Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 8
Decisions Taken

Just after 10.00 p.m. on Friday 21 May, the States Parties attending the Third Preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) adopted their report and applauded the Chair, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, who had brought the PrepCom to a successful conclusion.

Earlier in the day, there were long faces and furrowed brows as many diplomats gave up hope of a positive outcome. The outstanding problems included: allocation of items to the Main Committees for 2000, where Egypt was still holding out for the PrepCom to recommend a subsidiary body on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; background documentation, particularly whether to cover the 1995 Resolution; whether and how to forward draft recommendations on the products of the 2000 Review Conference; and what to do with the Chair's working paper on substance.

After hours of waiting, during which the Chair met with various groupings which included some of the key non-aligned governments, Arab states, the nuclear weapon states, and 'problem solving' delegations with ideas, the following compromises were finally agreed.

1) Subsidiary bodies and allocation of treaty items to committee Despite a growing concern about the inefficiency and inappropriateness of basing the treaty's review on debates in three committees, it was agreed to allocate the treaty articles and preambular paragraphs (but not the 1995 Principles and Objectives) to the three main committees along the lines followed since 1985, but without prejudice to proposals to change the structure, voiced by Canada and others. The PrepCom also noted that the Review Conference could consider and agree whether to establish subsidiary bodies within the main committees. In response to demands by Egypt and South Africa, there was written acknowledgement that some states parties had proposed subsidiary bodies on nuclear disarmament and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, leaving it up to the 2000 Review Conference to decide, in accordance with the 1995 decisions. Egypt had wanted a more definite recommendation, while the nuclear weapon states (especially Russia and the United States) had wanted to leave out the reference to subsidiary bodies. In view of the fact that rule 34 of the rules of procedure had been amended to reflect the reference to subsidiary bodies in paragraph 6 of Decision 1 on strengthening the review process, advocates of establishing subsidiary bodies in the end contented themselves with getting some mentions and leaving the decision to the 2000 Review Conference.

2) Background documentation It was finally agreed that the U.N. Secretariat be asked to prepare documents on the various treaty articles, as well as the CTBT and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East "reflecting developments since 1995 with a view to realising fully the objectives of the resolution". Documents were also requested from the IAEA and the various secretariats overseeing the NWFZ treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok. By this means, Egypt was successful in reinforcing its view that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was part of the package of decisions taken in 1995, while the United States was able to head off any special privileges for this resolution, including avoiding any additional responsibilities being undertaken by the depositary states (Britain, Russia and the United States), who had sponsored the resolution in 1995. While some expressed surprised that the United States had 'given in' on this issue, its more flexible approach from the beginning of the PrepCom had given hope that a compromise agreement would be found.

3) Recommendations on the outcome for 2000 Following a useful general debate during the first day of the PrepCom, in which some delegations outlined their views about what agreements, decisions and/or documents ("products") the 2000 Conference should aim for, Reyes circulated a paper on May 13 which reflected what appeared to be the majority view. France, Iran, Egypt and Mexico objected to putting forward recommendations for two documents, which they viewed as separating the review and forward-looking functions of the conference. After two further drafts, the PrepCom agreed a much less specific recommendation on "outcome" (rather than "products"). Without saying anything about expected reports or documented agreements, it outlined the Review Conference tasks of evaluating the results of the past five years and identifying future action, as well as examining the functioning of the review process and addressing what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and achieve universality. Once again, Egypt achieved a mention of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, together with the decisions on principles and objectives and strengthening the review process, reinforcing their validity as a package. South Africa, which will chair the 2000 Conference, was understood to be disappointed that a more specific recommendation for two primary documents had not been made, as this could have assisted its planning and structuring in 2000.

4. Substance Most of the final three days were taken up with considering first the Chair's May 14 working paper on substance and then its revision, issued on May 20. The May 20 revision expanded the original 31 paragraphs to 61. Reyes appears to have included those proposals made during the debate on Wednesday (May 19) which had substantial support with only one, two or a few delegations expressing opposition. Similarly, paragraphs which had substantial opposition, such as nuclear sharing, were omitted from the revised draft. During May 20, states parties had gone through the 61 paragraphs identifying whether there were any objections, but not attempting to draft changes or get agreement where objection was registered. By the end of Thursday, the question uppermost in delegations' minds was: what to do with the paper now that it has been the subject of discussions/negotiations? Could it be transmitted to the 2000 Conference and if so, how?

Attempts were made to establish the 'status' or 'standing' of the working paper through introductory paragraph(s) placing the paper in context (the 'chapeau'). Several alternative proposals for how this might be done were advanced, and for several hours it looked as if the PrepCom would become irrevocably deadlocked. Some, including France and the United States, wanted to differentiate between the paragraphs which had or had not been formally objected to and perhaps to recommend the 'agreed' sections; Russia wanted the paper to have only the same status as any of the national proposals made earlier in the week; since almost all the text on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East had been challenged by one or more of the NWS, the non-aligned and others argued against any preferential treatment for the more innocuous issues, hinting also that they would block agreement on the PrepCom report as a whole if there was no reflection of the substantive discussions and work.

Recognising that without consensus the paper could not go through as agreed recommendations, a growing number of delegations argued for it to be annexed to the report, whole, for consideration in 2000, while acknowledging that there was no agreement on the full text. In the end, the Chair manoeuvred through an Irish-New Zealand proposal, whereby both the May 14 and May 20 Chair's papers were annexed to the PrepCom report, together with the written proposals made by delegations. This compromise was hailed as a victory by those who wanted the text to be forwarded to the 2000 Review Conference as something the PrepCom had worked on, while others could claim victory in preventing the paper from having special authority or status.

Assessment

After the impasse at the second PrepCom it had been widely predicted that the third PrepCom would be difficult, and that proved to be the case. Nevertheless, all the essential decisions for preparing and planning for the 2000 Review Conference were successfully taken, although certain issues were fudged or remitted to the Review Conference for decision there. For example, the allocation of items was based on the post-1985 main committees structure, with Canada, New Zealand and others determined to discuss better ways for the future, including a possible article by article review. South Africa had wanted the PrepCom to recommend that there should be at least two final documents in 2000, covering review and future principles and objectives. Faced with strong initial opposition to this from France and Iran, joined later by Mexico, Egypt and a few other NAM states, saying they preferred a single document comprising both review and forward-looking elements, the 'recommendations' from the PrepCom on products merely reaffirmed the 1995 decisions and identified some obvious options. Nevertheless, that leaves the Chair-designate, Ambassador Jacob Selebi of South Africa, a reasonably free hand to undertake consultations over the next year.

As forecast, the Middle East and nuclear disarmament carried the major burdens of contention. Blamed for much of 1998's stalemate, and through bilateral meetings with Egypt over the past year, the United States came much more prepared to compromise on some issues. For example, the United States agreed to name Israel together with India, Pakistan and Cuba, in calls for universality, but not to name Israel on its own in relation to the Middle East. Intensive sessions between these two delegations and also among the Arab states, sometimes involving the Chair, enabled the final compromises to be made. In the end the Middle East resolution was linked several times with the decisions taken in 1995, and it was agreed to request the UN secretariat to prepare a document on this, which (like the rest) was to "give balanced, objective and factual descriptions of the relevant developments, be as short as possible and be easily readable".

The way for agreement on subsidiary bodies in 2000 was paved by acceptance of the change to the rules of procedure, which went through remarkably smoothly at the beginning of the PrepCom. Like Canada, which reiterated its proposal for PrepComs to have an independent role in commenting on contemporaneous events, but did not insist on a recommendation on that from the PrepCom, South Africa set down markers regarding security assurances and its 1998 proposal for a subsidiary body to consider practical proposals on nuclear disarmament, but did not insist on recommendations from 2000. Egypt, however, insisting that "nothing was agreed until everything was agreed" tried nevertheless to push for a recommendation on establishing a subsidiary body on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, before finally agreeing on a mention, with the understanding that the 2000 Conference would consider the proposal.

