Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 38, June 1999
Problems and Prospects of CWC Implementation After the Fourth
Session of the Conference of States Parties
By Alexander Kelle
Introduction
102 out of 126 Member States to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) took part in the Fourth Session of the Conference of States
Parties (CSP), which was held in The Hague from 28 June to 2 July
1999. (1) In addition, 13 signatory States, four International
Organisations and five Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were
admitted for participation. As in past sessions of the CSP,
however, NGOs were allowed access only to some of the meetings and
a part of the official documents of the Conference. (2)
The major task of the Conference was to decide upon the year
2000 Budget and Program of Work of the Organisation. Although the
Friend of the Chair appointed for this issue had been able to make
considerable progress in reducing the controversial issues, one of
them still remained to be solved during the Fourth Session of the
CSP: the distribution of Schedule 2 industry inspections among
States Parties. Other friends of the chair or facilitators working
in the intersessional period on unresolved issues have also been
able to narrow down diverging opinions on the issues under
facilitation. So, the Conference had before it a number of draft
decisions prepared for approval. Other potential compromise
solutions had not yet found a consensus, which necessitated further
negotiations during this Session of the Conference.
The substantial work of the Conference started, however, with
reports by the Director General of the Technical Secretariat, the
Chairman of the Executive Council, and the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole, who was coordinating the work of the
various facilitators, and the subsequent General Debate on the
status of implementation of the Convention. (3)
The Intersessional Period
As in the preceeding intersessional period the Technical
Secretariat continued to inspect CW related facilities as well as
industry related facilities and plant sites, based upon the
declarations by member States. As of 29 April the following
facilities had been declared by member States (4): CW production
facilities in 9 States Parties; 32 CW storage facilities in 4
States Parties; 33 CW destruction facilities in 4 States Parties;
54 old/abandoned CW sites in 8 States Parties; 24 Schedule 1
facilities in 19 States Parties; 315 Schedule 2 plant sites in 24
States Parties; 392 Schedule 3 plant sites in 27 States Parties;
and 3,542 other chemical production facilities in 47 States
Parties. These declarations have resulted in 460 inspections at 276
sites in 29 States Parties. 110 of these inspections were carried
out in CW production facilities, 65 in CW storage facilities, 101
in CW destruction facilities, 47 in Schedule 1 facilities, 93 in
Schedule 2 plant sites, 15 in Schedule 3 plant sites, 9 in
abandoned CW sites, and 20 in old CW sites. It is noteworthy that
the figures for both industrial declarations and inspections do not
contain any data on the US, which still has not submitted its
initial industry declaration.
As the Director General of the Technical Secretariat pointed out
in his statement to the Fourth Session of the Conference of States
Parties, a number of outreach activities were undertaken by the
Secretariat to enlarge the number of member States and thus move
closer to the universality of the Convention. However, only five
States joined the Convention in the intersessional period -
Estonia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Holy See, Nigeria
and the Repuhblic of Sudan -, leaving a big part of the African
continent and especially the Middle East still outside the purview
of the Convention. Surprisingly, the Director General adressed
States in the latter region directly when he expressed his hope
that the new Israeli government "will look afresh at the matter" of
joining the CWC. In addition, he argued, "the time has come for
Egypt, Lebanon, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Syria and Yemen to ask themselves whether the linkage they have
created between the Chemical Weapons Convention and Israel's
membership of ... the NPT is actually working to their benefit."
(5) In a similar vein, the Director General argued that Iraq and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should accede to the
Convention.
With respect to the implementation of the Convention's
provisions, two years after entry into force of the CWC 29 States
Parties still had to submit their initial declarations. What is
more, the declarations of a significant number of States Parties
remain incomplete, with the US amongst the "technically"
non-compliant States. The status of States Parties' payment of
assessed contributions gives an equaly bleak picture. As of 15
April only 36 of the then 121 member States had paid their 1999
assessments in full, 28 had paid partially and 57 had not paid at
all. 1998 contributions were fully paid by 61, partially paid by
23, and not paid at all by 37 member States. For the 1999 budget
alone, this low payment morale constitues a gap in the available
funds of roughly NLG 30 million, or some 28% of the budget.
