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Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 72, August - September 2003News ReviewIAEA Increases Pressure On Iran Over Nuclear InspectionsSummary & BackgroundInternational concern over Iran's nuclear programme has been rising steadily in recent months. In December last year, the US State Department provided details of two "clandestine" facilities under construction in the country: a suspected uranium-enrichment plant under construction at Natanz, and a suspected heavy-water plant under construction at Arak. Tehran responded dismissively, insisting it was developed a nuclear power-generation facility within the international legal framework established by its status as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran further noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been fully informed of the new facilities, and would shortly be visiting them. That visit took place, headed by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, in late February, a few weeks after Iranian President Mohamed Khatami announced that his government had begun to mine recently located uranium reserves with a view to establishing a fully-independent Iranian capacity to complete the nuclear fuel cycle "from discovering uranium to managing spent fuel". Hitherto, Iran's programme - earnestly pursued before, and massively disrupted by, the 1979 Iranian Revolution - has been centred on the completion of a Russian contract to build, and provide the nuclear fuel for, a light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr. While defending its right to assist Iran in this manner - in the face of fierce American criticism, expressed by both the Clinton and Bush administrations - Moscow has also sought to allay Washington's concerns by negotiating an agreement, reportedly ready for signing, allowing for the return of all spent fuel from Bushehr. In light of the emerging independence, technical and material, of Iran's programme, Russia has joined with the US and a wide spectrum of other states in urging Tehran to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol designed to provide added assurance of the non-military nature of a state's nuclear programme through a more intrusive and comprehensive safeguards regime. In response, Iran correctly points out that signing the Additional Protocol is a voluntary option rather than a mandatory requirement; indeed, as of June 10, much to ElBaradei's dismay, the Protocol had been brought into force by only 35 states. On the political, rather than legal, level, Iran declares itself open to the idea of signing the Protocol, while also seeking prior assurances with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology to support its future civil nuclear programme - a quid pro quo structured deeply into the NPT and IAEA regimes. From a mix of political and non-proliferation motives, a number of IAEA/NPT member states, including the United States and United Kingdom, currently ban all nuclear-related exports to Iran. In the turbulent period under review, the issue came to a head in mid-June with a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. Earlier in the month, the Board had received a report from the Director General on his February visit and a subsequent technical assessment of the Iranian programme. As ElBaradei made clear in his introductory statement (June 16), while Iran certainly did not stand convicted by the report, its government clearly had a case to answer: "The report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with the Iranian authorities. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards. In this respect, we are continuing our efforts - through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis - to understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, including: the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment programme; and its programme for the use of heavy water." Carefully neither singling out nor taking the pressure off Tehran, ElBaradei added: "I continue to call on Iran, as with all states with significant nuclear programmes, to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol at an early date, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. In the meantime, I also continue to call on Iran to permit us to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exist." (Note: this 'particular location' is not Natanz, but the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran - see below for details of the tense tussle between the Agency and Iran over the sampling issue.) In classic diplomatic fashion, all the main protagonists in this controversy claimed satisfaction at the substance of the IAEA report and the outcome of the Board of Governors meeting. For the US, the onus was now clearly on Iran to prove that no 'fire' accompanied the 'smoke' of confusion and suspicion clouding its programme and intentions. For Iran, the IAEA report and discussions had rebuffed US attempts to obtain a 'guilty' verdict against it, preparing the ground for UN sanctions, international isolation and the attempted destabilisation, and possible future military overthrow, of the next member of the 'axis of evil' due for 'regime change'. Iran also claimed that Washington's intense focus on its nuclear programme was in part an effort to divert attention from the discrediting of its claims concerning the Iraqi WMD threat. With a foot in both camps, Russia understandably sought to bridge the gap between these two interpretations: by its reading, the IAEA had begun the process, with which Iran was cooperating, of clarifying the situation - a process which could be brought to the happiest conclusion by speedy Iranian acceptance of the Additional Protocol. ChronologyMay 14: visiting Moscow, US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the Ekho Moskvy radio station - "We are concerned about what Russia is doing... We believe Russia also has some concerns. We will work with the international community to persuade Iran that they should not move in this direction. But it's not a matter for the armed forces of the United States at the moment..." May 22: G-8 Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris to prepare the Group's annual summit in Evian in