UN First Committee

2007 First Committee Resolutions

Nuclear Weapons

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UNGA 62/ (L.6)
Decision United Nations conference to identify appropriate ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament

Introduced by Mexico.

This decision puts the item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" onto the agenda of the 63rd (2008) session of the General Assembly.

First Committee: 123-3-44
UNGA: 133-3-43

Mexico continued without success get this conference off the ground. The vote was nearly identical as last year's, with opposition by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Most European states abstained. The New Agenda Coalition voted in favour.

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UNGA 62/24 (L.8)
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Iran.

Last introduced as a new resolution in 2005,this updated but largely unchanged resolution focuses mainly on the NPT disarmament undertakings the nuclear weapon states agreed to in 1995 and 2000. The substantive bulk of the resolution reproduces sub-paragraph 9 of paragraph 15 of the section on Article VI (the so-called 13 Steps) from the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. The preambular paragraph reaffirming the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, was added to the resolution verbally by Iran in 2005 in order to secure favourable votes from Arab states that were considering abstaining, was elaborated to call for universal adherence to the NPT and for the application of safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region.

First Committee: 103-53-15
First Committee PP6: 102-48-11
UNGA: 109-55-15
UNGA PP6: 114-50-10

After a troubled start-the 2005 version of this resolution was barely adopted, attracting only 70 favourable votes in the First Committee-Iran was generally more successful this year in attracting support from a larger, but still not universal, bloc of NAM states. The vote on the resolution was largely uneventful, the outcome of which reflected the usual NAM-EU/NATO divide, with a handful of states abstaining.

Barely passing in 2005, with a slim majority of 58 states in favour in the First Committee, PP6 on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East was again put to a separate vote, with NATO and European states voting against. Repeating its shock at the similar outcome of the vote on this paragraph last year, which was arguably decisive in ensuring the Arab vote on the resolution as a whole, the delegation of Egypt chastised states for taking a position contrary to past agreements.

Although the brief passage of time seems to have absolved the dubious provenance of this resolution, at least in the eyes of most NAM delegations, it retains the stigma of a finger-pointing exercise rather than a sincere effort to move the disarmament agenda forward. At least to Western states, this resolution continues to be generally seen as an effort by Iran to draw attention away from concerns over its nuclear programme. Also a factor that limits its support, the contents of the resolution tend to duplicate the three existing annual omnibus nuclear disarmament resolutions, two of which place emphasis on the implementation of the 1995 and 2000 agreements.

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UNGA 62/25 (L.9) Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

Introduced by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

The annual resolution of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) was revised, but follows the same general form at last year's. The resolution was given a substantial overhaul in 2005, adopting a less proscriptive tone in order to build greater consensus leading into the 2010 NPT review process. The resolution continues to place emphasis on the importance of the entry-into-force of the CTBT. It reaffirms that the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference "sets out the agreed process for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament," calls for the nuclear weapon states to accelerate their implementation of these efforts, and calls upon all states to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. While the 2006 version of the resolution specifically condemned the 9 October 2006 nuclear explosive conducted by tNorth Korea, the current version repeats its call on North Korea to rescind its decision to abandon the NPT. The resolution further stresses the need to achieve universal implementation of the NPT and calls for India, Israel, and Pakistan to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.

First Committee: 151-5-13
First Committee OP6: 155-4-2
UNGA: 156-5-14
UNGA OP6: 165-4-2

Support for this resolution has remained largely unchanged over the past three years, this year picking up a few more votes in favour while shedding a few negative votes and abstentions. It stayed firmly fixed behind Japan's annual nuclear disarmament resolution in its level of popular support. France, India, Israel, North Korea, and the United States continued to oppose the resolution. Pakistan, which voted against in 2006 due to the resolution's condemnation of nuclear testing, changed its vote to an abstention. India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States remained fairly isolated in their continued opposition to language in OP6, which was called to a separate vote, calling for the universalization of the NPT and for all non-parties to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.

