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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NPT PrepCom 2008

2008 NPT PrepCom: Calm first week and disarmament roundup

May 2, 2008

Rebecca Johnson

Be careful of what you wish for - you may get it (and be disappointed)! I was reminded of this on Friday, when the NPT PrepCom ran out of things to say on disarmament, and some delegations resorted to repeating parts of their general debate statements for a second and third time. Two nuclear weapon states (UK and France) brought something new to the table, and there were a few new or further-developed proposals from non-nuclear weapon states, but in the main the positions were those established since before the failed review conference of 2005.

Having opened the PrepCom on Monday with the earnest hope that no procedural obstacles would prevent the representatives of about 120 of the 188 states parties to the NPT from focussing on substantive issues, the Chair, Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine, found that the substance ran out rather sooner than the time he had allocated for cluster 1 and the special sessions on practical nuclear disarmament and security assurances. Moreover, as some delegations reproduced their main points in the general debate, cluster debate and then once more in the 'special time', it must be said that there are limits to how many times the same information can be repeated and heard! When the list of formal statements came to an end, Yelchenko gamely tried to encourage delegations to "interact" by commenting or asking each other questions about their statements and positions.

The first time he did this there was deafening silence. When he asked the following day, a few, starting with Germany, made some attempt to interact. An interesting session could have developed, but there was not enough focus and response. Fewer than ten delegations - New Zealand, South Africa, Iran, Norway, the UK, Japan and again Germany - participated, covering such issues as the importance of disarmament education (Japan and Germany); the links between disarmament and nonproliferation - mutually reinforcing and not competing, by general agreement, though some still sought to score ideological points in a debate on which comes first (or is more important) that has become as silly as that old saw about whether the chicken or egg comes first); nuclear sharing and the role of nuclear weapons in security concepts.

New Zealand engaged with the statements of various nuclear weapon states, for example, agreeing with US arguments against clinging to cold war attitudes and giving a riposte to NWS who say that they don't need to de-alert further because "they have complete confidence in the integrity and safety of their own systems". While this may be the case, New Zealand questions if the NWS have full confidence in the safety of nuclear weapons in all the other NWS and asks what assurances the NWS can provide to NNWS regarding safety and security. New Zealand also took issue with NWS statements that refer to nuclear weapons as providing them with "a unique security advantage" and urged the US and Russia "to be bold in their development of a new legally binding post START arrangement".

South Africa objected to NATO critics of African countries that have not yet acceded to the Pelindaba Treaty and challenged individual European countries to consider declaring themselves to be nuclear weapon free 'zones' in advance of regional progress towards that goal - something that many in Scotland already want to do. In amongst this, Iran raised questions about the inadequacy of verification for compliance by the NWS, which the UK took as an opportunity to explain the involvement of a non-nuclear weapon state (Norway) and NGO (Vertic) in the project on verifying disarmament run by the UK government and Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). Norway, which together with Austria has raised concerns about the safety, security and proliferation-sensitive aspects of nuclear energy, objected to allegations that such criticisms were akin to 'holding the treaty hostage', and pointed out that though the NPT rested on three pillars, it was not necessary to pursue all three with simultaneous alacrity.

This report will attempt to summarise main or new points from cluster 1 and the special sessions on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. As hearing and/or getting hold of statements and working papers is a work in progress, this does not purport to be complete or exhaustive. Delegations that feel their important contributions have been missed out or misrepresented are invited to bring them to my attention for future inclusion - not least in my more comprehensive analysis after the PrepCom ends, which will appear in the next issue of Disarmament Diplomacy and on our website.

Iraq rebukes Syria for using it as a political football

By Friday afternoon, the PrepCom began hearing 'cluster 2' statements, which focussed mostly on safeguards and included some criticisms of Iran, North Korea and Syria. This provoked Syria to demand a right of reply, in which it first castigated France for assisting Israel's nuclear programme, and then attacked the US over the Iraq war. Since Australia had joined France, Canada and the US in calling for Syria to come clean and clarify if there had been nuclear cooperation with North Korea in violation of the NPT, Syria extended its criticism to Australia for supporting the war on Iraq. At this point Iraq intervened to stop his country being used as a political football in Syria's attempts to divert attention from the concerns raised over possible NPT-violating collaboration with North Korea. With calm dignity, the Iraqi representative acknowledged that his country had developed nuclear weapon (and other WMD) programmes under Saddam Hussein but said that this was now over and he hoped that "the question of Iraq will not be alluded to again in the discussion of matters of proliferation".

