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United Nations First Committee

UN First Committee 2005: Introduction

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Introduction by Rebecca Johnson, October 20, 2005

The 60th session of the UN First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) is underway at the UN in New York, October 3 - November 3 2005, chaired by Ambassador Choi Young-Jin, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations.

Some 60 resolutions and draft decisions are before the First Committee, and voting will start on November 24. As listed below, they cover issues ranging from nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon-free zones, other WMD, conventional weaponry such as landmines, small arms and light weapons (SALW), outer space security and weaponisation, regional security and disarmament machinery. If adopted by majority, the resolutions are transmitted for the UN General Assembly to vote on them. All member states of the United Nations have the right to sponsor resolutions or amendments and to vote. Despite intensive efforts to rationalise and modernise the work of the First Committee, many resolutions appear year after year in an atrophied form, with little or no updating. There are always a few, however, that catch the eye, either because of political controversy or, more rarely, because they contain constructive new ideas for moving disarmament progress forward.

Among the most interesting issues to come to the fore at the 60th First Committee are a US-sponsored resolution on compliance; nuclear disarmament, especially a new resolution from Iran which is causing anxiety; increasing the effectiveness of the First Committee; and boosting efforts to make progress on disarmament negotiations that have been stymied by a small number of states abusing the rule of consensus in multilateral disarmament machinery, most notably the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). In addition, Russia has sponsored a new resolution on space security, entitled "Measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space", which it hopes will be adopted without a vote.

Boosting Disarmament Progress

The most controversial political issue this year concerned a draft resolution on "initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues" that was circulated by six representative middle power nations but in the end not tabled. This draft, sponsored by Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden (the G-6) called for four open-ended ad hoc committees to be convened under First Committee auspices but in Geneva to "negotiate" on a fissile material treaty and on security assurances from the nuclear to the non-nuclear states, and to "deal with" the issues of nuclear disarmament and "prevention of an arms race in outer space" (PAROS). The proposal was clearly intended not to undermine the CD but to exert pressure to get the CD working, since the draft made clear that these committees were to be convened "pending agreement on a Conference on Disarmament programme of work" on these four issues, which CD ambassadors in the recent past had identified as the priorities.

Even so, the three Western nuclear weapon states conducted demarches to the governments of the six initiators and tried to lobby NATO and EU members and a number of countries that wanted to support the proposal. In a nuclear-weapon-based alliance that is becoming increasingly familiar, the P-5 were vociferously joined in their opposition to the jump-start initiative by India and Pakistan (and no doubt by Israel as well, although it typically kept a low profile), an irony that did not escape notice, since the key protagonists in obstructing attempts to get a CD work programme over the past decade have also been drawn from this nuclear-weapon possessing pool. As a US brief sent to capitals and a number of UN delegations illustrates, a battery of arguments was used to scare First Committee members with the threat that the initiative would destroy the CD, the First Committee and, to listen to some of the wilder rhetoric, diplomatic civilisation as we know it.

Though most of the arguments were far from convincing, the N-6 decided to withdraw their proposal for this year, in large part in deference to requests from the six designated presidents of the CD for 2006 (Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal and Slovakia). These six ambassadors, who will serve for around a month each, are aiming to get agreement on a joint initiative to try to get the CD to at least discuss the major substantive issues next year, though most continue to despair of the possibility of getting a work programme that would permit the CD to begin negotiating in earnest. In withdrawing their proposal for ad hoc committees, the N-6 gave the CD notice that the proposal could be put back on the First Committee table in 2006 if sufficient progress is not made to address these important issues during the CD's 2006 session.

Improving the effectiveness of the First Committee

Building on the ground-breaking work of last year's First Committee Chair, Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, Ambassador Choi has increased the level of openness and interactivity in debates on thematic issues, both among states and, in a long overdue step, with participation from civil society, including presentations from disarmament educators, Dr Kathleen Sullivan and Dr Peter Lucas, at the First Committee's 'interactive session' on disarmament and non-proliferation education, an issue that has been strongly promoted by a number of states, most notably Japan, Mexico and New Zealand.

Even so, long shadows have been thrown by the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the US insistence on deteting all references to disarmament from the Millennium statement of the World Summit. As a consequence, the mood at the First Committee is rather flat and subdued, with many states admitting that they do not think progress can be made on any of the most important issues until there is a change in US attitudes towards multilateralism and international treaties, laws and mutually-applied controls. They also note that the counter-productive US posture is providing cover for other states that prefer to see a weak United Nations and ineffective international security instruments and measures, so that they can continue to sell arms or pursue national military objectives with relative impunity.

Nuclear Disarmament and Iran's Challenge

In addition to the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the US is once again expected to oppose, five key resolutions (and a large number of others) deal with nuclear disarmament issues. As in past years, Japan sponsors one based closely on the NPT, which is now entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Since 1998, the New Agenda Coalition has sponsored a challenging call for systematic progress to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. Now entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament", the NAC resolution focuses (as it did in 2004) on the essential principles underlying the plan of action for nuclear disarmament agreed by NPT parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A traditional omnibus resolution promoting the long-time call of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament is sponsored (as in past years) by Myanmar (Burma). And there is also Malaysia's resolution which follows up on the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and calls for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

This year, in an unexpected move in its diplomatic chess contest over its nuclear fuel cycle plans with the IAEA, UN, EU-3 and especially the United States, Iran has sponsored a new resolution, lengthily entitled "Follow up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

This resolution has caused consternation largely because many states suspect Iran's motives for putting it forward in this way and at this time. While the resolution's text might have attracted significant support in a different context, few UN delegations want to appear to endorse Iran's nuclear policies by voting in favour of such a resolution under the present circumstances and at such a sensitive time, when the UN Security Council may soon be considering the IAEA's report. There is also concern that by using the nuclear disarmament issue in this way, Iran may be playing into US hands, with the risk that it undermines other nuclear disarmament resolutions. The reverse could also operate, as states that want to demonstrate their opposition to Iran's uranium programme by voting against its resolution will need to demonstrate that they are not opposed to the implementation of the obligations agreed to in 1995 and 2000. To do this, Western states - including those with nuclear weapons - should at the very least vote in favour of the nuclear disarmament resolutions sponsored by Japan and the New Agenda Coalition, and not risk muddying the waters further with fence-sitting abstentions.

Iran's resolution has been designed to deflect attention from the controversy over its uranium enrichment programme and capture some of the anger among non-nuclear weapon states about developments by the major nuclear powers, particularly the emerging US nuclear posture and its support for new nuclear weapons and missions. It reiterates long-standing NAM decisions and includes reaffirmation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It expresses concern about the failure of the 2005 Review Conference and places particular emphasis on some of the practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states agreed to undertake as part of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. In operational paragraph (OP) 4, it presents the proposal made by Iran's recently-elected President Ahmadinejad to the General Assembly, for the establishment of "an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly in 2006 to hold three one-week sessions to review the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations" from 1995 and 2000.

Compliance

The very first resolution to be submitted was from the United States, entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements". This raises concerns about non-compliance, welcomes Libya's decision to "come back into compliance with its non-proliferation obligations and commitments and commends its approach to those States not currently in compliance with their obligations". It urges all states to implement and fully comply with their obligations and calls on "all Member states to take concerted action to ensure that all States comply with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance". Finally, without specifically naming Iran, North Korea, or UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on WMD, the US resolution "endorses efforts by the United Nations, its organs and other international organizations to take action to prevent serious damage to international security and stability arising from non-compliance by States with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament obligations".

The US is lobbying hard for this resolution to be adopted without a vote, but a number of states are concerned that the US wants to use the resolution to undermine multilateral and non-discriminatory international approaches, including verification and treaties. Some are trying to get more explicit references to international law and the UN Charter into the resolution; there are concerns that without explicit references to treaties such as the NPT, CWC and BTWC (at the very least), the resolution could be intended to act as a carte blanche for unilateral and club-of-the-willing approaches such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and export controls coordinated by suppliers' cartels.

Transparency and Confidence-Building in Outer Space

Egypt and Sri Lanka have once again co-sponsored their traditional resolution on Prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is identical to last year's text, which was overwhelmingly passed, with abstentions from the United States and Israel. Fearing to lose support or provoke a vote against, the co-sponsors have resisted suggestions in recent years to update or strengthen the resolution. Emphasising its support for the traditional PAROS resolution, Russia has now taken the issue cautiously forward with a new resolution to canvass states' views about enhancing space security. Entitled "Measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space", Russia's resolution merely reaffirms that preventing an arms race in outer space "would eliminate a serious threat to international peace and security" and requests UN Member States to "inform the Secretary-General... of their views concerning the advisability of the further formulation of international measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in space activities, aimed at advancing the cause of peace, security, international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Resolutions Index

Latest update October 30, 2005

Note: the name of the state that introduced the resolution is in square brackets. Where separate votes were taken on parts of a resolution, PP refers to preambular paragraph and OP refers to operative paragraph.

Votes are given as: for-against-abstention

The results of further votes will be added as we receive them.

Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons, Missiles and Outer Space

Title FC Votes

L.26/Rev.1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) [Mexico]

149-1-4

L.4 Towards a nuclear-free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments [South Africa for New Agenda Coalition]

OP4 148-3-9
whole res 144-5-19

L.28** Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons [Japan]

166-2-7

L.36 Nuclear Disarmament (time-bound) [Myanmar (Burma)]

94-42-17

L.38/Rev.2 Follow up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Iran]

 

L.46 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [Malaysia]

OP1 142-3-5
whole res 103-29-21

L.52 Reducing nuclear danger [India]

94-45-14

L.11 United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (decision) [Mexico]

108-5-39

L.54 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons [India]

97-46-11

L.45 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons [Pakistan]

98-0-55

L.22 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation [Philippines on behalf of HCoC members]

unamended whole res: 151-1-11

L.62 Rejected amendments to the HCoC resolution from Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia [Iran]

PP8 26-105-7
OP1 19-108-10
OP3 24-106-7
L.5 Missiles (decision) [Iran] 101-2-50
L.9 Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive waste [Nigeria for the African Group] without vote

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Title FC Votes
L.3 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East [Egypt] without vote
L.6 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East [Egypt] PP6 145-2-5
whole res 149-2-4
L.7 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (decision) [Uzbekistan] without vote
L.8 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty [Nigeria for the African Group] without vote
L.25 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) [Mexico] without vote
L.12/Rev.1 Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas areas [New Zealand] OP5 "and South Asia" 140-2-7
OP5 141-1-9
whole res 144-3-6

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Title FC Votes
L.10* Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament [Belarus] 150-1-1
L.31 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) [Poland] without vote
L.33 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Biological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) [Hungary] without vote
L.51 Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction [India] without vote

Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

Title FC Votes
L.27 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) [Sri Lanka] 160-1-1
L.30/Rev.1 Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space [Russia] 158-1-1

Conventional Weapons

Title FC Votes

L.57* The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects (SALW) [Japan]

OP2 162-0-2
whole res: without vote

L.55 International Instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (decision) [Switzerland]

145-0-25

L.34/Rev.1 Addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation [Netherlands]

160-1-0

L.37/rev.1 and orally amended Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them [Mali for ECOWAS]

without vote

L.40/rev.1 Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus [France]

 

L.56 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty) [Austria]

147-0-15

L.48 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) [Sweden]

without vote

L.49/rev.1 Prevention of the Illicit Transfer and Unauthorised Access to and Use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) [Australia]

without vote

L.58 Information on Confidence-Building Measures in the field of Conventional Arms [Argentina]

without vote

Regional Disarmament & Security

Title FC Votes
L.23 Regional Disarmament [Pakistan] without vote
L.43/rev.1 Regional Confidence-building Measures: Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa [Congo] without vote
L.44 Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Subregional Levels [Pakistan] 147-1-1
L.19 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [Indonesia for NAM] 121-3-44
L.47 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region [Algeria] without vote
L.60 Question of Antarctica  

Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Title FC Votes
L.1/Rev.1 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements [United States]  
L.13 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (decision) [Indonesia for NAM] without vote
L.14* Promotion of Multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation [Indonesia for NAM] 116-6-48
L.15 Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Control [Indonesia for NAM] 116-1-3
L.39/Rev.1 as orally amended Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism [France] 162-0-0
(GA resolution likely to be without a vote)
L.16 Relationship between Disarmament and Development [Indonesia for NAM]  
L.24 Confidence-building measures in the regional and sub-regional context [Pakistan] without vote
L.29** Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security [Russia] 163-1-0
L.53 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament [India] 88-49-13
L.50 Transparency in armaments  
L.42 Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures [Germany] without vote
L.35 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use good and technology [The Netherlands] without vote

Disarmament Machinery

Title FC Votes
L.2* Twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institutute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) [France] without vote
L.17 Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD IV) (Decision) [Indonesia for NAM] without vote
L.18 United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament [Indonesia for NAM]  
L.20 Report of the Conference on Disarmament [Peru] without vote
L.21 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin American and the Caribbean [Argentina] without vote
L.32/Rev.1 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific [Nepal]  
L.41 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa  
L.59 Report of the Disarmament Commission  

Sources:

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