Notably this year, the United Kingdom, which had previously voted against this resolution as a bloc with France and the United States, decided to drop its opposition to the resolution, stating after the vote that there were many things it would endorse in the resolution. However, the UK, backed by Australia, continued to fault the resolution for failing to acknowledge progress already made in nuclear arms reductions, and pointed to the need for the drafters of the resolution to incorporate this view in the future. Further disputing the basic premise of the resolution, the UK stated that calling for accelerating implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments conveys the message that little has been done. Challenging another central premise of this resolution, and others calling for nuclear disarmament, the UK also faulted the NAC resolution for failing to address Iran's nuclear programme, which it described as the greatest threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

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UNGA 62/ (L.20) Decision
Missiles

Introduced by Iran.

This decision places the issue on the agenda of the 63rd (2008) session of the General Assembly.

First Committee: 117-6-51
UNGA: 123-7-51

Iran decided to introduce a decision, rather than a substantive resolution, "as suggested by the 2005 Committee on 'methods of work,'" in light of the fact that the third Panel of Government Experts on this subject, established by UNGA resolution 59/67 (2004), will have two additional sessions in 2008. The mandate of the Panel is to "explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus can be reached." The Panel, which met for its first session in June 2007, is to submit its report, expected to be completed by June 2008, to the sixty-third (2008) session of the General Assembly.

Since the establishment of the Panel of Government Experts, there has been controversy over whether it should draw on the work of the two previous Panels, as preferred by NATO-aligned states, or should start its work anew. Although the United States again voted against the resolution, stating its opposition to including the item on the agenda in a statement made after the vote, US Ambassador Rocca stated that the Panel should draw on previous sessions. The United States was joined in its opposition to the resolution by Israel, and by NATO allies Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The European Union abstained from the resolution as a bloc.

The report prepared in 2006 by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of UNIDIR, pursuant to UNGA resolution 59/67 (2004) and welcomed last year by resolution 61/59 (2006), provided a useful overview in understanding the lack of consensus on the issue of missiles. It explored three axes of divergence on dealing with the matter: Priority-Addressing missiles "as a distinct priority" (a more recent development) or in the context of nuclear weapon delivery systems and as part of broader nuclear disarmament mandates; Scope-Which type of missiles are to be covered, whether it be ballistic missiles, in its various classifications by range and payload, cruise missiles, man-portable air defense systems, or anti-ballistic missile systems; Method-Dealing with missiles in universal and inclusive fora, with legal or voluntary regimes, and on a case by case basis or in a comprehensive manner.

The European Union continued to approach the issue of missiles narrowly as "WMD delivery systems," and continued "to promote the universal ratification of, and adherence to … the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation." Again repeating its contrary view, the Association of South East Asian Nations, in a statement delivered by Myanmar/Burma, cited "an urgent need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles proliferation," and called for "multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory" agreements. This view is similar to the approach taken in the preamble of resolution 61/59, from which most European and NATO states abstained, in part due to the resolution's lack of reference to the Hague Code of Conduct.

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UNGA 62/32 (L.21)
Reducing nuclear danger

Introduced by India.

First introduced in 1998, this de-alerting resolution is in its tenth year and has become somewhat of a ritual. It focuses on the adoption of measures to prevent accidental launch of nuclear weapons related to computer or other technical malfunctions. It retains language that the United States finds objectionable, calling for an end to nuclear postures based on "hair-trigger alert". In addition to general exhortations for all member states to work to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament, it calls for a review of nuclear doctrines (OP1), specifically by the five NWS (OP2), and requests the Secretary-General intensify efforts to implement the seven recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Millennium Declaration, including creating consensus for an international conference on reducing nuclear dangers and the risks of nuclear war.

First Committee: 113-50-13
UNGA: 117-52-12

This resolution was overshadowed this year by the introduction of draft resolution L.29 (see below), dealing with the issue of operational status of nuclear weapons in a fashion more amenable to attracting support from a wide cross sections of states. In contrast, India's annual resolution, unchanged in recent years and supported primarily by NAM states only, increasingly appears stale for failing to break past the easy goal of passing by appealing solely to the NAM majority, without any true effort to move the issue forward or seek broader support. In past years, this has been especially unfortunate in light of the fact that most states support the overall objective of the resolution, reducing nuclear danger.