June, issue a statement describing Iran's nuclear programme as "a cause of concern". The statement notes: "Ministers outlined that Iran had to allay these questions by building confidence, including by signing and implementing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and by acceding to the international instruments to which it has not yet adhered. Ministers used all their opportunities to forward this message to Iran." May 27: in Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov meets with Iran's Ambassador, Gholamreza Shafei. According to a Russian Foreign Ministry statement, "special attention" is "paid to the topical problem of non-proliferation". Specifically, "Gholamreza Shafei assured the Russian side of the firm adherence of Iran to its obligations...and briefed it on the intensive development of inspection cooperation [with]...the IAEA." For his part, "Georgy Mamedov expressed concern over the existence of serious unclarified issues in connection with nuclear research in Iran and pointed to the need for an exhaustive discussion of that problem by the IAEA Board of Governors in June and an early signing by Iran of an Additional Protocol..." The previous day, meeting officials from the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev tells reporters: "Russia does not see any reason now to review its stance and its role regarding construction of the first nuclear reactor [at Bushehr]... We will continue to fulfil our duties despite the fact that our position on this question is different to Washington's official view..." Reacting to this comment, State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher retorts (May 27): "Our view has been that Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons programme is such that Russia...should join the Nuclear Suppliers Group [to which Russia belongs] in ending all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Secretary Powell and President Putin discussed this issue in Moscow on May 14. ... We all have a mutual interest in assuring that Iran abide by its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations...and we share concerns about grave risks to the region and to our security interests posed by a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran. So we are working together with Russia in that regard and we look for any position movement in this direction." June 1: on the opening day of the Evian summit, G-8 leaders issue a 'Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". The statement warns: "We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program." June 4: Testifying to the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations, John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, declares: "Despite all Iran has done, it is not too late to halt and reverse Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States is using all diplomatic tools to this end. We have focused special attention on Russia, the supplier of the Bushehr reactor. Following sustained high-level exchanges, Russia shares our concern about Iran's nuclear activities, joins us in supporting the IAEA's ongoing inspections, and wants Director General ElBaradei to make a full and unbiased report to the Board of Governors on what his inspectors in Iran have found. My Russian colleague, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, made these points publicly on May 27. In Vienna, we are providing support to the IAEA to facilitate a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors. If the IAEA finds that Iran's nuclear activities are not in compliance with its safeguards obligations, the case would be compelling that the international community should oppose uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities in Iran and halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran." In an interview entitled 'There is No Evidence of the Existence of an Iranian Nuclear Programme', published in the Vremya Novostei newspaper on June 6, Deputy Minister Mamedov seemingly questioned the need or merit of calling such a complete 'halt' to nuclear contact: "Our nuclear cooperation with Iran is limited to building the Bushehr NPP [Nuclear Power Plant]. And all we are doing within the framework of this cooperation is absolutely, in all details, in compliance with the NPT and does not give rise to any questions on the part of this treaty's supervisory body, the IAEA. This Agency has carried out more than a hundred inspections at Bushehr NPP, which is comparable with what occurred in Iraq, and there are no questions [from the IAEA] to us or the Iranians." Asked "what do you think about Iran's possible nuclear programme?", Mamedov stated bluntly: "There are no evidences of the existence of that programme, we believe. I stress, the IAEA so far has identified no violations by Iran of the NPT." June 6: the Director General circulates his report on Iran to member states in advance of the June 16-19 meeting of the Board of Governors. Section D of the report, 'Findings and Initial Assessment', reads as follows: "[Paragraph] 32. Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be summarised as follows: (a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing.
(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.
(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed.
(d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated information for the MIX [Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon radioisotope Production] Facility and for TRR.
(e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak.
