Disarmament Documentation

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US-Russia Summit, Moscow and St. Petersburg, May 23-26

I. Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty

Including:

• 1) Text of Treaty
• 2) Remarks at Signing Ceremony
• 3) US Fact Sheet
• 4) Russian Fact Sheet
• 5) Russian Foreign Ministry Questions-and-Answers

See also:

• II. Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship
• III. Other Nuclear Weapons & Non-Proliferation Discussions
• IV. Comment and Reaction

1) Text of Treaty

'Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty', signed by US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The Kremlin, Moscow, May 24.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,

Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Source: Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Moscow, May 24.

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2) Remarks at Signing Ceremony

'President Bush, Russian President Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty: Remarks by President Bush and President Putin at Signing of Joint Declaration and Press Availability, The Kremlin, May 24, 2002', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Moscow, May 24.

President Bush: It's an historic and hopeful day for Russia and America. It's an historic day for the world, as well. President Putin and I today ended a long chapter of confrontation, and opened up an entirely new relationship between our countries. Mr. President, I appreciate your leadership. I appreciate your vision. I appreciate the fact that we've now laid the foundation for not only our governments, but future governments to work in a spirit of cooperation and a spirit of trust. That's good. It's good for the people of Russia; it's good for the people of the United States.

President Putin and I have signed a treaty that will substantially reduce our nuclear - strategic nuclear warhead arsenals to the range of 1,700 to 2,200, the lowest level in decades. This treaty liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our countries. We've also signed a joint declaration of new strategic relationship that charts a course toward greater security, political and economic cooperation between Russia and the United States. Our nations will continue to cooperate closely in the war against global terror. I understand full well that the people of Russia have suffered at the hands of terrorists. And so have we. And I want to thank President Putin for his understanding of the nature of the new war we face together, and his willingness to be determined and steadfast and patient as we pursue this war together.

President Putin and I agree also that the greatest danger in this war is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Our nations must spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation. And we discussed Iran in this context today. We'll work closely with each other on this very important issue.

Our nations also agree on the importance of a new NATO-Russia Council that will be launched in a few days in Rome. And, Mr. President, this council is also a tribute to your leadership and your vision. For decades, Russia and NATO were adversaries. Those days are gone, and that's good. And that's good for the Russian people, it's good for the people of my country, it's good for the people of Europe and it's good for the people of the world. ...

I am pleased with our relationship. I am confident that by working together, we make the world more peaceful. I'm confident that by working together, we can win the first war of the 21st century, and that is the war cold-blooded killers - against cold-blooded killers, who want to harm nations such as America and Russia. And I'm confident that when we work together in a spirit of cooperation on all fronts, both our peoples will benefit. ...

President Putin: We've just accomplished the official part of our talks with US President George Bush...but now we can name the major result of our talks - first of all, the logical development and practical implementation as seen by our agreements reached in Crawford last year. I mean the signature of the treaty between Russia on strategic defensive reductions and, first of all, this document. It's the statement of our countries to reduce our nuclear arsenals and the joint work for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It's the decision of two states which are particularly responsible for international security and strategic stability.

We're on the level of adopting the declaration on new strategic relationship which determines the basic directions in the security and international policy. It will have a positive impact for economic cooperation and development of our relations between the institutions of general public, and together with Mr. President, we discussed especially this aspect, the civil society between the people of our countries. The declaration formulates the principles of our dialogue, anti-missile dialogue. That is the transparency and openness and exclusion of potential threats. We confirmed the Genoa agreement on offensive and defensive systems in all their aspects.

A separate issue, the mechanism of NATO-Russia cooperation within the framework of 20, it presumes a new level of joint responsibility and confidence between all its participants. ...

[Our] agenda has very concrete issues of interaction against terrorism on the basis of unique standards against any manifestation of terrorism and extremism. ... The bilateral working group on Afghanistan has demonstrated its efficiency. And we, Mr. President, would like to transform it on a group to combat terrorism, especially chemical, biological, nuclear terrorism. ...

I would like to stress, in conclusion, that, of course, not all ideas, not all initiatives, are on paper and in the form of official documents. But a serious move forward in all these issues is quite evident for us. Today we together counteract global threats and challenges and we're going to form a stable world order that is within the interests of our peoples and our countries. And I think it's in the interest of all the civilized human society. ...