Next week:

The PrepCom will continue with debate on clusters 2 and 3, including special sessions to discuss regional issues and the Middle East and questions relating to other treaty articles, notably Article X on withdrawal. It is now anticipated that the six draft decisions (see my reports from April 28 and April 30) will be taken early in the week. Paraphrased, these are:

i) to invite the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with PrepCom members, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2010 review conference. This would be subject to formal confirmation by the review conference, but would enable work to be effectively coordinated in advance.

ii) for the PrepCom members to pay outstanding dues and agree that assessed dues should be paid well in advance of the remaining sessions of the PrepCom and the review conference;

iii) for the Committee to provide a financial report to the review conference and each session of the PrepCom. In order to promote greater financial transparency and accountability, the report should reflect the situation regarding contributions for assessed dues, credits, collections and outstanding dues by states parties.

iv) election of Ambassador Boniface Guwa Chidyausiki of Zimbabwe to chair the Third (2009) PrepCom;

v) venue and dates for the third PrepCom, recommended to be New York, May 4-15, 2009; and

vi) venue and dates for the 2010 Review Conference, recommended to be New York from April 26 to May 21.

Because of the perilous state of Zimbabwe's internal politics, there had been some sotto voce corridor concerns expressed about the wisdom of nominating the Zimbabwean ambassador (the candidate put forward by the African group of states in the NAM) to head the 2009 PrepCom. However, it now appears unlikely that this decision will be formally challenged. It is understood, however, that before agreement is given to holding the next PrepCom and the Review Conference in New York, the NAM wants assurances from the United States that it will not impose unreasonable visa restrictions or delays to obstruct the entry of NPT diplomats, as has reportedly happened in the past with diplomats from countries such as Iran and Cuba. In addition, some wanted to be reassured that the United Nations will be able to provide conference services during refurbishment of its current premises in New York.

As the PrepCom proceeds smoothly into its second week of discussions, there is speculation about the status and content of the Chair's factual summary. If it faithfully reflects the major concerns and disagreements as well as issues where there is considerable convergence, it may be challenged by states not wanting to be criticized, as happened last year. If it fails to reflect such concerns it will be challenged for being an inadequate or incomplete record. Either way, adoption of the chair's summary and report could prove contentious at the end of the PrepCom, though most expect a compromise will be found.

These decisions and developments, as well as security assurances, Clusters II and III and the special sessions on regional issues, Middle East and withdrawal, will be covered in Acronym reports during the second week.

Cluster 1 and Practical Nuclear Disarmament

The NWS gave more detailed statements to the cluster 1 and practical disarmament sessions. These covered US reductions and policy since 2002, developments outlined in recent announcements from Russian President Putin, French President Sarkozy and UK Defence Secretary Des Browne, and China's familiar positions. These statements and in some cases attached briefing papers are best read in their entirety (and can be accessed at www.reachingcriticalwill.org). Having given a brief synopsis of the NWS' positions in last week's NPT reports, the present analysis will focus more on the themes and positions represented by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), which at 183 greatly outnumber the nuclear possessors. Focus is given here to new, useful, substantive and/or challenging proposals rather than positions and rhetoric already familiar from past statements and NPT meetings.

Amidst the familiar and almost-universal calls for CTBT entry into force and commencement of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to enable negotiations to get going on a fissban/fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), there was a spectrum of approaches on disarmament. Each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) elaborated on their general debate statements (see Acronym's reports from days 1-3) and described at greater length what they had done (and, where relevant, announcements from government leaders of what they intended to do) to comply with their article I and VI obligations. Though the reductions in arsenals and further steps taken by four of the NWS were welcomed in most statements, many raised concerns that more than 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons remain in the major arsenals, and that many of these are still on high or "hair-trigger" alert. Even more states than last year raised serious concerns about the progress in reducing arsenals being undermined by replacement and modernization policies and the development of new nuclear weapons, missions and doctrines.

Concerns were raised about NATO nuclear sharing, non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons, and what would happen to strategic nuclear arms reductions when the current START and SORT agreements between the US and Russia come to their designated ends in 2009 and 2012 respectively. More attention was also given to missile proliferation, and cautious interest was expressed in Russia's proposal to extend the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and make its provisions globally effective.