In his statement to the Conference the Technical Secretariat's
Director General took up one issue that usually is pursued only by
a group of States Parties to the Convention. Yet, he addressed "the
need to foster the development of the peaceful use of chemistry in
all States Parties", in a way that called into question the future
utility of "ad hoc export control regimes such as the 'Australia
Group'". He went on to "call on those States Parties which are
members of such ad hoc export regimes to reconsider the application
of such export controls to fellow States Parties" to the CWC.
(6)
The Executive Council (EC) held four regular sessions between
the Third and the Fourth Session of the CSP. In addition, six
EC-meetings were convened at short notice. While the regular
sessions are announced long before, have a full agenda, and through
the receipt of a status of implementation report from the Technical
Secretariat mainly serve the purpose of regular communication
between the organs of the Organization, the newly established type
of meetings can be called at short notice if an "issue or matter
required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions and within
its competence" comes up and requires the immediate attention of
the EC.
Part of the issues the EC had to deal with during the
intersessional period were returned to it after the Third Session
of the CSP had been unable to reach a decision on them. They
included inter alia the requirements for reporting
information to the Council on verification activities; the
attribution of cost related to inspections of old and abandoned
chemical weapons; the draft relationship agreement between the
United Nations and the OPCW; the fostering of international
cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical
activities; and the OPCW Staff Regulations.
Despite continuing negotiations between the Technical
Secretariat and the EC on the reporting format for verification
activities, including inspection results, no consensus could be
achieved during the intersessional period which would have enabled
the States Parties to monitor the implementation of all provisions
of, and compliance with the Convention in a satisfactory manner.
Therefore, the EC decided to hold further consultations on the
matter. (7)
Two long overdue outstanding issues finally were resolved and
could be approved by the Council during the intersessional period.
During its Fourteenth Session in February a model facility
agreement for chemical weapons storage facilities was agreed upon;
this was followed during the Fifteenth Session in April by a model
facility agreement for chemical weapons production facilities. Both
decisions were submitted to the Conference for endorsement. (8) In
addition, the Council had before it two requests - one from the
Russian Federation and one from the Republic of Korea - for the
conversion of chemical weapons production facilities for purposes
not prohibited under the Convention. Both requests were approved
and equally transferred to the Conference for confirmation.
Furthermore, the Council considered a number of other CW related
issues, among them CW destruction plans, and combined plans for
destruction and verification, involving all declared CW possessor
States, except Russia. It became obvious that although CW
destruction - ot at least the planing for it - got underway since
the last Session of the Conference of States Parties, the
reimbursement of verification costs under Articles IV and V did not
proceed as smoothly. To the contrary, the EC noted with concern
that reimbursement payments by States Parties to the Organization
were outstanding for the great majority of costs in question.
In his Report on the Results of Intersessional Work on the
Unresolved Issues to the Conference the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole was able to present four issues that had
been resolved by the facilitators assigned to the topics. With
respect to the attribution of costs related to inspections of
abandoned chemical weapons, the facilitator presented his
compromise solution to the Executive Council's 14th
session, where it was adopted. According to the EC's decision, the
Organization will pay the initial inspection of declared abandoned
CW. If the abandoned CW are determined by the Organization to be
meeting the definition of old chemical weapons prouced between 1925
and 1946, "the costs of further required verification measures will
be attributed to the abandoning State Party". (9) This is very
close to the language already worked out during the Third
Conference of States Parties in November 1998, but obviously the
time was then not yet ripe for resolution of the issue. A related
question - the attribution of costs related to inspections of old
chemical weapons - was not solved in the intersessional period and
had therefore to be taken up again during the Fourth Session of the
Conference.
