Disarmament Diplomacy

NPT Report

Rogues and Rhetoric: The 2003 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards

By Rebecca Johnson

Introduction

The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - held in Geneva from April 28 to May 9, 2003, and chaired by Ambassador Laszló Mólnár of Hungary - can be characterised as a carefully managed meeting that accomplished the adoption of its report, but also as a missed opportunity to address resurgent proliferation and disarmament challenges collectively. Attended by 106 states parties, the PrepCom was a diplomatic, but not necessarily a political success.

Where the first PrepCom seemed to paper over widening the cracks, the second PrepCom more clearly reflected US priorities in the post-9/11 security environment. As such, it may represent a 'return-to-the-past' turning point for the non-proliferation regime, echoing the Cold War emphasis on preventing 'undesirables' from acquiring nuclear weapons, while nuclear disarmament is consigned once again to the periphery, as a distant, rhetorical objective that does not really impinge on the ringfenced privileges of the 'already haves'. This resurgent marginalisation of disarmament, echoed in different interventions from several of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) during the PrepCom, was best illustrated by the US response after the report and summary had been adopted, brusquely denying any connection between slow progress on nuclear disarmament and the growth of proliferation threats, and stressing that "compliance with Articles II and III" - covering the basic obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) - "are at the NPT's heart".

The meeting took place in the shadow of some very serious proliferation challenges. These included: North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT on January 10 this year; US allegations of clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran, first detailed by the State Department last December; and persistent debates in the United States about developing new nuclear weapons, with the concomitant threat that the testing moratorium could be violated and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) killed off, perhaps within 2-3 years. In addition, the US-led war on Iraq is viewed by many as an inadvertent promoter of proliferation, due to the dangerous strategy of lumping together the very different threats from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, showing the power of such capabilities to instil fear in much better-armed governments, and undertaking pre-emptive military action against a much weaker adversary. On the other side, Cuba - whose accession to the NPT on November 4, 2002 made it the 188th state party, leaving only Israel, India and Pakistan outside the regime - stated its reasons for joining in terms of strengthening and consolidating the United Nations, multilateralism and the international treaties on disarmament.¹ While many wanted the PrepCom to address North Korea's violation and announced withdrawal from the treaty, the United States was determined to put Iran in the dock.

The PrepCom concluded by midday on May 9 with the adoption of a procedural report listing decisions, participants, working papers and other procedural data, to which was attached the Chair's factual summary, reproduced in full at the end of this article. The meeting was unable to take decisions on who will chair the Third PrepCom and the next Review Conference (RevCon), scheduled for New York in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Although the dates for these meetings were fixed by the first PrepCom as April 26 to May 7, 2004 for the Third PrepCom and May 2 to May 27 for the Review Conference, there was also some discussion about extending the Third PrepCom for a third week, or possibly inserting a Fourth PrepCom to deal with procedural arrangements. It was not clear how much support these suggestions carried, but neither was agreed nor, for that matter, ruled out. The Chairs for the next PrepCom and the Review Conference are expected to be nominated by the group of nonaligned states parties to the treaty. Though some names were being floated, no formal nominations were made and the appointments have been remitted to the next PrepCom.

In accordance with Review Process practice since 1997, the fifth plenary of the PrepCom, on April 30, heard from a range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Despite this now-established session, conditions for NGO and press representatives were more restricted than ever before, with UN guards instructed to implement unusually draconian prohibitions on NGOs picking up statements or working documents relating to any of the non-plenary debates on nuclear disarmament, security assurances, safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones, regional issues, nuclear energy and nuclear safety.

They also did their utmost to prevent NGOs or press from entering the conference room to talk with delegates before or after meetings other than the designated plenaries. Denied timely access to most papers and blocked from the daily, informal mingling and talking with NPT diplomats that is immeasurably more productive at meetings such as these than formal appointments, Acronym's reporting role of earlier years was severely impeded. Rather than risk misrepresenting the closed discussions on regional issues, the Middle East, nuclear energy, safeguards, export controls and safety², I have concentrated on gleaning enough information on a smaller number of key issues relating directly to noncompliance and nuclear disarmament, highlighting particular concerns and developments likely to affect the NPT's implementation in the future.

With civil society (NGOs and press) now so excluded, the burden of providing accessible summaries on the major debates and issues falls more heavily on the Chair, required since 2002 to produce a factual and substantive summary. As in 2002, Mólnár's summary provides a useful, publicly available snapshot of the range of concerns, although diplomatic convention means it can indicate little about the tenor of debate, and the main protagonists have to be guessed at from context, sometimes aided by references to "one state party" or "some states parties". The Chair's text is appended to my report.

Unlike 2002, Mólnár's summary was privately negotiated, to a significant extent, with a number of the key states, to ensure that no-one would block its attachment to the PrepCom report. At 10 pages and 42 paragraphs, it echoed much of Henrik Salander's 2002 summary, but provided greater length on some issues. Various delegations were solicited to contribute text on issues that they had identified as priorities, which were then checked out with other key states that might have an objection. As a consequence many references were substantially amended and/or watered down to accord with the sensitivities of the key delegations. Notwithstanding the comments and caveats made at the end by some 19 delegations, the reception was generally favourable.

The United States chose to make noncompliance its major theme for the PrepCom, devoting a large part of its combative opening statement to accusing the DPRK and Iran, with reference also to the Ba'ath regime's attempts to develop an Iraqi nuclear bomb. In contrast with this narrow view of noncompliance, many states wanted to draw attention also to the deficiencies and derelictions in the nuclear-weapon states' compliance with the treaty's nuclear disarmament obligations, especially the 13 Steps agreed at the Review Conference in 2000.³ In addition to a growing spotlight on non-strategic nuclear weapons, reflected in this report, two issues of broader disarmament interest also began to push their way onto the NPT agenda: the urgency of preventing the weaponisation of outer space; and the importance of disarmament and education.⁴

Noncompliance by NNWS

One of the most serious developments for the NPT, the declared but disputed withdrawal from the treaty by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was set to one side to avoid delaying the start of the meeting. Recognising that there were "diverging views" on the status of the DPRK, and that "a debate on the issue would only serve to the detriment of the purpose of the Preparatory Committee... to 'consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality", Mólnár, as Chair of the PrepCom, decided "under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of [the DPRK], temporarily, in his custody."⁵

This clever initiative avoided early arguments about whether the DPRK nameplate should be removed, signifying acceptance that it has withdrawn from the treaty, or placed in its usual alphabetical place in the Conference chamber, indicating that its withdrawal is still in doubt, despite its declared intention. While some treat the withdrawal as a done deal, however much they might regret it, others argue that the withdrawal clause in the treaty, Article X, applies only to states in good standing.⁶ In accordance with this reasoning, because Kim Jong Il's regime had violated the DPRK's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations prior to evoking the withdrawal clause, it could not legally leave the treaty until those violations had been properly dealt with. France, which took the latter view, argued that the DPRK "cannot evade its obligations by withdrawing from the Treaty: the withdrawal procedure is not designed to legitimise non-compliance with the Treaty and the development of nuclear weapons."⁷

By the time of the PrepCom, the US-led Coalition had ousted Saddam Hussein, and its troops were in occupation of Iraq. Though a silent official at times sat behind Iraq's name-plate, no-one was quite sure whom he represented. Comments about Iraq's violation of the NPT, exposed in 1991, and the subsequent IAEA inspections and destruction of Saddam's nuclear capabilities, were therefore muted. The United States instead focussed on Iran, making allegations of Tehran's noncompliance with the treaty the centrepiece of many of its interventions. This strategy was fuelled by heightened concerns following the reported exposure of two undeclared nuclear sites under construction in the country - a suspected uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and heavy water production facility near Arak.⁸

North Korea: In or Out?

Some 30 statements, representing more than 150 NPT parties, expressed varying degrees of condemnation of North Korea's self-declared withdrawal from the treaty, its expulsion of IAEA inspectors, and the confusing but clearly ominous signs suggesting the revival of the country's nuclear weapon programme. In an example of the stronger level of criticism, Greece, on behalf of the European Union (EU), deplored the DPRK's action and urged it to reconsider and "fulfil its commitments under the NPT, retract its announcement to withdraw from the NPT and readmit IAEA inspectors". In addition, "any clandestine nuclear weapons programme should be dismantled immediately in a verifiable manner." The EU emphasised its "firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations..."⁹ The statement delivered by New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, Marian Hobbs, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), emphasised the importance of "dialogue over confrontation" and called for a peaceful resolution "leading to the DPRK's return to full compliance with the Treaty's terms".¹⁰

By contrast, after a bitter debate on this issue among nonaligned states parties, Malaysia, speaking on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)'s behalf, was able only to note the DPRK's decision and "express the view that the parties directly concerned resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT as an extension of their goodwill." Speaking solely for itself in the "Cluster 2" regional issues debate on Friday May 2, Malaysia went further in expressing concern and welcoming efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Alluding on more than one occasion to the DPRK's reported admission of a covert uranium enrichment programme in October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf said that North Korea's "withdrawal action was both cynical, in light of its long-standing breach of the Treaty, and dangerous in its impact on security in Northeast Asia". Commenting that "If NPT withdrawal and threats to acquire nuclear weapons become the currency of international bargaining, our world will be in chaos", Wolf called on all NPT parties to send the same message to the DPRK: "abandon your nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT." The US statement also contained a barely veiled threat. Though "determined to end North Korea's threat through peaceful, diplomatic means", Wolf emphasised that "all our options remain available".¹¹

Later, during the "Cluster 1" debate, the US argued that while it was "doing its part to help find a diplomatic solution...the solution must be multilateral in conception and execution." An even more detailed statement was made in the session devoted to "regional issues", where the United States told NPT parties that "on the margins" of the multilateral talks hosted by China (Beijing, April 23-25), the DPRK representatives "told us unequivocally that they have nuclear weapons... They also said there is a way to move on and gave us a proposal." The proposal was "not going to take us in the direction we need to go", and the US "will not be intimidated by North Korea's claims or threats...[and] we are not going to pay for the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme...[that] should never have begun in the first place..." The US believed the "international security regime will weather" North Korea's challenge, emphasising that "North Korea will come into compliance with NPT obligations or face serious consequences." The UK also deplored the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal and called on it to clarify the exact status of its nuclear programme and dismantle it in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Echoing many of the same points, France also highlighted the DPRK's "ambitious ballistic missile programme...[and] chemical arsenal" and argued for the UN Security Council to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Several delegates noted that China's plenary statement failed to mention the DPRK, an omission remedied only by a short statement during the debate on regional issues at the end of the first week. The statement, delivered by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, stressed simply that Beijing "stands for maintaining the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean peninsula...and resolving the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through negotiation." Briefly commenting on the Beijing talks between China, the US and the DPRK, Hu noted that "the DPRK nuclear issue is complex and sensitive". Calling for DPRK's security concerns also to be addressed, China hoped that "the US and DPRK will exercise restraint and demonstrate sincerity and flexibility".

