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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2008

General debate day 2: Of Common Endeavours and Double Standards

April 29, 2008

Rebecca Johnson

Back to the main page on the NPT

Ukraine kicked off the second day of the 2008 NPT PrepCom, and was followed by Indonesia, Morocco, South Africa, Bahrain, Norway, Syria, UK, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Argentina, Iran, Thailand and Iraq.

Interesting what difference a day makes in a General Debate. Yesterday was mostly substantive, with statements from groups and four of the nuclear weapon states, whereas today there was much rhetoric about balance, selectivity and double standards; shared values and common endeavours; different views over whether the NPT really rests on two or three main pillars. There was more on regional security and nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), with particular emphasis on the Middle East, following on from the joint statement made yesterday on behalf of the NPT parties in the League of Arab States. Several different versions of principles, steps, plans and initiatives to get to a nuclear weapon free world were canvassed, which included practical considerations for a Nuclear Weapon Convention, interpretations and ideas for carrying forward and implementing all or some of the Thirteen Steps; and what might be called the 'Oslo principles and recommendations' to reach a nuclear weapon free world.

The afternoon was devoted to a series of very substantive NGO statements on relevant aspects of the NPT. This opened with a critical analysis of the current challenges and security environment and an appeal from Japanese survivors of the atomic bombings of 1945. It ended with a series of very concrete proposals for enhancing international security and implementing the NPT. There were passionate appeals for nuclear disarmament from two representatives of BANg, an international network of young people opposed to nuclear weapons, who described their concerns and actions and posed searching questions to the governments that require to be taken seriously. Going beyond the current obsession with multinationalizing uranium enrichment or reprocessing, the NGOs provided analysis on the broader proliferation, environmental and health risks posed by the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to nuclear energy and on up to nuclear weapons, giving support to the German initiative for an International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

Further statements critiqued compliance by the nuclear weapon states with their disarmament obligations and addressed the necessity for further deep reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, tactical and substratregic nuclear weapons including NATO sharing, and taking all nuclear weapons off alert. Delegations were challenged to consider how gendered assumptions and expectations equating masculinity with strength and force contribute towards armament policies and a "dangerous and illusory idea that security can be achieved through militarized, weaponized strength", including nuclear weapons. There was a sobering presentation of new research on the climate, environmental and health effects of the use of a relatively 'limited' number of nuclear weapons in a regional war, and further analysis of the risks and problems of missiles, missile defence and the risks of the weaponization of space. Serious concerns were raised about the US-India nuclear deal, and further campaign ideas and strategies from Mayors for Peace and others were put forward, including a "Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol" to the NPT that would provide planning and target dates for fully implementing Article VI. The Egyptian Council on Foreign Relations announced a new initiative for NGOs based in the countries of the New Agenda Coalition, including Dr Hans Blix, to work together to take forward the commitments made in 2000.

These statements can be accessed in full at:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/ngostatements.html

Challenges for Nuclear Disarmament

The UK finally got its turn to speak, but gave the least substantive statement of all the nuclear weapons states. After "strongly endorsing" the long EU statement of yesterday, the UK perhaps in the interests of brevity wanted to avoid repeating EU positions and felt it was unnecessary to reprise the widely circulated statement of Defence Secretary Des Browne to the CD February 4. That left the statement very short on specifics, which will need to be provided to the cluster debates. In their place, the unequivocal undertaking the UK took in 2000 to eliminate its nuclear arsenal was subtly echoed as: "The United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to strengthening" all three pillars of the NPT. Stressing that "non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are not in competition", the UK argued that "if one is truly committed to the goals of article VI....then you must be a non-proliferator". The statement emphasized things like "common endeavour", a "world where the international community will tolerate no proliferation... a genuinely integrated approach to nuclear disarmament... a world in which the NPT enables and facilitates the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, whilst underpinning our common security."

Later, the UK was more specific when it exercised its right to reply after Iran's statement made the accusation that the UK decision "to renew and further develop its nuclear weapons capability, by approving the Trident project, is... in full contravention of Article VI of the NPT and in defiance with the unanimous decision of the 2000 NPT Review Conference". Iran further argued that, "The Trident project can generate and in fact expand the nuclear arms race beyond the traditional rivalry between the two most powerful nuclear weapon states, thus is a special source of concern for the international community and is a clear setback for the global efforts to bolster nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation."