The already mentioned model facility agreements for CW storage
facilities and CW production facilities were agreed upon and
submitted to the Executive Council. In addition, two still
outstanding CW related issues could be resolved by the facilitator
appointed for the issue. They relate to the declaration
requirements for chemical weapons and the determination of how
States Parties report CW on their territory which are owned by
another State. (10) Yet, despite these successes, a considerable
number of unresolved issues remain more than two years after entry
into force of the Convention. This state of affairs once more
raised the question for the Fourth Session of the Conference on how
to continue dealing with these matters. The Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole who was in charge of coordinating the
various facilitators work recalled that the "facilitation process
was invented during the First Session of this Conference to deal
with the problems created by the incomplete work of the Preparatory
Commission and the composition of the Organization at that early
stage." He went on th suggest that it "may now be time to close
this chapter, and to start using the term 'unresolved issues' for
those that actually deserve it". (11)
The Fourth Session of the Conference of States
Parties
During the general debate 40 States Parties made statements in
which they presented their assessments of the state of affairs in
implementing the Convention. Two of them spoke on behalf of groups
of States: Germany on behalf of the European Union and Algeria on
behalf of the African Group. Recurring themes were the achievements
made up to now in implementing the Convention, the need to redress
imbalances in the fulfilment of treaty obligations, as well as the
desirability of achieving universal adherence to the
Convention.
In addition, a number of statements are noteworthy for some of
the issues they addressed. In the Canadian statement, for example,
it was announced that the "Government of Canada is in the process
of removing its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol in respect
of chemical weapons, as this is no longer relevant or necessary,
given the Chemical Weapons Convention." The German statement on
behalf of the EU pointed out that "failure by a State Party with a
major chemical industry to provide declarations has led in 1998 to
64 per cent of Schedule 2 inspections and 54 per cent of Schedule 3
inspections being carried out in Member States of the European
Union. The EU believes that the time has come for all concerned to
take action urgently to redress the imbalance", thereby setting the
stage for the end-game of the budget negotiations, especially the
industry verification part thereof.
The US statement reaffirmed that CW destruction in the country
was well on target and stated that as of early June the US had
destroyed close to 4,500 tons, or 14% of its CW stocks. Less
promising was the US statement in relation to the timing of its
industry declaration. Here, the US delegate announced that "it is
unlikely that we will be in a position to submit the required
declarations before early next year at best." Yet, this confession
of continued US non-compliance with the Convention did not prevent
him from criticizing the "artificial limits on further industrial
inspections until all initial inspections have taken place", which
were being sought by some States Parties. The Polish statement in
the General Debate contained a passage on old CW in which it is
postulated that there is "a fundamental requirement that the costs
of verification of old chemical weapons shall be reimbursed to the
OPCW in accordance with the same guidelines which apply to chemical
weapons." Unfortunately, the Polish delegate did not elaborate on
how he derived this opinion - which resembles that of the US on
this matter to a considerable extent - from the text of the
Convention.
As already indicated, the most controversial issue standing in
the way of the finalization of the budget related to the question
of Schedule 2 industry inspections. Already in the run-up to the
Fourth Session of the CSP the uncertainty surrounding the
submission of the initial US industry declaration led to the
inclusion in the draft 2000 budget of 50 Schedule 2 inspections for
States Parties who have not yet submitted the corresponding
declaration, i.e. the United States. For some reason, it was
assumed that the US would submit its declaration towards the end of
1999, so that 14 initial inspections of Schedule 2 plant sites
could be conducted before the end of the year, leaving 36 initial
inspections for the year 2000. (12) The number for Schedule 2
initial inspections in States Parties who have already submitted
their initial inspection was set at 21, while the number of
re-inspections for these countries was set at 10 for the year 2000.
Furthermore, 34 Schedule 3 inspections and 6 inspections of plant
sites with discrete organical chemicals (DOCs) are planned for the
next year.
In case the 14 Schedule 2 initial inspections can not be
conducted before the end of this year - which seems likely given
the the US statement during the General debate - these inspections
will be added to all 57 Schedule 2 initial inspections foreseen for
the year 2000 and will be subject to a geographically equitable
distribution among States Parties with declared Schedule 2 plant
sites. At the same time the amount of Schedule 3 and DOC inspection
will be reduced by 14. In case the US initial industry declaration
is further delayed and therefore less than 36 initial Schedule 2
industry inspections will be conducted in 2000, the number of
inspections not used up for this purpose will be added to Schedule
3 and DOC inspections, whose conduct will be limited to States
Parties who did not receive any Schedule 2 inspections in 1998 and
1999. These rather complex fallback positions take into account the
interests of all States Parties concerned and thus enabled the 2000
budget to be finalized.
Another thorny set of issues, which was inherited from the
PrepCom, was under constant facilitation ever since and could not
be resolved on the level of the Executive Council, concerns three
issues related to old chemical weapons produced between 1925 and
1946: first, the criteria for judging their usability; second, the
type of verification regime to be established to cover their
destruction; and, third the attribution of the cost of their
verification. Whereas a facilitator was appointed to the latter of
the three issues, a solution in the context of the intersessional
process was not possible.
According to the German position - Germany being one of the
major players in this context - it is evident that although Article
IV, para. 16 of the CWC stipulates that "each State party shall
meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to
destroy", it is clear from para. 1 of the same Article that its
scope does not cover "old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical
weapons to which Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies".
Since Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex does not contain any
provision relating to the costs of verification, it is the German
position that these costs have to be covered by the regular OPCW
budget, not by the States Parties declaring old CW. Indeed, this
reading of the Convention is supported by Article VIII, para. 7 of
the CWC. It states that the cost of verification activities are to
be borne by the organization itself, unless an exception to this
basic rule is clearly spelled out in the Convention - as is the
case for the verification of the storage and destruction of
chemical weapons. Yet, no such exception exists for old CW.
(13)
This view is strongly contested by the USA, the Russian
Federation, and a view other States Parties. In a national paper
submitted to the Conference, the US pointed out that according to
Article IV (16) of the Convention "each State Party shall meet the
costs of verification of destruction of chemical weapons" it it
obliged to destroy. Because the Convention requires a State Party
to destroy old chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that
have deteriorated to such an extent that they can no longer be used
as chemical weapons, Article IV (16) requires that State Party to
meet the verification costs of destruction of those chemical
weapons. (14) When no movement was discernible in these mutually
exclusive positions, the Russian delegation towards the end of the
Conference circulated a draft proposal which foresaw the treatment
of cost of verification of old CW analogous to the solution found
for abandoned CW. Since this would have prejudicated a solution
through the back door of budget allocations, it proved equally
inacceptable to States Parties concerned. In the end, the matter
could not be resolved and had to be transferred back to the
Executive Council which will take up the issue again during its
next regular meeting in September.
Yet, altogether, the Fourth Session of the Conference can be
regarded as a successful one: drafting of the budget caused less
trouble than during the Third Session of the Conference, the
decisions prepared drafted by the facilitators and transfered to
the Conference by the Executive Council were confirmed without
exception, and the Staff Regulation was agreed in principle, too.
The only remaining detail to be worked out in this context concerns
the starting point of the seven-year duration of staff contracts.
While the Director General of the Secretariat and a few delegations
insisted that this rule cannot be applied retroactively for current
employees, taking into account the time span they have already been
working for the Organization, other States Parties insisted that
exactly this would have to be the case. Eventually, the Executive
Council was tasked to solve this detail before the end of the year.
Similarly, the finalization of the UN-OPCW Relationship Agreement
was left with this Session's Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole, the Hungarian Ambassador Gyarmati.