Russia's opening statement emphasised the importance of the Korean peninsula remaining nuclear free, noting that Moscow was "of the opinion that the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary and possible." Calling for a "political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis through negotiations", Russia argued that North Korea should be provided with "guarantees of security, sovereignty, as well as to restart humanitarian and economic programs which had been in place on the Korean peninsula".¹²

Japan stated that it could not accept "any development, transfer or possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea" and urged the DPRK "to refreeze its nuclear related facilities and to take prompt action to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner". Japan also argued that the Beijing talks should include the "early participation of the concerned countries, including Japan and the Republic of Korea".¹³

Unsurprisingly, South Korea expressed its deep concern at its neighbour's "entirely unacceptable" nuclear weapons programme, and called for the "international community to stand together in containing the spectre of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula". Providing some background and history to regional efforts to address the crisis, South Korea called for a peaceful resolution through diplomatic means, said it would "spare no effort to this end".

The failure of the NPT parties to move beyond symbolic rhetoric under the current conditions of the review process can be seen from Paragraph 28 of the Chair's factual summary, which referred delicately to the DPRK's 'nuclear issue':

"A wide range of concerns was expressed on the recent developments regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issue. In this regard, states parties called upon the DPRK to show its political will to cooperate with the international community in increasing mutual confidence. In particular, states parties expressed concern about or deplored the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme, which undermines peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. States parties felt that the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Treaty represented a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. States parties called upon the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, verifiable and irreversible way. States parties called for a denuclearised Korean Peninsula and urged the DPRK to reconsider its course of action and to comply with all safeguards obligations pursuant to the Treaty. They stressed that the DPRK nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully, through diplomatic means, and urged the DPRK to take the necessary action to de-escalate and improve the situation and to engage in talks with countries concerned in a responsible, forthcoming and constructive manner. States parties welcomed the talks between the US, the DPRK and China held in Beijing from 23 to 25 April, 2003 and expressed the hope that these talks would prove to be an important first step towards resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. States parties believed that this issue should continue to be dealt with multilaterally, with the participation of the concerned countries. The view was expressed that the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula should be maintained, that the legitimate security concerns of the DPRK should be addressed, and that the relevant sides should exercise restraint and demonstrate sincerity and flexibility. The Preparatory Committee took note of a statement by the Chair at the first meeting of the Session related to the views of States parties on the DPRK's status in the Treaty."

While many delegates had applauded Mólnár's deft sidelining of the question of the DPRK's status in the treaty, corridor reservations were expressed as the meeting wore on. One argued that the Chair's initiative gave the DPRK its desired special status, which could have been avoided by having the Chair take administrative custody of the nameplates of the large number (over 80) states parties that were not present at the beginning of the meeting. Bypassing the central dilemma of whether the DPRK was in or out of the NPT left the PrepCom with no role other than impotent rhetoric. Seeing this, some questioned whether it might not have been better for the long-term health of the NPT for the start of the PrepCom to have been delayed a bit to enable (or force) a discussion of how the NPT regime and the treaty parties might contribute to a multilateral, diplomatic solution, and, more generally, how to strengthen the role and authority of NPT parties to address such challenges and ensure against similar attempts to withdraw.

Reactions to this argument were mixed. While some felt that empowering the treaty regime to be more effective was the most important issue the meeting should have come to grips with, others argued that an impasse would have weakened the NPT (and given the DPRK an undesirable spotlight). On the other hand, even if the start had been delayed by a few days of intensive consideration of the DPRK's situation and the role of NPT parties in the event of this or further withdrawals, it would not mean losing the PrepCom altogether. The Chair could have kept the name-plate initiative in his back pocket, and would no doubt have won acceptance for it when the issue had been fully debated and the time was right for the PrepCom to move forwards. While this would have truncated the rest of the discussion agenda, that would have been no substantial loss, and the crisis talks might have yielded substantial benefits.

Iran: Accused and Accuser

Following directly after its warnings to an absent North Korea, the United States fired a broadside at one of the delegations seated across from it in the conference chamber. In his opening statement, Wolf accused Iran of "conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons programme". Declaring that "Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT", Wolf posed and answered a series of questions: "How many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states built an enrichment plant before their first power reactor was finished? None. What responsible country would or could commit to building a production scale plant without extensive research and development? None. How many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear programs based solely on light water reactors have also built large-scale heavy water plants? None. Why has Iran sought clandestinely to acquire laser enrichment technology?" The United States noted that "we have seen the pattern of cheat and retreat before - of begrudging compromises on process but obstinacy on real disclosure", and accused Iran of "going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq."¹⁴

The following day, in Iran's national statement to the General Debate, G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, responded that Iran would "vigorously exploit its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", and insisted that "Iran has been in constant cooperation with the IAEA and has fully complied with its obligations under its safeguards agreements." Khoshroo then gave a strongly-worded, apparently unequivocal condemnation of the development of nuclear weapons: "unlike some others, we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defence doctrine. They do not add to our security, nor do they help us to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in our supreme interests. We have no hidden agenda and do not seek nuclear weapons, and most certainly we do not accept or tolerate allegations by those who have clearly placed themselves outside the law."

Parodying Wolf, Khoshroo then threw out a series of questions intended to highlight ways in which the United States had failed to fulfil expectations and commitments under international law: "How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have prescribed the use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and developed new types of nuclear weapons compatible with its combat scenarios? None. Which other nuclear weapon states have sought to utilize outer space for nuclear purposes more than the United States? None. How many nuclear weapon states other than the United States have legislatively rejected the CTBT and practically doomed its future? Why did the United States through its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM and its abrogation of step 7 of the 13 steps threaten the strategic stability of the world? Which NPT party other than the United States has left such a record of undermining so many international instruments, on disarmament and other issues alike? None. Are these not the relevant questions that should be dealt with at this PrepCom and other NPT meetings?"¹⁵

Iran's vigorous riposte, in which it also called for examples "by deeds, not words and polemic", irritated or amused, depending on the listeners' perspective. To many, it appeared designed to deflect rather than address the genuine concerns underlying the US accusations, which are shared by many NPT parties, notwithstanding their comparative silence.

Undeterred, the United States elaborated on its themes of Iranian noncompliance in several more statements spread among the various cluster and special issue debates. During the course of the meeting, some 40 others according to the UK, raised similar concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, notably in statements from the EU and associated states, Canada and Australia. The US insisted that this must be reflected in the Chair's summary, risking a potential deadlock, as Iranian opposition could result in the PrepCom refusing to accept the summary. After intensive consultations with the US and Iran, as main protagonists, and some of the Europeans, the Chair ensured that paragraph 5 addressed the need for full compliance, confidence and the removal of concerns through verification, including the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

This generalised but strong statement was made more explicit when Iran was named in paragraph 34, which followed three paragraphs that addressed the IAEA safeguards and urged that the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) be made the NPT's "safeguard standard" at the 2005 Review Conference, ensuring that it would then be recognised as a condition for nuclear supply arrangements. Iran succeeded in watering down this language, placing it in the context of a call for all states who had done so to adhere to the Additional Protocol, and inserting references to two of Iran's statements repudiating the allegations, as follows:

"The importance of building confidence in the peaceful character of nuclear activities, in particular through transparency measures required by the IAEA, was emphasized. All States parties, particularly those with advance nuclear programmes, were called upon to conclude, bring into force and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement at the earliest opportunity, which enhances the confidence of States parties and helps eliminate concerns regarding their nuclear programmes. In this context, and in light of the scope of its nuclear programme, Iran was called upon to sign an Additional Protocol and to ensure full and forthcoming cooperation with the IAEA, whose Secretariat is expected to provide a comprehensive report at the June 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. The inalienable right of all states parties in full compliance with the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well the inviolability of nuclear facilities, were reaffirmed. States parties noted Iran's statement of 29 April 2003 solemnly declaring that it does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is engaged in addressing in a detailed and substantiated manner the questions which have been raised about its nuclear programme. States Parties also noted Iran's statement of 8 May 2003 underlining the need to avoid prejudgement about Iran's nuclear program in order to maintain the integrity of the IAEA process."

Responding after acceptance of the Chair's summary, the United States, despite having been closely consulted by Mólnár, expressed its dissatisfaction. Underlining that the PrepCom had done more than call for Iran to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol, the US argued that it had "called on Iran to make full, truly transparent disclosure and compliance on all its NPT obligations". The UK followed, complaining that the language on Iran was "weak", and reiterating concern regarding the "scale, scope and lack of transparency" of Iran's programme, "as stressed by some 40 states parties".