Ambassador Reyes was generally held to have chaired extremely well. Despite taking over late in the year, he had prepared well and consulted carefully. Although many delegations voiced serious doubts in the second week about his strategy with regard to the Chairs' papers, especially when he took delegations through the process of giving their views paragraph by paragraph on the revised substance paper, he retained the authority and calm to bring the edges together and make use of solution-building suggestions from different governmental and non-governmental sources. Reyes has been nominated to chair the most difficult committee, MC I on nuclear disarmament in 2000, where he will no doubt need all the skill, perseverance and humour that he displayed this fortnight in New York.

I will write a much fuller analysis over the next few weeks, but finish with a few brief comments. The continuing wide differences in intention and perceptions over the Middle East and nuclear disarmament are likely again to be major sources of conflict and disagreement in 2000.

The problem of proliferation in South Asia, precipitated by last year's nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan, was addressed more fully than in past years, but the states parties avoided the temptation merely to condemn, and sought instead to urge constructive solutions, including calling for full compliance with the measures stipulated in UNSC 1172.

The United States came across as more engaged and flexible this year, with Egypt, in contrast, looking somewhat divided and raising concerns even among NAM colleagues that its tactics could be counterproductively divisive. Following the US precedent set in 1998, four out of the five NWS (Britain, France, Russia and the United States) presented some form of factsheet summarising their actions, especially on article VI, but were not disposed to discuss present difficulties or future actions. Russia engaged more, but clearly wanted to keep the lid on any progress or implementation under the review process. Able to announce the decisions of the 1998 strategic defence review, Britain appeared much more comfortable than last year. Of the NWS, Britain appeared the most flexible on a number of issues, actively seeking solutions to enable the PrepCom to lay positive foundations for 2000 and avoid a further PrepCom meeting, as had been threatened earlier in the week.

Questions rumbled below the surface (not least in the European Union) about the role taken by France, which challenged the unity that the German presidency of the EU sought to represent on several important issues, especially products and procedures. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade just days before the PrepCom started ensured that the Chinese would raise security questions about force and sovereignty. Despite its refusal to work within the 'P-5' context, China participated fully in the PrepCom. Amongst the familiar positions on no-first use etc, there were clear signals that any discussion of steps towards quantitative or qualitative nuclear disarmament would be met by linked concerns about missile defence, which should be expected to play a larger role in the coming year and through 2000.

Many considered this had been a "good conference" for the New Agenda Coalition, launched in June 1998, just after the second NPT PrepCom. Their first proposal was co-sponsored by 32 states and the working paper by 44. Several of the paragraphs in the May 20 Chair's working paper echoed NAC language and approaches. It will be interesting to see how the New Agenda Coalition builds in the run-up to 2000.

Finally, it was a mixed PrepCom for the non-governmental organisations. NGOs had contributed well to discussions in the run-up to the PrepCom. Following a fairly well attended informal plenary session in the first week, which heard 13 statements on a range of treaty-related issues, a roundtable discussion between NGOs and some delegations was held, the first ever to be put on the NPT agenda for voluntary participation. It was attended by several European ambassadors and representatives from some 10 other delegations. On the other hand, access to the actual proceedings has become worse than ever.

NGOs were excluded from everything except the opening debate and about five minutes on the last day, when the gavel came down on a PrepCom report that the public had had no opportunity to hear. As a consequence, obtaining information on the text of decisions this year has been particularly hard, and would not have been possible without the help of delegation members from all sides.

If the reason for excluding NGOs from hearing most of the session is to avoid having 'formal' sessions requiring summary records, then discretion could be employed to admit the handful of NGOs interested in following these issues to be present at 'informal' sessions, not requiring summary records. NGOs could be requested to leave if exchanges of views became sensitive negotiations. If, on the other hand, the problem is that some delegations are wary of saying what they have to say openly, this begs two questions: i) what are you afraid of? and ii) is it better for NGOs to receive reports of your words filtered through hearsay and the opinions of opposing delegations than to hear directly and judge for ourselves?

Written by Rebecca Johnson.

Grateful thanks to all the NGOs and friendly delegates who made these NPT reports possible, and especially to Nicola Butler, who contributed greatly to getting these reports out.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 7
Make or Break?

Working Paper on Products

For the past two days, states parties to the NPT, attending the third PrepCom to the 2000 Review Conference, have been going through the working papers submitted by the Chair, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia. By the end of Thursday, he had provided a second draft of the paper recommending the 'products' (documented agreements) which the 2000 Conference should seek to achieve. Gone was the specific recommendation for two documents, one identifying actions and approaches for the next five years and the other to review and evaluate implementation in the past five years. The Chair's working paper affirmed that the objectives of the 2000 Conference must be to look forwards as well as back, but left open the question of how this should be done, and how many documents should be negotiated in 2000.

Leaving the question open seemed to satisfy the main concerns of Mexico. Egypt, however, still pushed for a single document encompassing both review and future programmes, and France tried to introduce amendments to narrow down the options and make one document the likely outcome. Egypt also wanted the paper to reflect proposals for subsidiary bodies on the Middle East and nuclear disarmament, but others consider that this debate and decision should be left to 2000. Although most of those who objected to the first draft are now signalling that they could accept the second, with a few minor clarifications, a number of non-aligned countries have warned that they would only agree a working paper with 'product' recommendations if it were accompanied by a working paper on substantive issues.

Working Paper on Substance

As parties went through the May 14 Chair's paper paragraph by paragraph, putting in their amendments or alternatives, a widening gulf of perceptions and intentions has become exposed, mainly between the non-aligned NNWS and the NWS and their allies, and also between incrementalists and fundamentalists. There are tensions within both the NAM and the Western group as one or two delegations continually hold out against views that most of their colleagues support or would at least be prepared to accept. Some of the proposals are the epitome of moderation; others reflect pet national positions. Some seek to delete entire paragraphs, such as para 7 relating to nuclear sharing and articles I and II. Others want to expand or narrow the scope of existing sections, such as para 8 on the South Asian tests or para 13 on the CTBT. Some parts of the Chair's paper have hardly drawn attention, indicating a wide measure of support and consensus. In others, however, especially relating to nuclear disarmament and the Middle East, the range of different proposals and perspectives would be hard to reconcile, except at a fairly bland level.

The key question now is whether agreement can be reached on making recommendations on substance to the 2000 Conference. One senior diplomat characterised the dilemma as a choice between a paper with agreed status but not much content and a paper dealing substantively with the issues, but without agreement (and therefore no status). Unfortunately, he concluded, the PrepCom looked as if it was heading for something with neither content nor status. Early in the week it had been feared that some of the NWS might insist on watering down the substance in the Chair's paper only to reject the paper in the end, a common ploy in consensus-based structures. There is also a concern that some individual states may be prepared to sacrifice the chances of agreement in order to pursue other agendas or interests.

Indonesia, on behalf of the NAM, today warned that they would not be satisfied this time with only procedural recommendations: if the PrepCom could not agree some recommendations on substance as well, then it would be regarded as a failure.

Although there are reports that the United States and Egypt may be nearing agreement on some of the outstanding issues regarding the Middle East resolution, including background documentation, no decisions have yet been forthcoming. There have been whispered speculations about a possible fourth PrepCom, which the majority would be keen to avoid, and talk of suspending the PrepCom if no agreement on substance is forthcoming by Friday, with a view to reconvening it some months later. These are drastic options, and may be coming up now in order to galvanise the political will to ensure a constructive outcome. With two days left, and a second draft of the Chair's working paper on substance promised for Thursday, a positive outcome is within reach but by no means certain.