Question: I have a question for both Presidents, please. If we've truly entered a new era, why do you each need 1,700 nuclear weapons? And, President Putin, why does Russia need to continue producing nuclear warheads? And to, President Bush, why does the United States need to keep some 2,000 of these weapons in storage, ready for deployment?

President Bush: First of all, remember where we've come from. We've come from 6,000 to 1,700 in a very quick - or to 1,700 to 2,200 in a very quick period of time. You know, friends really don't need weapons pointed at each other. We both understand that. But it's a realistic assessment of where we've been. And who knows what will happen 10 years from now. Who knows what future presidents will say and how they react. If you have a nuclear arsenal, you want to make sure they work. It's - one reason that you keep weapons in storage apart from launchers is for quality control. And the thing I think it's important for you to know...is that we've made tremendous progress from the past. And the treaty is setting a period of time in the rear-view mirror of both countries. And I am not only confident that this is good for world peace, I'm confident this sets the stage for incredible cooperation that we've never had before between our countries.

President Putin: I concur with the assessment given by my colleague, Mr. Bush. And naturally, our position is well-known, we are guided by the facts that it's more worthwhile perhaps to eliminate a certain part of nuclear potentials. At the same time, I'd like to point out another thing here. Any man who has at least once in his career dealt with arms, had arms in his hands, at least to hunt or a rifle or whatever, he knows that it's much better, much safer to have it in stock disarmed, disassembled perhaps, rather than to have it in your arms and charged with bullets in it and with your finger on the trigger at the same time. This is a different state of affairs, as it were. And the fact that we agreed with President Bush regarding such detente, in such manner, this is a serious move ahead to ensure international security, which is a very good sign as regards the relationship between our two countries.

Now, as to why Russia should continue to produce nuclear arms, I'd like to say that this is not our priority. But in addition to Russia and US out there, there are other states who possess nuclear arms. What is more concerning, there are countries who want to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Experts in the area of international security are aware of the fact, and they have been talking a lot about nuclear arms as deterrent. Moreover, many of them assert - and it is difficult to dispute this fact - they say the existence of the nuclear arms was an impediment, an obstacle which contained the world from large-scale wars over the past decades, let's say. And I think we should take that into consideration while building a new quality of relationship within the two main nuclear states of the world. We also should pay attention to the whole set of relations currently in the world out there and we should take into account the prospects of development of the world in the realm of security, bearing in mind those potential threats I've mentioned here. ...

Question: [Did you discuss the issue of Iran as a] state sponsor of terrorism? I wonder...if these Russians sales [to Iran] that you object to...bump up against what you outlined in your speech to Congress when you said, in the war against terrorism, you're either with the United States or against the United States? And, President Putin, the Bush team says that your sales of nuclear technology and sophisticated military technology to Iran are the world's single biggest proliferation problem right now. Do you agree with that assessment, and did you make any specific promises today in your meeting with President Bush?

President Bush: Well, first, we spent a lot of time on this subject. And as I said yesterday in Germany, I worry about Iran and I'm confident Vladimir Putin worries about Iran, and that was confirmed today. He understands terrorist threats, just like we understand terrorist threats. And he understands that weapons of mass destruction are dangerous to Russia, just as they are to America. And he's explained that point himself, of course, now, he standing here. But we spoke very frankly and honestly about the need to make sure that a

non-transparent government run by radical clerics doesn't get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. It could be harmful to us and harmful to Russia. And the President can speak for himself. And he gave me some assurances that I think will be very comforting for you to listen to. And I'm confident we can work together on this issue. This is in both our countries' mutual interest that we solve this problem.