Unlike most of the oral statements following adoption of the report and summary, Iran's was distributed as a formal, written response. It went beyond objecting to being named in the factual summary, referring to Iran's own history in the past two decades of war and foreign pressure. In particular, the Director General for International Political Affairs, Mr Amir Zamaninia, objected to "the inability of the United States to view Iran's peaceful nuclear programme objectively, that is to say, separate from problems [in] our bilateral relations". Zamaninia compared the US approach to Israel - "a proven and substantiated, established proliferator" and Iran, saying the US showed "double standards". Arguing that with seven separate interventions accusing Iran during this PrepCom, the US was attempting "to create a quasi-crisis", he wryly commented "frankly speaking, I could not bring myself to listening and reading more than the first three". Iran, which had been successful in watering down paragraph 34, nevertheless argued that it was tantamount to a "prejudgement" and "name calling" before the IAEA report on Iran had come out. Reiterating some of the points made in Iran's General Debate statement and response to the first US broadside, Zamaninia referred to Iran's "desire and effort to become economically strong and be able to distribute prosperity, where we are not dependent only on the revenue from the sale of oil as a raw material". The Iranian delegation argued that it took questions about its nuclear programme seriously, and referred delegations to the statement by Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President, on "Iran's Nuclear Policy (Peaceful, Transparent, Independent)", delivered that the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on May 6, 2003.¹⁶

Iran's apparently unequivocal condemnation of nuclear weapons as "inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles" caused much debate and speculation. The Americans were quick to dismiss it. Some observers recalled that India used to employ similar kinds of rhetoric, until May 1998, when it conducted a series of nuclear tests and demanded to be recognised as a nuclear weapon power. Where India's statements chiefly condemned the use of nuclear weapons, however, Iran has deliberately extended its abhorrence to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. Though Iran's statement allayed few fears that Tehran may be developing the technology and materials that underpin nuclear weapon capabilities as an insurance policy for the future, it suggested to some that it would seek to follow Japan's example - effectively keeping its weapons options open, rather than setting weaponisation in motion - and so avoid either repeating Iraq's mistakes or mimicking North Korea's defiance. Consequently, Iran may not try to construct actual weapons for many years, if ever; instead it may be planning to develop a virtual nuclear 'deterrent' based on legally acquired nuclear and missile programmes, while avoiding any direct, verifiable violation of its NPT obligations that might serve as an excuse for military action or interference from the United States or others.

The IAEA's anticipated report - issued to Agency delegations on June 6 and substantially quoted in media reports - cited five key areas in which Iran had failed to meet its obligations and identified measures that Iran was undertaking to rectify them. In particular, "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."¹⁷ Meeting in Vienna from June 16-18, the IAEA Board of Governors, despite US lobbying, did not declare Iran in violation of the NPT, and did not adopt a resolution on Iran or call on the UN Security Council to deal with Iran's failures. However, Iran was strongly encouraged to resolve the outstanding questions before the next Board meeting in September, particularly with regard to the role and uses of uranium metal and heavy water in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.¹⁸

Iraq, an Example (of Sorts)

Comments on Iraq, in the wake of the war, were muted. Papering over the EU's internal divisions, the Greek Ambassador, Tassos Kriekoukis, carefully noted that "In fulfilling its disarmament and verification task based on UNSC Resolution 687 and related resolutions, the IAEA, until December 1998, was able to obtain a coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme and dismantled what was known of that programme. So far, the IAEA has found no evidence that Iraq had relaunched a nuclear programme. Inspections need to be completed in order to resolve the remaining questions."¹⁹ Russia argued that "the process of the post-war settlement in the Middle East and Iraq, in particular, should be brought back into [an] international legal framework based on already available mechanisms accountable to the UN Security Council." Such an approach would "also facilitate the solution of the tasks connected with the strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime in the region."²⁰

The United States referred to the "objective message" conveyed by its experiences with Iraq, Iran and North Korea - namely, that "an irresponsible NPT party may use its 'declared' peaceful nuclear program to mask its development or acquisition of nuclear weapon capabilities." In an observation that may come back to haunt Washington, the US stated: "What is presented as 'compliance' may in fact not be real. Only genuine commitment, true transparency, and rigorous verification can lead to genuine confidence."²¹

The New Agenda Coalition took the message underlying the pre-war arguments about disarming Iraq rather further than the US intended: "We believe that the recent international debate in the United Nations Security Council, including statements made by its Permanent Members, on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, underlined international concerns about the legitimacy, possession and possible use of such weapons. These statements should provide further impetus to international efforts to delegitimise all nuclear weapons and to hasten international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. These statements, moreover, underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again."

Pursuing this theme more deeply, South Africa expressed support for "the strong statements that were repeatedly made [in and around the UN Security Council] about the threat that is posed by weapons of mass destruction, about the need to eliminate this threat, about the need to destroy these weapons... and about the legitimacy of their possession, including by the Nuclear Weapon States". Noting that "these statements focussed on the horrendous consequences of the possession, proliferation and use of, or threat of use, of these weapons," South Africa concluded by underlining that whatever the good or evil intentions of people, "It is our task, in accordance with the unequivocal undertaking that was agreed upon for nuclear disarmament, to work for the elimination of these weapons and not for us to rely on the fickleness of the nature of human kind."²²

In paragraph 26, the Chair briefly summarised the less contentious lessons on Iraq:

"States parties recalled that there remained unresolved questions regarding Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and noted the importance of clarifying those outstanding issues. In this context, the view was expressed that the objective of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction capabilities in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) represented a step toward establishing in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Some states parties took note of the IAEA's readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq."

Despite congratulating Mólnár on "sufficiently reflecting" the issues and showing "able and professional leadership", Russia objected to part of paragraph 26. Instead of merely taking note of the IAEA's readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq (a phrasing that the US had reportedly insisted on) Russia considered that "a more accurate point would have reflected that some states parties welcomed the IAEA's readiness to resume its inspection activities in Iraq".

Noncompliance and Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear disarmament issues were mainly raised in the General and Cluster 1 debates and a special session. Some 44 statements were made, as well as additional interventions as part of the greater "interaction" that Mólnár did his best to encourage, with mixed results.

The New Agenda Coalition opened the General Debate with a strong statement from New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, Marian Hobbs, who noted that though there had been some positive developments (notably Cuba's accession and progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia), trends on the debit side, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament, were "dismal".²³ Elaborating on this in Cluster 1, New Zealand's Ambassador Tim Caughley expressed deep concern about "the risk of an arms race on earth and in outer space". On behalf of the NAC, he noted that "the number of nuclear weapons, deployed or in storage, amounts to many thousands. Nuclear weapons continue to be part of security doctrines. There are disturbing references to new types of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to new battlefield uses for those weapons."

By contrast, having devoted half his statement to proliferation challenges from North Korea and Iran, US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf said that "disarmament continues, and in fact took a significant step forward with signing of the Moscow Treaty", agreed between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in May 2002 and specifying an upper limit of 2,200-1,700 operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads per side by December 31, 2012. Contrasted to mounting proliferation concerns, this further step towards reducing the Cold War arsenals of the US and Russia, Wolf suggested, showed that the NPT was "dangerously out of balance", a theme the US returned to on several occasions.²⁴

All five of the nuclear-weapon states gave reports of one sort or another. The US provided the most comprehensive information, including fact sheets, focussing mostly on the Moscow Treaty, but also running through some of the 13 Steps. Responding to concerns raised by many, the US information paper on Article VI noted that "while the United States no longer supports all 13 steps, we unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament", an objective which "can be achieved only through a step-by-step approach". The US argued that, contrary to the view of many NPT parties, Washington's new strategic posture would "reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence through modernization of conventional forces, the addition of missile defenses, and other measures". Furthermore, "the Department of Defense has not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons. We have not produced a nuclear warhead in over a decade. Certainly, cost and feasibility studies related to possible nuclear modernization are undertaken [but they] in no way represent a decision to proceed with development of a new warhead." The paper also stressed that "there has been no change in US nuclear declaratory policy and that the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use."²⁵

Russia's more detailed reports did not seem to be accessible to non-Russian-speaking NGOs, but reportedly also focussed on strategic offensive reductions. China put in a host of working papers on the major NPT issues, including one on "nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war", which reiterated its familiar policies and pointed out what others should do, but gave little information about China's own nuclear weapon modernisation programme, arsenal or progress towards fulfilling the 13 Steps.²⁶

France again cited the steps it had taken in the past, dwelling on the closure and dismantlement of its nuclear test site and the Pierrelatte and Marcoule fissile materials production facilities. It appeared to offer nothing further for 2000-2005, apart from its contribution towards the G-8 'ten-plus-ten-over-ten' global partnership to destroy weapons and dismantle facilities in Russia and elsewhere.²⁷ France continued to emphasise that progress on nuclear disarmament must be linked with general and complete disarmament, "notably conventional, biological and chemical disarmament".²⁸

Britain, too, had nothing new to offer with regard to further reductions or disarmament per se, but published a useful working paper on "Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: First Interim Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components"²⁹, also bringing scientists from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston to give a presentation on the study for NPT participants. To some delegations and observers, however, the UK still seemed to lean on old excuses to avoid eliminating its nuclear arsenal, as agreed in May 2000. Instead, Ambassador David Broucher told the PrepCom, "the UK has reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons to a single system - Trident - at the minimum level necessary for the UK's national security. We continue to encourage mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons world-wide. And when we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made that would allow us to include the UK's nuclear weapons in multilateral negotiations, without endangering our security interests, we will do so."³⁰

This is merely an updated version of UK policies from the Cold War, which, much like China, argued that US and Russian nuclear arsenals had to be brought down to the hundreds before the UK would entertain the notion of making its own reductions. In May 2000, Britain, in common with the other NWS, gave an unequivocal undertaking and specific pledges to make further unilateral efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal, and to engage "as soon as appropriate" in a five-power process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. Britain's assessment that its security environment would be endangered if it were to carry out these obligations to disarm was widely seen as neither convincing nor appropriate in the present security environment, and certainly not sufficient to let it off the hook of its May 2000 commitments.

Under the undoubted influence of Britain and France, the EU's opening statement caused consternation by appearing to reassert linkage between the "common goals of global nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control", despite the fact that the final document of the 2000 Review Conference had clearly indicated that these objectives must be pursued independently of each other.³¹

On May 2, responding positively to the invitations extended by Mólnár to be more "interactive", Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden posed a series of questions to the NWS. He asked Britain and France to "elaborate on the concept of keeping your nuclear arsenals at a level necessary for your national security, and on the threats you see with regard to your national security today... more bluntly put, we would be interested in your explanations as to why a country like, for example, Sweden, would not need nuclear weapons, if the United Kingdom and France need them." Salander also told China he would like to hear its views on transparency and to see more substantive information about the Chinese nuclear arsenal and the concrete steps it is taking on nuclear disarmament: "What arsenals are we talking about; what weapons; are weapons being developed; are weapons being dismantled?"³² Of answer came there none.

