The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2007

2007 NPT PrepCom opens in Vienna on April 30

WILL THEY, WON'T THEY?

Rebecca Johnson

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Though the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meeting for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started with a positive buzz, optimism began to dwindle as the day closed without adoption of an agenda. Inevitably there were uncomfortable comparisons with the 2005 Review Conference, which took two weeks to adopt its agenda and a further week to agree on a work programme. Almost everyone hoped to avoid a repetition of that debacle, and the cautiously constructive consultations fostered by the Chair-designate of the PrepCom, Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan, appeared to show that Egypt and the United States were more prepared to compromise this time round.

Amano has spent weeks trying out versions of recent PrepCom agendas, and negotiating assiduously with the key countries that had blocked agreement on an agenda for the NPT Review Conference in 2004-05. By morning, as the NPT PrepCom opened, it was understood that only Iran continued to hold out against agreement on a compromise text, claiming that it did not have instructions from the key officials back home in Tehran.

At issue is the paragraph that frames the work of the PrepCom. In 2004-5, the United States had blocked consensus on an agenda that placed the review in the context of the consensus agreements from 1995 and 2000, some of which the Bush administration had subsequently rejected. This time the US (and France, which increasingly supported the Bush administration desire to marginalise the 2000 programme of action on nuclear disarmament) agreed to reference the 1995 Conference (at which the NPT had been extended) as had been done in 2002, but they wanted the 2000 Review Conference diminished in a list that included 'the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000' and, bizarrely (at US insistence) also the 2005 Review Conference, the outcome of which was a dismal failure, largely due to US obduracy during the review process. For the sake of getting the 2010 review process off to a constructive start, Ambassador Amano and the majority of States decided to accommodate these contortions of language. Iran, however, balked at the last part of the sentence, which referred to the need for full compliance.

The agenda text under consideration:

Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.

After closed-door consultations throughout the day, which revealed that the vast majority of Non-Aligned States were unwilling to support or provide cover for Iran, the Chair tried again at the end of the day to get agreement. Putting down his agenda he asked for consensus. Iran immediately objected. First the delegation complained of being put on the spot, saying that it was awaiting instructions. Then Iran confused everyone by claiming to prefer the agenda adopted in 2005. This astonished many listeners, since this truncated agenda had represented an abject defeat for the non-aligned countries because it deleted all reference to 1995 and 2000, except by an asterisked note.

Germany and Canada waded in to support the Chair's agenda, whereupon Russia surprised everyone with a speech that started by encouraging the Chair and ended by appearing to support Iran's stated desire to go back to the 2005 agenda. However, it turned out later that under the heat of exposure, Iran's delegate had mispoken and actually meant to say that Iran preferred the agenda adopted by the 2002 PrepCom. It will be interesting to see how Russia and Iran disentangle themselves.

The Chair wisely decided to close the session. He had obtained agreement that the General Debate would proceed during Tuesday May 1st, and said that he would try again to get agreement on the agenda. Though he did not make any explicit threat, Ambassador Amano has warned that if states have not adopted an agenda by midweek, he may suspend the PrepCom altogether, on the grounds that there would be no agreed framework for proceeding with cluster debates or allocating special time to key issues.

Iran's position apparently hardened during the day, as Tehran assessed the tenor of the first statements to the General Debate and reportedly viewed them as focussing too pointedly on Iran and "noncompliance".

Statements were heard from the Austrian Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnick, who spoke critically of nuclear power; Japan, Canada, Australia, Russia, Egypt, Germany on behalf of the European Union, Cuba on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, the United States, Ukraine, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Morocco, Syria, Brazil, and Indonesia.

It is true that many of these interventions made critical reference to the nuclear programmes and activities of Iran and North Korea. However, the North Korean Denuclearization Agreement adopted in January had given some hope that the Six Party Talks were beginning to pull the North Korean regime back from the brink. Criticisms of North Korea, therefore, were tinged with a cautious optimism that was absent from the concerns being raised about Iran.

Many also made critical reference to the inadequate progress on nuclear disarmament, and though no one explicitly condemned the UK's decision to renew Trident, concerns were raised in several statements that the nuclear weapon states were renewing or modernising their arsenals and doctrines.

New Zealand, for example, said there was an "inherent contradiction between some states arguing a unique security benefit from the possession of nuclear weapons while insisting that no more states should be allowed to acquire them". In an unmistakable dig at the British debate over Trident, New Zealand further raised the concern that "it would be irresponsible for some states to relinquish nuclear weapons in the current geo-political environment."

Britain made an effort to defend itself, stating: "The UK is retaining not modernising its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine. The UK's nuclear weapon system will not be designed for war-fighting use in military campaigns. It is a strategic deterrent that we would only ever contemplate using in extreme circumstances or self defence." [emphasis in original]

Notwithstanding the host of issues raised in the first day of general debate, In Tehran's over sensitive eyes, an agenda reference to full compliance with the NPT must be aimed solely at Iran. Since this was reportedly insisted on by the United States, Iran is no doubt right that it is one of the intended targets. But viewed from another angle, there is a growing clamour for full compliance by the nuclear weapon states as well - in other words, nuclear disarmament. On this basis if for no other, the NAM needs to persuade Iran to accept this agenda and support full compliance - for all treaty parties, nuclear and non-nuclear.

Though the Acronym Institute will be participating fully in the 2007 PrepCom, the onerous task of daily reporting has passed to a younger, fitter generation! See the website of Reaching Critical Will - www.reachingcriticalwill.org -for daily NGO briefings on the PrepCom plus electronic copies or links to as many conference and NGO documents and statements as they can lay hands on.

Acronym supports Reaching Critical Will's work (and contributed a short article to the first issue). In addition we will be producing occasionally analyses on Acronym's website, as well as a comprehensive analysis soon after the PrepCom ends.

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© 2007 The Acronym Institute.