33. Although the quantities of nuclear material have not been large [Report Footnote No. 6: 'The total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is, however, not insignificant in terms of a state's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities.'], and the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern. While these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the declarations is still ongoing." The concluding paragraph (No. 35) of the report states: "The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for states, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies. In the view of the Director General, the adherence by Iran to an Additional Protocol would therefore constitute a significant step forward." June 10: Gholamreza Aqazedah, the Director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, repeats his government's main reservation regarding the Additional Protocol, namely that may prove a one-sided bargain - "We are prepared to initiate a process for signing the Additional Protocol, but we expect the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its member states equipped with advanced nuclear technology, to...end discrimination against us and allow all member states equal access to nuclear technology". June 11: briefing reporters on condition of anonymity, a senior US State Department official describes the June 6 IAEA report as a conclusive endorsement of Washington's presentation of Iran as a state in violation of its international obligations: "Indeed, it is a devastating report in what it shows about what the Iranian capabilities are in the nuclear field... Every piece...is consistent with our theory, our belief, that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons programme". Despite this confluence of perspective, however, the official noted that the crisis did not yet require referral to the UN - "we do not, underline not, anticipate that the...[IAEA] at this meeting will refer the Iranian programme to the Security Council". Instead, by means either of a resolution or statement, the "Board of Governors should, based on this report, certainly do something...to express the concern that we all have about what the Iranians are up to". June 16: European Union (EU) foreign ministers, discussing the growing crisis at a meeting in Luxembourg, issue a statement explicitly linking the resolution of the nuclear issue with prospects for a general development of EU-Iran relations: " The Council [of Ministers] discussed developments in relations with Iran following its decision to launch negotiations on agreements concerning trade and cooperation and political dialogue. ... In particular, the Council has taken note with concern of the Report on implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted by the Director General of IAEA on June 6. The nature of some aspects of Iran's programme raises serious concerns, in particular as regards the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium centrifuge, announced by President Khatami. The Council stressed the need for Iran to answer timely, fully and adequately all questions raised regarding its nuclear programme. It called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA. The Council called on Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally an Additional Protocol. This would be a significant step in demonstrating Iran's stated peaceful intentions with regard to its nuclear programme. ... The Council will continue to follow closely developments on this issue and the other areas of concern. It reiterates that progress in these matters and strengthened dialogue and cooperation are interdependent, essential and mutually reinforcing elements of EU-Iran relations." June 16-19: the IAEA Board of Governors - whose 35 members currently includes Iran - meet in Vienna. Despite the momentous range of issues facing the Agency, notably with regard to North Korea, discussions are dominated by the Iran crisis and the Board's response to the June 6 report from the Director General. The meeting takes place to the backdrop of regular, large-scale, and occasionally violently repressed student pro-reform demonstrations in Iran. After ElBaradei's opening statement (quoted in 'Summary & Background', above), US Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill sets out his government's case against Tehran: "The report that the Director General has put before us is one that no country can afford to ignore or dismiss. It is an impartial and wholly factual product of the international inspectorate entrusted by us all to verify the obligations of every country that has brought into force an NPT-required safeguards agreement. The inspectors were invited by Iran itself to test its stated policy of 'full cooperation with the IAEA' and 'complete transparency.' Iran's 'complete transparency' proved not to extend, however, to the import of nuclear material, or to the subsequent processing of that material, or to the facilities where the material was stored and processed. In fact, Iran's 'complete transparency' has proven in crucial respects to be an empty promise, intended to distract attention from its reluctant confirmation of the existence of a whole series of clandestine activities and facilities. ... When revelations about Iran's nuclear program were made last summer, Iran did not demonstrate a willingness to move promptly to ensure the IAEA was fully informed about developments relevant to its responsibilities. ... We all need to reflect on the implications of the fact that the sequence of events leading to the Director General's report was the result not of reports by Iran to the IAEA, but largely of information that came to the Agency through open sources. ... Without...outside revelations, Iran's extensive nuclear program would still be proceeding on a largely clandestine basis, with the existence of only the Bushehr power reactor and a few other facilities acknowledged by Iranian authorities. Can the IAEA or anyone else be confident under these circumstances that there are no other clandestine facilities that have yet to be revealed? ... The United States also joins other Board members in calling on Iran to sign, ratify, and implement the Strengthened Safeguards Additional Protocol without delay and without conditions. If Iran's nuclear program were limited only to peaceful purposes, Iran would see the Additional Protocol as a way to show its commitment to the non-proliferation regime and complete transparency. Instead, when Iranian officials speak about signing the Additional Protocol, they attach conditions no other country has sought or imposed. Like all other NPT signatories, Iran has an obligation to safeguards compliance that should be unqualified. Its adherence to the Additional Protocol should not be conditional." Brill concludes: "I want to reiterate the gravity of this issue. The Secretariat's work to date and the Director General's forthright reporting on it have rendered an important service