For an efficient overview of the main positions put forward by the NWS, paragraph 12 of Mólnár's summary was admirable in its brevity (see Appendix). Paragraph 13 provided the counterfactual, acknowledging that there had been "concern and uncertainty about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, as well as the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons..."

Generally unimpressed with progress towards nuclear disarmament, Malaysia reminded the PrepCom that it had submitted a working paper on a Nuclear Weapons Convention at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, together with Costa Rica, and intended "to pursue this matter with a view to achieving agreement in the context of the NPT review process.³³

The following analysis will consider some of the arguments made in relation to four key issues raised at the PrepCom: the Moscow Treaty; nuclear testing; non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons; and security assurances.

The Moscow Treaty: Disarmament, Dealerting or Illusion?

Though acknowledging that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or more simply the Moscow Treaty) was a positive step in defining a new US-Russian relationship, the New Agenda questioned the measure's contribution to disarmament, noting that it ignores non-operational warheads, requires the destruction of no warheads or delivery systems, and contains no verification provisions. Referring to the 13 Steps, Caughley called for the application of the principles of irreversibility (step 5), increased transparency (step 9), and verification (steps 10 and 13) to be applied to all agreements, including the Moscow Treaty. Warning that "reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons", the New Agenda in its opening statement called on the US and Russia to make the Moscow treaty "an irreversible and verifiable instrument on nuclear disarmament".³⁴ China took the same line, arguing that "the reduction of nuclear weapons should be carried out in accordance with the principles of being effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding".

In an "information paper" on Article VI, the United States went into considerable detail about the Moscow Treaty, recalling UN General Assembly resolution 57/68 (November 22, 2002) which said that this "advanced the NPT commitment" of the US and Russia. Because the Moscow treaty reflected "a new era and strengthened US-Russian strategic partnership... it was not necessary to incorporate hundreds of pages of cumbersome rules and procedures into the treaty". After further clarifying its approach and the treaty, the US emphasised that "the absence of treaty constraints on warhead disposition allows the United States and Russia to proceed with warhead elimination in a manner that is unhindered by artificial requirements." The treaty's "flexibility" recognises the "fundamentally different stockpile maintenance practices" in which "Russia continues to produce new warheads while the United States currently has no capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons".³⁵

Russia said the Moscow Treaty was "a new major step forward in nuclear disarmament", glossing over the fact that President Putin had wanted the treaty to be irreversible and verifiable as well as legally binding. Under the new umbrella of interaction, Sweden raised five questions about the Moscow Treaty. Following from the fact that the envisaged two-thirds reduction of operational warheads is legally required only to be fully implemented for one day, December 31, 2012, Salander requested further information about the rate of removal from deployment and "which factors created the time constraint that ruled out earlier achievement of the projected deployment levels". Noting that irreversibility is not precluded (though also not provided for) by the Moscow Treaty, Salander questioned if the option of irreversible cuts was under bilateral or unilateral consideration, and asked about measures to provide "advance warning of redeployment after 2012".³⁶

Brazil's Ambassador, Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, stated categorically that "there should be no possibility of redeploying nuclear weapons currently in non-operational status, for this would render nuclear weapon reductions meaningless". Duarte reminded states that when the Brazilian Congress approved Brazil's accession to the NPT in the mid-1990s, it was on the understanding that there would be serious progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.³⁷

The US information papers and fact sheets gave details of the withdrawals and dismantlements under way, fissile material measures, cooperative threat reduction, nuclear weapons policy, and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The US agreed that the Moscow Treaty did not preclude the redeployment of strategic warheads removed from operational service, but said that it "has no plans to do so", "does not seek to rearm", and "has not manufactured a new nuclear weapon in more than a decade".

The Chair's summary contained several paragraphs covering reductions in nuclear weapons, the disposal of fissile materials, cooperative threat reduction, and the G-8 initiative. Nevertheless, perhaps reacting to paragraph 13's acknowledgement of many states parties' views that "reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons", the United States said it would have liked to see a more positive report on such progress: "these achievements are truly remarkable and the factual summary should have reflected this better." Taking particular exception to paragraph 11, which emphasised commitment to the 13 steps, the US repeated that it had "made clear this year and last year that it does not support all the 13 steps". It also objected to the references to the ABM Treaty (paragraph 15), noting that it had exercised its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and was now "continuing our legal development of missile defences", for contrary to the views of many, missile defences were "stabilising and enhanced deterrence".

CTBT and Nuclear Testing

There is a fundamental link between the CTBT and the NPT, as enshrined in the NPT Preamble, the 1995 Principles and Objectives and the 13 Steps. By the opening of the NPT PrepCom, 166 states had signed the CTBT and 98 had ratified, although only 31 of the 44 states listed as part of the entry-into-force requirement (under Article XIV of the CTBT) had ratified. Among the nuclear-weapon states, Britain, France and Russia have ratified. More than six years after signing the treaty and ceasing to test, China continues to state (with diminishing credibility) that it is "committed to ratification at an early date". The US Senate rejected President Clinton's bill on ratification in October 1999, and the Bush administration has made clear that it opposes the CTBT and will not seek ratification, although it has promised to maintain for now the US testing moratorium, first established in October 1992 when George Bush Sr. held the US presidency.

In May 1998, India and Pakistan both conducted a series of nuclear tests. Though neither has yet signed or ratified the CTBT, both have declared moratoria on further testing. North Korea is the third state among the 44 to have failed to sign the CTBT, and a few diplomats and NGOs have referred in private to the possibility that the DPRK may try to raise the stakes in its diplomatic joust with the US by testing a nuclear device during the next 12 months.

While it was troubling that several states omitted to mention the CTBT, while others were rather perfunctory, there were many calls for the 13 remaining states whose ratification is essential for entry-into-force to come on board, and for the moratoria on conducting nuclear tests to be upheld by all, pending entry-into-force. Cuba, the newest NPT state party, baldly noted that the United States was the only treaty member to openly oppose the CTBT. Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi of Japan called the CTBT a "historic milestone" and said that it was "one of the major pillars of the NPT regime as well as a realistic and concrete instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world". Inoguchi referred to Japan's initiatives to encourage states to ratify and support the verification regime. She said it was her country's "sincere wish to see the United States review its position towards this treaty" and asked the delegation of China to provide information "on progress in its ratification process". The New Agenda Coalition expressed deep disappointment that the CTBT had still not entered into force "given its importance and the effort we have all invested in its conclusion". In echoing these views, the EU, and a few others, including Japan and South Korea, encouraged participation in the Third Conference on Facilitating the CTBT's Entry into Force in Vienna (September 3-5, 2003), which the EU noted would be chaired by Finland.

The nongovernmental organisations attending the PrepCom were not the only ones to raise concerns about developments in the US that could lead to a resumption of nuclear testing in order to develop new, low-yield (5 kilotons or less) or deeply-penetrating nuclear weapons. For Sweden, recognising that careful language can sometimes mask real intentions, Salander asked if statements from the US that it had "not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons" meant "that there are no plans or designs for new nuclear weapons"?

For its part, the US told delegates that "while the United States will not pursue ratification of the CTBT we continue to support the current moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992." While neither seeking to justify nor, indeed, referring to the US withdrawal of its allocated financial contribution for the CTBT Organisation's work on on-site inspections, which has worried many NPT parties, the information paper continued: "We also support the establishment of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests." Addressing some of the concerns raised by states and NGOs, the US acknowledged: "Proposals exist to decrease the time that it would take to resume nuclear testing, were that ever to be necessary. But that fact says nothing about the likelihood of a nuclear test. Nor does it relate to the development of a new nuclear weapon. The current test readiness would be more than adequate for that purpose. For the foreseeable future, we believe that the stockpile stewardship program can ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile and that no nuclear tests will be required."

Paragraph 14 of Mólnár's summary expressed "strong support" for the CTBT, emphasised that the moratoria must be maintained and, in calling for the remaining 13 necessary-ratifiers to do so, particularly spotlighted "those two remaining nuclear weapon states". Objecting to this paragraph, the United States reiterated that it is not pursuing further tests and emphasised again that "the US does not support the CTBT and does not intend to proceed with ratification".

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW)

Non-strategic - or tactical - nuclear weapons, first identified as a specific problem in the NPT context in May 2000 (Step 9.iii of the 13 steps), have continued to climb up the list of priorities raised by the NNWS. Noting that the "comparative portability of non-strategic weapons and the ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict makes them more susceptible to use in combat or theft", the New Agenda Coalition argued that the possession of these weapons posed real risks and required collective attention.³⁸ Going into more detail in the NAC intervention in the nuclear disarmament session, Caughley referred to "deeply worrying signs... that evolving security policies entail new designs and generations of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons to be used against mobile and deeply buried targets, and as a counter to conventional warfare"³⁹, a point echoed strongly in several other statements. Brazil, for example, was disturbed that "evolving security policies have confirmed the central role of nuclear weapons" and expressed alarm over "developments regarding new types of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to new battlefield uses..."⁴⁰

The NAC called for further reductions of NSNW in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner; further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by these weapons; the formalising of existing bilateral arrangements into legally binding agreements (with specific reference to the Bush-Gorbachev Presidential Initiatives of 1991/92); the verified elimination of NSNW that have been removed from arsenals already; an undertaking not to increase the number or types of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed; and the enhancement of security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of NSNW, their components and related materials.

Sweden, on behalf also of Austria and Mexico, issued a further statement and working paper on NSNW, elaborating on many of the New Agenda's arguments and drawing support from a number of other states. Noting that there were between 7,000 and 20,000 NSNW, depending on definitions, the paper emphasised ways in which these weapons posed "great threats. Their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and high probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict increase the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorised or accidental use. They can be more easily and frequently transported than strategic nuclear weapons. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and sometimes less sophisticated safety and security devices." Like others, the paper raised concern that tactical nuclear weapons were again becoming valued as "battlefield weapons" and that the CTBT could be threatened if they were not effectively addressed and prohibited, since "the development of new weapons probably would require the resumption of nuclear testing". Concerns were expressed that "the distinction between conventional weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons is being erased, and, thus, that the threshold against the use of nuclear weapons is being lowered."

