The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage
Breaking the Logjam on Day 16: working papers introduced in
plenary
May 17, 2005
Rebecca Johnson
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After adopting an agenda on Wednesday May 11th, the NPT Review
Conference became mired in disagreements about which subjects
should be discussed in the main committees (MC) and which should be
addressed in more practical detail in subsidiary bodies.
Building on what states had indicated were their priorities
during the general debate, the President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte,
had proposed one subsidiary body under the auspices of each main
committee: i.e. a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and
negative security assurances (NSA) under MC.I; a subsidiary body on
regional issues including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
under MC.II; and a subsidiary body to discuss Article X and
questions concerning withdrawal from the treaty. The NAM started
out wanting separate subsidiary bodies on disarmament and NSA,
while the United States was adamant that NSA should not be an
explicit focus of any subsidiary body. As one problem seemed to get
resolved, another was discovered. It was clear that though the vast
majority of NPT delegations would have been happy to accept this
proposal in order to get the substantive work underway, one or two
within the Western Group and NAM held dogmatically to positions
that obstructed agreement.
During the Conference so far, a few naysayers have sought to tie
the President's hands by employing two negotiating tactics: in one,
intransigence is transmitted to the President in private, forcing
him to accommodate minority objections before he can make or even
float his proposals to the rest; at the same time, the traditional
group system, whereby the Western Group, Eastern European group and
NAM are supposed to caucus separately to help manage
decisionmaking, is manipulated and used to give camouflage to those
seeking to impose their will or block consensus. Deals have
therefore been packaged up together in such a way that most have
had to assume that work cannot go forward without all the main
committees and subsidiary bodies - plus mandates - being
agreed.
By the opening of the third week, frustration was running
extremely high. By this time more than 35 working papers had been
formally circulated on a range of relevant issues, but without an
opportunity for discussing them.
As the situation appeared increasingly hopeless, the President
provided time for delegations to introduce their working papers in
the plenary. Australia went first, with a paper on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from the G-10. (Comprising
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, the G-10 has
coordinated on "Vienna-based" issues since 1980). Malaysia followed
on behalf of the NAM, introducing their substantive working papers
on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, negative security
assurances, regional issues and nuclear energy. Then came Japan,
which introduced its working paper entitled "21 Measures for the
21st Century", which ranged from nuclear disarmament to export
controls and disarmament and non-proliferation education, with
sections on North Korea, Iran and Libya. Canada summarised its
various positions on nuclear disarmament and implementation of the
Thirteen Steps.
Luxembourg, on behalf of the European Union, read the EU working
paper on withdrawal from the treaty (Article X). Egypt came in on
the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted
together with the extension decision, and more generally on the
integrity of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences,
which must be honoured and implemented. Finally China introduced
several of its working papers, which addressed some of the major
themes, relating them also to the work of the Conference on
Disarmament and the necessity to consolidate common and collective
security and prevent the weaponisation of space.
It was politically and substantively important that the G-10's
first working paper so clearly underlined the centrality of entry
into force of the CTBT to the NPT compact, and the profound
proliferation dangers attached to holding open the option to resume
nuclear testing. As emphasised in almost every single general
statement, the overwhelming majority of NPT states are concerned
about the fate of the test ban regime if entry into force of the
CTBT continues to be so wantonly delayed. A stark warning was sent
to those of the nuclear weapon states that have failed to ratify
the test ban (China and the United States), thereby holding open
the option to test: other states (North Korea for example) may take
advantage of their failure to lock down the CTBT and conduct a
nuclear test that would jeopardise the test ban norm and also the
NPT, with which the CTBT has been inextricably linked since
1967.
The working papers are available at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/documents.html.
Scroll down past official documents and reports.
Where now?
As the working papers were introduced and summarised, the sense
of relief was palpable. Not only had the President's authority to
open the plenary to introduction and discussion of working papers
not been challenged, but it had been seized on constructively by
several important groups and delegations to enable them to put
their substantive ideas and recommendations on the table for
consideration.
Somewhere in the middle of this, Iran raised a point of order to
try to object. While claiming to "welcome" the introduction of
working papers, Iran appeared surprised by the alacrity with which
others had seized on the initiative to present their ideas as well.
Extraordinarily, part of Iran's argument seemed to rest on the
assertion that civil society might object or that the move would
"not give a positive impression to civil society outside". It is
unclear which part of civil society Iran meant to represent, for
transnational civil society includes views and positions that are
as varied politically and strategically as the positions of states.