President Putin:I will confirm what Mr. Bush has just said, and I agree with your evaluation of threats in this regard. Generally speaking, I believe that the problem of non-proliferation is one of the key problems as regards ensuring international security. Incidentally, this happened to be one of the main motivating and underpinning logical stimuluses to work in Russia-NATO framework together on non-proliferation on nuclear arms. At the same time, I'd like to point out that cooperation between Iran and Russia is not all a character which would undermine the process on non-proliferation. Our cooperation is exclusively, as regards energy sector, focused on the problems of economic nature. I'd like to point out also that the US has taken a commitment upon themselves to build similar nuclear power plant in North Korea, similar to Russia. And in addition to Iran, I think, we also need to think about other countries here. For example, we have some questions concerning development of missile programs in Taiwan, in some other countries where we've been witnessing active work of producing mass destruction weapons and their carriers. All of that should be a subject of our in-depth discussion both bilaterally and in the frameworks of NATO-Russia agreement. That's one of the key issues of the modern times, I believe. It would seem to me that in order to be efficient, in this sense, like in other areas, we need to address the main task, to upgrade confidence mutually. And today I mentioned to President Bush here, that as regards Iran and some other countries, according to our data, the missile programs of those countries, nuclear programs, are built largely on the basis of the technologies and with the support of the Western companies. We do have such info, and we stand ready to share it with our American partners. So if we pursued that way, not dealing with generalities, then we'll get results with respect to this very complicated and very important [issue]...

Question: To both Presidents, to what extent the treaty ensures real nuclear parity, and are there conditions that the treaty can be terminated by either side? And how true is the fact that Russia still remains as one of the nuclear targets for nuclear forces? And how does that relate to the announced new strategic relations between our two countries?

President Bush: This document is a treaty that will be confirmed by the United States Senate and the Duma, hopefully. Secondly, treaties have always had outs; there's nothing new about that. There are conditions of which things may change and people get out of treaties. That's the way it's been. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had an out; there's nothing new about that. And, thirdly, you know, we are going to work to end the - forever end the Cold War. And that begins with the statement that Russia's our friend, not our enemy. And you say targeting - I mean, the idea of our weaponry, our military has no aims at Russia. There may be old vestiges in place, but Russia's not an enemy. You don't think about how to deal with Russia the way they used to. Russia is a friend. And that's the new thinking. That's part of what's being codified today.

President Putin: As regards the parity, the parity relationship of sorts, the weight of military potentials and nuclear potential, and so on, so forth, each state would have its own strategy of development of what you refer to as nuclear deterrent process. But I'd like to assure you that all the action undertaken by us in this area fully confirmed with the interests of the Russian Federation. The documents signed today are a result of joint effort of the Minister of Defense and Chiefs of staff and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, of course, jointly with our American colleagues. And we proceed from the assumption we have today, and we try to forecast the status of affairs in the world for a lengthy period of time - I would like to point out, again, for a lengthy perspective. Now, as regards the question of verification and control, perhaps, I'd like to point out that we're very much satisfied with the US administration approach to this question. Our American partners have agreed that we need to retain START I, which is provided for by the system of verification. We agreed we will continue this work on the basis of the documents signed today, as well. ... I will also make a remark...regarding aiming targets. And Mr. Baluyevskiy, our military First Deputy Chief of Staff, is here with us. He and his American counterpart are full aware of those things, targeting aims and other things involved and what is the status today of those aimings and targeting. All in speculations in the press are nothing but expression of domestic political infight either here or in the US... We are not being emotional here. We're not talking to the press, but as experts, we're full aware of that and we have no concern whatsoever in this regard.

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3) US Fact Sheet

'Fact Sheet: Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions', The White House, Office of the Press secretary, Moscow, May 24.

Today, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012, a level nearly two-thirds below current levels.

This new, legally-binding Treaty codifies the deep reductions announced by President Bush during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and by President Putin at that Summit and a month later. It is part of the new strategic framework that the United States and Russia have established. This framework includes a broad array of cooperative efforts in political, economic, and security areas, and marks a new era in our bilateral relationship.

Treaty Provisions

The Treaty requires each country to reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012. Each side may determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic forces consistent with this limit. A Bilateral Implementation Commission will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to the Treaty.

Ratification Process

The Treaty will be transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification; in Russia, the two Chambers of the Federal Assembly must approve a bill on its ratification. Once this process is completed in both countries, the United States and Russia will exchange instruments of ratification and the Treaty will enter into force. It will remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended or replaced with a subsequent agreement.