In response, Ambassador Duncan said it was "wholly incorrect to suggest that the UK is further developing its arsenal". Referring to the December 4, 2006 White Paper on Trident, he said the UK had decided to develop replacement submarines 'to ensure future governments can maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent should they so choose". This decision did not, he stressed, mean that the UK is committing now to retaining nuclear weapons to 2050. He repeated that the UK arsenal has been cut to below 160 and that the UK's nuclear weapons represent a small proportion of the world inventory of nuclear weapons.

Norway gave one of the most substantive presentations, evoking both the five principles and ten policy recommendations from the February 2008 Oslo Conference on Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, and the seven Nation Ministerial Declaration issued by the governments of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom after the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. [See also Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre's speech to the CD March 4, and reproduced in Disarmament Diplomacy 87.]

Noting that "we all have much to lose by weakening the NPT [and] cannot let this happen", Norway argued that: "Our task during this Review Process must be to consolidate and further strengthen the NPT. We must create the necessary enabling environment and political will to this end. This entails working in more innovative ways, not least across regions."

Indonesia referred to both the Oslo Conference and the Wall Street Journal articles, agreeing that though nuclear weapons are now strategically "irrelevant", they have become more dangerous. Indonesia considered that addressing the role and use of nuclear weapons should be a "central part" of the work of the 2010 review conference. After recognizing the special responsibility and need for disarmament leadership by the US and Russia, Indonesia argued that the adoption of a new NATO Strategic Concept that required the retention of nuclear weapons would contradict the NPT's obligations, Indonesia supported "any actions to remove and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons from territories of NNWS which are members of NATO".

Chile had given a strong statement on the first day on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama,, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. While addressing a range of NPT-related issues, including universality, NWFZs and the importance of strengthening the IAEA's verification capacity, the main focus was Article VI. This group of Latin American and Caribbean countries roundly rejected "the idea of maintaining the option of nuclear weapons' use as a dissuasive element in the strategic doctrines and national security policies of certain countries" and insisted on unconditional and legally binding security assurances for NNWS. They called for a verifiable fissban to be negotiated in the CD and for entry into force of the CTBT, commending Colombia's recent ratification. In addition to calling for universalization of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), they welcomed adoption of UNGA resolution 62/36 on Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems", which Chile had co-sponsored with New Zealand and others.

Various of these states followed with their own statements, adding or emphasizing particular elements. Stressing accountability, Brazil sought to weaken the hostility of some NWS to its previous proposals for reporting in a comparative way, by arguing that the NWS would gain if their steps "in streamlining their nuclear arsenals and other control measures" were better known through "comparative tables showing those measures".

Among the other statements that emphasized the reciprocal responsibilities and obligations of NWS and NNWS, Malaysia underscored that "only through the total elimination of nuclear weapons can we eliminate the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons". Describing the NPT as "only the middle point in the process, whose final objective, as article VI declares, is nuclear disarmament", Costa Rica recommended that NPT parties study and discuss the legal, technical, political and verification approaches and elements in the model Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) developed by civil society and spearheaded in the UN First Committee and General Assembly by Malaysia and Costa Rica. Costa Rica tabled this model NWC as an NPT working paper at the 2007 PrepCom, and wanted to promote discussion among states as well as civil society about its ideas. Raising concerns about the renewal of nuclear arsenals and the "meagre commitment by NWS to live up to their commitments to make concrete, verifiable and irreversible progress towards nuclear disarmament", Costa Rica argued that a quinquennial review was not sufficient, and the NPT needed more active mechanisms for constant review and accountability.

Universality and Middle East

Several more interventions today addressed the Middle East, including Bahrain, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The various Arab states endorsed the statement made on behalf of the states in the League of Arab States by Syria yesterday, which focussed on implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In the statement and working paper (NPT/CONF2010/PC.II/WP.2), the Arab League set out the history of proposals and positions of the Arab states and presented a series of demands, proposals for dealing with the issue in the NPT context, and interim steps to implement the Middle East resolution.

These call on Israel to accede to the NPT as a NNWS without restriction or condition, and demand that the international community - and especially the depository states (US, Russia and UK) should assume responsibility for implementing the resolution. They propose allocation of specific time, establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II in 2010 and, more controversially, the establishment of a standing committee at the 2010 review conference to follow up - intersessionally - the implementation of the Middle East recommendations. As interim steps, the Arab League calls on the UN to convene an international meeting on establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East. Emphasising that the NWS must fulfil all their commitments under the NPT not to transfer weapons or technologies or assist or encourage Israel's nuclear programme, they further argue that NPT parties should also not "extend any assistance to Israel in the nuclear field, whether for peaceful or for military purposes", and call for these commitments to be reported on and monitored through to the 2015 Review Conference.

