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Rebecca Johnson
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After adopting an agenda on Wednesday May 11th, the NPT Review Conference became mired in disagreements about which subjects should be discussed in the main committees (MC) and which should be addressed in more practical detail in subsidiary bodies.
Building on what states had indicated were their priorities during the general debate, the President, Ambassador Sergio Duarte, had proposed one subsidiary body under the auspices of each main committee: i.e. a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances (NSA) under MC.I; a subsidiary body on regional issues including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East under MC.II; and a subsidiary body to discuss Article X and questions concerning withdrawal from the treaty. The NAM started out wanting separate subsidiary bodies on disarmament and NSA, while the United States was adamant that NSA should not be an explicit focus of any subsidiary body. As one problem seemed to get resolved, another was discovered. It was clear that though the vast majority of NPT delegations would have been happy to accept this proposal in order to get the substantive work underway, one or two within the Western Group and NAM held dogmatically to positions that obstructed agreement.
During the Conference so far, a few naysayers have sought to tie the President's hands by employing two negotiating tactics: in one, intransigence is transmitted to the President in private, forcing him to accommodate minority objections before he can make or even float his proposals to the rest; at the same time, the traditional group system, whereby the Western Group, Eastern European group and NAM are supposed to caucus separately to help manage decisionmaking, is manipulated and used to give camouflage to those seeking to impose their will or block consensus. Deals have therefore been packaged up together in such a way that most have had to assume that work cannot go forward without all the main committees and subsidiary bodies - plus mandates - being agreed.
By the opening of the third week, frustration was running extremely high. By this time more than 35 working papers had been formally circulated on a range of relevant issues, but without an opportunity for discussing them.
As the situation appeared increasingly hopeless, the President provided time for delegations to introduce their working papers in the plenary. Australia went first, with a paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from the G-10. (Comprising Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, the G-10 has coordinated on "Vienna-based" issues since 1980). Malaysia followed on behalf of the NAM, introducing their substantive working papers on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, regional issues and nuclear energy. Then came Japan, which introduced its working paper entitled "21 Measures for the 21st Century", which ranged from nuclear disarmament to export controls and disarmament and non-proliferation education, with sections on North Korea, Iran and Libya. Canada summarised its various positions on nuclear disarmament and implementation of the Thirteen Steps.
Luxembourg, on behalf of the European Union, read the EU working paper on withdrawal from the treaty (Article X). Egypt came in on the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted together with the extension decision, and more generally on the integrity of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, which must be honoured and implemented. Finally China introduced several of its working papers, which addressed some of the major themes, relating them also to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the necessity to consolidate common and collective security and prevent the weaponisation of space.
It was politically and substantively important that the G-10's first working paper so clearly underlined the centrality of entry into force of the CTBT to the NPT compact, and the profound proliferation dangers attached to holding open the option to resume nuclear testing. As emphasised in almost every single general statement, the overwhelming majority of NPT states are concerned about the fate of the test ban regime if entry into force of the CTBT continues to be so wantonly delayed. A stark warning was sent to those of the nuclear weapon states that have failed to ratify the test ban (China and the United States), thereby holding open the option to test: other states (North Korea for example) may take advantage of their failure to lock down the CTBT and conduct a nuclear test that would jeopardise the test ban norm and also the NPT, with which the CTBT has been inextricably linked since 1967.
The working papers are available at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/documents.html. Scroll down past official documents and reports.
As the working papers were introduced and summarised, the sense of relief was palpable. Not only had the President's authority to open the plenary to introduction and discussion of working papers not been challenged, but it had been seized on constructively by several important groups and delegations to enable them to put their substantive ideas and recommendations on the table for consideration.
Somewhere in the middle of this, Iran raised a point of order to try to object. While claiming to "welcome" the introduction of working papers, Iran appeared surprised by the alacrity with which others had seized on the initiative to present their ideas as well. Extraordinarily, part of Iran's argument seemed to rest on the assertion that civil society might object or that the move would "not give a positive impression to civil society outside". It is unclear which part of civil society Iran meant to represent, for transnational civil society includes views and positions that are as varied politically and strategically as the positions of states. However, this particular civil society commentator was relieved to see progress move forward on the introduction of the working papers, reinforcing a little-used precedent set in 2000 that could create the much-needed opportunity for further work at this Review Conference.