While NAM statements continued to emphasize the need for a timetable or timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, as discussed in an earlier report, Australia joined Costa Rica, Malaysia and the New Agenda Coalition in making explicit reference to a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), noting, "at an appropriate time, the international community will likely need to consider complementary legal frameworks, including a possible nuclear weapons convention, for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons."

Though hedged with caveats like 'possible' and 'eventual', this was significant in being Australia's first positive mention of the objective of a nuclear weapons convention, which physicians and NGOs have been at the forefront of pursuing though the Australian-initiated International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Campaigning and awareness-raising/education based on the NGO-generated 'model nuclear weapon convention' has been the subject of several NGO sessions, including one on the first day that was addressed by the Ambassador of Costa Rica, Mayors, and members of the Belgian and Scottish parliaments.

With regard to 2010, proposals were made by the Netherlands, South Korea and various others to take the changed security environment into account in deliberations leading up to and including the 2010 review conference. While many NAM states have emphasized the enduring validity of the 13 practical disarmament steps in the NPT 2000 final document, which have yet to be effectively implemented, South Korea proposed reviewing each of the steps to reflect changes in the security environment and bring them up to date. The NAM states collectively and individually reiterated their call for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on fulfilling the Article VI obligations.

CTBT

Variously calling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "vital", "urgent", "essential" and "necessary", many applauded the high number of signatories to the CTBT and Colombia's ratification, bringing the number of states required for entry into force down to nine. These are:

two non-NPT states (India and Pakistan) and one former NPT party (North Korea), which have not even signed;
two NWS party to the NPT that have signed but not ratified (the United States and China);
one non-NPT state that has signed the CTBT but not ratified (Israel);
three non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties that have signed but not yet ratified the CTBT: Egypt, Indonesia and Iran.

After commending the CTBTO Preparatory Commission for its progress on establishing the verification system and emphasizing the importance of the CTBT for nuclear disarmament and the credibility of the NPT, many expressed the hope that the existing moratoria on testing would be maintained, and that breakthroughs in the hold-out countries would the CTBT to enter into force in time for the 2010 Review Conference. Though there were some direct expressions of encouragement to specific states, little more could be said in this US election year, given the widespread view that the key to getting CTBT entry into force back on the practical agenda for many of the hold-out countries is the United States. Behind the scenes, however, there was much discussion of how to build a bipartisan strategy to push for US ratification once there is a new US president and senate. Some also noted, in Japan's words, that the effectiveness of the CTBT's international monitoring system (IMS) had "proved its effectiveness on the occasion of the DPRK's October 2006 nuclear test".

The "Vienna Group of Ten" - Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden - put in a substantive working paper on the CTBT. Raising concerns that "any development of new types of nuclear weapons may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold", the Vienna Group called on all states "to refrain from any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, pending its entry into force", and underlined the importance of maintaining the moratoria and of DPRK fulfilling its October 3, 2007 commitments as well as acceding to the CTBT. Referring to various verification and educational work carried out by the CTBTO Commission and supporting governments, the Vienna group called on all to support and resource the work of the CTBTO. Turkey pledged to hold a "Cross-Regional Workshop" on the CTBT in July to review the test ban regime's achievements and "offer perspectives for the future".

Fissban

While most if not all the groups and delegations referred to the fissban - or, more narrowly, an FMCT - as high on their list of priorities, it was generally mentioned in conjunction with exhortations to resolve the CD's long years of paralysis. Since most hope that a change of US administration will prompt a rethink on verification, few saw much point in going into detail on the substantive and political challenges relating to this long-sought nonproliferation objective. Several took the opportunity to support the CD's latest draft work programme put forward by 2008's six presidents (P-6) as draft decision CD/1840. (See Disarmament Diplomacy 87.) Japan pointed out that no CD delegation has actually expressed opposition to fissban negotiations, but that there were "differences over the modality and the scope".

NAM countries are almost unanimous in arguing for the fissban to include stocks and verification. Norway, like most others outside the NAM, said that from their national perspective, "an ideal FMCT would have to include verification provisions" and said that " in the long run, we hope it should be possible to monitor decommissioned military facilities in all nuclear weapons states." Norway argued that "dealing with existing stocks of fissile materials will undoubtedly strengthen the disarmament dimension of such a streaty, and urged the NWS to "declare or reconfirm their moratoria [and]... place material designated as no longer required for military purposes under an IAEA verification regime".

Germany put forward a working paper (WP.21) on FMCT and suggested that a "stepping stone" could be a "political declaration of all nuclear weapon states, de facto nuclear weapon states and important non-nuclear weapon states, which have the capacity to produce weapons usable materials... This declaration would contain an unambiguous fissile material cut-off commitment, a commitment to adopt or maintain the necessary measures for security, control and accounting of weapons usable materials and a commitment to enter without preconditions into negotiations on a non-discriminatory, legally binding FMCT." Advocating an incremental approach, Germany suggested that an FMCT could be a "framework treaty" enshrining the basis norms and then charting a process for implementation, including stricter verification (which could be added as protocols) and the incorporation of stocks. Meanwhile, a Group of Scientific Experts could be established in the CD to examine technical aspects and prepare the ground, as was done for several years before the CTBT was finally negotiated.

Germany also drew attention to the complementary mechanism for addressing stocks that has recently been put forward by Bob Einhorn - a "Fissile Material Control Initiative" (FMCI), conceived as voluntary arrangements by or among the relevant states to increase security, transparency, accounting and control of fissile material stocks around the world, which could increase confidence and accountability so as to pave the way for or, if negotiations get underway, reinforce the FMCT.

Einhorn also put these ideas forward during a packed breakfast meeting supported by UNIDIR and the Netherlands, among others, for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) to give an update on their work. The IPFM briefing included country-specific reports from various key states (including India, Pakistan, the United States and South Africa) on attitudes to the fissban and a presentation of key elements and approaches regarding scope and verification of a draft treaty in progress intended to address some of the disarmament and nonproliferation concerns that a fissban will need to address.

New weapons, modernized arsenals, strategic doctrines, use of nuclear weapons

During the disarmament sessions, following on from the substantive concerns raised by the NAM and NAC statements to the general debate (see my report from Day 1), there were further criticisms of replacement and modernization of weapons in the arsenals. In most cases these were linked with concerns about continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, post cold war doctrines, concepts and operations for nuclear weapons use, and the maintenance of nuclear weapons on high alert. The use and threat of use of nuclear weapons were also addressed in relation to negative security assurances (NSA) which will be the subject of a later Acronym report.

Brazil summed up the contradiction noted by many delegations, stating, "While we welcome the efforts made by the NWS for the reduction of stockpiles, the progress achieved thus far does not necessarily represent a commitment to nuclear disarmament". Brazil referred to new rationalizations for the use of nuclear weapons as well as modernization processes, and called for "full and transparent reporting" on what has already been done and on envisaged future progress. Brazil reiterated its proposal for a comparative table of measures undertaken by the NWS, for use at the 2010 review conference and beyond.

The NAM cluster 1 statement underlined the conclusions of the July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and said that new targeting options and weapons "to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes" undermine the disarmament commitments.

South Africa underscored that the NPT not only tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but "also contains a legal commitment for their total elimination". Supporting recent efforts and initiatives from prominent personalities and states, South Africa encouraged bilateral reductions and unilateral steps, as undertaken by some NWS, but emphasized that these "should follow the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability". Calling for the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to be diminished, South Africa argued, "As long as some countries continue to possess and maintain nuclear weapons and have military doctrines that enhance the role and use of nuclear weapons, they create a situation in which there will be others who will also aspire to possess them. It is highly dangerous to perpetuate the perception that nuclear weapons provide security, because they only increase insecurity." Kenya, likewise, referred to deliberate efforts to modernize and improve nuclear technologies and called for defence doctrines based on nuclear arsenals to be discarded, together with "the cold war mentality that the possession of nuclear weapons can be a prerequisite for security".

Indonesia made clear that though it welcomed the growing political momentum to reduce arsenals and undertake practical actions to achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, "nuclear disarmament should not only be seen as reducing the number of weapons, but also in preventing those that do exist from use". Arguing that the role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary world should be a central part of the agenda for the 2010 review conference, Indonesia referred to the "continued existence of thousands of nuclear warheads in stockpiles and on high alert status" and criticized that "more sophisticated and advanced nuclear weapons are also being developed by some NWS in order to maintain their nuclear deterrence". Noting that though the strategic importance of nuclear weapons "now is irrelevant", Indonesia said they had become more dangerous: "These are compelling reasons for renewed efforts by NWS to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals and review the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines." Concerned that a new NATO Strategic Concept based on the retention of nuclear weapons would contradict the NPT, Indonesia supported "any actions to remove and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons from territories of NNWS which are members of NATO".