These arguments were reprised and in most cases amplified by even more explicit condemnations of Israel by several other Arab delegations, including Algeria, Morocco and Bahrain, which said it had recently become a member of the IAEA.

Following directly on from Syria, Egypt emphasized bringing in the states outside the NPT, arguing that "efforts to realize Treaty universality have thus far not been commensurate with the recognition by all states parties of the pivotal role that the NPT plays in enhancing international peace and security." According to Egypt, NPT universality is a necessary first step towards the universal application and strengthening of IAEA full scope safeguards: "Egypt rejects any attempts to impose additional obligations on non-nuclear weapon states, which are already in compliance with their commitments pursuant to the Treaty, if they are not reciprocated by equal and commensurate measures by states that still lie outside the treaty and are not bound by Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements." Egypt raised concerns about nuclear cooperation between NPT parties and non-parties "regardless of the motives declared or the intentions stated". This appears to be an oblique reference to an agreement a few weeks ago between the US and Israel on cooperation relating - according to reports - to nuclear safety. Like the condemnation of such cooperation contained in yesterday's NAM statement, this position condemns the US-India nuclear deal as well.

On day 2, Syria made a further statement in its national capacity, complaining that the NPT was under pressure because there was a lack of balanced treatment in the "two main pillars" of the NPT, nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear proliferation; and also "because of the use of double standards by some countries" concerning the third pillar, nuclear energy, and Israel, "which possesses advanced military nuclear capabilities outside the framework of any international control". Arguing that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East "remains in effect till its goals and objectives are achieved" and that Israel "refuses to achieve just and comprehensive peace", Syria devoted the rest of its statement to the Arab League initiatives on universality and establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. It concluded by posing three questions for NPT parties: i) why the international community has not been able to achieve the universality of the treaty or a NWFZ in the Middle East after four decades of international meetings; ii) why nuclear disarmament was not yet achieved; and iii) whether nuclear arsenals provide security to states that possess them, or do they just undermine international peace and security?

Raising concerns about the continuing prospect of confrontation and conflict in the Middle East, with arms flows from several directions, terrorism and wastage of resources that are needed by many communities, Iraq argued that stability and security in the Middle East would require NPT universality, and that a Zone free of WMD in the Middle East would fulfil numerous UNSC and IAEA resolutions as well as the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Iraq criticised Israel for impeding this objective, saying that it could provide an impetus to nuclear terrorism, and arguing for further pressure to be brought to get Israel to give up its nuclear arms and join the NPT.

In a twist on the oft-heard clichés about NPT balance, Iran argued that "the NPT also provides for a balance between security concerns and the socio-economic requirements for development, especially for developing countries". Before attacking US nuclear cooperation with the "Zionist Regime" and defending its own record with regard to what it called "my country's exclusively peaceful nuclear activities", Iran provided some combative arguments to accuse the United States, Britain and France of violating various of the NPT's articles, though their nuclear weapons doctrines and modernization programmes and (particularly in the case of the US) in its cooperation with Israel. Iran also castigated the US and certain NATO countries. China and Russia were exempted from these attacks, despite a recent cooling of Iranian-Russian relations due to Russia's more muscular support of UNSC pressure on Iran.

Harking back to the battle over the text of the agenda at the 2007 PrepCom in Vienna, Iran said: "Now that we have on our agenda the issue of non-compliance with all the provisions of the treaty, it is imperative for the NPT states parties to take the cases of violation of Article II by the NATO members very seriously." Iran, which has already tabled a number of working papers on different NPT-related issues, concluded that "as a powerful and influential member of the international community, [Iran] has been preparing a package of initiatives on international peace and stability, based on the justice, sovereignty and mutual respect which could be the basis for negotiations ..."

Once again, a large number of states (with contrasting motivations) wanted to see expansion and development of nuclear energy, but weren't quite sure what to do about the proliferation and safety risks of such expansion. The problems of nuclear waste, transport and radioactivity were seldom if ever alluded to, a significant change from a few years ago.

To see scanned statements, NGO statement and NGO-produced News in Review, check out www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

For the youth webcast, go to website http://npt-webcast.info/.

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