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Disarmament DocumentationUS-Russia Summit, Moscow and St. Petersburg, May 23-26IV. Comment and ReactionIncluding: See also:
1) Briefing by Secretary of State Colin Powell'Press briefing by Secretary of State Colin Powell on President's trip to Russia, The Grand Europa Hotel, St. Petersburg, May 25, 2002', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 25. Secretary Powell: The President is very pleased with the trip, as you might well imagine, and we all are. We think it's been quite successful, as highlighted yesterday morning by a signing of the two documents - the Treaty of Moscow, as we now call it, as well as the political declaration and other statements that went along with the treaty that the President and President Putin also signed. I think I might say a word about the Treaty of Moscow, the strategic offensive reduction treaty. And let me say a word about the treaty by taking you back to the 1st of May of last year, when at the National Defense University, President Bush gave a vision of where he wanted to go with respect to a strategic framework with Russia; where he wanted to go with respect to missile defense and with respect to the ABM Treaty and what we had to do about the ABM Treaty to move into a new future strategic relationship with Russia. The President has acted on every one of the elements of that speech at the National Defense University, in a way that did not cause a disruption in our relationship - we moved beyond the ABM Treaty. At the time we did that, we had also announced our intention to reduce our strategic offensive arsenal down to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads. And President Putin, when responding to our notification that we were leaving the treaty, made a similar statement with respect to the reduction that he would be undertaking. So, rather than leaving the ABM Treaty and causing an arms race, did quite the opposite. And then after a period of intense discussion and negotiation, we came up with the treaty that was signed yesterday, which moves operationally deployed warheads down from their levels of roughly 5,000 to 6,000 now, down to 1,700 to 2,200. We believe, and I think I can speak for the Russian side, as well, because they said as much - believe that this is an historic achievement. There has been some commentary as to, well, it doesn't deal with the actual warheads once they're in storage, it deals with the warheads on their launchers. I might point out that all previous arms control treaties were of the same type - they didn't deal with the stockpile elimination, they dealt with either launchers or systems. And so this is consistent with those previous treaties - SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the INF treaty. The important point is that warheads are coming off of launchers. And if you were interested in reducing the number of warheads in the world on both sides and destroying these warheads, you start with taking them off a launcher. And once you have them into your stockpile, then you can make judgments as to whether you retain some as operational spares, or whether you use some to modernize systems, or whether you destroy them. I think both sides have it in their interests to destroy as many as possible. Both sides are also limited as to how many they can destroy in any given year because it is a very technical process. We are limited to how many we can do; so are they, just by the nature of our nuclear infrastructure. We are interested in helping the Russians not only to get rid of their excess stockpile warheads, but also their no longer necessary chemical weapons stockpiles and whatever other chemical, biological or radiological stockpiles they may have. And that's why we put close to a billion dollars a year into these cooperative programs with the Russians, and will continue to maintain that level of investment. It is also why we are looking at new creative ways of finding the means by which Russia can accelerate the elimination of these kinds of stockpiles. So I think it is an historic treaty which serves the interest of both nations, both peoples, and makes it a safer world, as we reduce the number of launchers that are sitting there with warheads on them, and as we then turn our attention to how do we get rid of those weapons in stockpiles that are really not necessary, they're excess to anyone else's needs. And over time, I think you will see that happen. Nothing in this treaty keeps anybody from destroying warheads that they no longer need which are in stockpiles. ... Question: Secretary Powell, on yesterday's meetings with President Putin, can you be a little more specific about what kind of commitments he made in relation to the exports to Iran? And also what your assessment is, now that you've had a chance to talk with him, about how much loose nuclear material remains unsecured in Russia, the degree to which that is an existing concern. We know you set up a commission, so there has to be some concern. But we don't really have a quantitative sense of what you think is out there. Secretary Powell: With respect to Iran, I would answer the question this way. Both nations are agreed that we don't want to contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, and that includes nuclear weapons technology to Iran. Both nations are committed to the proposition that this would not be a good thing for any one of them to be involved in. There is a disagreement between we and the Russians about the nature of some of their activities. It's a disagreement that's gone on for some time. We believe that some of the activities they are participating in can be seen as helping Iran in the direction of proliferation. They disagree with our assessment. They say that they are as sensitive to this issue as we are, they are closer to Iran than we are and, therefore, that's why they are more sensitive, and that their activities do not assist Iran in that direction. We disagree with that, and the groups that have been set up, plus our continuing bilateral dialogue that's been going on for quite a while will continue to explore this. There are some areas that I look forward to taking up with Foreign Minister Ivanov to see if he can assure me, or I can convince him who has the right side of this argument. The good news is that we've had candid discussions about this, and I hope we'll be able to solve this going forward, just as we have solved some of the other difficult issues that