Relationship to START

The five-Party Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 continues in force unchanged. (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States are Parties to START.) START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for transparency and predictability regarding implementation of the new bilateral Treaty. As noted in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship also issued today in Moscow, the United States and Russia also will continue discussions to explore additional ways to enhance transparency and predictability.

US Reduction Plans

As outlined in the Department of Defense's Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress earlier this year, the United States plans to retire all 50 of its ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and convert four Trident submarines from strategic to conventional service. Additional steps to reduce the number of US operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the 1,700-2,200 level will be decided subsequently.

Some of the warheads which are removed from deployment will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed. The United States will continue to deploy land-, sea- and air-based strategic forces.

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4) Russian Fact Sheet

'Fact Sheet: SOR Treaty - a New Stage in the Development of the Treaty Base with Respect to Nuclear Arms Reductions' Russian Foreign Ministry 1047-22-05-2002, May 22.

Format of the SOR Treaty; Ratification Procedure

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions bears a legally binding character. The chief undertaking of the Parties under the Treaty is to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warhead to 1,700-2,200 by a fixed date - December 31, 2012.

The Treaty is subject to ratification in accordance with constitutional procedures of each of the Parties. For Russia this means: a law on ratification is passed by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council, and signed by the President. It will enter into force the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

The Treaty will remain in force until December 31, 2012. It contains a provision for its renewal and possible replacement earlier than this date by a subsequent agreement.

Each Party, according to the Treaty, has the right to withdraw from it - by way of the exercise of state sovereignty upon three months written notice to the other Party. ...

Principles Set Forth in the SOR Treaty

The Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions proceeds from the recognition of their commitment to the goal of strengthening mutual relations by cooperation. It states that new global challenges and threats demand the establishment of a new strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, based on genuine partnership.

The Preamble to the Treaty specifies the principles on which such partnership will be built in the military-strategic field: mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness and predictability.

Of special importance is the mention of the principle of mutual security, for the first time appearing in Russian-American treaties. This is a reflection of the qualitatively new stage in the positive development of relations between the two countries.

Thus, the new Treaty places emphasis above all on a more developed base of the strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, in which the principles of partnership and cooperation, and a mutual recognition of the demands arising from new global challenges and threats figure much more prominently.

The Treaty by referring to the Joint Statement of the Russian and US Presidents in Genoa on July 22, 2001, reconfirms the principle of the interconnection of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

The Treaty reaffirms the obligations which both Parties bear in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This Article establishes the interconnection between the task of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the task of nuclear disarmament with consistent advancement towards general and complete disarmament.

The Treaty-envisaged strategic offensive arms reductions are an important contribution to the current NPT review process with the objective of preparing for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Main Content of the SOR Treaty

The Treaty envisages a considerable reduction of strategic offensive arms. In accordance with its provisions each of the Parties must reduce the levels of its strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012; i.e. by about three times compared to the ceiling established by the now operative START I Treaty (6,000 weapons). Furthermore, each of the Parties will itself determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, proceeding from the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

The Treaty envisages no stages (schedule) of reductions. This lets each Party plan at its own discretion the lowering of the levels of strategic nuclear warheads in its possession. As the experience of the implementation of the START I Treaty shows, reducing strategic offensive arms is a complex, labor-consuming process requiring a lot of effort, time and expenditure. So both Parties will be able to draw up such schedules even in the absence of relevant treaty provisions. There is mutual understanding that it will take certain transparency with respect to such reduction plans and their implementation to enhance the verifiability of the Treaty.

Set into the Treaty itself are the conditions for its further enrichment, strengthening and development. It is borne in mind that a special Bilateral Implementation Commission will deal with this matter. It will meet at least twice a year. Regulations for this commission will have to be worked out, determining its functional powers, objectives and tasks.

On the Interrelationship Between the SOR Treaty and the START I Treaty

Article II of the new Treaty records the consent of the Parties that the START I Treaty shall remain in force. Special reference is also made to their obligations under this Treaty.

The START I Treaty shall remain in force until December 5, 2009 and with the consent of both Parties may be renewed. This means that the strategic offensive capabilities of Russia and the USA will at least until this date be under the double complementary restriction of these Treaties.