The Way Ahead
Another important step taken by the Fourth Session of the
Conference which will have an impact on the future conduct of the
Organization's business is the decision to abandon the
intersessional procedure for addressing unresolved issues, as it
was implemented in the past. Instead, the Executive Council will
establish an open-ended working group to solve the issues which
really need to be solved, thereby cutting of the organizational
structure which some States Parties could utilize to pursue their
"hobby-horses", which in a number of cases were of minor relevance
for the operation of the Organization. Although there might be a
danger of repeating the working group model as it was implemented
during the PrepCom phase between early 1993 and entry into force of
the Convention in April 1997, it seems that States Parties are
aware of this potential pitfall and will certainly try to avoid
it.
Although the relationship between the organs of OPCW, i.e. the
Technical Secretariat and the Executive Council, appears to be on
its way towards normalization, a certain tension in that regard was
still identifiable during the Fourth Session of the CSP. On one
hand the Director General complained in his report to the CSP about
the classification of post within the Secretariat, the absence of a
tenure policy for the Organization, and the Secretariat's work
still being "held ransom to short-sighted acts of micromanagement
and, on occassion, to individual idiosyncrasies." (15) This
assessment is contrasted, on the other hand, by some States Parties
ongoing concerns about the flow of information from the Secretariat
to the Council and their insistence that it is up to the States
Parties - not the Secretariat - to decide upon treaty compliant
behavior. Yet, the prospects are good, that these utterances to a
considerable extent are merely a reflection of structurally
determined differences in attitude built into practically every
international organization in which its member States share part of
their responsibility with an international bureaucracy created for
treaty implementation.
Notes and References
1. For an assessment of the first three Sessions of the
Conference of States Parties and CWC implementation at these stages
see A. Kelle, 'Setting Up the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons',
Disarmament Diplomacy, May 1997, pp.9-10; A. Kelle, 'Implementation of the CWC after the Second
Session of the Conference of States Parties', Disarmament
Diplomacy, December 1997, pp.15-19; A. Kelle: 'CWC Update. Business as Usual in
Implementing the CWC? Not Quite Yet', Disarmament
Diplomacy, November 1998, pp.8-12.
2. See Decision. Attendance by Non-Governmental Organizations
and Industry Representatives at the Fourth Session of the
Conference of the States Parties, Document C-IV/DEC.2, 28 June
1999.
3. See Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of
its Activities (5 September 1998 - 29 April 1999), Document
C-IV/1, 4 June 1999; Statement by the Director General to the
Conference of States Parties at its Fourth Session, Document
C-IV/DG.12, 28 June 1999; Chairman of the Committee of the Whole,
Report on the Results of Intersessional Work on the Unresolved
Issues, Document C-IV/CoW.1, 28 June 1999.
4. The following data are taken from Progress in The Hague,
Quarterly Review no 26, in The CBW Conventions Bulletin,
Issue No.44, June 1999, pp.14-15.
5. See Document C-IV/DG.12, p.2.
6. See Document C-IV/DG.12, p.5, 6.
7. On the other issues mentioned, see the sections on the
Intersessional Procedure and on the Fourth Session of the CSP,
respectively.
8. See documents EC-XIV/DEC.8, dated 5 February 1999 and
EC-XV/DEC.8, dated 29 April 1999.
9. See document EC-XIV/DEC.2, dated 4 February 1999.
10. For more details see the Council´s decision as
contained in document EC-XIV/DEC.3, dated 4 February 1999.
11. See Document C-IV/CoW.1, dated 28 June 1999, pp.4-5.
12. This latter figure then found its way into the Draft OPCW
Programme and Budget 2000, as contained in Document
C-IV/DEC/CRP.1/Rev.3, dated 21 June 1999, pp.18-19.
13. See Document EC-XV/NAT.5 for details of the German
position.
14. See Document C-IV/NAT.10, dated 30 June 1999, p.2.
15. See Document C-IV/DG.12, dated 28 June 1999, p.9.
Dr. Alexander Kelle is Research Associate at the
Non-Proliferation Project of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
(PRIF).
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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