we have faced over the past year. With respect to fissile material, I can't tell you how much is unaccounted for, if any. I just don't have that data. That's why we're working with them, and we're investing in our comprehensive threat reduction efforts. And we want to have a broader dialogue with them, to get a better understanding of what they have done over the years, what they have produced over the years, how can we be more effective in capturing that material, recycling it to be used as fuel, or for other purposes, or getting it under solid accountability, so that the whole world can be more comfortable with the knowledge that it is under solid accountability. Question: Have they been reluctant to give you that data? Secretary Powell: We have not gotten all the intimation on not just that type of technology, but other technology - chemical activities, biological activities that they've had ongoing over the years. And the group that has been set up consisting of the four ministers - the two Ivanovs, Rumsfeld and Powell, these are some of the areas we'll be exploring with them. ... Question: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us in the context of the non-proliferation efforts, give us your assessment of how concerned you are with level of danger presented by the tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Russia? Secretary Powell: Yes. This is an area we will have to pursue in the future. Secretary Rumsfeld makes a particular point of it every time we're together. This agreement yesterday dealt with strategic weapons, but both sides have tactical nuclear weapons. We have much fewer than they do. We made a more deliberate effort to get rid of them back in 1991 when, frankly, I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we did it. And they have a larger inventory. They are short- and medium-range weapons that don't present the same kind of threat to us as the strategic systems do. But nevertheless, they're nuclear weapons. And we believe that, as we move forward, we should discuss these weapons, discuss inventory levels. Have you met the unilateral commitments you made 10 years ago to get rid of these? Because at that time, President Gorbachev, I think it was, made the same commitment that President Bush did to get rid of these kinds of systems or bring them down to a much, much lower level. We still have a few or some - we still have some. They have many more. And so we do want to explore with them theater nuclear weapons, as to how we can get a better handle on this kind of weapons system, and we'll be discussing that with them as we move forward. Question: Can I just follow up quickly? President Putin mentioned earlier today that there had been quite a bit of discussion about cooperation on missile technology. Is there any discussion related to ballistic missile defense systems and cooperation with Russia's technology? Secretary Powell: Yes. And if you'll look in the joint statements we put out, you'll see a reference to our willingness to discuss with the Russians cooperative efforts in missile defense. They have technology, we have technology. We have ideas, they have ideas. So we're looking forward to pursuing that, as has been US policy for many years, ever since President Reagan first put it out there, a different kind of missile defense, when he was talking about the Strategic Defense Initiative. But we've always been willing to make this defensive technology available to others and cooperate with others, within reasons of - within reason and with respect to certain classification issues, of course. But, for the most part, try to be as forthcoming as we can with our plans, with what we're planning to do. Share it with the Russians, tell them, show them, so they don't see it as a threat to them, but they do see missile defense as something they may want to be involved in as a way of protecting them from the kinds of threats that will come from these irresponsible states that keep moving in this direction. And that's what our missile defense programs are all about. 2) Remarks by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov'Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov's Answers to Questions at Meeting with Media in St. Petersburg in Course of Visit of US President George W. Bush to Russia, May 25, 2002', Russian Foreign Ministry transcript. Question: Yesterday at the press conference US President George Bush, stressing the importance of the signed Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, said this document is a safeguard against the possibility of the friendly Russian-American relations turning...hostile and will be binding for subsequent presidents of the two countries. How did you understand President Bush? Foreign Minister Ivanov: With the signing of the two documents (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the RF and the USA) we are actually beginning to widen the juridical base of our relations in the new post-Cold War conditions. This does not mean that we are starting from a clean slate. It is necessary to preserve all the things of positive value that have been accumulated over the preceding years. Russia would like the 1972 ABM Treaty to be retained in this package. At the same time we are disposed to most resolutely broaden and strengthen the juridical base in all areas: in the military-strategic, economic, humanitarian and other fields. We believe that the stronger this juridical base, the more confidently and optimistically we will be able to regard our relations in the long term. That's how we've understood the statement of US President Bush. You can't build relations for a year or a year and a half - it's necessary to arrange them for a strategic term. The signed Treaty is designed for ten years, but it may be extended and work further, just as the START I Treaty, which expires in 2009, and, if neither party suggests differently, may be extended for a subsequent term. Such long-term documents in so important military-strategic field create a sense of confidence and stability - both in relations between the two countries and internationally. ... Question: Does Russia agree with the US stand that a situation meets the interests of all countries where Iran would fully exclude the possibility of possession of WMD? What can you say about the involvement of Western firms and companies in the process of the creation in Iran of nuclear reactors and a nuclear capability? Foreign Minister Ivanov: Russia steadfastly champions