Echoing many of the proposals in Caughley's statement on behalf of the NAC, the Swedish-Mexican-Austrian statement went on to specify that "certain types of non-strategic nuclear weapons could, as a first step, be prohibited and eliminated, including those that already have been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear weapons states. A ban could be suitable for nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells, grenades, short-range ballistic missiles, nuclear anti-aircraft, and anti-missile weapons. Transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons could be developed."⁴¹ Several others, including Finland, which has long prioritised this issue, reportedly expressed their interest and appreciation of this paper as a useful basis for further discussion.

Aware that it would be put on the spot over tactical nuclear weapons, Russia devoted a significant part of its opening statement to the subject. After stressing its support for the NPT "as a time-tested document", and noting that the 2000 Final Document should be the basis for the 2005 review of the treaty, since "the scope of measures it contains at multilateral, regional and other levels is, in essence, the program of joint efforts to further improve the NPT's effectiveness", Russia's statement appeared to downgrade or bypass its undertaking to eliminate its nuclear arsenal (Step 6). Instead, like France, Russia prefers to refer to "the ultimate goal" of "complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament..." Even more pointedly asserting a linkage between nuclear and conventional disarmament which had been effectively severed by the consensus Final Document of May 2000, Russia argued that "it is impossible to consider the issues of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments... elaboration of specific proposals to reduce and limit nuclear weapons should be accompanied by adoption of specific measures also to limit other types of weapons including non-nuclear, as well as by prohibition or limitation of activities with such weapons within the reach of each other's territories.⁴²

Such remarks compounded the concerns of a number of countries that the distinction between tactical and conventional weapons is being deliberately and dangerously blurred. Germany, as the prime deployment site for US, British and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and still harbouring a small number of US free-fall bombs under NATO arrangements, knows more about this problem than most. Referring to a Russian statement in favour of "a comprehensive consideration of issues of different kinds of weapons," Germany asked the Russian delegation to clarify what it meant and said that this "should not be taken as a pretext not to address specifically the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons".⁴³ As noted at the 2002 PrepCom, Germany's desire to be more proactive on this and certain other issues has spelled the end of the NATO-5 (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway), which was briefly influential up to and including the 2000 Review Conference.

Instead, however, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, whom some are now calling the 'NATO-3' coordinated their positions and submitted a working paper on various NPT issues. With regard to NSNW this chiefly called on Russia and the US to codify and implement the Presidential Initiatives, and for "the reduction and ultimate elimination" of NSNW to be included in the "overall nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process."⁴⁴

Sweden asked the US and Russia why they could not formalise agreements on NSNW and "emphasise their new partnership in a new era". Salander further called on Russia to give more information about the "specific security and physical protection measures for transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials, that you have undertaken in the last decade, and not least during the last few years when terrorist acquisition has been a particular concern".⁴⁵

Despite its manifest reluctance to deal with its own NSNW, Russia's opening statement commented that "the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons... from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the cold-war period."⁴⁶ China also called on the NWS (meaning the US) to "withdraw and return home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside of their own territories".⁴⁷

In response to these digs as well as the broader arguments put forward by Sweden and others, the United States pointed out that "NATO has considerably reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons". Through "unilateral action", Washington had reduced its NSNW by "nearly 90 percent" and "eliminated all but one of its nuclear delivery systems from Europe". NATO's nuclear-capable delivery aircraft, which used to be able to launch in minutes had had their "readiness time... lengthened to months". Noting that NSNW delivery systems were often dual-use, the US had "looked at the prospect of formal arms control treaties on NSNW and concluded that such an approach was not possible". It took the view that "the nature of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems makes it far more difficult to have confidence in treaty implementation than is the case for strategic systems." It was, however, committed to transparency, and said that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was "discussing confidence-building measures related to NSNW", and that the issue had also been raised with Russia in the bilateral consultative group established at the 2002 Moscow Summit.⁴⁸

Estimates vary about how many US tactical nuclear weapons remain in Europe, but there are believed to be some 150-250 air-launched free-fall bombs in bases in several NATO states: Belgium, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey. The bombs may already have been withdrawn from Greece. These delegations did not, in the spirit of transparency they evoke in other contexts, identify how many tactical nuclear weapons are actually deployed on their soil, or discuss a time-table for their removal and elimination, in accordance with other NPT undertakings agreed in 2000. However, towards the end of the PrepCom, a heated exchange between the Netherlands ambassador, Chris Sanders, and Canada's ambassador, Chris Westdal, revealed conflicting views. In this, Sanders reportedly stated that the US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe "support NATO's nuclear posture", an argument Westdal appeared not to share. Sanders also said that the tactical nuclear bombs in Europe were "politically and physically well protected and there is no possibility that those weapons will be transferred" to other non-nuclear states.⁴⁹

Mólnár's Paragraph 16 gave both sides of the argument, noting that some states parties had stressed that "non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, and that negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible. Substantive proposals were made on this issue. It was argued that these proposals would also serve the purpose of helping to ensure that terrorists would not be able to gain access to non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the importance of enhancing security of transport and storage with regard to these weapons was also emphasized. A view was expressed that the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of a comprehensive nature and is linked to other aspects of strategic stability and therefore cannot be considered separately from other types of weapons."

Russia objected to paragraph 16's characterisation of the issue. Quoting from the May 2000 Final Document, Russia underlined that the step on NSNW "should be implemented in a way that strengthens international stability and undiminished security" and said that "disassociating NSNW from other weapons and security considerations does not reflect this step properly".

Security Assurances

Two kinds of security assurances are important in the NPT context: positive assurances, to provide assistance (unspecified) to victims of acts or threats of nuclear weapons aggression; and negative security assurances (NSA), according to which the NWS undertake not to attack states which have renounced nuclear weapons. Having declined in importance after 1995, when the NWS codified the terms of the security assurances they offered in a UN Security Council Resolution just prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference (UNSC 984, April 11, 1995), the issue of security assurances has begun to attract renewed interest.

The main push came from nonaligned countries. Though the issue has long been a priority for them, it was propelled to the top of the agenda by the US National Security Strategy and recent statements by US and UK officials which were taken to threaten possible nuclear weapon use in response to chemical or biological threats (the doctrine of pre-emption would not require an attack, but could be on the basis of intelligence assessments of an imminent threat, such as the claims used to galvanise reluctant populations into going to war on Iraq). Referring to the doctrines of the NWS, especially the US Nuclear Posture Review, Iran spoke of "a new fragile environment in which NNWS are in dire need of acquiring negative security assurances".⁵⁰

Britain, the US and also France denied that there had been any change in their policies since they were codified in 1995. France put forward the view that "states in breach of their commitments on non-proliferation cannot invoke the benefit" of security assurances and that its undertaking as recorded in UNSC 984 "is governed by the inherent right of self-defence" enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁵¹

Canada asked "what criteria would be used for the determination that a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty was in violation of its commitments"? At the same time, Canada took issue with one of the NGO presentations on "The evolving nuclear strategy of the US and UK and its Implications for the NPT".⁵² As a non-nuclear-weapon state member of NATO, Canada affirmed that "the 1999 Strategic Concept has not been re-opened and remains the base for NATO's nuclear policy. Nor is it NATO policy that nuclear weapons may be used against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, except as providing in the language" of the NSA affirmed in 1995 by the three nuclear members of NATO, Britain, France and the United States. Having declared the belief that nuclear disarmament was in both the general security interest of the international community and Canada's particular security interests, the statement sought to harmonise this view with some of its nuclear weapon allies' statements, emphasising that "the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding that nuclear weapons may have a deterrent effect in the mind of a potential aggressor".⁵³

Russia emphasised its support for legally-binding security assurances in the context of nuclear weapon free zones, noting that it had provided such commitments to more than a hundred states. Russia also expressed its support for reestablishing an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to address NSA.⁵⁴ China, of course, reiterated its policy that "all nuclear weapon states should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances and should conclude international legal instruments for that purpose."⁵⁵

South Africa, the driving force behind both the NAC's working paper on security assurances and the statement by the Heads of State and Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM), noted that the Movement had "emphasised the need for Preparatory Committee meetings to allocate specific time for deliberations on security assurances". NAM states were enjoined to pursue the achievement of a "universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument" as a matter of priority, in order to finalise recommendations in time for the 2005 Review Conference.⁵⁶

Indonesia argued that the "mere Security Council resolutions which contain assurances with loopholes and hence subject to varying interpretations" are a "far cry from the need for unconditional and legally binding assurances in an international convention".⁵⁷ Indonesia also put forward the NAM demand for another subsidiary body - on security assurances - to Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference. Surreally, in view of the appalling human insecurity inflicted by governments such as these on their own people, Burma reminded the PrepCom that at the 2002 PrepCom it had tabled, together with Nigeria and the Sudan, a draft protocol on security assurances.⁵⁸

South Africa reacted against suggestions that security assurances could be used as a confidence-building measure for states outside the treaty, such as North Korea, "to lure them back into the NPT".⁵⁹ South Africa cautioned that this could send a "bad message, a message that would advise that those states who have for nearly 30 years been in compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations are not able to rely on the NPT to achieve legally binding security assurances, whereas the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation leads to this being granted." Appearing to accept the caveats made by France and others, South Africa asserted that "security assurances rightfully belong to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option - as opposed to those who are still keeping their options open".⁶⁰

In a statement on behalf of the NAC, echoing many points in the South African statement, Caughley argued that the existing declarations or assurances granted in the context of NWFZs were not sufficient: "security assurances should be provided in the context of an internationally legally binding instrument, which could be either in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT, or as a protocol to the Treaty."⁶¹ The NAC working paper briefly set out the background and key questions and, though it did not specify its preferred legal format, identified that it would need to include: a general statement of the assurances given; the identification of the states providing the security assurances; identification of the beneficiaries; and any qualifications.