to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to global security. My government now looks forward to further information from the DG as soon as possible on the Secretariat's progress in determining the correctness and completeness of Iranian declarations to date. The US expects the Agency's accumulation of further information will point to only one conclusion: that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. We propose that the Board be prepared to meet in special session to consider further information and analysis from the Secretariat whenever it becomes available, rather than waiting until the next scheduled Board meeting in September. In the interim, Iran should take all necessary steps to facilitate the work of the inspectors, so the world can be reliably informed of the full truth about its nuclear program." As Brill spoke in Vienna, President Bush told reporters in Washington: "The international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon - Iran would be dangerous if they have nuclear weapons." Iran's statement, delivered by Ambassador Ali Akbar Salehi on June 18, opens with a "friendly criticism of the way the report was drafted": "The report has an apparent factual format, but our assessment is that the report could have been crafted in a more partial, fair and balanced manner." However, given "the political rhetoric in the past few months and [the] awkward directives issued at certain influential capitals on the form, the content and the final conclusion and judgment of the report, one has no other choice but to be realistic and be satisfied with what is at hand". With regard to the "crux" of the report, Salehi notes that it "deals only with a small amount of...natural uranium that we imported in 1991...to be used for the various testing of the different processes involved in our Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)...[which] has been under the Safeguards Agreement ever since the actual construction of the facility started". The Ambassador concludes: "Iran believes that all provisions of the NPT are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of 'rights and obligations' enshrined in the treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages both the NPT's universality and its full implementation. Iranians know that more capability necessarily prompts more responsibility. We would [like to] prove that accountability is part and parcel of our quest for full nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We are enforcing our national laws and regulations on the control of nuclear and radioactive material and equipment. We welcome any constructive interaction with other parties, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). ... We wish to reiterate...that promotion of cooperation and confidence-building are best addressed amicably and in an environment of peace. And, in this vein, we would like to state over again our positive consideration of the Additional Protocol. Certainly, the positive outcome of this session will be conducive towards the settlement of this issue." On June 19, the Board issued a short 'summing-up statement' through its chair, Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla of Kuwait: "The Board shared the concern expressed by the Director General in his report at the number of Iran's past failures to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations. Noting the Iranian actions taken thus far to correct these failures, the Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified in the report and resolve questions that remain open. The Board welcomed Iran's reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expected Iran to grant the Agency all access deemed necessary by the Agency in order to create the necessary confidence in the international community. Noting that the enrichment plant is under IAEA safeguards, the Board encouraged Iran, pending the resolution of related outstanding issues, not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant, as a confidence-building measure. The Board called on Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency in its on-going work. Specifically, the Board took note of the Director General's 16 June Introductory Statement which called on Iran to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exists [the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran]. The Board welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an additional protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities. The Board requested the Director General to provide a further report on the situation whenever appropriate." Speaking to reporters after the statement was released, ElBaradei concentrated not on blame or exoneration, but on the list of tasks ahead: "We still have a lot of work to clarify safeguards and verification issues in Iran... With regard to the enrichment programme, [and] with regard to the heavy water programme, we need to fully understand the depth and breadth of the programme and [ensure] everything is declared to the Agency and under safeguards. To that end we would like to continue to have a collection of environmental samples; we would like to see Iran, as early as practicable, concluding an Additional Protocol which gives us the required authority to sites and locations; and the Board was supportive of my request to conclude a protocol to allow us to take environmental samples." In terms of timeline, ElBaradei noted: "I intend to report to the Board in September - that would be the time, in my view, required for us to be able to complete our analysis, but obviously I could report to the Board earlier if required. ... I think I come from that Board equipped with broad support of the measures we have so far taken and we would like to take in the next few weeks and months. There is, I would say, a very concrete support by the international community. We need to bring that issue to a closure as soon as possible and we need to go to the bottom of that programme to assure ourselves that it is a comprehensive programme dedicated to peaceful purposes." Russia welcomes the purposive but measured outcome of the meeting. A Foreign Ministry statement notes: "In the course of the discussion...we drew the attention of the members of the Board of