the strengthening of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. This is our principled, firm stand which concerns both Iran and any other countries of the world. We believe that now, in the conditions of the international fight against terrorism it is necessary to strengthen also international cooperation to prevent weapons of mass destruction from getting into terrorists' hands. This can be achieved only by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We will be working in this direction both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level, expanding the participation of states in these efforts. So far as the illegal leak from Western countries of so called dual-use technologies is concerned, much is written about this in the Western press. We believe that in the framework of international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime it is necessary to foster the corresponding exchange of information between countries in order to prevent such leaks from any state. Question: Is a continued dialogue between Russia and the USA possible with respect to ABM defense? Foreign Minister Ivanov: The Treaty and Declaration envisage a continued dialogue on ABM defense issues. In what form this dialogue will be held and how the consultations will be arranged is a question of upcoming talks. The most important thing is that both sides have underscored the importance of such dialogue in the spirit of openness and transparency. Speech to Russian Parliamentarians by Foreign Minister Ivanov'Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at a Joint Session of the International Affairs Committees of the State Duma and Federation Council, May 21, 2002', Russian Foreign Ministry transcript. The major criterion for the effectiveness of our course [of action in foreign policy] is the creation of favorable external conditions for the ensuring of national security and the continuation of political and economic reforms in our country. Taking into account contemporary threats and challenges, as well as our real possibilities and resources, we strive to accomplish this task mostly by politico-diplomatic means, on a basis of vigorous multilateral and bilateral cooperation. It is precisely security interests in their broadest understanding that lie at the base of our dialogue with the United States. Everybody remembers the not easy start in our dealings with the current US administration. And now, too, differences remain between us, including those of a fundamental character. But in what matters most, our policy toward the US has fully acquitted itself. The US leadership and we have the understanding that existing problems should be dealt with on lines of dialogue, not confrontation. On this basis we have been able to advance substantially in the elaboration of a new strategic framework of Russian-American relations. For the upcoming Russian-American summit, the draft of a new Treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms has been prepared. This is a small document in size, but it is of basic importance. It declares that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads shall be reduced to an agreed level of 1,700-2,200 for each Party. And each Party, which is crucial, will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. This gives us additional flexibility in developing strategic nuclear forces, compared to the START II Treaty. Moreover, the text of the new Treaty has a direct reference to the Genoa Statement of the Russian and US Presidents, fixing the close link between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Thanks to this we will be able to continue negotiations across the full range of ABM issues in the conditions of a US withdrawal from the Treaty of 1972. Incidentally, the Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between Russia and the USA that is being prepared for the summit reflects the more than once publicly stated position that a US missile defense system will bear a limited character and will not pose a threat to the strategic interests of Russia and to the global strategic situation. To implement the new Treaty a bilateral commission will be established, which will on a permanent basis monitor the realization of these accords. Thus we are actually reaching the first legally binding bilateral treaty which the administration of George Bush will sign. Of course, this is a compromise document. It will probably be criticized, asserting that more could have been achieved. I can assure you that we too, those who were conducting the negotiations, wanted more. However I believe that we have achieved the greatest possible result as of now. The most important thing is that we have preserved the negotiation process on these complicated issues. And we hope that this is the first step within the framework of possible future accords. ... Developing the dialogue with the USA also helped us reach agreement on the document for a new model of relations between Russia and NATO. I shall say at once, the question, as the President of Russia indicated, is not one of cooperation with the Alliance in the field of defense or even less so of Russia's entry into NATO. The aim which we had set ourselves was to establish a structure of joint responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region which would permit full consideration for our interests. In other words, the Council at 20 is designed to give an opportunity for all its participants to interact on a basis of equality, and in their national capacities in areas where there are common interests: the struggle against terrorism, peacekeeping, elimination of the consequence of disasters, a missile defense system for Europe and some others. ... A...regional problem of concern to us is the situation around Iraq. We, of course, are doing everything possible to keep developments within the framework of political settlement. With our active participation a dialogue between the UN Secretary General and Baghdad was restarted. Now discussions center on the various aspects of the implementation of the resolutions connected with Iraqi settlement. We are continually dialoguing with Baghdad, pursuing an active line in the Security Council and hold that some tendencies for reaching a political solution of the problem have emerged. But the situation remains complicated, including with regard to the threats coming from Washington of carrying out a force-based scenario. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |