preparing a nuclear test to prove its much-bragged-about nuclear weapons capability, very many statements have called for resumption of the six party talks, with the clear objective being North Korea's renunciation and dismantling of any nuclear weapon programme, under full IAEA safeguards. Stephen Rademaker, US assistant secretary of state said, "we are attempting to bring together the regional players in the Six Party Talks to convince Pyongyang that its only viable option is to negotiate an end to its nuclear ambitions. We have tabled a proposal that addresses the North's stated concerns and also provides for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korean nuclear programmes."
Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, devoted several paragraphs to what it called "a direct threat to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia", calling on the NPT RevCon to deliver a clear message to the DPRK that it must return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions, "completely dismantle all of its nuclear programmes, including its enrichment programmes, subject to credible international verification". South Korea's Deputy Minister, Chun Yung-woo, castigated the NPT's "inherent limitations" and bluntly argued that "the Korean peninsula suffers from diminished security because of the miserable failure of the NPT to contain the nuclear spectre".
In a very hard-hitting statement that condemned North Korea's "complete disregard for and defiance of all nuclear non-proliferation norms" and called for Pyongyang to take "the strategic decision to abandon and dismantle once and for all its entire nuclear weapons programmes", South Korea welcomed the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network and the adoption of UNSC resolution 1540 but warned that of themselves, these will not put an end to trafficking: "One should never underestimate the resourcefulness of black market peddlers and determined proliferators to outsmart and outmanoeuvre governments." South Korea favoured a much tougher approach to the fuel cycle, safeguards and export controls and said it was open to various options to make withdrawal from the treaty more difficult, including requiring Security Council approval. Recognising the importance also of addressing security concerns, South Korea argued for the crisis to be resolved peacefully and for the incentive of better security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with their NPT obligations.
Most notably, given its position on the proliferation front line, South Korea joined Ireland, Canada, Sweden and a growing number who advocate giving the NPT more powers for enforcement, including annual meetings and 'emergency' powers.
Building on the Irish initiative from 2000 and its own paper on addressing the NPT's "institutional deficit" that was circulated at the 2004 PrepCom, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright gave the following argument, which due to its complexity and importance is quoted in detail: "More sustained attention is required, as well as greater opportunity for States Parties to discuss and promote implementation, to express their views on critical issues affecting the Treaty's health and authority and to take decisions on pressing matters. It is no longer adequate to do this only once every five years. The existing preparatory process, with its inherent limitations, fails to provide for an annual forum worthy of this Treaty and our collective interests in it. Hence, our proposal to have the NPT membership adopt a new arrangement for its meetings within the existing time envelope we currently devote to the Treaty's gatherings. We propose an annual one week Meeting of States Parties, to provide us with a regular policy forum, a feature now standard in the operation of most other treaties in the disarmament field. Our proposal would retain the necessary time for preparing the Review Conferences. Recent experiences have demonstrated that States Parties also require a rapid reaction capacity, the ability to come together and take necessary action in cases of extraordinary circumstances involving threats to the Treaty, its norms and its authority, such as an announcement of withdrawal. The outside world expects no less of us. The ability to call such meetings would be vested in a standing bureau. This rapid reaction capability would not detract from the mandate of the IAEA nor the role of the UN Security Council, but rather be complementary to any action by these bodies, conveying the strongest possible messages on behalf of the Treaty's members."
Unlike North Korea, Iran is in the room. Toning down some of the US rhetoric in evidence at the 2003 and 2004 PrepComs, as well as from various Washington podia, Stephen Rademaker said, "Britain, France, and Germany, with our support, are seeking to reach a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, a solution that given the history of clandestine nuclear weapons work in that country, must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and facilities related to such activity. Iran must provide such objective and verifiable guarantees in order to demonstrate that it is not using a purportedly peaceful nuclear program to hide a nuclear weapons program or to conduct additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere in the country." Varying in degree rather than kind, while trying to avoid explicitly accusing or jumping to conclusions, a significant number of other states called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and fully and transparently cooperate with the IAEA to reassure the world that its programmes were indeed peaceful. On behalf of the EU, Nicolas Schmit, Luxembourg's Minister delegate for Foreign Affairs said it was important "for Iran to re-establish trust", making clear that the EU was "united in its determination not to allow Iran to obtain military nuclear capabilities, and to see the proliferation implications of its nuclear programme resolved." Iran was enjoined to strictly respect the Paris Agreement provisions (November 15, 2004) and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, especially regarding the suspension of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities.
Iran responded with a combative speech from Dr Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he declared that Iran "is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes..." Stating that "arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and countries can and will only undermine the Treaty", Kharrazi argued that Iran "has been eager to offer assurances and guarantees that [its programme] remain[s] permanently peaceful." Moreover, he warned, "Cessation of legal activity is no objective guarantee against so-called break-out; it is indeed a historically tested recipe for one." Most of Iran's statement was devoted to trying to turn the tables on the nuclear powers by first identifying issues of concern such as the research and development of new nuclear weapons and missile defences that could instigate a new arms race in outer space, and then suggesting that the RevCon take decisions on: universality; a legally binding instrument codifying the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; ensuring and promoting "the basic rights of states parties to unhindered access to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination"; and implementation of the 13 practical disarmament steps. Though its expressed concerns about new nuclear weapons and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines by codifying a commitment not to use or threaten to use them are shared by many of those who have castigated the inadequate progress on nuclear disarmament since 2000, it is unlikely that such devices will distract the other NPT parties from the serious concerns many of them have raised about Iran's programme and intentions.
In addition to those listed in Day 1's briefing, such as the fuel cycle, further themes that are recurring frequently, but which will need to be addressed more fully in future briefings are:
Finally, as this is getting long and late, I will devote much more briefing space to the claims and counter claims relating to nuclear disarmament when Main Committee 1 gets underway, but much has been said in the General Debate about the need for genuine progress and fulfilment of the so-called 13 steps (actually 13 paragraphs containing some 18 specific principles and measures) for the practical and systematic pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI. One point needs clarification however.
In their efforts to be fair to the nuclear weapon states, a number of parties - notably Sweden and the New Agenda Coalition - have commended Britain for taking its nuclear weapons off alert. This is not strictly the case. In 1998, the UK announced a 'reduced notice to fire', and in 2000, confirmed that its weapons were now de-targeted (the latter being a commitment undertaken with the rest of the P-5). As UK officials have been at pains to explain to me, reducing the notice to fire from hours to days is not de-alerting: it is an operational procedure relating to command and control and not a physical procedure relating to the weapons. Though to be welcomed as a marginal improvement on the cold war posture, this does not amount to de-alerting because it can be reversed at a moment's notice. It has further been explained that de-alerting the UK nuclear weapons would not be practical because it is necessary to the UK's doctrine of deterrence that when Trident goes to sea, the warheads are firmly attached to the delivery missiles and that they are in an ever-ready condition to be targeted and fired as soon as the order is given. Under reduced notice to fire, however, the UK anticipates taking a leisurely few days to transmit and act on any order to annihilate the chosen target with a nuclear strike, unlike during the cold war, when they expected that such decisions would have to be extremely fast. Therefore, though the UK delegation has no doubt been basking in the commendations it has been receiving on de-alerting from states such as they are not yet fully deserved.
05.05.05
© 2005 The Acronym Institute.