Security Assurances

The following sections on security assurances and nuclear energy summarise the statements made in the general and cluster debates during the first week and do not reflect any of the discussion over the Chair's papers in the last two days. Indeed, reflecting either their lack of relative importance or controversy, these issues have barely been raised in interventions on the Chair's working papers. Member States, which through their accession to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) have forsworn the option of developing nuclear weapons of their own, have long demanded guarantees from the NWS against being threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Such 'negative security assurances' have so far been conditional and hedged with exceptions, offered only on a individual and voluntary basis by the NWS, reinforced through endorsement in two UN Security Council resolutions, 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

As in past years, China has called for legally binding instruments by which the NWS would "undertake unconditionally...not to be the first to use nuclear weapons nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" against NNWS. Indonesia, in presenting the NAM paper, reiterated the long-standing position that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons (the only genuine guarantee for NNWS against the threat or use of nuclear weapons), a legally binding regime on security assurances should be concluded. As in their 1998 working paper, the NAM called for the PrepComs to negotiate on a legal instrument to be adopted by the 2000 Review Conference. South Africa submitted a working paper containing a draft protocol to the NPT on security assurances, which it wants to be negotiated and attached to the Treaty. Iran argued for three kinds of multilateral agreements to be pursued within the NPT context: negative security assurances to NNWS, a treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons, and a convention of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

Australia also supported consideration by the NPT Parties of possible further measures on security assurances and wanted the NWS to reiterate the terms of their 1995 declarations and UN Security Council resolution 984 (April 1995). New Zealand, however, took the view that "a real test of the commitment to security assurances must be ratification by the nuclear weapon states of the Protocols to the nuclear weapon free zone treaties". Although New Zealand "remained interested in exploring the possibilities for more robust assurances", it regarded negotiation of a single internationally legally binding instrument "problematic", and was not sure of the right way forward.

In Algeria's view, the South Asian nuclear tests and NATO's strategic concept as confirmed in the April 1999 Washington Summit have particularly exposed the inadequacies of the present assurances contained in UNSC 984. Where the NAM statement merely noted that the CD had established an ad hoc committee in 1998 on negative security assurances, something which even the United States and Britain mentioned, Algeria called for this committee to be reconvened to negotiate and conclude some kind of treaty or multilateral instrument on security assurances. Nigeria, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Malaysia mentioned security assurances as important, but did not express any preference for how they should be dealt with.

In a move which surprised some, Italy gave a statement on behalf also of Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Norway (the 'Nato-5'), which acknowledged "we have to comply with the legitimate concern of the States party to the NPT with regard to their security needs, and work for an international framework that could assure those parties to the Treaty that are non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of such weapons". The NATO-5 recognised the importance of security assurances in the context of NWFZ and of building on UNSC 984. They called for further steps to be identified, which "could take the form of a legally binding treaty". Reflecting some differences among the New Agenda states, the NAC statement called only for a legally binding instrument on NSA, without specifying where the issue should best be addressed.

Nuclear Energy

As in previous years, many statements supported the Article IV provision on nuclear energy and called for wider financial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Many of the nuclear supplier states emphasised the importance of the export control regime. In response to criticism from the NAM and others that these controls impeded access to technology and assistance for developing nuclear energy, Italy, as current chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), announced that a comprehensive report on transparency of NSG activities will be prepared in time for the 2000 Review Conference.

Several states supported the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which held its first review meeting in Vienna last month. Austria, one of the few states which refuses to back nuclear power, drew attention to its understanding that information provided at the meeting "clearly showed the existence of safety deficits" and that "implementation of measures for improvement can and will be expected". More than ten years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine, it is clear that money is still required to assist in clean-up operations. The Kyrgyz Republic wanted stricter procedures for the safe handling, transport, storage, and disposal of sensitive nuclear material to be observed. In a section specifying the production of nuclear weapons, but more widely applicable, both the Kyrgyz statement and a working paper from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, noted that "there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associate nuclear fuel-cycle activities". In addition, a number of states raised concerns about safety hazards arising from the Year 2000 (Y2K) computer problems, also called the Millennium bug. Several supported IAEA efforts to deal with the problem, although some, including Australia and Austria, wanted better information.

Several, including Australia and New Zealand, who cited last year's meeting of the South Pacific Forum, and Peru, Chile and Argentina, expressed concerns about the maritime transport of radioactive materials through their region. New Zealand reiterated its request for states to adopt "at least prior notification and ideally prior informed consent procedures" for transshipment of radioactive materials. However, France and Japan, which are responsible for transporting much of this material insisted that there must be no impediment to the "rights and freedoms of navigation".

Written by Rebecca Johnson and Nicola Butler.

Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 6 - May 17

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On Papers, Zones and the Middle East

When asked how the closed debates on the Chair's working papers were going, one diplomat (outside for a smoke) said it was like passing the 34th floor: "okay so far". New York is full of skyscrapers so such analogies come easy. After the confusion and deadlock at the Second PrepCom of the NPT in 1998, diplomats attending the Third PrepCom are nervous of failure. The 2000 Review Conference will be the first real test of the strengthened review process agreed in 1995. A lot therefore hinges on having a successful and constructive meeting now, to sort out as many practical issues as possible before 2000.

So far, the first week of the PrepCom seemed to have gone well. The Chair, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, had prepared carefully and took the meeting briskly through a general debate and substantive sessions on nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, including special attention devoted to the Middle East, the fissile materials production ban (mired in CD politicking) and practical approaches for nuclear disarmament, as called for in the 1995 programme of action. The opening debate also enabled delegations to air views on the desired outcome and 'products' (documents containing negotiated agreements) for the 2000 Conference. Underneath the businesslike atmosphere, however, there is a sense of unhealed scars and grievances, contributing to lurking beartraps: would the United States and Egypt find a way to compromise on how to address the 1995 Middle East Resolution and Israel's nuclear programme? would states cooperate in finalising the preparations for the 2000 Conference or would some throw spanners into the works to advance their other political agendas? would the PrepCom succeed this time in making recommendations on substance to the 2000 Conference, and if so, what would they say about nuclear disarmament, the South Asian tests or the Middle East?

Monday 17 May was almost entirely taken up with discussions about the role and content of the two working papers tabled by Reyes last Friday. First, however, it was agreed to include the CTBT Organisation with the regional intergovernmental organisations, such as OPANAL or the South Pacific Forum. This paved the way for the rules of procedure to be adopted.

The Chair's first paper sought agreement for recommending two basic 'products' for 2000, a forward looking 'objectives' document and a review and assessment (backward-looking) document, leaving open the question of other possible agreements. It was supported by several delegations, including Brazil, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Britain, though some had suggestions for changes. For example several regarded the paragraph on making "every effort" to adopt documents by consensus redundant, since the rules of procedure already encourage this, outlining the voting procedure under rule 28 if consensus is too elusive. France was especially adamant on the importance of consensus and again argued for a composite document based on the work of the three main committees. Mexico, Egypt and Iran, however, considered it premature to make a commitment to two principal documents. Like France (but for different reasons) they would prefer a single 'sink or swim' document, comprising both forward and backward looking elements. After many statements the delegations were no closer to agreement. The debate was therefore shelved, although Reyes may seek to resubmit a revised version later in the week.

Reyes' second Chair's paper comprised 31 paragraphs covering eight themes: universality, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, the resolution on the Middle East and 'peaceful uses' of nuclear energy. It was intended to offer a starting point for developing recommendations on substance for the second PrepCom. Some delegations wanted to start immediate negotiations, seeking to insert their proposals into the text or delete paragraphs they did not like. Others thought it would be better to have an open discussion on the paper, but leaving it to the Chair and Secretariat to incorporate the views and revise the drafts. It is expected that negotiations on the themes will begin on Tuesday, but some delegations are still wondering where such work fits in. The recommendations from the PrepCom, even if adopted by consensus, are not binding on the Review Conference, although they could undoubtedly help to facilitate the planning and negotiations for 2000.... or not.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Positive references were made to the concept of nuclear weapon free zones "freely arrived at" by the relevant states in a region, and especially to the full implementation of the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Rarotonga), Africa (Pelindaba) and South East Asia (Bangkok). Referring to problems over the protocols covering the zone of application of the security assurances expected from them, the United States said that it continued to "work intensively with the nations of Southeast Asia to fashion an approach that would permit the United States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok". Brazil raised its sponsorship of UNGA resolutions supporting a nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas, noting that the initiative was receiving increasing support, with 154 votes in favour in the 1998 UN General Assembly.