In this last regard, pertaining to nature and scope, the NAC discussed current qualifications relating to alliances or associations or a state "in material breach of its own non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the NPT." Unlike some of the NAM, the NAC paper seemed to accept that "while all NNWS parties to the NPT are beneficiaries of security assurances, these assurances would in certain circumstances be qualified". Finally, the legal instrument would need to include some provision of the mandatory actions to be undertaken by the UN Security Council if a beneficiary of security assurances were subject to threats or the use of nuclear weapons against it. By way of example, the working paper offered a six-article "Draft [Protocol] [Agreement] on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".⁶²

Unable to reconcile the range of views on this issue, a very long paragraph 29 of the Chair's summary listed most of the options:

"Many states parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some states parties were of the view that this could take the form of an agreement or protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon states in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon states were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective Security Council resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective Security Council resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfilment of the Treaty obligations. Several states parties, including one nuclear-weapon state, emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy. A proposal was also made that a further subsidiary body be established to Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference to address the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states."

France and Britain, however, argued that paragraph 29 had not adequately reflected the reassertions of the 1995 assurances that had been made by four of the nuclear powers, complaining that these had received "only the smallest of mentions in contrast with other aspects of NSAs".

Accountability, Representation and Interaction

Three structural and/or organisational issues also came to the fore in Geneva. Prior to and during the PrepCom, considerable interest had been expressed in the arguments I put forward at the pre-PrepCom meeting in Annecy and in Disarmament Diplomacy, regarding the need to develop timely and effective mechanisms for NPT parties to address compliance, enforcement and the proliferation challenges of the real world.⁶³ In addition to the options I sketched out, other participants took up the baton and made further suggestions for how the NPT regime might tackle these challenges. Secondly, the 2002 crisis on reporting seemed to have borne fruit, since a growing number of NPT parties, including some NWS, put in reports on nuclear disarmament and/or the Middle East. Though these reports were published as documents of the PrepCom, there is still a lack of clarity or agreement about their format and use. Thirdly, the issue of NGO access and treatment again reared its head, in relation to which Canada submitted a very thoughtful overview of current practice in different UN-related fora and outlined options for improvement in the NPT context.

Priorities, Emergencies and Enforcement

As discussed in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 70, Dr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr of Ireland had put forward at the 2000 Review Conference a proposal for replacing the PrepComs with a 3-4 day annual General Conference of States Parties, with real decision-making powers and serviced by a small secretariat.⁶⁴ Referring to "the gap in administrative capacity which is a problem for the NPT", Ambassador Mary Whelan reminded states parties that Ireland's ideas were still up for consideration. She noted that "an advantage of this proposal would be to provide a forum in which NPT parties could react to issues affecting the implementation of the Treaty which require an early response." Emphasising that Ireland's aim was not "a further layering of the NPT regime in policy terms", but rather "NPT enhancement by focussing strategically on the Treaty's implementation needs", Whelan looked forward to developing such ideas further at the 2005 Review Conference.⁶⁵

Taking a different tack, some NGOs argued for an "NPT Emergency Response Mechanism" to be activated if a state announces its intention to withdraw from the treaty, as evoked by the DPRK. This would use the 90-day notification period to investigate and, if possible, resolve the crisis. One approach would be for the Bureau of the previous NPT Review Conference to meet within 24 hours to consider the withdrawal and initiate an emergency meeting of all the states parties. In relation to this, the NGOs argued that though consensus should be sought, the meetings of the states parties should be able to take decisions by voting. Moreover, defining a compliance crisis as one that cannot wait until the next Review Conference, the NGOs argued that the response mechanism must be equally available for non-proliferation compliance crises, such as a violation of safeguards or withdrawal from the Treaty, and for disarmament compliant crises, for example, if a NWS wanted to resume nuclear testing.⁶⁶

Commenting that "it is questionable whether the present strengthened process, as agreed to in 2000, is having the desired outcome and effect that was envisaged", and complaining of the demonstrated inability to provide for substantive interaction on either the consideration of states parties' reports or their statements and proposals, South Africa suggested that NPT parties should study the approach adopted by parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).⁶⁷ Accordingly, South Africa presented an adapted version of the BWC decision in the form of a draft decision for NPT parties to consider in 2005. The proposal would retain the present structure of PrepComs between five-yearly Review Conferences, but one week of each PrepCom would be "reserved to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action" on a small number of specific issues, as agreed. All meetings, "both of experts and of the Preparatory Committee", would take decisions by consensus. The PrepComs would consider the different issues in turn, rather than all at each meeting (as at present), and each PrepCom would be preceded by a two-week meeting of experts (it was not clear, however, whether South Africa envisaged a mix of governmental and non-governmental, or only governmental, experts). The experts would prepare for the meeting and provide factual reports. Decisions on action would be taken at the following review conference.⁶⁸

Germany welcomed this paper, as well as Mólnár's attempts to encourage greater interactivity in the PrepComs. In particular, Germany called for a "focussed, results oriented agenda" that concentrated on issues that were crucial to the successful outcome of the review process, rather than the present approach that tries to cover all NPT-relevant issues. Germany sought to lead the way by example, refusing to duplicate its report and working papers from 2002, while emphasising that these remain relevant and important contributions for the 2005 Review Conference.⁶⁹

Each of the different approaches has different merits and disadvantages. The BWC model will need to be further tested and evaluated before being applied to the NPT. Likely to be attractive to some, because it requires only minor modifications to the post-1995 review process, it would facilitate more focussed debate and action on priority issues, but suffers from the disadvantage that, apart from the quinquennial review conferences, the meetings would continue to lack effective decision-making powers. The emergency response mechanism prompted interest at the PrepCom and deserves further discussion. It does not challenge the current review process, as it is intended to operate alongside, and be activated by the Bureau of outgoing and incoming Chairs only in the event of certain kinds of crisis.

Corridor discussions on my three options convinced me that electing an Executive Council would not be helpful, chiefly because this extra decision-making layer is unnecessary and cumbersome. If established on a regional basis, it would lead to key players being excluded at least part of the time; if the criteria included nuclear infrastructure, as in the case of the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO), it would discriminate against NNWS. Moreover, current NPT meetings show that among the 187-8 states parties with the right to attend, the number of active participants is small enough for decision-making to be manageable.

After enduring another two weeks of repetitive national statements, in which many cluster and special time presentations did little more than repeat or amplify what delegations had already said in the General Debate, the Irish option was looking increasingly attractive to some delegations and observers. If the short, annual plenipotentiary meetings were combined with the establishment of a Director General and small secretariat, based in the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), there is no reason why this structure should not be able to provide an emergency response function as well, as the secretariat ought to be empowered to call emergency meetings if need arises. The much shorter meetings would be far more time- and cost-effective, which should be attractive to governments and their officials. As with the South African and German approaches, a shorter meeting would require some selection and prioritisation of issues, which would be addressed with the possibility of taking action, rather than merely making pronouncements, as at present. That would not preclude any state from raising any NPT-related issue it wished, but would ensure more focussed interaction on the priority issues, which could be changed over time or from meeting to meeting.

Reporting

The issue of reporting, required in paragraph 12 of the NPT 2000 RevCon's 13 steps on disarmament and paragraph 16 on the Middle East⁷⁰, continues to make positive progress but has not yet found its role. There was no repeat of the challenges from a couple of NWS that nearly derailed the 2002 PrepCom. Moreover, the heightened attention last year ensured that a larger number of states parties took the trouble to submit reports this year, which were published as documents of the PrepCom.⁷¹

It was noticeable that while none of the NWS issued formal reports on their compliance with Article VI, they provided information with their presentations, of rather variable quality and detail. Notwithstanding their refusal with regard to disarmament, Britain and the United States put in formal reports on the Middle East. China published a series of working papers on different aspects of the treaty, which were long on aspiration and principle but rather short on specifics. It is clear, however, that the NWS continue to dislike the requirement of formal reporting, and they continued to challenge attempts to establish a consistent format. As it was, formats adopted for disarmament reports varied enormously, with some considerably more substantive or readable than others. While others did not think the format should be so rigid that it restricted the provision of dissimilar kinds of relevant information, they wanted the information to be provided in ways that were accessible and comparable.

Canada identified several generic categories of information, some of which were covered in reports and some of which were more likely to be found in presentations and working papers. These included: general assessments of developments and trends; national nuclear holdings and doctrines; disarmament policies, initiatives and programmes (national, bilateral or multilateral); diplomatic action and advocacy priorities; agreements and commitments; declarations of compliance. In particular, the NNWS wanted more comprehensive reporting on the holdings and production of nuclear weapons (numbers, types and yields of warheads); numbers and types of delivery vehicles, the deployment and alert status of current holdings; and more detail on nuclear weapons or delivery systems that were being either added to arsenals or withdrawn and dismantled.⁷²

As Canada noted, the reports made states parties reflect on the measures they are undertaking and provided a useful record of progress, more concrete than normally covered in NPT statements. As such, they increased active participation in the NPT and can make an increasingly comprehensive "information and reference source... a means of assessing progress... to inform preparations and support discussions..."⁷³

There are still problems, however. The reports were intended to facilitate dialogue and exchange, but despite Mólnár's valiant attempts to encourage interaction and some pointed questions asked of the NWS by countries like Sweden and South Africa, little real exchange or dialogue occurred.

NGO Access and Participation

For decades, NGOs have worked on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. From organising grassroots demonstrations to coordinating high-level seminars to bring together experts and diplomats, NGOs have taken a more active role than many governments in promoting the health and implementation of the NPT regime. Organisations like the Acronym Institute, the Monterey Institute and the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN, now folded into the Mountbatten Centre) have become carriers of the institutional histories of treaty regimes such as the NPT, BWC and CWC, also playing important roles strategising with diplomats behind the scenes and educating new generations of officials in these issues. Others, such as Greenpeace, have played an important role in getting public and media attention for meetings and discussions that would otherwise be invisible to people outside UN circles.

In the now institutionalised three-hour session for NGOs to address the NPT, NGOs provided challenging information and ideas relevant to many of the questions the states parties were grappling with, while also bringing serious, related issues to governments' attention, such as the devastation already wrought on indigenous populations by nuclear fuel cycle and weapons-related activities and the proliferation implications of strategic planning in South Asia.⁷⁴

Explicit partnership between governments and civil society actors brought about the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Less formally, and utilising a considerable tactical toolbox, NGOs and civil society kept alive the hope of a CTBT and worked closely with a number of officials to create the conditions to bring the treaty to conclusion.