Governors to the need to consider and solve the questions associated with the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in Iran in an atmosphere of cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding, without any attempts to bring in elements of confrontation." White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was asked, "is there a military option on the table for dealing with Iran?" Fleischer replies that the "President wanted to see what the IAEA reported. Clearly, the United States and the international community share the same concerns about Iran. ... I think the world will be very interested in the Iranian reaction... If the Iranians are pursuing peaceful nuclear energy...then they have every reason to comply with the IAEA request, particularly the specific requests to take the environmental samples and to sign the Additional Protocol. ... And as the President has said, we - which is an expression representing the international community - will not tolerate Iranian development of nuclear weaponry, which is exactly what the IAEA report is all about." Tehran expresses relief and overall satisfaction at the Board's statement. Gholamreza Aqazedah tells Iranian television: "America has carried out extensive propaganda for this meeting, and we should acknowledge that our friends' efforts and the presentation of enough proofs and documents caused their failure... In previous months we have intensively cooperated with the Agency to remove ambiguities, and of course this cooperation will continue. ... Our attitude toward this Additional Protocol is not negative, it is positive. We have implemented all our commitments, but the Agency has not fulfilled its commitments." June 20: meeting in Thessaloniki, Greece, EU heads of state and government issue a statement taking "note of the statement issued yesterday by the Chairperson of the IAEA Board of Governors", reiterating "full support for the IAEA in its efforts to conduct a comprehensive examination of Iran's nuclear programme", expressing "serious concern at some aspects of the Iranian programme," and urging "Iran to make good its commitment, reaffirmed at yesterday's IAEA meeting, to full transparency." June 21: in an interview with Russia and foreign journalists at the Kremlin, President Putin is quizzed on his government's assessment of the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Putin reveals: "As for your question whether I have received new assurances from Iran that it has no plans to build its own nuclear weapons - yes, I have. Two days ago, I spoke by telephone with President Khatami on his initiative, and he once again assured me that Iran has no plans to make nuclear weapons. What's more, we have information that the Iranian leadership plans to sign all the protocols as demanded by the IAEA for IAEA supervision over Iran's nuclear programmes. ... I can [also] tell you that a meeting of the IAEA's Directors has just taken place, and no resolutions condemning Iran were passed. The meeting decided that the IAEA must pursue its joint work with the Iranian leadership on ensuring that all Iran's programmes will be transparent in the future. This corresponds to the position of the Russian Federation, and we will continue to work in this direction." Gholamreza Aqazedah tells reporters that, following the Board of Governors meeting, "we will try to step up our cooperation with the IAEA. Our cooperation with the Agency will be comprehensive and at a level acceptable to the Agency." Aqazedah adds: "We will continue any sort of cooperation with the IAEA within the framework of [existing] regulations. It doesn't mean that we have adopted a new position towards the IAEA". Specifically: "The IAEA has not asked us to stop plans to enrich uranium. It was the opinion of some countries, not the Agency, to only delay shipment of materials to the Natanz plant... It's part of our rights [to enrich uranium] and we will continue our activities under the umbrella of the IAEA. Currently, IAEA cameras have been installed at Natanz and the materials used there have been sealed - it's the widest and most comprehensive supervision applied to any country." With regard to prospects for satisfying the IAEA's main demand, Aqazedah commented: "We are optimistic about signing the Additional Protocol... We only want to know whether the IAEA has fulfilled its obligations toward Iran [with regard to the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology] after it has signed many treaties, including the NPT... There are some ambiguities. We will discuss those issues with the IAEA. But some issues must be cleared." Speaking in Jordan, ElBaradei welcomes Aqazedah's remarks, contrasting them with less helpful comments reported the day before: "I read a statement by Aqazedah yesterday saying Iran will not allow environmental sampling. I think that would have been very unhelpful." In fact, in earlier comments on June 21, Aqazedah repeated his opposition to environmental sampling at one specific site - the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, the "particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exist", in the words of ElBaradei's opening statement to the Board of Governors. Describing the request to take samples at the company's workshop as "contrary to agreements" signed by Iran and the IAEA, Aqazedah elaborates: "We've had no problem concerning environmental samples, but we've been telling the IAEA that this location is a non-nuclear location." Note: given the potential significance of the Kalaye subplot in the unfolding drama, the relevant section (paragraph 8) of the IAEA's June 6 report is reproduced here - "During the discussions in Iran in February...reference was made by the Agency to information in open sources on the possible conduct of enrichment activities at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Iranian authorities acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran. According to the Iranian authorities, all testing had been carried out using simulation studies. While a centrifuge production facility is not a nuclear facility required to be declared to the Agency under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran was requested, in light of its stated policy of transparency, to permit the