More and more states, notably the United States and Britain, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland and Mongolia, have welcomed progress on the initiative by five Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their region. Noting that South Asian nuclear tests had "underlined the importance of regional approaches to disarmament and nonproliferation", the Kyrgyz Republic joined Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in updating the NPT on their progress (together with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. A working paper from the five Central Asian states welcomed the continued assistance from the UN and IAEA, as well as participants from the NWS, and hoped that a treaty establishing the Central Asian NWFZ would be completed and ready for signature at the earliest date possible.

Belarus reiterated its initiative on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe, prompting a furious response from 13 others. Croatia, on behalf also of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, rejected Belarus' initiative on the grounds that there was no consensus in the region and that NWFZ "should not interfere with existing or evolving security arrangements". In a bitter exchange, Belarus queried the notion of collective security "based on a military alliance whose major strategic component is the concept of nuclear deterrence and refusal to undertake an obligation not to use nuclear weapons first" and remarked that of the 13 "three...have already become new members of the North Atlantic alliance and are bearing responsibility for barbaric bombing of sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without authorisation of the UN Security Council using, inter alia, prohibited types of weapons". Others, it noted, were seeking NATO membership.

Middle East

The NAM working paper, introduced by Indonesia, contained six paragraphs supporting the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, including establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It called on Israel to accede to the NPT without further delay. The NAM also pointedly emphasised article I's prohibition on transferring nuclear devices or technology to Israel and sought to prevent any assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel "as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards". The NAM statement proposed that the 2000 Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II "to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East..."

On behalf of the Arab States, Algeria noted that since 1995 all the Arab states had become NPT parties, leaving Israel as the sole state in the region still refusing to accede to the Treaty. The Arab States submitted a working paper which reinforced the recommendations made by the NAM paper and called on all NPT parties, particularly the NWS to "shoulder their responsibilities, extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts" to achieve the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. Statements by several Arab countries supported the NAM and Arab League positions. Egypt also demanded that a "substantive part of the report of the PrepCom" should reflect the issue in a separate section, calling on Israel to accede to the Treaty and stressing the "special responsibility of the depositary states that have co-sponsored the 1995 resolution". Egypt submitted its own working paper, for the PrepCom to transmit to the Review Conference. It proposed language relating Israel's nuclear capabilities to articles I, II, III, IV, and VII.

Many others, including Germany, on behalf of the EU, Canada, Malaysia and South Africa, made clear their support for the implementation of the 1995 resolution, which France (in a separate statement) called "an integral part of the set of four documents agreed" at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The EU urged "the earliest possible accession by all States in the region which have not yet done so to the NPT and to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, as well as to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in the pursuit of the goal of universal adherence to all these instruments..." Several others, including the United States and South Africa echoed this call. Emphasising the importance also of the Middle East Peace Process, South Africa underlined from its own experience that "with the destruction of our nuclear weapons capability came real security for ourselves and for the countries of our region". South Africa reiterated the paragraph from the New Agenda Coalition resolution to the UNGA, calling on "all three states that are nuclear weapons capable" and that have not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse their pursuit to develop and deploy nuclear weapons and "refrain from any actions which would undermine regional and international peace and security". Nigeria also reminded the Middle East states of the positive lessons learned from the successful experience of establishing the African NWFZ, including "the positive and catalytic political effect from Apartheid South Africa's successful peace process with the frontline and neighbouring African states".

Seeking to avoid the problems of 1998, the United States said that it shared the view that the goals and objectives of the 1995 Middle East resolution "remain valid until those goals are achieved", and that "Middle East issues are relevant to discussions of universality and NWFZ", as well as considering issues of universality, compliance and enhanced safeguards. The United States gave further details of its approach, declaring that "to promote further adherence [to the NPT] the United States, by law and policy, does not engage in nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the Treaty". Noting again problems of Iraqi non-compliance and the South Asian tests, the United States said that "we see that the challenges facing the NPT require the review process to look beyond a single region and focus on issues across the board". They must now be hoping that the election of Ehud Barak as Israel's new Prime Minister will herald a more positive approach to the peace process and regional security and non-proliferation issues.

Written by Rebecca Johnson with assistance from Nicola Butler.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 5
Fissban and Safeguards

At the end of the first week, the Chair of the 1999 NPT PrepCom, Ambassador Camilio Reyes of Colombia issued two working papers. One contained draft recommendations about products for the 2000 Conference, particularly the number and type of documents which the NPT parties should aim to adopt. Responding to the majority of views put forward on the first day and in consultations, the working paper suggested two main documents, one covering the review and the other looking forward, with the possibility of further documents on strengthening the review process, or other decisions or resolutions. The paper encapsulated an approach that until last week seemed close to convergence. Egypt, however, has now joined Iran and France in preferring a single document covering both the forward and backward looking elements, with reports of others, including the United States, possibly wavering.

Some seem to hope that going back to the single-document format will restore pre-1995 conditions and reduce the impact of any objectives or programme of action the 2000 Conference may put forward. Others seem to believe that a single document, comprising both forward and backward looking elements, will act as a more effective lever, since its success or failure could hold the Conference hostage. It is likely that there will be further discussion of these issues, but since it is not essential for the PrepCom to make formal recommendations on the products, the decision might best be left for the 2000 Review Conference, before which further consultations could be held by the President-designate.

Reyes' second working paper offered 31 paragraphs on the seven themes in the 1995 Principles and Objectives plus the Resolution on the Middle East. His aim is clearly to seek consensus for recommendations to be transmitted to 2000, without watering down important concerns to a level of lowest common denominator banality. Given the spectrum of views to be accommodated, this is a difficult task, so it is expected that the May 14 working paper will be the focus of further debate throughout the second week. It now looks likely that the PrepCom will be able on Monday to adopt the rules of procedure for 2000 and some of the outstanding procedural issues. Bilateral discussions between the United States and Egypt have gone up and down, with reportedly no agreement yet on how to address the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In that event the PrepCom is expected to remit its decision on background documentation to later this week.

Briefing 5 summarises the special session devoted to attempts to facilitate negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the cluster 2 session on safeguards, covering article III. Security assurances, nuclear weapon free zones, and the special session on the Middle East will be covered in Briefing 6.

Fissban

More than half the statements to the general debate, as well as around 14 interventions in the special session on fissban attested to the importance of this issue. All expressed frustration about the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. In general, when referring to the proposed treaty prohibiting the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), western delegations and the NWS tend to speak of a cut-off treaty or FMCT, emphasising the halting of future production. Non-aligned countries more frequently refer to a fissile materials treaty or FMT, while others (including the Acronym Institute) prefer the abbreviation 'fissban', which does not prejudge the scope and approach. Though there appeared to be general acceptance that the responsibility for verification should be assigned to the IAEA, Russia and others preferred to speak of it as a 'controlling mechanism'. Some, like South Africa, supported the IAEA but considered that "certain proliferation and resource constraints" would have to be addressed.

Germany on behalf of the EU and 11 other European countries said that "an FMCT is not only a contribution to, but an integral and indispensable part of nuclear disarmament and an important step towards a world free of nuclear weapons". The EU called on NPT members to "demonstrate their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament by doing everything in their power to facilitate immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations...[and].. to send a strong and unambiguous signal" to the CD. Australia accused the CD of "possibly frittering away a short-lived opportunity" and underlined all the reasons why the fissban was important to international security, non-proliferation and was "an essential and unavoidable step" towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States, Britain and especially France, which has irreversibly shut down its facilities for the military production of plutonium and HEU, also catalogued the ways in which a fissban would contribute to nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament. Russia clearly stated that it would not be appropriate to consider current stocks in the fissban's scope. China, which had earlier reiterated that negotiations should commence without further delay, appeared to question the point of negotiating new agreements when the settlement of important strategic issues like missile defence, the expansion of NATO and the "indiscriminate" bombing of a sovereign state (in Yugoslavia) were of "much higher priority". Many applauded the trilateral discussions between Russia, the United States and the IAEA, suggesting that the arrangements for placing surplus material under IAEA supervision could be built, including all the NWS.