Despite some achievements, such as the NGO plenary session that has now been institutionalised as part of the NPT review process, over the many years that I have been covering the UN and treaty fora, access and conditions for NGOs have been getting worse, not better. The 2003 PrepCom was the worst yet, due to a combination of heightened security following September 11th (exacerbated no doubt by the recent Gulf War), and a quixotic, unprecedentedly rigid interpretation of a set of rules that most diplomats are either not aware of or think mean something different from how they have recently been applied.

To avoid being excluded from information and interaction during the meetings, some NGOs are being put under pressure to join delegations. While this may be a sensible option in special cases, especially for academics or NGOs whose major objective is influencing their own national policies, it is not available to most. Moreover, it precludes the kind of independent reporting and strategising with different delegations that has been the hallmark of the Acronym Institute's work. For NGOs seeking to exchange information and interact with the diplomats and governments, the conditions are getting so bad that working with the UN and treaty system is taking a high and increasing toll; so high, perhaps, that few may soon be left willing to do it on an independent, consistent basis.

It is pointless having the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, make ringing declarations about the importance of civil society, when the conditions on the ground as implemented by UN officials and guards are driving hard-working NGOs away. The remedy is in the hands of governments. With regard to the NPT, if states parties value the participation of NGOs and want to continue to benefit from our ideas, expertise and reports such as these, the solution is in their hands.

The rules of procedure are what you agree them to be. States parties can say how they want the rules to be interpreted and implemented and they can change the rules if they bar NGOs and press from gaining timely access to their statements and working papers. Diplomats can refuse to stand by (or turn away in embarrassment) when civil society representatives are insulted or manhandled by security guards who have been conditioned to treat those without red or yellow badges as second class, or, more to the point, as if they were troublemakers and nuisances instead of legitimate partners in international democracy. The governments and the secretariat should insist that security guards understand that their job is to ensure that all the different parts of the UN - government, officials, civil servants, and civil society - are able to do their jobs in safety and security; it is not the security guard's job to play politics or exclude inconvenient participants on behalf of certain governments. On the other side, since rights also carry obligations, NGOs have made it clear that we understand (and share) the heightened concerns about security, and are willing to undergo a more stringent accreditation process and increased searches.

In its well researched working paper, Canada examined the different modes of NGO participation across a range of multilateral meetings and process, reviewed proposals for enhancing NGO participation, considered current NGO access and explored options for enhancing NGO participation in the NPT review process.75 The paper presents several options for consideration. Although Canada hosted a lunch for some of the diplomats and NGOs to discuss the matter, there was little interaction in the PrepCom itself on this subject.

It is past time to enhance the level of access at disarmament fora, thereby making NGO and press access more consistent across the range of issues. The presumption should be transparency rather than exclusion. Rather than restricting access in the name of security, the security of all could be enhanced by means of a 'contract' that all pass holders sign, setting out the rules, rights and obligations of participation in UN or other multilateral meetings and events. That way, there would be a clearer process for withdrawing the pass (and therefore access) from any individual who violates the rules and abuses or endangers others, without penalising other governmental, NGO or press pass holders unconnected with the offender. At present the rules are often unclear, as well as being selectively and arbitrarily imposed, resulting in unwitting infractions and unnecessary confrontations with officials or security guards. A more open and transparent approach would enhance overall security and protect legitimate participants much better than the present muddle.

Conclusion

From being added as a 'good faith' article at the insistence of NNWS at the height of the Cold War arms racing in 1968, nuclear disarmament came to look practically achievable during the 1990s. As a consequence, the post-Cold War period saw a number of parallel initiatives to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, discredit and diminish their role in defence and deterrence, and determine the steps that would bring the world closer to nuclear disarmament. In the context of the NPT, these initiatives culminated in consensus agreement on a substantive final document at the 2000 Review Conference. Just three years later, the 2003 PrepCom made those strategies and aspirations look like a world away.

In its heavy focus on preventing horizontal proliferation, this PrepCom seemed a flashback from the past. The question is: how much of this is due solely to the Bush Administration's neo-conservative agenda, and how much of the shift in priority and emphasis represents a new, post-9/11 trend?

The war on Iraq has raised far more questions than it has answered about pre-emptive military action to prevent proliferation. With hindsight, public reluctance to be bounced into war again on the basis of hyped threats and misused intelligence may also serve to reinstate the value of strengthened multilateral institutions, inspections and verification (not forgetting the important contributions from dissidents and whistleblowers) as mechanisms for investigation and containment.

In view of the dangers inherent in a link between terrorism and the acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, the return-to-the-past focus on non-compliance and proliferation is understandable. But the other arm of this policy push - the downgrading of disarmament - is very dangerous. While the US focussed on noncompliance, Iran and the DPRK, another central theme of this PrepCom was concern about the intentions and plans of the Bush administration. Though many presentations were muted, the corridor conversations revealed deep concerns, from US allies as much as from the more marginalised countries. Concerns centred around the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy, and various strident statements by administration officials and Republican representatives regarding nuclear weapons use, doctrine, and the need for new, more flexible nuclear weapons, raising the spectre of a resumption of nuclear testing, and the collapse of the CTBT and NPT regimes in the future.

The particular conditions of the Cold War, with its nuclear policy justifications that based security on balancing terror, vulnerability and mutual assured destruction, and its de facto exemptions for the major nuclear powers, will not return. We are faced with a much more complex mix of objectives, reactions and potential or actual capabilities. Iran, it would seem, is more likely (at least for the time being) to follow Japan's example than Iraq's: to use Article IV to develop 'insurance policy' capabilities amounting to virtual deterrence, rather than a clandestine nuclear weapons production programme in clear violation of the NPT. However unconvincing the civilian nuclear energy and space launch justifications might appear, with good reason, we cannot base non-proliferation policies on whether a country is regarded as friend or foe - particularly as such an assessment may shift and swing with the political winds. The problem with the insurance analogy is that one pays insurance premiums year by year so that the policy can be activated to provide financial protection or help if needed. Activating nuclear weapons, however, provides not help or compensation but widespread death and destruction. If Iran pursues this path, it must expect to be haunted by its own words of abhorrence.

Iran's strategy, likely to be followed by others, should force the world to address the potentially fatal Achilles heel in the nonproliferation regime. Long opposed by anti-nuclear activists, the historical commitment to nuclear energy enshrined in Article IV continues to be the primary route to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities. As long as the acquirer does not seek to weaponise, there is little the regime can do but - as the United States showed at this meeting - toss around accusations and innuendo. Does proliferation then become a question of weaponisation? Are we going to see more and more countries prepared to make the heavy investment in unnecessary nuclear power in order to give themselves as virtual deterrent for the future? Since, as India and Pakistan have shown, virtual deterrents can be weaponised fairly quickly, such a scenario would be profoundly destabilising of regional and international security.

If this is the case, as many believe, then the United States is making some big mistakes in how it tries to address the serious proliferation challenges confronting the world. Its actions now may in fact be provoking the nuclear threats of the future.

Times are changing, but the NPT regime appears to be slipping backwards, not adapting to consolidate the post Cold War gains and move forward. Its focus is narrowing at the very time it needs to grow. To retain respect and utility as an important tool of non-proliferation and disarmament, a serious overhaul, in four fundamental areas, is now required:

• Reduce incentives to acquire nuclear technology and weapons: The NWS must stop treating nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, which means that nuclear disarmament must be restored at the heart of the non-proliferation regime; and the problematic contradiction of Article IV's promotion of nuclear fuel will finally have to be dealt with.
• Address the security concerns of potential proliferators and their neighbours. Giving rather different meaning to pre-emption and preventive action than the military strikes envisaged in neo-conservative doctrine, this should be done proactively, as a matter of course, not just in reaction to nuclear threat or blackmail (which tends to reinforce proliferation incentives).
• Restore the credibility and effectiveness of arms control and the international rule of law. When powerful governments engage in negotiations and then cherry pick the bits they like, they undermine the regime as a whole and steal security from everyone.
• Increase verification and enforcement powers: Start by making the Additional Protocol mandatory.

Finally, the strengths as well as the limitations of the 2003 PrepCom, as with its predecessor, are making it ever clearer that the NPT review process is inadequate to the task of dealing with the kinds of proliferation challenges now threatening international security. It was encouraging to see serious consideration being given to different structural and organisational approaches. While the BWC model and the emergency response mechanism are both interesting, neither would be sufficient. The treaty has passed the need for an enhanced review process; it needs a structure and mechanism for states parties to take responsibility for implementation and enforcement of its obligations. What this should be, may be the most important question that the 2005 Review Conference has to decide.

Notes and References

Note to Reader: all quotations from statements or papers have been referenced. Quotes that are not referenced were taken from the author's contemporaneous notes of plenary or on-the-record statements, mainly from the final session of the PrepCom on May 9, 2003.

1. Jorge Ivan Mora-Godoy, Permanent Representative of Cuba, General Debate, April 29, 2003. Cuba also submitted a substantial working paper outlining its views on the NPT, including continuing reservations regarding the failures "over all the years that have elapsed since [entry-into-force on] 5 March 1970" of the "club of nuclear weapon states" to attain the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with specific reference to what it called the "isolationist measures" and "complete disregard of ... multilateral institutions and methods" of the United States. NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.10.

2. My decision not to report on these debates should not be taken as a lowering of the significance of these important issues. In addition to the Chair's factual summary, which gives a good overview of the principal issues covered, more on these can be found at: Jean du Preez, "2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: Progress towards 2005 or business as usual?",

http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/npt2k3fr.htm. See also Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org. Hampered by the lack of access to statements and delegations, Acronym's analysis will not try to be comprehensive, but aims instead to give as representative an overview as feasible, focussing on a cross section of key statements rather than the entirety. These include interventions from members of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), who played a defining role on behalf of the non-nuclear weapon states in obtaining the 13 Steps, the nuclear-weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) and other statements or papers containing new or important elements of interest to disarmament practitioners.

3. For a summary and analysis of the 13-step 'plan of action' on nuclear disarmament, see Rebecca Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: a Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 46 (May 2000).