Agency to visit the workshop and to take environmental samples there to assist the Agency in verifying Iran's declaration and confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The request was initially declined. However, they subsequently agreed to permit access to the workshop (to limited parts of the location in March, and to the entire workshop in May), and have recently indicated that they would consider permitting the taking of environmental samples during the visit of the Agency's enrichment experts to Iran scheduled to take place between June 7 and 11, 2003." Iran's subsequent refusal to grant permission for environmental sampling at the facility was strongly criticised by the United States and others at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. In his June 18 statement, US Ambassador Brill commented: "While Iranian officials publicly claim full cooperation with the IAEA and say they are offering 'complete transparency,' the DG reported that Iran initially denied inspectors access to parts of the Kalaye Electric site, then only grudgingly granted some access, and still continues to prevent inspectors from taking environmental samples there. If Iran's claim that it never introduced nuclear material into centrifuges is true, why will it not permit sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company? Does it have something to hide there?" June 25: at their annual summit meeting in Washington, the US and EU issue a joint statement on 'Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'. The statement expresses "our continuing serious concern at Iran's nuclear programme in particular as regards the pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle, as announced by President Khatami", adding: "We are troubled by the information in the IAEA's report detailing Iran's failures to meet its safeguards obligations and we fully support ongoing investigation by the IAEA to answer the unresolved questions and concerns identified in that report. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA, remedy all failures and answer all questions. It must also sign and implement an Additional Protocol, without delay or conditions, as a significant first step towards addressing those concerns." At a press conference after the summit meeting, Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, tells reporters: "The dialogue with Iran is going on daily and deeply, [and] we push that they accept all the inspections... We have to be sure that they don't constitute a danger to future peace. We have to be absolutely sure." President Bush interrupts Prodi's remarks: "Iran must comply. The free world expects Iran to comply. If they don't, we'll deal with that when they don't." Understandably questioned about the prospect of future conflict with Iran, Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis, the current European Council President, replied: "There was no discussion about force and none of us has ever mentioned force in this case... It is possible to have a difference with a state on such a very important matter and [yet] discuss it without immediately making hypothesis of a war..." June 29/30: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visits Iran. The trip, his fourth to the country in less than two years, is described by a Foreign Office statement (June 29) as "a continuation of our engagement and dialogue with the government of Iran". Interviewed by the BBC in Tehran, Straw (June 30) seeks to make plain that the UK is not adopting an 'axis of evil' approach to the non-proliferation issue in Iran: "No one should ever compare Iran with Iraq in terms of their political systems or their danger". Asked, "do I take it from that that there are no circumstances in which we would agree to an attack on Iran?", Straw replies: "Yes, and I can conceive of no such circumstances." In Moscow on June 30, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov meets with Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation Director Gholamreza Aqazedah. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement reports: "The sides examined in detail the state of affairs in the field of implementation of the bilateral inter-governmental agreement on Russia technical assistance in the construction of the nuclear plant at Bushehr. Igor Ivanov reaffirmed the adherence of the Russian side to its obligations on this project in strict accordance with the provisions of the NPT. The Minister also noted that Iran's accession to the Additional Protocol...would be one more confirmation of the peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear programme, as well as of Iran's close cooperation with the Agency." Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko (July 1) asserts: "There are plans to sign this protocol in the near future. This has been agreed with Iran." Aqazedah, however (July 1), repeats only that Iran "is ready to sign the Additional Protocol...but only in an atmosphere of transparency and trust regarding the participants of this document". With regard to the future development of the Iranian programme, Aqazedah adds: "We have plans for building, alongside the Bushehr nuclear power plant, several others having a total capacity of 6,000 megawatts, and we are inviting Russia to take this opportunity [to assist us]". July 1: Iran and the IAEA announce that Director General ElBaradei will visit Tehran on June 9. According to Agency spokesperson Melissa Fleming, ElBaradei will "discuss all outstanding issues, particularly those identified in his recent report to the Board of Governors and in the Chairman's statement from that meeting". According to Halil Mousavi, a spokesperson for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, the discussions would concentrate on "ways to expand cooperation". July 2: President Bush discusses the crisis in a telephone call to President Putin. Bush tells reporters: "I thanked him for keeping the pressure on the Iranian government to dismantle any notions that they might have of building a nuclear weapon. And we're making progress on that front." July 7: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid Reza Asefi tells reporters that Iran had successfully completed the testing programme for a ballistic missile capable of striking