However, this particular civil society commentator was relieved to
see progress move forward on the introduction of the working
papers, reinforcing a little-used precedent set in 2000 that could
create the much-needed opportunity for further work at this Review
Conference.
Moreover, given the effectiveness with which two of the most
intransigent parties have employed procedures and structures to
avoid being held accountable for their proliferation-encouraging
activities, the success of this initiative may give courage to
others. Iran's objection got nowhere because the rules of procedure
make clear that the President has the right and authority to
"direct the discussion... accord the right to speak... [and] have
complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of
order thereat". The constructive response of the majority of states
is a clear vindication of the determination shown by Australia and
the others, and the courage of the President in moving to bypass
the procedural blockages to allow substantive issues to begin to be
addressed.
The buzz of excitement engendered by the morning's progress
largely dissipated in the afternoon when the diplomats went into
closed session - which broke several times for group consultations.
Despite having been offered an opportunity to bypass the logjam,
they returned to the interrupted business of arguing about the main
committees and subsidiary bodies. This time it appeared that US and
other objections mysteriously melted away, as both Iran and the
United States let it be known that they were (now) keen to get the
committees underway. No agreement was reached, however, on how to
allocate the remaining time to the different committees and
subsidiary bodies. Although there is space for two sessions to run
simultaneously, there are only eight working days left before the
Review Conference is scheduled to end on May 27th. The committees
were supposed to start half way through the first week, not half
way through the third. Unless significant restraint is exercised,
it is difficult to see how they would accomplish the traditional
tasks of speeches, debates and negotiations on paragraphs of text
which - if agreed - are then supposed to be transmitted to the
drafting committee and president.
If the conference succeeds tomorrow in achieving agreement on
convening the committees and subsidiary bodies - as many diplomats
appear to hope it will - this might turn out to be a pyrrhic
victory - too little and far too late to be productive. Either the
chairs will have to exercise considerable discipline and authority
to telescope the work of three weeks into one, or there is a risk
of leaving the conference with little room to manoeuvre or
negotiate late in the final week, especially if any of the
committees gets bogged down, as has happened in the past.
Alternatively - but I wouldn't hold out much hope for this - the
conference could be constructively flexible and recognise that at
this late date it could be preferable to continue work without
formal recourse to the committees. Instead, under the president's
auspices, it could be more productive to utilise formal and
informal plenaries for discussions on the working papers and
delegations' proposals and recommendations, while the designated
chairs could be charged with the task of consulting with
delegations to develop building blocks of text on the basis of
which the conference would try to negotiate its agreements in the
final week. Either scenario carries risks and potential pitfalls.
In the end, some delegations will be trying to assess which would
be likely to work best, while others may decide on the basis of
which would be easier to stuff up with procedural challenges,
protectionism and power plays.
Among the working papers, there are many good and workable ideas
for strengthening NPT compliance and implementation across the
board. Regrettably, the conference has so far been distracted from
these ideas and paralysed by those who want to evade the
obligations and commitments undertaken in the past and avoid future
nonproliferation constraints and responsibilities. Instead of
protecting the naysayers, it is surely time to expose their unholy
alliance for what it is: a two-pronged (if uncoordinated) attack
that puts narrow national interests above multilateral
nonproliferation and the norms and rules on which our collective
security rests.
Addendum to Day 10
The Statement by the President in connection with the adoption
of the agenda (item 16) read as follows: "It is understood that the
review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the
resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any
issue raised by States Parties." (NPT/CONF.2005/31*)
The NAM statement linked by asterix to the agenda when it was
adopted on May 11th read as follows (NPT/CONF.2005/32):
1. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT welcome the
adoption of the agenda of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the NPT. The agenda establishes the framework for conducting the
review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article
VIII, paragraph 3 of the Trearty, the decisions and the resolution
of previous Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference and the decision of the 2000 Review Conference
to adopt by consensus its Final Document.
2. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their
commitment to implement - in good faith - their obligations under
the Treaty as well as all the commitments agreed upon by consensus
in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Non-Aligned States
Parties to the NPT urge all States Parties to implement their
obligations and commitments in the same spirit.
3. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT also reaffirm their
commitment to ensure the successful outcome of this Review
Conference.
4. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT request that this
present statement be circulated as an official document of this
Review Conference.
17.5.05
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