Another factor ensuring continued NATO and European opposition is India's questionable sincerity in sponsoring such a resolution, as neither India nor Pakistan have the technology yet for hair-trigger alert. The resolution thus mainly serves as a criticism of certain nuclear weapon states without running the risk of being applied to India itself.

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UNGA 62/51 (L.23)
Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

Introduced by India.

Unchanged from previous years, this annual resolution argues that a multilateral, universal, and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the total elimination of nuclear threats. It requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention "prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances" and to report the results to the General Assembly.

First Committee: 115-50-11
UNGA: 120-52-10

Co-sponsored by a more narrow cross-section of Non-Aligned states than last year-Bangladesh, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, and Viet Nam-this resolution is endemic of the treatment many controversial, yet nonetheless vital, issues receive in the General Assembly. The drafters, able to secure its guaranteed passage every year by catering to positions adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement, put forward an unchanging draft text year after year, indicating more a desire to score cheap political points by forcing European and NATO opposition, rather than seeking some way to move the agenda forward.

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UNGA 62/34 (L.25)
Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

Introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States

First introduced in 1988, this biennial resolution highlights the hazards of radioactive waste, noting their potential for use in radiological warfare. It calls on states to prevent "any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of states" (OP3). The resolution also recalls various agreements related to nuclear safety and the dumping of radioactive wastes, including the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. It requests the CD to "intensify efforts towards an early conclusion" of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons (an item on the CD's permanent agenda that has not received much attention since 1994, despite German efforts to revive it in 2002), and for it to consider radioactive waste.

First Committee: without a vote
UNGA: without a vote

This resolution arises from African concerns regarding the adverse effect on development and other problems posed by the indiscriminate dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes. It argues that such dumping constitutes a threat to international security, and hence a topic appropriate for the First Committee, and expresses concern that such waste could be used as radiological warfare.

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UNGA 62/59 (L.28*)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Introduced by New Zealand.

This resolution, originally introduced in 2000 and every year since 2002, underlines the continuing urgency of the treaty and calls for its early entry-into force, specifically calling upon those ten states whose ratification is necessary for this to happen to accelerate their national ratification processes. The condemnation of North Korea's October 2006 nuclear explosive test contained in last year's resolution was modified this year in light of progress made in the Six Party process. New language calls for successful implementation of the Joint Statement and for a peaceful solution to nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula in the context of the Six Party Talks. The resolution notes 177 states have signed the CTBT, including 41 of the 44 needed for entry into force, and that 140 states have ratified, including 34 of the 44. It further calls upon all states to continue upholding voluntary moratoria on explosive nuclear weapons testing and to refrain from taking any actions that would undermine the purpose of the treaty pending to its entry-into-force.

First Committee: 166-1-4
UNGA: 176-1-4

Joined last year in its opposition to the resolution by North Korea, this year the United States resumed its now customary role as the spoiler, casting the lone negative vote on this resolution. Without explanation, North Korea did not participate in the vote. The European Union continued to place utmost importance on the early entry into force of the treaty and stated it had conducted an "intense lobbying campaign" of the 10 annex II states whose ratification is necessary for this to happen. The EU also expressed concern over the financial stability of the CTBTO due to the failure of states to meet their obligations. Syria, which abstained, and Iran complained that the resolution does not contain language reflecting continued development and modernization of nuclear weapons, activities that the advanced nuclear weapon states seek to continue without resorting to full-scale, explosive nuclear testing. Colombia, which also abstained, reiterated it could not yet support the treaty due to constitutional limitations.

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UNGA 62/36 (L.29)
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems

Introduced by New Zealand.

This new resolution, carefully drafted to attract support from NATO states and revised to avoid semantic quibbles, was intended to spark discussion and seek common ground on moving this issue forward. The only substantive point in the parsimonious operative portion of the resolution "Calls for the taking of further practical steps to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status." The resolution also non-exhaustively welcomes steps already taken to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons.

First Committee: 124-3-34
UNGA: 139-3-36

In his rebuttal to US Ambassador Rocca's 9 October statement disputing that any US nuclear weapons were on high alert, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed to US development of a new US strategic doctrine called Prompt Global Strike, which he concluded, "deepens the commitment to keeping [strategic] forces on alert to react very quickly to-even preempt-adversaries using or planning to use weapons of mass destruction." According to US Department of Defense planning documents, Prompt Global Strike is defined as "a capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives."