Israel. Reza stated that the final test-flight of the Shahab III missile ('shahab' meaning 'meteor' or 'shooting star' in Farsi) "took place several weeks ago". Reportedly based (though the allegation is dismissed by Iran) on North Korea's No Dong and Pakistan's Ghauri II missile, the Shahab III is said to have a maximum range of 810 miles (1,300 kilometres) and be capable of delivering a maximum payload (warhead) of 1,000 kilograms. Pressed again on the Additional Protocol controversy, Asefi tells reporters: "There is no have-to involved. We hope that in negotiations with Mr. ElBaradei, the two sides can cover subjects that allow us to build mutual trust.... [I]f not, negotiations must continue. ... [This is] not a black-and-white issue. For every problem there is a solution, and for this problem we are ready to negotiate and we are fully ready to listen..." Asefi then reacted angrily to persistent reports that the EU might seek to link trade cooperation with the Protocol issue: "The Islamic Republic will not accept such pressure... Sanctions against the Islamic republic have been ineffective. The Europeans should be careful about what they say and avoid using threats." July 9: ElBaradei's one-day visit to Tehran fails to shift the non-committal attitude of the Iranian authorities towards the Additional Protocol. According to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Asefi: "For the moment, we have not discussed the signing of the Additional Protocol. These talks are to build mutual trust through listening to what each side has to say and hearing each other's demands..." Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi argues that the mere "fact that Mr. ElBaradei is visiting is a positive... The IAEA will see in the discussions that Iran wants to cooperate, and we hope that the questions of each side can be answered... We have nothing to hide. Our nuclear programme is purely peaceful." ElBaradei tells reporters that a team of senior IAEA officials, headed by Pierre Goldschmidt, the Agency's Deputy Director for Safeguards, would remain in Iran for talks on the Additional Protocol, while a team of legal and technical experts would arrive in the country in the "near future". The Director General comments: "I hope that once these issue have been clarified that Iran will be in a position to sign the Protocol... The idea is for them [the IAEA experts] and the Iranian authorities to work out a timetable on how to resolve the outstanding issues [which] essentially have to do with us satisfying ourselves that we know and understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme." Gholamreza Aqazadeh tells a press conference that the IAEA team would submit a report to Tehran on the Additional Protocol. "After having this report and doing the required studying", he adds, "we will take the necessary decisions. ... We are sure that the cooperation will have very good results." Selected CommentIAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, interview with Reuters, July 5: "I think it's very important that they [Iran] have to take the first step...[and begin] a 'peace offensive' to show they have done everything to demonstrate transparency... I'm confident, once they do that, then over time the ban or the sanction applied [by various countries] will be gradually lifted. But to create confidence, it takes time." Gholamreza Aqazedah, Director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, June 10: "We do not have any site in Iran which is necessary to declare to the [International Atomic Energy] Agency... In the era of satellites, how could such huge facilities be hidden?" Hamid Reza Asefi, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, June 23: "The Americans make statements on Iran while they are...in possession of little information about our country. ... Regrettably enough, in US foreign policy telling lies has been institutionalised. The world is still waiting for the US to prove its claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and to apologise for having created Al Qaeda, but the US has so far failed to do so... Of course, the issue of a military attack on Iran is being raised by a very hardline and extremist minority in the US, and this mentality has no advocate in Europe and in the world, and not even in the US." US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, June 11: "The intelligence community in the United States and around the world currently assess that Iran does not have nuclear weapons. The assessment is that they do have a very active programme and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a very short period of time." Russian President Vladimir Putin, interview with the BBC, June 22: "Iran is our neighbour, our traditional partner. We have a certain system and a level of inter-governmental relations. And we do not intend to lose our position in Iran. We plan to develop relations with this country. But we have several fundamental questions, and our Iranian partners know about these problems: we are opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister George Mamedov, May 14: "There is a myth that all the problems originate from peaceful cooperation between Iran and Russia being used to cover the delivery of weapons technology. This we categorically deny... In our opinion, many of the problems connected to the situation with nuclear weapons in Iran are connected to illegal activities by some western companies working in Iran." Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko, June 26: "After the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 16, this theme is no longer topical... But I will again say that if anyone has any concerns we are prepared to continue dialogue." UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, interview with the BBC, June 17: "Now on this issue of the Iranians' possible nuclear systems, what...I've said personally to Kemal Kharrazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, is 'look, if its is correct that you have nothing to hide, then you have nothing to fear from the kind of enhanced inspections which now the whole world wishes you to undertake'." David Albright, President of the US Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), June 16: "We are at a very important time. If the non-proliferation regime cannot solve this problem with Iran, I think the Non-Proliferation Treaty will become, not irrelevant, but a place where the good guys show that they are good guys - not a real treaty that can be used to resolve tensions." Related material on Acronym website:
Reports: US says has no plans for military action on Iran, Reuters, May 15; G8 ministers flag N. Korea, Iran nuclear concerns, Reuters, May 23; Moscow says it won't back out of Iran nuclear plan, Reuters, May 27; Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian political director at the G-8, Georgy Mamedov, meets Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Gholamreza Shafei, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1268-27-05-2003, May 27; Text - G-8 nations declare support for WMD non-proliferation regime, Washington File, June 2; US to eliminate WMD in all rogue states, by force if necessary, Agence France Presse, June 5; Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov, interview with the newspaper Vremya Novostei on June 6, 2003, under the heading 'there is no evidence of the existence of an Iranian nuclear program', Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Iran says it has no hidden nuclear facilities, Reuters, June 10; Iran open to more nuclear monitoring, Associated Press, June 10; Rumsfeld says Iran might have nuclear arms soon, Reuters, June 11; US seeks strong IAEA statement on Iranian nuclear program - senior official, Agence France Presse, June 11; UN's IAEA won't take Iran to Security Council yet, Reuters, June 11; Introductory statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, June 16, 2003, IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org; Iran stands firm on nuclear plans, student protest, Reuters, June 16; UN asks Iran of its nuclear ambition, Associated Press, June 16; UN calls on Iran to allow stricter nuclear inspections, Agence France Presse, June 16; EU Foreign Ministers' meeting, Luxembourg, June 16, 2003, EU Council website; Interview given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, for BBC Radio 4, June 17, 2003, FCO website; Iran says UN nuclear report biased and unfair, Reuters, June 18; Iran Statement to the Board of Governors, Vienna, June 18, 2003, IAEA website; Bush will not tolerate Iran nuclear arms, Associated Press, June 18; Transcript - White House press briefing, June 19, 2003, Washington File; Bush - Iranian nuclear weapons won't be tolerated, USA Today, June 19; US 'satisfied' with Iran nuclear reprimand, Reuters, June 19; Director General's press statement, IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, June 19, 2003, IAEA website; Chairwoman's summing up statement, Vienna, June 19, 2003, IAEA website; Bush welcomes IAEA statement on Iran's nuclear program, Washington File, June 19; Regarding the completion of the examination by IAEA Board of Governors of the question of the implementation of the safeguards agreement pursuant to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Iran, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1437-19-06-2003, June 19; Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Report, GOV/2002/40, released (derestricted) June 19; Iran welcomes IAEA statement, says US failed, Reuters, June 20; Transcript - White House welcomes IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program, Washington File, June 20; EU leaders back draft constitution, police clash with anarchists, Agence France Presse, June 20; Press conference by Russian President Vladimir Putin with Russian and foreign journalists, Moscow, June 21, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; ElBaradei confident of Iran nuclear cooperation, Reuters, June 21; Iran defies international pressure on nuclear aims, Reuters, June 21; Iran backs away from nuclear row, vows cooperation, Reuters, June 21; Russia will continue helping Iran with nuclear programme - Putin, Agence France Presse, June 22; Iran - we'll work with UN nuclear agency, Associated Press, June 22; Interview with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, by the British BBC television and radio company, Moscow, June 22, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Text - US urges IAEA to expedite, expand Iranian nuclear investigation, Washington File, June 23; Iranian foreign ministry spokesman's weekly meeting with reporters, June 23, 2003, Iranian Foreign Ministry website, http://www.mfa.gov.ir; Bush, EU leaders condemn North Korea, worry about Iran, Agence France Presse, June 25; Russia says IAEA meet solves US worries over Iran, Reuters, June 26; European leaders back US on Iran nuclear inspections, Washington Post, June 26; Iran - US-EU statement says Iran must accept further inspections, Global Security Newswire, June 26; Britain's Straw arrives in Iran with appeal for Iraq help, stern warnings, Agence France Presse, June 29; Edited transcript of an interview given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, for BBC Radio 4, June 30, 2003, FCO website; Text - Vershbow urges US, Russia to stay united on Iran, N. Korea, Washington File, June 30; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov meets with Iranian Vice President and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization Gholam Reza Agazadeh, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1515-30-06-2003, June 30; UN nuclear watchdog chief to visit Iran on July 9, Reuters, July 1; Iran reportedly set to sign no-nuke deal, Associated Press, July 1; Iran offers Russia chance to build more nuclear reactors, Agence France Presse, July 2; Bush, Putin discuss Iran, North Korea, Reuters, July 2; Tehran considering allowing greater access, Global Security Newswire, July 2; IAEA - Iran should make first move on nuclear issues, Reuters, July 5; Iran conducts final test on long-range missile, Reuters, July 7; Iran brings Israel within missile range, Agence France Presse, July 7; ElBaradei in Iran to press for nuclear inspections, Reuters, July 9; Iran refuses to open discussions with ElBaradei on tougher inspections, Agence France Presse, July 9; IAEA team to clarify Iran's concerns on inspections, Reuters, July 9; ElBaradei concludes meetings in Iran, IAEA News Update, July 9, IAEA website. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |