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WMD Possessors and AspirantsBack to the main page on WMD Possessors and Aspirants IranIntroductionFrom April 24-27, Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, attended a series of meetings in Tehran, hosted by the international Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and Iran's Centre for Strategic Research. The meetings primarily concerned Iran's nuclear programme but included a day-long conference on Iraq, which provided an opportunity for Tehran to emphasise its interest in promoting peace in Iraq and helping Britain and the United States to extricate themselves from the current impasse, without further destabilising the region. The International Conference on Iran's nuclear energy programme: Politics and Prospects was opened by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the former President and one of Iran's leading clerics, chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, and Pugwash Secretary-General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, and heard from nuclear and international relations experts from many different countries. Dr Johnson was invited to make a presentation on Disarmament and Sustainable Non-Proliferation. Iran is undergoing a bitter power struggle between the 'moderates' (these terms are relative, but includes the professional, educated elites around Rafsanjani), and the President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose appeal to the conservative, fundamentalist and predominantly poor 'right' is reminiscent of President Bush's appeal to the US bible belt. The moderates appear to want to defuse the conflicts and find sustainable diplomatic solutions. There is real concern that Mr Ahmadinejad is deliberately trying to 'play' the United States, hoping to provoke the Bush administration or the United Nations into a premature or disproportionate action like sanctions or air-strikes to prevent an enrichment programme that is, as the law currently stands, permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Security Council should beware of short-term gestures or threats that would help Ahmadinejad to win his domestic power struggle and neutralise the more rational opposition, which includes the professional, educated workforce and officials and diplomats around Mr Rafsanjani, chair of the Expediency Council. Ahmadinejad's recent outbursts about Israel and threats to withdraw from the NPT are not representative of the majority view of educated Iranians, but they seem to have been deliberately timed to undermine efforts by Iranian moderates to defuse the crisis and work with the IAEA, the EU-3 or international scientists and diplomats. Current Bush policy plays into the hands of the extremists, even more so if the Security Council authorises sanctions or if anyone were to be foolish enough to take military action. Iran could weather sanctions more easily than most. Any imposition of sanctions by the Security Council would backfire. It would discredit the United Nations in the eyes of many Iranians, make it impossible for IAEA inspections to be resumed, and reinforce the view that Iran is being unfairly treated. This would enable Ahmadinejad to strengthen his position and neutralise the opposition to him, potentially even dressing them in traitors' clothes. At present Iran does not seek nuclear weapons per se, though Iran's nuclear programme appears to be designed to provide a nuclear weapon option for future decision; however, the more they feel themselves to be under threat from US-led hostilities, the more they will regard nuclear weapons as a legitimate deterrent or defence. This could have the effect of driving Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in earnest, so the Security Council needs to be very careful in what it decides to do. Reporting Iran to the Security Council was probably premature, but now that it is done, the United Nations has a difficult dilemma. It must appear to do something, but must be careful not to drive Iran further into isolation, which would suit the agenda of Ahmadinejad's hard-liners. The Council must not fail to act, as that risks undermining its own authority and credibility, and that of the United Nations, and will feed perceptions that the NPT and UN are weak and ineffectual - reminiscent of the inability to deal effectively with North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Regrettably, we have to face facts and realise that the demand that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment, as required under the November 2004 Paris Agreement, has now been overtaken by events. For most Iranians, it is a matter of national pride to have crossed that technology threshold, but that does not mean they want nuclear weapons. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have been variously described by senior Iranian representatives as "un-Islamic" and "inhuman, immoral, illegal and against [Iran's] basic principles". While almost all the international participants in the conference would have preferred that Iran should have no enrichment programme at all, there was the realisation that we cannot turn the clock back. Rather than wasting valuable time on demands that no Iranian government can now be seen to accept, there was significant interest in a proposal that an American physicist, Dr Thomas Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council, made to the conference and in an informal meeting with Dr Hassan Rouhani. This would cap Iran's programme, allowing some research under the stringent eye of the IAEA. Instead of the resolution that is currently under consideration, the Security Council should back a Presidential Statement that would require Iran to halt plans for further enrichment cascades beyond the 164 research-level centrifuges and ratify the Additional Protocol by a specific date in 2006; Iran would be required to reapply safeguards on the basis of the Protocol (which it suspended in February), cooperate fully with the IAEA and apply other transparency measures deemed necessary by the Agency and reopen talks with the EU-3. A Presidential Statement is greatly preferable to a resolution under chapter VII at this stage, and would be more possible for Iran to accept, while of course leaving open the options of a resolution and heavier action in the future if Iran fails to comply with the very reasonable proposals in the Security Council President's letter. It is bad diplomacy and worse strategy to hit Iran with the Security Council's heaviest weapons now: this would leave nothing in reserve for leverage, and, as underlined above, would play directly into the hands of the hard-liners, thereby tipping the balance towards Ahmadinejad, which must be avoided at all costs. In dealing with Iran's nuclear crisis, it is important to address three levels: nuclear technology, regional and international security concerns, and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. To deal with 21st century threats, the regime needs to be brought up to date. An understanding of Article IV needs to be adopted that would recognise that plutonium and highly-enriched uranium are not necessary for power generation. These nuclear bomb materials should be renounced and prohibited, both for weapons purposes (as the fissile material cut-off treaty was intended to do) and for energy production. Secondly, Article VI needs to be taken much more seriously. Continued reductions are important, but nuclear weapons also need to be devalued, thereby reducing their role and attractiveness. To comply with the NPT and make nuclear weapons less salient for aspirant proliferators, the existing nuclear weapon possessors need to take the lead in minimising the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security doctrines. An important first step towards this would be for all states to declare that they will not use nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing international security and removing the options of nuclear pre-emption or retaliation. Iran's nuclear programme is undoubtedly worrying, but it is still at an early stage and nowhere near the industrial production levels necessary to make nuclear weapons.
© 2006 The Acronym Institute. |