4. The weaponisation of space was raised by China and in several statements by New Agenda and NAM states. See also the working paper on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education, sponsored by Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden, who also referred to this issue in their statements. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.18.

5. Laszló Mólnár, Statement from the Chair, Opening Session, April 28, 2003, reproduced in NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/CRP.1.

6. Under the terms of the NPT's Article X, withdrawal, which must include a statement of the "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, [which] have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country", would be effected three months after an announcement by a state party of its intent to leave the regime. On January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared, for the second time, such an intent, thus suggesting a formal withdrawal date of April 10. As the French and US statements suggest, some international lawyers argue that for withdrawal to be valid, a state must be fully compliant with the treaty prior to the announcement. The issue with regard to the DPRK is further complicated because its first withdrawal announcement, in 1993, was suspended one day short of the expiration of the three-months period, following the opening of negotiations with the United States which were to lead to the signing of the October 1994 'Agreed Framework' between the two states. The DPRK maintains that due to the three-months-less-a-day notice already served - and never retracted - its withdrawal took effect after just 24 hours, i.e. on January 11.

7. Hubert de la Fortelle, Permanent Representative of France, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

8. Details of the Natanz and Arak facilities were first unveiled by the US government in a special State Department briefing, presented by spokesperson Richard Boucher, on December 13, 2002. See 'US alleges clandestine nuclear activity in Iran', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 69 (February/March 2003). Concerns over the country's nuclear programme were further heightened on February 9, 2003, with an announcement by President Mohammad Khatami that Iran had begun to mine uranium reserves, recently located in the central Savand region. Khatami added that, in order to establish an independent nuclear power industry, his government was "determined to complete" the nuclear "circle... from discovering uranium to managing remaining spent fuel." See 'US insists Iran poses gathering nuclear proliferation threat', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 70 (April/May 2003).

9. Tassos Kriekoukis, Permanent Representative of Greece on behalf of the European Union, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

10. Marian Hobbs, New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

11. John S. Wolf, US Assistant Secretary of State, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

12. Russian delegation, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

13. Kuniko Inoguchi, Permanent Representative of Japan, General Debate, April 29, 2003.

14. John S. Wolf, US Assistant Secretary of State, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

15. G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, General Debate, April 29, 2003.

16. Amir Zamaninia, Director General for International Political Affairs, Final Plenary, May 9, 2003.

17. Quoted in 'UN body says Iran fails to honor nuclear accord', AFP report, published in International Herald Tribune, June 7-8, 2003. The full report was made public on June 19; see the IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

18. Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, 'Iran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards', Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 18, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030618.htm. For statements and documentation from the Board of Governors meeting, see the IAEA website and the website of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0306/doc07.htm.

19. Tassos Kriekoukis, Permanent Representative of Greece on behalf of the European Union, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

20. Russian Delegation, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

21. John S. Wolf, US Assistant Secretary of State, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

22. Peter Goosen, South Africa, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

23. Marian Hobbs, New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

24. John S. Wolf, US Assistant Secretary of State, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

25. Information Paper from the United States concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.

26. China, working paper on nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war, April 28, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.3

27. The G-8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US) 'Global partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of mass Destruction' was launched at the summit of the Group's heads of state and government at Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002. 'Ten-plus-ten-over-ten' refers to a $20 non-proliferation programme spread over ten years and funded between the G-8 and the EU ($10 billion) and the United States ($10 billion).

28. Hubert de la Fortelle, Permanent Representative of France, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

29. United Kingdom, working paper on 'Verification of nuclear disarmament: first interim report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components', April 23, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.1.

30. David Broucher, Permanent Representative of the UK, General Debate, April 29, 2003; reiterated in the Cluster 1 debate, April 30, 2003.

31. Tassos Kriekoukis, Permanent Representative of Greece on behalf of the European Union, General Debate, April 28, 2003. With regard to the separation of the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, step 6 of the 13-steps reaffirms an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI"; step 11 reaffirms "that the ultimate objective of the efforts of states in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control." Article VI itself reads: "Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

32. Henrik Salander, Permanent Representative of Sweden, Cluster 1, May 2, 2003.

33. Statement by Malaysia on Nuclear Disarmament, May 1, 2003.

34. Tim Caughley, New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament, Cluster 1, April 30, 2003.

35. Information Paper from the United States concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.

36. Henrik Salander, Permanent Representative of Sweden, Cluster 1, May 2, 2003.

37. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, Head of the Delegation of Brazil, Special Time for Nuclear Disarmament, undated, 2003.

38. Marian Hobbs, New Zealand's Minister of Disarmament, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

39. Tim Caughley, New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament, Cluster 1, April 30, 2003.

40. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, Head of the Delegation of Brazil, Special Time for Nuclear Disarmament, undated, 2003.

41. Henrik Salander, Statement by Sweden on behalf of Austria, Mexico and Sweden, April 30, 2003. See also "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons", Working Paper submitted by Austria, Mexico and Sweden, May 2, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.13.

42. Russian Delegation, General Debate, April 28, 2003. Regrettably, as NGOs and press were barred from hearing the debate on nuclear disarmament, I was unable to take notes on Russia's detailed written statement on Article VI, which was delivered in Russian and has not been made available in English or French, so I have therefore been unable to discover if Russia clarified or elaborated further on its position with regard to NSNW.

43. Rüdiger Lüdeking, Director, Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, April 30, 2003.

44. Working Paper submitted by Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, May 6, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.17.

45. Henrik Salander, Permanent Representative of Sweden, Cluster 1, May 2, 2003.

46. Russian Delegation, General Debate, April 28, 2003.

47. Statement by the Chinese Delegation on 'Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War', April 30, 2003. See also China's working paper on this subject, April 28, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.3.

48. J. Sherwood McGinnis, Deputy US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), May 1, 2003. See also the Information Paper from the United States concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.

49. See Jean du Preez, "2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: Progress towards 2005 or business as usual?" , http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/npt2k3fr.htm.

50. Iran, Position paper on Negative Security Assurances, May 2, 2003.

51. Report by France on the Implementation of Article VI and Paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, 2003. Despite its title, the paper does not appear to have been submitted to the secretariat for publication as a formal report and document of the PrepCom.

52. NGO presentation, coordinated by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and others, on "The evolving nuclear strategy of the US and UK and its Implications for the NPT", April 30, 2003.

53. Canadian Intervention, specific issue, nuclear disarmament, undated.

54. Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, May 1, 2003.

55. China, working paper on 'Nuclear Disarmament and Reducing the Danger of Nuclear War', April 28, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.3.

56. Peter Goosen, Statement by the Republic of South Africa, May 1, 2003.

57. Statement by the Indonesian delegation, Cluster 1, May 1, 2003.

58. U Mya Than, Permanent Representative of the "Union of Myanmar" (Burma), May 2, 2003.

59. See, for example, Rebecca Johnson, "Incentives, Obligations and Enforcement: Does the NPT Meet its States Parties' Needs?", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 70 (April/May 2003).

60. Peter Goosen, Statement by the Republic of South Africa, May 1, 2003.

61. Tim Caughley, New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament, Cluster 1, May 1, 2003.

62. Working Paper on Security Assurances, submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden and South Africa, as members of the New Agenda Coalition, May 1, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11.

63. Rebecca Johnson, "Incentives, Obligations and Enforcement: Does the NPT Meet its States Parties' Needs?", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 70 (April/May 2003). The article revived interest in Ireland's suggestions in 2000 for short annual plenipotentiary meetings and/or a secretariat, and also canvassed the possibilities of a Director General and/or an Executive Council who could be empowered to act on states parties' behalf.

64. Ireland, revised working paper on Strengthening the review process for the Treaty, May 4, 2000, NPT/CONF.2000/WP.4/Rev.1.

65. Mary Whelan, Permanent Representative of Ireland, Strengthening the Review Process, May 8, 2003.

66. NGO presentation, coordinated by NGO Committee on Disarmament and others, on "NPT Emergency Response Mechanism", April 30, 2003.

67. Meeting in Geneva from November 11-14, 2002, the Fifth BWC Review Conference agreed to hold a one-week meeting of states parties in each of the three years leading up to the next Review Conference in 2006. These meetings, to be supported by the work of experts' groups, will consider different key aspects of the Convention's evolution and implementation. For further discussion on the BWC approach, see Marie Chevrier, "Waiting for Godot or Saving the Show? The BWC Review Conference Reaches Modest Agreement", Disarmament Diplomacy No. 68 (December 2002/January 2003); and Nicholas A. Sims, "Biological Disarmament Diplomacy in the Doldrums: Reflections After the BWC Fifth Review Conference, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 70 (April/May 2003).

68. South Africa, working paper on further strengthening the review process of the NPT, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.9.

69. Volker Heinsberg, Permanent Representative of Germany, Organisational Aspects of the Review Process, May 8, 2003.

70. Article VI, paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 referred to the provision of "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process...on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) [1995]... and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July, 1996". A similar commitment to reporting was made with regard to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (paragraph 16, subparagraph 7).

71. Some reports covered the NPT as a whole, some put in two reports, while other reports covered either disarmament or the Middle East, as specified. According to the PrepCom report, reports were received from the Republic of Korea (disarmament), Morocco (Middle East), Croatia, Slovakia (disarmament), Egypt (Middle East), Lithuania, China (Middle East), Australia (2), New Zealand, Morocco, Netherlands (disarmament), Canada, Malaysia, Switzerland (disarmament), Indonesia (disarmament), South Africa, Bulgaria, Finland (disarmament), Sri Lanka, Sweden (2), Saudi Arabia (Middle East), Japan (2), Brazil, Norway, United States (Middle East), Belgium (disarmament), and UK (Middle East). Germany, which submitted a report in 2002, said it still stood but did not need to be duplicated, since there was little new to add.

72. Canada, working paper on Reporting by States Parties, April 24, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.2.

73. ibid.

74. NGO Presentations to the 2003 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, April 30, 2003, compiled by Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

75. Canada, working paper on NGO participation in the NPT review process, May 6, 2003, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.16.

Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym Institute and Publisher of Disarmament Diplomacy.

See also: Appendix: Chair's Factual Summary, May 9, 2003

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