Disarmament Documentation

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US-Russia Summit, Moscow and St. Petersburg, May 23-26

III. Other Nuclear Weapons & Non-Proliferation Discussions

Including:

• 1) Excerpt from Joint Statement on Counterterrorism
• 2) Nuclear Material Reduction
• 3) Advanced Nuclear Technologies
• 4) Cooperative Threat Reduction

See also:

• I. Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty
• II. Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship
• IV. Comment and Reaction

1) Excerpt from Joint Statement on Counterterrorism

'Joint statement by president George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Counterterrorism Cooperation', Moscow, May 24; White House text.

We will work to strengthen national, bilateral, and multilateral measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related technologies, and delivery means as an essential element of the fight against international terrorism and all those who support it.

An important step in our joint cooperation will be a meeting of our scientists in June. We will seek to develop jointly new technology to detect nuclear material that can be used to manufacture weapons for purposes of terrorism.

The US-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan has proven a successful vehicle for joint efforts between the United States and Russia to counter terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Recognizing the increased threat of terrorism originating in other regions of the world, we have directed that the Working Group's agenda be broadened, and that it be renamed the US-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism. Among other issues, this Working Group will address the threats posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. The next meeting of the Working Group will take place in the Washington area in July 2002.

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2) Nuclear Material Reduction

'Fact Sheet - US-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Material Reduction', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Moscow, May 24.

President Bush and President Putin have agreed to establish a joint experts group to examine means to eliminate more weapons-grade nuclear material.

Both the United States and Russia have recognized that one important means to keep nuclear weapons material out of the hands of hostile nations or terrorists is to reduce the amount available. Under existing agreements, the United States and Russia are committed to reducing the amount of nuclear weapons-grade material, through the elimination of 34 metric tons each of plutonium and through US purchase of 500 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium for use in commercial nuclear reactor fuel. More than 140 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium has already been delivered under the latter agreement.

These programs will eliminate enough material for almost 25,000 nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, President Bush and President Putin agree that they should seek to do more. Therefore, a joint experts group under Secretary of Energy Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev will examine near- and longer-term, bilateral and multilateral means to reduce inventories of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium still further.

The joint experts group will begin work immediately, and report its findings to Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev within six months. It will consult closely with industry to ensure that commercial markets would not be adversely affected by any new recommended initiatives to eliminate more weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.

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3) Advanced Nuclear Technologies

'Fact Sheet - US-Russian Cooperation on Advanced Nuclear Technologies', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Moscow, May 24.

President Bush and President Putin have agreed to establish a joint experts group to develop recommendations for potential US-Russian collaboration on advanced nuclear fuel cycle research and development.

The United States and Russia share the view that their economic well-being and national security would be strengthened by the development of advanced nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies that would reduce significantly the volume of waste produced from civil nuclear reactors, would be highly proliferation-resistant, and could be used in the longer term to reduce stocks of excess weapons-grade plutonium and other potentially dangerous nuclear materials. These benefits were highlighted in President Bush's National Energy Policy in May 2001.

Therefore, the Presidents have agreed that a joint experts group under Secretary of Energy Abraham and Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev will be established immediately to develop recommendations for potential collaborative US and Russian research and development on advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The group will present its recommendations within 60 days. Implementation of the recommendations will be in keeping with US non-proliferation goals.

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4) Cooperative Threat Reduction

'Fact Sheet - United States Government Non-Proliferation/Threat Reduction Assistance To Russia', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Moscow, May 24.

• From 1992-2002, the Departments of State, Defense and Energy have funded over $4.9 billion in non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia. For FY 2002, United States Government security-related assistance for Russia totals over $870 million.
• The Administration review of non-proliferation assistance to Russia, completed in December 2001, found that most programs are effective and well run, some should be expanded and a few modified. FY02 budget allocations reflect these decisions.
• State Department FY02 funding is about $41 million for non-proliferation efforts under the Science Center, Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), Biological Weapons (BW) Expertise Redirection and Export Control and Related Border Security assistance. Some of this assistance cannot be obligated until Russia is certified under FREEDOM Support Act Title V criteria or a waiver is authorized by Congress and exercised by the President.
• Congress increased Department of Energy funding with an FY02 Supplemental in addition to FY02 appropriations. Assistance increased for Material Protection, Control and Accounting to $291 million; Plutonium Disposition to $61 million; and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and Nuclear Cities Initiative to $57 million.
• FY02 funding for DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is estimated at $400 million; with $307 million in Russian programs. CTR continued funding Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Chemical Weapons Destruction. CTR funds cannot be obligated until Russia is certified as eligible to receive CTR aid or a waiver is authorized by Congress and exercised by the President.
• The Administration Review resulted in direction to transfer to DOE the CTR project to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production ($74 million) under the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement. In FY03, DOE will fund this effort. Also, Congress directed $30 million be transferred from DOD/CTR to State for BW Redirection under the Science Centers.
• FY03 request for threat reduction and non-proliferation programs in former Soviet states is over $1 billion.

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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.