This is important from, among other things, the viewpoint of ensuring proper verification. The START I Treaty verification mechanism, which continues to function, will enable the Parties to trace the state of affairs in the strategic arsenals of each other, including in the interests of the new Treaty. In addition, as envisaged by the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the provisions of the START I Treaty will serve as the basis for ensuring trust, openness and predictability in the further reduction of strategic offensive arms along with other supplementary measures to be agreed upon, including measures of openness.

An important role in implementing the new Treaty is also called upon to play by the START I-prescribed quantitative and qualitative restrictions on delivery vehicles of strategic offensive arms and the provisions concerning re-equipment of such delivery vehicles. They contain a serious restraining element for back deployment of warheads.

Questions of the START-ABM Link in the SOR Treaty and the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship Between Russia and the USA

Russia continues to regard the unilateral US decision to quit the ABM Treaty as erroneous. Nevertheless, to prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the area of strategic stability, the Russian side chose the constructive path of preparing a new agreement with the USA on strategic offensive arms. Moreover, it has been possible to ensure in the new Treaty the confirmation by both sides of the objectively existing link between strategic offensive and defensive arms.

Thus, the Preamble to the Treaty cites the Genoa Joint Statement of the Russian and US Presidents on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001, in which "we agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems" and spoke in favor of holding "intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems."

The Preamble to the Treaty also refers to the Joint Statement of the two Presidents on a new relationship between Russia and the USA of November 13, 2001, which speaks of both a shared commitment to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons and an agreement to continue consultations on strategic defense in the "broad framework of the new strategic relationship."

The Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship develops the provisions on interconnection. It directly points out that Russia and the USA proceed from the Joint Statements adopted in Genoa and Washington. Besides, in order to ensure the predictability of the Parties' actions Russia and the USA, in accordance with the Declaration, have consented to carry out a number of measures aimed at confidence building and the expansion of openness in the field of antimissile defense, and agreed to study possible areas of cooperation with respect to antimissile defense.

Those provisions provide politico-legal conditions for the further discussion of the question of interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, as well as for the elaboration of appropriate supplementary agreements.

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5) Russian Foreign Ministry Questions-and-Answers

'Fact Sheet: On the Principal Provisions of the New Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR)', Russian Foreign Ministry Document 1041-22-05-2002, May 22.

Replies to Questions About the new SOR Treaty That Have Been Received by the Russian MFA Information and Press Department

1. Question: The USA has repeatedly said that it will carry out unilateral reductions of its strategic offensive arms regardless of whether a new agreement will be reached with Russia on this or not. Does the new Treaty

mean a de facto acceptance by Russia of this American approach?

Answer: In assessing the new Treaty one should proceed from other, objective premises. The new SOR Treaty is a legally binding document envisaging joint, not unilateral reductions by almost two-thirds of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers of the world and, moreover, opening up the prospect for further advancement along this road. Herein is the essence and importance of this Treaty.

2. Question: Does the signing of the Treaty mean that Russia agrees with the American concept of reducing only the so called "operationally deployed warheads"?

Answer: No, it does not. There is no such term in the Treaty altogether. Questions of the practical realization of the Treaty will be tackled by the sides in a special Bilateral Implementation Commission.

3. Question: Why does Russia agree to new nuclear arms reductions with the USA in the situation where Washington has announced its decision to quit the ABM Treaty of 1972?

Answer: Russia continues to regard the unilateral US decision to quit the ABM Treaty as erroneous. Nevertheless, to prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the area of strategic stability, the Russian side chose the constructive path of preparing a new agreement with the USA on strategic offensive arms. Moreover, it has been possible to ensure in the new Treaty the confirmation by both sides of the objectively existing interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Contained in the Treaty text is a special reference to the Genoa Joint Statement of the Russian and US Presidents of July 22, 2001, which recorded this interconnection. In addition, an important element of the new Russian-American accords is to be the mutual understanding, recorded in the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship, on the development of a system of confidence building measures and predictability in the ABM field, which would offer the confidence that this statement is being strictly implemented in practice. This work will be continued, in particular, in a High-Level Consultative Group for Strategic Stability that is being created.