South Korea underlined that "any qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types are contrary to the obligation to work for nuclear disarmament in good faith".

New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition welcomed widespread support for removing all nuclear weapons from high alert status, which would increase confidence and reinforce a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

Nigeria drew attention to UNGA resolution 62/36 which it had co-sponsored with Chile, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, saying that "moving all nuclear weapons from high alert status would lead to increased security for all... and provide a much-needed signal that the nuclear weapon states take their responsibilities seriously in the lead up to the 2010 Review Conference".

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

While the NAM and a number of statements raised concerns about NATO nuclear sharing, including references to tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), the most concrete proposals on NSNW came from Finland, speaking also on behalf of Sweden, Lithuania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Austria.

Noting indications of new types and new plans for NSNW as "battlefield weapons to counter or complement... conventional forces", Finland et al said this would "go against" the NPT obligations, including the 2000 NPT final document. Welcoming the focus on these weapons in the Wall Street Journal articles, the WMD Commission (recommendation 21) and the Chair's Summary from the 2007 PrepCom, they called on the PrepCom to "convey a clear message of the importance of treaty-bound disarmament measures" regarding NSNW. Relating this issue to proposals to broaden the INF regime, they specifically argued for the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) to be codified in a post-START context and called for NSNW to be consolidated and withdrawn to central storage as a first step towards their reduction and elimination.

With some EU states hosting US nuclear weapons and bases as part of NATO and Finland and others highlighting the dangers from tactical nuclear weapons, the EU is unable to say much, but at least it "encourage[s] states concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest possible reductions" in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Concerned that a new NATO Strategic Concept based on the retention of nuclear weapons would contradict the NPT, Indonesia supported "any actions to remove and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons from territories of NNWS which are members of NATO".

The New Agenda Coalition identified as "a significant transparency and confidence- building measure if those non-nuclear weapon states that are part of regional alliances which include nuclear weapon states could report on steps taken or future steps planned, to reduce and eliminate the role for nuclear weapons in collective security doctrines".

Addressing this issue, Russia said all its NSNW had been withdrawn from former Soviet territories to Russia and concentrated in central storage facilities, where technical safety and reliable protection is ensured. Russia also said it had introduced measures to protect against terrorist actions, and drew attention to its longstanding proposal "that all nuclear arms be withdrawn to the territory" of the NWS that own them.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

South Korea and others welcomed last year's joint US-Russian statement supporting the INF Treaty. Most of Russia's cluster 1 statement was devoted to explaining the status of its current arsenal and efforts to pursue follow-on bilateral agreements on strategic nuclear systems before START and SORT expire. However, Russia also put forward President Putin's initiative to make the INF obligations "truly global", and then elaborated on this objective in a fringe meeting with other states and NGOs. In response to some who have questioned whether Russia is serious about taking this initiative forward (particularly since its first reaction to US plans to deploy ballistic missile defence (BMD) bases in the Czech Republic and Poland was to threaten to pull out of the INF Treaty), Russia argued that the renunciation of these missiles would strengthen regional stability and global nonproliferation and missile control regimes, and "reverse troubling trends that lead to increasing international tensions".

In its briefing on turning the INF treaty into a universal arrangement for global accession, Russia's delegation drew attention to the draft multilateral INF treaty elements it had attached to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's speech to the CD in February 2008, and highlighted: obligations not to flight test and produce missile stages and launchers; obligations to eliminate existing intermediate and shorter range missiles by an agreed deadline; pending this, restrictions on deployment and movement of such missiles; information exchanges; elimination procedures; compliance and verification rules; and, of course, other basic treaty requirements and provisions such as depositary, implementation authority and entry into force. However, they were more hazy in response to questions about how to draw in the other states that have or are developing intermediate and shorter range missiles in their arsenals, and where and how they envisaged negotiating the expanded treaty.

BMD and Outer Space

A few statements explicitly linked outer space security with nonproliferation. Drawing NPT parties' attention to the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), Russia summed up the connexions thus: "The emergence of weapons in space would not only expand the spheres of military competition, but bring it to a quantitatively new level, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire arms control process, strategic stability and international security as a whole" and warned of a potential arms race in space that would give new momentum to WMD proliferation.