The NAM statement called for negotiations on a treaty "banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons" or explosive purposes. The NAM regretted the "continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues" in the CD. Commenting that the responsibility lay on all, Algeria noted that there remained differences in perceptions regarding what the treaty should cover. Though not placing conditions on the negotiations, Algeria wanted the treaty to play its role in developing an international regime to address the weapons usable stocks held by all nuclear capable states.

Some entered into more concrete discussion of the key issues and the approaches they advocated. There were many similarities in the points made by Canada, Japan, Norway and South Africa, but also some differences. Japan called for the NWS to announce a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons, which Britain, France, Russia and the United States say they have in de facto terms already done. Canada wanted an official moratorium to be declared by "all states concerned". Japan identified five principles for the fissban: universality, especially adherence by all states capable of producing nuclear weapons; non-discrimination, to ensure that the treaty did not create differential obligations between the NWS and others in terms of rights and obligations; cost-effectiveness; that the treaty should not affect the use of nuclear energy 'for peaceful purposes'; and "that the issue of existing stocks must be dealt with" in "parallel discussions" if it is not realistic to find a comprehensive solution in the fissban negotiations.

Saying that focussing exclusively on a cut-off of future production was not enough, Norway called for "the entire field of weapons usable fissile material" to be addressed "in a comprehensive manner". Praising the 'pathbreaking initiative' of the US-Russian Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium, Norway identified four aspects that should be addressed multilaterally: future production as envisaged by the CD's negotiating mandate (contained in the Shannon report); stockpiles related to excess weapons material, including the development of norms covering irreversibility, safety, security and standards for national control, auditing and transparency; HEU for non-explosive purposes and naval propulsion; and military stocks, as outlined in Norway's 1997 four-step proposal for increased transparency and confidence-building through voluntary measures.

Building on its own experiences, South Africa substantially agreed with the foregoing suggestions for how the negotiations and verification system might address "non-proscribed" uses of "weapons-grade" materials, surplus stocks and irreversibility. South Africa further argued that verification arrangements should be worked out for facilities where production is closed down or redirected into non-military uses. Noting that an essential function of a fissban was to contribute to a "quantitative capping" of nuclear arsenals, South Africa suggested that it would be better to focus beyond fissile materials and include "certain other transuranic elements from which nuclear explosives can be made". Recognising the practical difficulties of providing fully accurate and complete declarations about past production and stocks, South Africa considered that declarations of historical production could be made as a "political gesture of goodwill".

Safeguards

During the closed debate on safeguards, many states emphasised their support for the IAEA Model Protocol, developed under the 93+2 programme to strengthen the safeguards regime. The EU statement announced that its member states would endeavour to conclude their ratification procedures in time for the 2000 Review Conference, while the United States said it intended to submit its additional protocol to the Senate for advice and consent by the end of 1999. Although Russia and China reportedly contributed to the safeguards debate, no papers or English translations were made available to enable NGOs excluded from the session to assess what was said. There were several calls for all remaining states to conclude Additional Protocols with the IAEA without delay, with New Zealand proposing the goal of universal subscription to the Additional Protocol by the year 2000. In addition, there were calls for greater integration of traditional safeguards with Model Protocol safeguards, with the objectives of increased efficiency, cost effectiveness, and establishing both methods as the norm for safeguards and the full implementation of article III in the future.

In addition to references to non-compliance during the general debate, several states expressed concern about the lack of progress in implementing safeguards in the DPRK. A number also condemned Iraq's non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions on the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and supported efforts to re-establish an effective disarmament and monitoring regime.

Several states raised the problem of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The United States in particular proposed that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material be extended to cover nuclear material in domestic use and storage, a point with which Canada and others concurred. The IAEA Director General will convene an experts meeting in Vienna in November to consider this further. France, however, expressed reservations about the sensitivity of verification in this area, arguing that "the best is liable to be the enemy of the good".

There was support for further efforts on the part of the NWS to put 'excess' fissile materials under IAEA safeguards, including the US-Russia-IAEA trilateral initiative. The UK also outlined the steps announced in its Strategic Defence Review to place more nuclear material under international safeguards and to increase transparency in relation to all its holdings of nuclear materials. France highlighted its plans, along with Germany, Italy and Russia, to reprocess excess weapons plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.

Written by Rebecca Johnson and Nicola Butler.

The section on nuclear energy will be held over to a later briefing.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 4
Nuclear Disarmament (2)

This is the second part of the briefing on disarmament issues raised during the closed debates at the third NPT PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference. Many statements emphasised the importance of fulfilling the obligations in the 1995 Principles and Objectives, especially the CTBT and fissile materials production ban. Many also underlined the importance of the US and Russia moving beyond the START impasse and undertaking accelerated reductions in their strategic arsenals. Several went further, detailing actions that would reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons, including those identified by the 1996 Canberra Commission, such as taking nuclear weapons off alert and restricting or withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons.

Algeria, Peru, Egypt and others recalled the various proposals from non-aligned states in the CD and argued that the ideas for substantial progress were available but that the political will appeared to be lacking among some parties. This was a theme echoed by many statements, with frequent calls for the NWS to reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to speeding up the process for getting there. New Zealand, Canada and others rejected the view (heard from some of the NWS) that article VI makes nuclear disarmament contingent on general and complete disarmament, with Canada providing legal and political arguments in support of their case that nuclear and general disarmament are two distinct undertakings by all NPT parties.

The impasse in the Conference on Disarmament inevitably spilled into the debate. A large number of non-aligned delegations called for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to be established. As in past years, the statement from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a CD committee to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons "with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination". Others, such as South Africa, Japan and Canada emphasised the need for the CD to set up a committee to discuss nuclear disarmament issues as a first step. Italy, on behalf of five NATO countries (including Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Norway) spoke in favour of a working group at the CD to exchange information on nuclear disarmament. While dismissing the idea of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, France said it would be "prepared to join in a consensus" based on the NATO-5 proposal for the CD. South Africa, which has its own proposal for a CD committee on nuclear disarmament, said that in view of the importance of having some kind of mechanism to address the issue, it would be willing to lend its support to the NATO-5 proposal.

Proposals for Action

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) asserted that all NPT parties bear responsibility for nuclear disarmament, particularly the NWS with the largest arsenals. The NAM statement and interventions from several non-aligned delegations reiterated their long-held demand that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons "with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination". The NAM also argued for a subsidiary deliberative body to be established at the 2000 Review Conference, quoting the commitment in 4c of the 1995 Principles and Objectives committing NPT parties to "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons".

Brazil made a statement on behalf of 32 countries, based on the New Agenda Coalition, which originated in a statement on June 9 1998 by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. Following from their UN General Assembly resolution (53/77Y), which garnered 114 votes in December 1998, seven of the originators were joined by Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Iran, Indonesia, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malawi, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. After reviewing the situation, including the START process, CTBT, nuclear testing in South Asia, lack of a fissile materials ban and security assurances, the NAC statement concluded that "the pace of efforts to implement all the obligations of the NPT is faltering". Concerned that the NWS were reaffirming their nuclear doctrines and re-rationalising the continued possession of nuclear weapons, the Coalition said that the NWS had not been fulfilling their obligations with sufficient vigour, and emphasised that "we must not enter the next millennium with the prospect that the retention of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future." NAC called for mutually reinforcing bilateral, plurilateral (among the NWS) and multilateral efforts to be pursued in concert, including greater progress on START reductions and steps to de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, including de-alerting and de-mating warheads from delivery vehicles and reducing reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as transparency and confidence-building measures. Critical of NATO's recent affirmation of the central role played by nuclear weapons in its alliance doctrine, NAC also called for "the early examination of measures to enhance strategic stability and to review strategic doctrines". A number of the co-sponsors gave their reasons for supporting the NAC initiative, with some elaborating more fully on the practical steps they would like to see.