Before the vote on the resolution, US Ambassador Rocca only partially backed off her earlier position. Disagreeing with the resolution's assertion that the US level of readiness increases risk of accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons, Ambassador Rocca further stated that "the United States does not rely on launch-on-warning," without explaining her understanding of this nebulous term. This denial failed to address the knowledgeable assessment of Bruce Blair and the crux of international concern of alert levels, that US command and early warning systems are "geared" to fire "friendly forces en masse before the anticipated arrival of incoming enemy missiles with flight times of 12-30 minutes."

In explanation of their negative votes, nuclear weapon states France and the United Kingdom provided better reasoned rationales backing their national positions, but still obviously came up short of the resolution's intent. The United Kingdom stated it disagreed with the resolution's basic premise that the world is at risk due to the alert status of nuclear weapons. In the view of the UK, the issue has been adequately dealt with and is not a priority issue. French Ambassador Dobelle explained France was not against the idea of reducing operational status, noting France had taken the decision to de-target its nuclear forces in 1997, but France cannot go any further unless the strategic situation and France's security needs allow for it.

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UNGA 62/37 (L.30)
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

Introduced by Japan.

Japan's annual resolution, significantly revised in 2005, is largely unchanged from last year. It emphasizes the importance of the NPT and highlights some of the 2000 NPT final document's 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament, including the CTBT and a fissile materials cut-off treaty. The resolution includes paragraphs on reducing the operational status and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, and takes a strong stand on the CTBT and fissile materials ban. Its reference to negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off treaty continues to omit reference to a verified treaty, consistent with the approach taken by the EU and other states interested in getting negotiations off the ground. The resolution also calls for the "universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Model [Additional] Protocol," as well as providing a strong endorsement for implementation of the recommendations of the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

First Committee: 165-3-10
UNGA: 170-3-9

Of the three annual omnibus nuclear disarmament resolutions, this one continues to receive the most support, including from nuclear weapon states Russia and the United Kingdom. After voting in favour for the past two years, France abstained. The French delegation explained that while it understood Japan's resolves, the text of the resolution has remained unchanged over the past two years despite their strong reservations. Specifically, the French delegation disagreed with the resolution's calls for further reductions in strategic arsenals (OP4) and for a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies (OP8). The French maintained these issues could only be dealt with through negotiation.

The New Agenda Coalition was still unable to support this resolution as a bloc in the First Committee, as it did in 2005. NAC member Egypt abstained in the First Committee due to the resolution's failure to reflect the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, its move away from the Shannon mandate calling for a verified FMCT, and for what it felt was a mischaracterization of the "legal reality" of IAEA safeguards. However, Egypt, the last NAC hold-out, voted in favour of the resolution in the General Assembly. After abstaining last year, Brazil voted in favour of the resolution, noting that the general thrust of the resolution is in line with the position of the New Agenda Coalition, although it continue to express reservations on calls for the universalization of the additional protocol (OP13).

The three negative votes came from North Korea, India, and the United States. North Korea again joined the states opposing this resolution, justifying its "deterrent" as necessary for regional stability and objecting to language in PP11 regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). While India expressed appreciation for Japan's commitment toward achieving general and complete disarmament, it could not support the resolution due to its call for the universalization of the NPT. Pakistan abstained for similar reasons. While the US delegation noted the positive aspects of the resolution, it voted against it due to its reference to the CTBT.

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UNGA 62/39 (L.36)
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by Malaysia.

Introduced for an eleventh consecutive year and first tabled after the ICJ advisory opinion of July 1996 on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this resolution underlines the ICJ's major unanimous conclusion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (OP1) and links it with a call for "commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination" (OP2). It recalls many international obligations, including the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the 2000 Review Conference thirteen steps, the various nuclear-weapons-free zones, and traditional NAM positions, such as a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, it stresses that the CD should "commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time" (PP12).

First Committee: 121-25-29
UNGA: 127-27-27

As in previous years, the resolution was supported by a variety of countries including some Non-Aligned, Western, and weapon possessing states, including China, India, and Pakistan. France, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States opposed the resolution. Japan, which abstained, stated it is premature to call on all states to fulfill their NPT Article VI obligation by calling for a convention, and instead called for a steady step by step process.