4. Question: Does the new Treaty mean a nuclear parity between Russia and the USA in the new conditions?

Answer: The Treaty and other documents of the summit aim to confirm the new relationship between Russia and the USA, when the importance of nuclear parity is no longer what it was in the Cold War era. Nevertheless the comparability - now on a fundamentally lower level - of the nuclear capabilities of Russia and the USA, undoubtedly, remains an important element of strategic stability. In this sense it is important that the new Treaty sets equal upper limits for both Russia and the USA to the total number of strategic nuclear warheads (2,200 each), which the sides must not exceed.

5. Question: How is it borne in mind to verify the implementation of the Treaty?

Answer: The Treaty contains an important clause confirming that the START I Treaty remains in force. There is also a reference to the obligations of the sides under this Treaty. Thus, a close link is being established between the two treaties - START I and the new Treaty. It is to be recalled that START I will be operative until the end of 2009 and may be renewed. Thus, the thoroughly developed verification mechanism it provides for, which makes it possible to sufficiently accurately trace the state of affairs in the strategic arsenals of the sides, will be operative as well. In its turn, the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship points out that the provisions of the START I Treaty will serve as a basis for ensuring trust, openness and predictability in any further strategic offensive reductions along with other supplementary measures to be agreed upon, including measures of openness. Finally, by the new Treaty it is agreed to establish a Bilateral Implementation Commission, where all the questions that either side may have can be considered. Thus, with reference to the new Treaty a mechanism is being created to provide the confidence that the Treaty is being implemented.

6. Question: Are any stages of reductions being provided for? If not, will this not lead to a hypothetical possibility that some one of the sides can long not reduce its arms by putting off such reductions until the last moment?

Answer: Arms reductions - and this is indicated by the experience of the previous treaties, including START I - is a technically not simple, labor-consuming process requiring considerable effort, time and financial expenditure. So we think it would be naive to presuppose that some one of the sides will be putting off such reduction until the last moment. But the absence of the stages of reductions - and they are not provided for - permits each of them to plan the lowering of the levels of strategic nuclear warheads it has in its own way.

7. Question: What is the duration of the Treaty?

Answer: The Treaty, in keeping with its provisions, will remain in force until December 31, 2012. Provision is made for its renewal or replacement earlier than this date by a subsequent agreement. We attach great importance to the fact that each of the sides is not only to reduce by December 31, 2012, but also to "limit" its strategic nuclear warheads to a total number not exceeding 1,700-2,200. This is a look into the future.

8. Question: Is there any provision in the Treaty for the reduction of delivery vehicles of strategic offensive arms, as was the case in START I?

Answer: The Treaty provides one quantitative limit to be set to the total number of strategic nuclear warheads. Each of the sides will itself determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms proceeding from the established aggregate limit for the quantity of such warheads. Furthermore, the START I Treaty with its restrictions on delivery vehicles shall remain in force.

9. Question: What was the compromise in preparing the Treaty which Russia made?

Answer: Any Treaty born as a result of difficult negotiations cannot but be a mutual compromise. Thus, in the "matrix" of the SOR Treaty it has not been possible to put all the questions that have a bearing on strategic stability, for example, the questions of cosmic weapons, antisubmarine activities, high-precision weapons and others. But this does not mean that these questions are either forgotten or pushed aside. Dialogue on them will be continued, in particular, within the Consultative Group for Strategic Security being created by the sides, led by the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, which is stated in the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship.

10. Question: What is the fate of the START II Treaty?

Answer: Russia, as is known, has ratified the START II Treaty in May 2000. The USA has not completed the ratification process in respect of this Treaty, and also, by announcing a decision to quit the ABM Treaty, deprived START II of one of the major conditions for its entry into force.

11. Question: Will the new Treaty be ratified?

Answer: Yes. It is to be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each of the sides. In Russia the Treaty will have to be ratified in accordance with our constitutional procedures: as is known, laws on ratification are passed by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council and signed by the President. The Treaty will enter into force the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged between Russia and the USA. It will be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.

12. Question: Please comment on the title of the new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR).

Answer: The term "strategic reductions" incorporates warheads and delivery vehicles and all that is linked with cuts in strategic offensive arms. It also includes verifying the agreements reached to be sure. The title of the new Treaty covers all this.

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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.