Between the NAM and the NAC, it is clear that a large number of parties had strong views that more needed to be done. In addition to the NAM call for a nuclear weapons convention, several others reinforced this objective, including Egypt, Malaysia and Brazil. The NAC statement acknowledged that "the total and final elimination of nuclear weapons will require a multilateral agreement", without specifying further. Outlining actions on START, no-first-use, CTBT and fissban, China repeated its position that on that basis, "a convention banning nuclear weapons should be negotiated". Australia took the view that "until nuclear disarmament nears the elimination phase, it will be premature for the international community to address the question of a single weapons convention".

Speaking for the first time, Brazil -- whose recent accession to the NPT was enthusiastically welcomed in many statements -- outlined a comprehensive and practical programme, recognising that "after the CTBT and the FMT, there is a logical step at the multilateral level, that is, a Nuclear Weapon Convention..." urging parties to begin at least considering this objective. Brazil also called for interim steps that would complement and reinforce the bilateral reductions underway, including: the de-alerting of nuclear weapons; the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; an agreement on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons; an agreement not to increase or modernise nuclear arsenals; the removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites; and greater transparency on fissile materials stocks. Peru specifically supported the de-alerting and de-activation of nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of non-strategic weapons. Supporting the NAC statement, as well as more support for the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, Nigeria also called for the other NWS not to "sit on the sideline", but to join in nuclear disarmament negotiations. China reiterated its long-standing demand for a legally binding instrument among the NWS on no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Demands for more specific actions have increasingly been aired outside the non-aligned movement as well. Canada, for example, called for a new programme of action for 2000 to include the following additional elements: acceleration and full implementation of the START process, with the direct engagement of the other three NWS (Britain, China and France) "in the near future"; measures such as de-alerting, transparency and confidence-building, and negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons.

Warning that unless the tasks of nuclear disarmament were "thoroughly addressed, the NPT could lose its credibility", with grave consequences, Japan recalled its resolution to the UN GA (53/77 U). Like Canada, Japan emphasised the importance of the START process, CTBT and fissban, but also called for "further efforts" by all five NWS "to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their negotiations". Together with a growing number of states, Japan also underscored the importance of practical measures such as de-alerting and de-targeting, as well as assistance in dismantling nuclear weapons, and managing and disposing of the resultant fissile materials. Both France and Britain said that their weapons were no longer targeted and that they had reduced the state of alert, though without characterising this as 'de-alerting' in the way that most states intended.

Written by Rebecca Johnson with assistance from Nicola Butler.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 3
Nuclear Disarmament (1)

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and issues relating to articles I, II and VI of the NPT have been raised in three sessions: the 10 May general debate, a general session devoted to cluster 1, and special time, which had been allocated to specific consideration of paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. The special session was intended to promote discussion of practical steps which might be included in a programme of action in principles and objectives for 2000 and several states took the opportunity to make concrete and interesting proposals. While the EU shared Australia's characterisation of progress on disarmament in the last five years as "impressive", Egypt summed up the majority assessment that progress had been "slight" by comparison with what was required and the post Cold War opportunities.

All the NWS and many others gave their views, in individual or collective statements. In addition to the working paper from more than 100 NPT parties in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM), essentially the same as in 1998, there was a ground-breaking statement sponsored by the 'New Agenda Coalition' (NAC) and 25 other parties.

This briefing covers non-proliferation, testing, the CTBT, START, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear sharing and missile defence. Briefing 4 will cover proposals for concrete programmes or proposals for action, fissile materials issues (fissban) and security assurances. Since the cluster debates are now closed to NGO participation and not all interventions were available in English or French (or were not in written form), some may have been missed.

Nuclear Weapon States

Each of the NWS reported on the progress they had made in fulfilment of their obligations under article VI. For the first time, Russia and France gave more details and figures on the cuts and measures undertaken, along the lines of the report given by the United States at the 1998 PrepCom. Britain did likewise, also issuing an information pack containing detail from its 1998 strategic defence review. The United States updated last year's report and issued two substantial fact sheets on its classic and 'non-classic' arms control approaches, including cooperative measures with Russia on safety, control, protection and accountancy. China argued that its doctrine of no-first use, rejection of deterrence concepts, and restraint in the build-up of its arsenal over the years was proof of its commitment to the Treaty, but other than that gave no information on its nuclear forces or any measures it had undertaken since 1995.

Apart from their stated commitments to the CTBT (which China, Russia and the United States have yet to ratify) and to negotiating a ban on fissile material production (fissban) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the NWS said little about further concrete steps they would be prepared to take or about how to move beyond the impasse in the START process. The United States commented that "external realities" such as "domestic and international policy factors, the global security environment, and... financial resources" were related to the process of arms control and disarmament, a point parallelled by China's remarks about "US-led NATO's... gunboat policies" not being conducive to international security and stability, and therefore jeopardising efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Dismissing those "trying to identify a new agenda" for disarmament, the United States said that "we have an existing agenda that remains to be completed".

Proliferation and Non-Compliance

Some 20 statements, including Iran, Malaysia, Brazil, Australia, the NWS and the EU on behalf of 26 European countries, raised explicit concerns about the May 1998 tests conducted by India and Pakistan. Others, such as the NAC statement, referred more obliquely to "severe setbacks" in South Asia and criticised the fact that these countries have begun echoing rationales for "minimum credible deterrence".

Although many insisted that the PrepCom and 2000 Review conference could not ignore the tests, there seemed to be a general feeling that the time for expressing condemnation, as such, was over. In considering how to address the situation, South Africa and others concurred with the view expressed by Japan, who wanted it made "abundantly clear that the demonstration of nuclear weapons capability will not bring even a hint of a reward or imply status" as a NWS. Many argued for the PrepCom and RevCon to call for full implementation of UNSC resolution 1172 adopted unanimously on June 6 1998, just after the tests. Canada also asserted that further progress on nuclear disarmament by the NWS and the "devaluation of the political significance they ascribe to nuclear weapons" would be crucial to discouraging nuclear weapons proliferation "as witnessed in South Asia". A number of statements raised concerns about Israel, which will be covered in a later briefing after the special session on the Middle East resolution.

Some statements, notably Britain and the United States also targetted non-compliance by NPT-parties Iraq and North Korea (DPRK). In the general debate, Iraq claimed there was 'abundant proof' of cooperation between the US, UK and Israel, in violation of Article I. Britain and the United States denied the accusation and directed attention instead to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme and the need to reinstate IAEA inspections there. South Korea (ROK) also emphasised non-compliance by DPRK and made a pointed reference to the special responsibilities and obligations of the NWS to comply with article I. South Korea called for the full implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

CTBT

Around 20 interventions, including the NAM, EU and NAC statements, emphasised the importance of the comprehensive test ban treaty, an explicit priority identified in the NPT preamble and the 1995 Principles & Objectives. The CTBT Organisation, set up in Vienna to prepare for the Treaty's implementation, briefed delegations on the state of readiness of the verification regime, noting that there was strong support -- both political and fiscal -- for the CTBT. Some echoed Venezuela's view that the South Asian tests had highlighted the necessity for all governments to sign and ratify the CTBT. Several announced their intention to do so before the Special 'Article XIV' Conference on entry into force, due to take place in October. Some referred to the undertakings by India and Pakistan not to impede entry into force and urged them to sign in time to participate in the Special Conference.