Costa Rica and Malaysia intend to submit a revised draft of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention to the United Nations to the current session of the General Assembly. The Model Convention, which was developed by a non-governmental experts, was originally submitted by Costa Rica in 1997 and circulated by the Secretary-General as document A/C.1/52/7. It outlines legal, technical, and political measures and mechanisms necessary to achieve a nuclear weapons free world.

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UNGA 62/42 (L.40)
Nuclear Disarmament

Introduced by Myanmar/Burma on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement

The operative paragraphs of the Non-Aligned Movement's traditional nuclear disarmament omnibus are identical to previous years'. The lengthy resolution serves as a compendium of NAM positions including its call for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, agreement on legally-binding negative security assurances, and an international conference on disarmament.

First Committee: 113-45-17
UNGA: 117-47-17

Of the three annual omnibus nuclear disarmament resolution, this compendium of Non-Aligned Movement disarmament priorities, hailed by Cuba as the most comprehensive of the disarmament resolutions, continues to attract little support outside the bloc while attracting active opposition from NATO. As in past years, NATO and European states voted against the resolution, China voted in favour, and Russia abstained. India and Pakistan also abstained, citing the references to the NPT. This resolution also continues to fail to gain the backing of the sponsors of the other two annual nuclear disarmament omnibuses, with the two European members of the New Agenda Coalition, Ireland and Sweden, abstaining. The Japanese delegation, which also abstained, explained that it felt the draft did not contain elements necessary for the international community to reach agreement, and thus they would prefer a different approach.

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UNGA 62/19 (L.44)
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Introduced by Pakistan.

Tabled annually by Pakistan since 1990, this resolution on security assurances has been carried forward with few changes over the years, despite Pakistan's own nuclear tests and assertion of its nuclear weapon status. The resolution notably calls on the CD to "actively continue intensive negotiations" on effective international arrangements. The resolution serves largely as statement of the Non-Aligned Movement position on the issue, reaffirming the outcome of various NAM meetings that have dealt with the matter.

First Committee: 120-1-54
UNGA: 121-1-56

For a second year in a row, the United States cast the single vote against and again merely restated the US position to oppose legally-binding security assurances. While most states do indeed support some sort of arrangement on security assurances, there continued to be disagreement over where those negotiations should take place. Many view this issue as most appropriate within the context of the NPT, where such assurances could conceivably take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, rather than a separate instrument negotiated by the CD as this resolution calls for. As with many other nuclear disarmament related issues, the principal division is between the NAM, which votes in favour, ensuring the resolution's passage, and the Western/NATO/EU bloc that annually abstains.

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UNGA 62/45 (L.46/Rev.1)
Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources

Introduced by France.

This biennial resolution, first introduced in 2005 under the title, "Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism," has been revised and re-titled, although it retains the core elements of the original. The thrust of the resolution remains unchanged and is aimed at encouraging states to support international efforts, cooperate and strengthen national capacities, and strengthen national measures to prevent illicit trafficking in and acquisition of radiological materials. New paragraphs welcome the entry into force of the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encourage states to enhance their national capacities to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and sources.

First Committee: without a vote
UNGA: without a vote

According to French Ambassador Dobelle, the resolution was revised and re-titled to reflect "a diverse range of instruments by the member states to circumvent terrorists of acquiring radioactive materials or sources." Although this resolution proved to be less controversial in its second introduction, action on the action had to be delayed on it until the final day of voting to discuss amendments tabled by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in document L.53, which tried to extend the focus on the cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing states. In the end, CARICOM's proposed amendments were not included. Barbados formally withdrew the amendments, expressing frustration that concerns of CARICOM members had not been considered. However, CARICOM wanted to ensure the resolution would be adopted without a vote, responding to a threat from France to withdraw the resolution if it could not be accepted by consensus. Unrelated to the CARICOM dispute, the preambular section was modified to remove reference to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was not a feature of the 2005 resolution. The revised draft also included language emphasizing the responsible of states "to maintain effective nuclear safety and security."

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