Moreover, given the effectiveness with which two of the most intransigent parties have employed procedures and structures to avoid being held accountable for their proliferation-encouraging activities, the success of this initiative may give courage to others. Iran's objection got nowhere because the rules of procedure make clear that the President has the right and authority to "direct the discussion... accord the right to speak... [and] have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat". The constructive response of the majority of states is a clear vindication of the determination shown by Australia and the others, and the courage of the President in moving to bypass the procedural blockages to allow substantive issues to begin to be addressed.
The buzz of excitement engendered by the morning's progress largely dissipated in the afternoon when the diplomats went into closed session - which broke several times for group consultations. Despite having been offered an opportunity to bypass the logjam, they returned to the interrupted business of arguing about the main committees and subsidiary bodies. This time it appeared that US and other objections mysteriously melted away, as both Iran and the United States let it be known that they were (now) keen to get the committees underway. No agreement was reached, however, on how to allocate the remaining time to the different committees and subsidiary bodies. Although there is space for two sessions to run simultaneously, there are only eight working days left before the Review Conference is scheduled to end on May 27th. The committees were supposed to start half way through the first week, not half way through the third. Unless significant restraint is exercised, it is difficult to see how they would accomplish the traditional tasks of speeches, debates and negotiations on paragraphs of text which - if agreed - are then supposed to be transmitted to the drafting committee and president.
If the conference succeeds tomorrow in achieving agreement on convening the committees and subsidiary bodies - as many diplomats appear to hope it will - this might turn out to be a pyrrhic victory - too little and far too late to be productive. Either the chairs will have to exercise considerable discipline and authority to telescope the work of three weeks into one, or there is a risk of leaving the conference with little room to manoeuvre or negotiate late in the final week, especially if any of the committees gets bogged down, as has happened in the past. Alternatively - but I wouldn't hold out much hope for this - the conference could be constructively flexible and recognise that at this late date it could be preferable to continue work without formal recourse to the committees. Instead, under the president's auspices, it could be more productive to utilise formal and informal plenaries for discussions on the working papers and delegations' proposals and recommendations, while the designated chairs could be charged with the task of consulting with delegations to develop building blocks of text on the basis of which the conference would try to negotiate its agreements in the final week. Either scenario carries risks and potential pitfalls. In the end, some delegations will be trying to assess which would be likely to work best, while others may decide on the basis of which would be easier to stuff up with procedural challenges, protectionism and power plays.
Among the working papers, there are many good and workable ideas for strengthening NPT compliance and implementation across the board. Regrettably, the conference has so far been distracted from these ideas and paralysed by those who want to evade the obligations and commitments undertaken in the past and avoid future nonproliferation constraints and responsibilities. Instead of protecting the naysayers, it is surely time to expose their unholy alliance for what it is: a two-pronged (if uncoordinated) attack that puts narrow national interests above multilateral nonproliferation and the norms and rules on which our collective security rests.
The Statement by the President in connection with the adoption of the agenda (item 16) read as follows: "It is understood that the review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any issue raised by States Parties." (NPT/CONF.2005/31*)
The NAM statement linked by asterix to the agenda when it was adopted on May 11th read as follows (NPT/CONF.2005/32):
1. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT welcome the adoption of the agenda of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The agenda establishes the framework for conducting the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Trearty, the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the decision of the 2000 Review Conference to adopt by consensus its Final Document.
2. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to implement - in good faith - their obligations under the Treaty as well as all the commitments agreed upon by consensus in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT urge all States Parties to implement their obligations and commitments in the same spirit.
3. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT also reaffirm their commitment to ensure the successful outcome of this Review Conference.
4. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT request that this present statement be circulated as an official document of this Review Conference.
17.5.05
© 2005 The Acronym Institute.