It was noted that of the NWS, only Britain and France had ratified. While there are growing concerns that the Clinton Administration has given up on getting the CTBT ratified this year, Russia equally disturbingly said that it had to "take into account the ratification processes of the 44 countries whose adherence was made a condition of entry into force", implying that it was waiting for others. Though China's formal position is that it will soon put the Treaty to the People's Congress for ratification, a senior Chinese official told a meeting organised by NGOs to promote the Treaty's entry into force that some countries among the 44 "could have second thoughts" in the light of NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia and Washington's decision to push ahead with missile defence plans.

START

Notwithstanding the reports from the US and Russia on their efforts to cut their strategic arsenals, welcomed by the EU and others, many delegations expressed disappointment at the non-ratification of START II by Russia. Like the NAC, many urged both countries to move beyond the impasse and begin negotiating START III reduction levels and beyond. Switzerland also emphasised that the reductions should be made irreversible, encompassing the destruction of the warheads and missiles rather than merely their dismantlement.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

A number of statements raised concerns about tactical nuclear weapons. Countries as diverse as Canada, Finland, Switzerland, the Kyrgyz Republic and Nigeria thought that tactical nuclear weapons needed more attention. Concerned that the role of tactical nuclear weapons could increase in importance again, these delegations advocated measures ranging from greater transparency and confidence-building to unilateral reductions, preferably with "contractual verification arrangements". The NAC statement also argued for a reduction in reliance on non-strategic weapons.

Russia supported the implementation of declared unilateral initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons and proposed that all [i.e. NATO/US] tactical nuclear weapons be returned to their country of origin. China likewise proposed that "all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil should be withdrawn to their owner's territory".

NATO and Nuclear Sharing

Concerns about NATO have been raised in several ways. Some, notably China, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Iran, expressed anxiety about NATO's expansion, its strategic concept as confirmed in the April 1999 Washington Summit, and the bombing of Yugoslavia, which they regarded as flouting international law and threatening international security and further progress on arms control and non-proliferation. The NAM working paper, Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa focussed concern on nuclear sharing among NATO States. Egypt reiterated its proposal, echoed in the NAM paper, that the 2000 RevCon should unambiguously state that articles I and II allow for no exceptions and are binding in times of war and peace alike.

Missile Defence

China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Mongolia raised concerns about the destabilising effect of US missile defence plans on arms control and disarmament efforts. China proposed recommendations to the 2000 Conference committing states parties to "refrain from engaging in the research or development of missile defence systems, which could upset global and regional strategic stability and... trigger off a new... arms race". Russia warned that the maintenance of and compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was a prerequisite for further nuclear weapon reductions.

Written by Rebecca Johnson with assistance from Nicola Butler.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 2
Non-governmental Views

Organisation for 2000

The third NPT PrepCom began its second day by agreeing to designateAmbassador Jacob Selebi of South Africa as President of the 2000 review conference and beginning to solve some of the sticky procedural questions that stymied the 1998 PrepCom. In particular, they agreed to amend rule 34 to permit establishment of "subsidiary bodies so as to provide for a focussed consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty", as specified in paragraph 6 of decision 1 on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, adopted in 1995. The rules of procedure for the 2000 Conference have not yet been adopted because of disagreement over a proposal from Austria to accord the CTBT Organisation the same rights under rule 44 as the United Nations and IAEA. Austria based its argument on the fact that the CTBT was a principal objective identified in the programme of action on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

The PrepCom also adopted the proposed agenda for the 2000 Conference, after noting concerns raised by Canada regarding the relevance of the present system of allocating issues to three clusters, as exemplified in the Main Committees on disarmament, safeguards and energy. Reiterating its support for a more straightforward review conducted article by article, an argument raised by others as well in Monday's general discussion, Canada proposed that this important question be discussed and decided upon in 2000, rather than at this PrepCom. Other procedural decision requiring further consultations with specific delegations, such as background documentation, have been remitted to a later date for decision.

NGO Presentations to the PrepCom

Most of the day was taken up with presentations from non-governmental organisations, followed by an informal roundtable. Thirteen statements had been co-ordinated and drafted with the involvement of a large number of NGOs, and with the intention of expressing a broad and representative range of views.

NPT Compliance

The opening presenter expressed concern that "the NPT is not in good health" and that "a clear diagnosis of the problem is needed if it is to be saved". He went on to call on states parties to "launch an historic compliance assessment review" to be completed by the end of 1999 so that the 2000 Review Conference could take "serious steps to remedy problems that the compliance assessment might identify".

US-Russian Relations

The second speaker emphasised that "the process of nuclear weapon reductions has been hopelessly deadlocked" at a time when "nuclear dangers" continue to grow. He called on the US administration to "supplement the traditional arms control process by pursuing immediate, parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable initiatives with Russia". The presentation made detailed proposals: to reduce nuclear forces to levels far below those envisioned in START III; to take the majority of US and Russian forces off hair-trigger alert; and to secure, monitor and greatly reduce fissile materials and warhead stockpiles. Delegates to the PrepCom were urged to "create a list of constructive and politically solid recommendations for the 2000 review conference".

NATO

Next to be addressed was the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's recently adopted Strategic Concept and the continuation of nuclear sharing within NATO. The statement strongly supported the position of the German and Canadian Foreign Ministries that the Alliance's forthcoming consideration of options for "confidence building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament" should include a "full review of NATO's nuclear doctrine". The NGOs were also "encouraged" by the vote on the New Agenda Resolution in last year's UN General Assembly and called on members of NATO to "make sure" that the Alliance "seriously considers the proposals made in the resolution".

Regional Proliferation

Four areas were highlighted in the fourth NGO presentation: South Asia; the Middle East; North Korea and Belarus. Exactly one year after India conducted its nuclear tests and following the recent missile tests, the NGOs called for India and Pakistan to "stop the missile race" and for the two countries to "formalise their existing moratoria on nuclear tests" and "sign the CTBT at the earliest possible date". NGOs also requested that the international community "help stop the repression of those opposed to the tests and similar developments in the two countries". On the nuclear question in the Middle East, concern was expressed that "paralysis of the peace process and the vetoing of any course of engagement or cooperation with Iraq" only compound the problem. Whilst on the subject of North Korea "the immediate implementation of the 1994 KEDO agreement" was emphasised. These problems, along with indications of renewed interest in nuclear weapons from Belarus, had all made the task of nuclear disarmament "more urgent than ever".

CTBT

Focussing on ratification and entry into force of the CTBT, this presentation urged delegates of non-ratifying nations to ratify this treaty with the goal of safeguarding their own national security and the purpose of "isolating those that have not ratified". The presenter also asked each of the governments represented and the NPT PrepCom as a whole "to express support for a Ministerial-level Special Conference on CTBT entry into force this fall". On the subject of "Stockpile Stewardship" activities, the statement emphasised the importance of nuclear weapon states refraining from activities that "could be confused with underground nuclear tests".

Nuclear Laboratory Testing

Continuing on the theme of stockpile stewardship, this presentation highlighted the role of the French PALEN programme and the US National Ignition Facility. It proposed that "international observers be given free access to facilities and programmes (in the framework of the IAEA), in order to check the stated goals of minimum maintenance of existing stockpiles, and to set up transparency and confidence building measures". In addition, the presenter called on the nuclear powers to "announce a moratorium on laboratory nuclear experiments".

Nuclear Energy

Opening with a call for the assumptions about nuclear energy made in 1945 and in 1968 to be "re-evaluated in a world that has experienced Chernobyl and Three Mile Island", the presentation on nuclear energy addressed four areas: economics, proliferation, releases of radiation and waste. Many NGOs believe that it is "inappropriate to define an activity that is limited to one or two generations in benefit, but results in a liability that will persist for thousands of human generations to come, as an 'inalienable right'". Article IV was the "fault line along which the non-proliferation function of the Non-Proliferation Treaty cracks. It normalises and legitimises an industry which is economic insanity, environmental suicide, is mutagenic and cancerous".