Transparency, irreversibility and verification

Given its membership, the EU's contribution on cluster 1 predictably contained mixed messages. Referring to the "significant reductions" by two EU states, it stressed the need for the largest NWS to follow on from START and SORT and make deeper cuts and emphasised the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability. The EU also referred to the "de-activation of thousands of nuclear warheads" and "efforts to convert military stockpiles of fissile material into a physical state which can no longer be used in nuclear weapons".

The New Agenda Coalition also addressed transparency and confidence-building. Supporting Brazil's proposals for the establishment of clear parameters to facilitate comparative nuclear accounting, the NAC called on the NWS to "provide further clarity as to the current status of their holdings, as well as future plans for downsizing and the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in national and regional security doctrines". As noted above, the NAC called for reports relating to this from nuclear umbrella states as well. The NAC encouraged all the NWS to maximise opportunities, for example through engaging in the UK-led P-5 meeting on disarmament verification.

Underlining the importance of the NWS undertaking further "practical disarmament measures", Japan's working paper highlighted three core principles agreed in the 2000 NPT final document - transparency, irreversibility and verifiability - and called for the role and operation status of nuclear weapons to be further diminished and for the "threshold for the use of nuclear weapons" to be kept "as high as possible".

On transparency (a commitment that China has found particularly difficult), Japan itemised examples of the information that could be disclosed, including: the aggregate numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems deployed and in stockpiles; the extent of nuclear stockpile reductions and the number and pace of reducing and dismantling nuclear warheads and delivery systems; the extent of reductions in the nuclear weapons complexes, including personnel and size; the year in which fissile material production for weapons ceased (if it has ceased); the amount of fissile material declared excess and plans for its disposition; activities to assist in the removal of fissile materials from dismantled weapons; steps taken to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; and plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures.

With regard to irreversibility, Japan cited as "exemplary measures" the dismantling of nuclear warheads and delivery systems; dismantling of nuclear test sites (a widely welcomed proposal long advocated by non-aligned states and recently revived by President Sarkozy of France, despite reluctance from some of the other NWS); shutting down and dismantling facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes (another proposal advocated by France, which has already made progress on this at Marcoule and Pierrelatte, which it closed in 1995-96); and disposing irrevocably of fissile material declared excess to military requirements, as voluntarily undertaken by the US, Russia and UK, though in pursuit of disarmament some might argue that the concept of "excess" should be rigorously justified.

Elsewhere....

Iran made several statements and issued a working paper on nuclear disarmament that castigated some or all of the nuclear weapon states for failing to fulfil their Article VI obligations in several areas. Going into detail about the modernization of arsenals and contradictions in the policies and statements of the US, UK and France in particular, Iran quoted from NGO briefings and documents to substantiate its arguments. Though well documented and expressed, however, Iran's arguments are perceived by many NPT delegations as playing to the gallery in order to distract and divert attention from the ongoing concerns about Iran's own nuclear programme and ambitions. Others, most notably the EU and United States, seemed to play the same game, however, when they extended their general criticisms of Iran into their cluster 1 statements. While there is undoubtedly a connection between proliferation concerns and the confidence and will to pursue disarmament, the cluster 1 focus ought to prioritise those states that actually have nuclear weapons, while other sessions provide a more appropriate basis from which to address the uses and abuses of Article IV and failures to comply fully and unreservedly with safeguards provisions and inspectors.

As Canada seems weaker than before on practical proposals and constructive initiatives, Australia is showing a noticeably more positive attitude, as expressed in the opening sentence of its Cluster 1 statement: "Australia under a new government is fully committed to realising a world free from nuclear weapons". In Australia's view, this will require all states to play their part, with further irreversible reductions from the NWS, a confirmed reduced role for them in national security policies, further practical measures to "raise the threshold for nuclear weapons use and help avoid the risk of miscalculation" and "calibrated steps that buttress international peace and security".

More on the session on security assurances tomorrow, as debate continues on cluster 2 covering safeguards and NWFZs.

Thanks to Tristan Price for contributing notes and to Reaching Critical Will for scanning and posting statements and documents as soon as they become available. See www.reachingcriticalwill.org

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