Indigenous Peoples, Environmental and Human Health

Presented by a representative of Indigenous people of the Pacific, this statement opened with a prayer "that we touch the Earth with kind and gentle hands". It highlighted the "catastrophic consequences both for the environment as well as human health" that have been generated by the Nuclear Age. The speaker urged "local, national, regional and international bodies to own up to the problems created by nuclear weapons and fuel production and begin a healing process that is overdue". He asked NPT states parties to ensure that such a process was begun.

Paths to Elimination

In the context of the millennium bug, arguments were made that look at "qualitative disarmament measures and policies that reduce risks and set the stage for abolition", including strengthened security assurances and dealerting of nuclear forces. The presenter called for all countries, but particularly the United States and Russia to "reduce the likelihood of accident, mistake, or miscalculation, by taking nuclear weapons off alert".

Multilateral Instruments and Forums

Urging the creation of "a forum or forums that explicitly have under consideration the institutional framework for a nuclear weapon free world and how to achieve it", this presentation underscored that "every action, negotiation, instrument and forum should be measured by whether it contributes to the achievement of 'nuclear disarmament in all its aspects'".

General and Complete Disarmament

Highlighting the background of "war in Europe, Africa and South Asia and bombing in the Middle East", the presenter acknowledged that to talk about general and complete disarmament might seem to be "grasping at dreams", but stressed that "these problems cry out for solutions". Emphasising that the "need for comprehensive disarmament must never be allowed to be an excuse for failing to accomplish nuclear disarmament", she said that "it is also true that there can and should be a dynamic interaction between the two endeavours".

Nuclear Weapons, Ethics and Law

After addressing the ethical, moral and legal framework for nuclear disarmament, a simple solution was put forward: "States should treat others as they wish to be treated in return". It called for a "new level of co-operation" to fulfil the "integrated human security agendas that emerged from the world summits of the 1990s". Drawing attention to the "awesome destructive power" of nuclear weapons and the magnitude of their cost, the presenter concluded that nuclear disarmament was "nothing less than an ultimate moral imperative".

In summation…

NGOs expressed their desire to have a "constructive as well as critical involvement in the Non-Proliferation Treaty process". The presentations had highlighted the "many possible paths to the global elimination of nuclear weapons" and delegates to the PrepCom were urged to: "take the steps which will provide the fastest possible path" to a "multilateral, verifiable and enforceable Nuclear Weapons Convention".

Written by Nicola Butler with assistance from Rebecca Johnson.

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Third NPT PrepCom - Briefing No 1
Objectives for 2000

The Third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened on 10 May with a one minute silence to remember those killed and injured when NATO planes inadvertently bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia was then unanimously adopted as Chair, with Ambassadors Markku Reimaa of Finland and Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland appointed Vice Chairs.

Saying that the third PrepCom must work on both substantive and procedural issues, Reyes emphasised that its principle task was to prepare effectively for a successful Review Conference in 2000. He accordingly obtained agreement for a timetable for two weeks' work that began with a general debate, focussing on what the NPT parties wanted the review process to achieve, especially what sort of documents or agreements the PrepCom and, more importantly, the 2000 Review Conference should aim to produce.

The first week would include a session focussing on the procedural decisions necessary for organising the 2000 Review Conference, followed by an afternoon in which NGOs would discuss their priorities for implementation of the Treaty with delegations. Three days would then be assigned to 'cluster debates' on the main areas of the treaty: nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy. In addition, to the surprise of several delegations, Reyes successfully proposed that the third PrepCom should follow the precedent set by decisions taken at the first PrepCom and devote special time to issues of particular concern: in this case to nuclear disarmament (with emphasis not only on Article VI but also on the more practically defined programme of action in the 1995 Principles and Objectives); the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (fissban); and the Middle East.

According to the timetable, most of week two would be spent on drafting and deciding on procedural and substantive recommendations to the review conference. It is likely that sidebar consultations, probably under the auspices of the vice-chairs or 'friends of the chair', would attempt to resolve any problems with the procedural and organisational decisions, with a view to submitting them for decision again at the beginning of week two. If agreement is still lacking, sufficient time would be left to seek a compromise before the final deadline.

General Debate

Although Reyes had emphasised his hope that delegations would focus particularly on the practical consideration of what kind of products (documents and agreements) the review process should aim to deliver, it was inevitable that many of the 37 statements also gave national positions on the subject matter of the NPT.

The following issues were referred to most frequently:

• the importance of the NPT and non-proliferation regime and the risks of undermining it by failing to implement the strengthened review process constructively;
• concern about the impasse in the START process, the necessity for more effective progress on nuclear disarmament and suggestions for steps that could be undertaken;
• condemnation of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan a year ago;
• the importance of getting sufficient signatures and ratifications for the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) to enter into force;
• the bombing by NATO of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia and the effect of NATO's actions on future prospects for arms control;
• concern about the destabilising impact of missile defence plans;
• the importance of getting negotiations on the fissban underway;
• security assurances;
• universality and full adherence to the Treaty; and
• nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), especially in relation to the Middle East and Central Asia.
• Many also mentioned nuclear energy, the importance of safeguards, nuclear safety, security and export controls.

Products and Outcomes

The discussion on the objectives and purpose of the review process focussed particularly on the kind of documents the Review Conference should aim to produce. While at least ten statements failed to mention this question, many others seemed to endorse New Zealand's hope that the PrepCom would be able to offer a "framework paper recommending agreed or possible options". Four distinct options began to emerge, though there were also nuanced differences and some blurring of the edges:

• two documents: one forward-looking beyond the year 2000, along the lines of (but not by means of amending) the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O), in effect, a 2000 P&O; and a second to cover reviewing the treaty's implementation from 1995 to 2000. The two-document option was a clear front runner, advocated by South Africa, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, most of the European Union (EU) countries and, it appeared, various others.
• one document, combining both forward and backward-looking elements, preferred by Iran and France, but with significant differences. Iran suggested that the final declaration should be in two sections, one reviewing the treaty's implementation, article by article, while the second would update the Principles and Objectives. France surprised its EU colleagues by making a strong argument for retaining the pre-1995 pattern, advocating three reports from the Main Committees (nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy). Each would look both forward and backwards, with a common "chapeau" or synthesising document prepared by the Conference Chair, which might incorporate recommendations.
• three documents: a 2000 Principles and Objectives; a review summary; and (if deemed necessary) a document clarifying the purpose, powers and limits of the strengthened review process. Canada and Japan specifically advocated this approach, with South Africa and New Zealand recognising that some additional work in this area may be required, without necessarily specifying a third document on the review process.
• a set of decisions and/or resolutions mirroring the 1995 package: e.g. a decision on further strengthening the review process; decisions on Principles and Objectives and a programme of action on non-proliferation and disarmament; and a resolution on the Middle East (proposed by Myanmar).

Canada questioned the allocation of issues to the three main committees, suggesting that reviewing the treaty article by article might be more efficient and appropriate, a point New Zealand supported.

Some, such as the United States and France emphasised the need for full consensus on all documents. Others, including Canada, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa, considered that the review document would not necessarily have to have all its elements agreed by consensus, as that approach has tended to result either in failure or in anodyne expressions pitched at the lowest common denominator of agreement. Instead, the aim could be to adopt by consensus a review document that reflected agreement where possible, with a factual summary of differing views where necessary. There was general agreement that the Principles and Objectives should be agreed by consensus.

Due to France's alternative proposal, the EU, whose collective statement had been expected to endorse the two-document option, with a 2000 Principles and Objectives and a review document, was only able to reaffirm that the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference should contain both forward- and backward-looking elements.

Written by Rebecca Johnson with the assistance of Nicola Butler.

© 1999 The Acronym Institute.

Go to Documents from the Third NPT PrepCom

Summary and analysis of the 1997 PrepCom is available from Disarmament Diplomacy No 14.

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Briefings from the 1998 NPT PrepCom