ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never

ACRONYM Report No.8, October 1995

Conclusion

Between 15 May and 2 October 1995, France and China each conducted two nuclear tests. These caused considerable criticism in the CD, contributed to an overall deterioration of relations between some of the states, and wasted valuable negotiating time. However, instead of reacting by throwing in the towel, the international community seems to have redoubled its determination to get a CTBT. Heightened international and domestic pressure had a marked effect on the negotiating positions of France, the US and the UK, resulting in positive initiatives on scope. After initial reluctance Russia joined them in October, further exposing China's isolation on the fundamental issues.

Although scope has not been finalised, it is now clear that there will either be a fully comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions or no CTBT at all. On this basis, the related issues of verification, organisation and funding could be finalised. Gone is the uncertainty of thresholds, and in return, it is expected that attempts to cast the net wider, banning, for example, preparations and laboratory tests, will be dropped by those who want a treaty. An irony of these negotiations is that had the P-5 fallen in with attempts by non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude a treaty before April 1995, they would almost certainly have succeeded in keeping some level of low threshold testing, including hydronuclear experiments. They lost this through their inability to agree a level and the greed of those who advocated hundreds of tons. France's decision to resume nuclear testing ignited protests that put nuclear testing centre stage once more, also fuelling opposition to nuclear weapons production and development. In that context, the non-nuclear-weapon states were no longer prepared to turn a blind eye to any kind of threshold, while the political pressure within the nuclear-weapon powers to end testing was also intensified.

With the scope of the treaty understood, it is now possible to finalise the verification regime. The basic structure and functions of the Organisation are likewise known, if not yet fully agreed. There are too many brackets in the rolling text for painstaking negotiations on every alternative to be feasible. It is time for one or a few delegations to exercise political leadership and propose a clean draft text, based on the direction of convergence which is now manifest on the majority of issues. If compromise is not possible, political decisions must be made by those who disagree with the majority view, whether to go along or to wreck the treaty. On the politically sensitive questions of composition of the Executive Council and entry into force, where there is not yet any real convergence around a particular option, the drafters of the clean text will need to use vision to propose solutions which, while not able to meet each wishlist, can be tolerable for all.

A CTBT is not a treaty which will affect the military or scientific activities of more than a handful of states. It would not take place in a vacuum, but as the product of a dynamic interaction between public demand and political expediency. While the technical provisions must be effective enough, this is essentially a political agreement. It would be a mistake to make the financial and technological burdens too heavy for a CTBT's real purpose and functions.

As recent events have shown, a ban on all nuclear explosions is a measure desired by people all over the world, including majorities in the nuclear-weapon states.10 France was criticised not only for resuming testing, but for arguing that its final series was necessary in order to develop simulation techniques. Such an argument may have been appropriate to persuade nuclear and military lobbies to accept a CTBT, but for most of the world a test ban had two essential purposes: prevention of further environmental harm and prevention of future development and refinement of nuclear weapons.

In protesting French and Chinese tests this year, one clear message has been sent by international public opinion: give us a CTBT in 1996. France, the US and even the UK seem now to have heard. Of the current 37 members of the CTBT, most have begun to respond with a greater sense of urgency. If countries are voicing support for a CTBT but acting to slow down, complicate or tie up the negotiations, they must be held accountable. While France itself has counterbalanced its decision to resume testing with a much more positive engagement in the negotiations, it must recognise responsibility for creating a climate that may be used negatively by those who would like to see the test ban negotiations fail. Since 1993, China has repeatedly declared commitment to conclusion of a CTBT no later than 1996. With the CD's calendar, this means conclusion in effect by June 1996. If China continues to push for provisions which it is already clear the majority of states would not accept, and which do not contribute to a cost-effective and practical CTBT, the non-nuclear-weapon states - including the nonaligned who traditionally hold back from criticising China - must exert collective pressure. At the same time, greater compromise may be possible to admit some of China's less extreme positions or to meet its security concerns in ways that do not jeopardise this treaty.

India and Pakistan have both been playing deep games, enunciating pure principles, but suspected by at least some states of masking less honourable intentions. Some of the European countries have provided worthy contributions, but have too often fallen in with the wishes of the UK or France, not always in the interests of the CTB itself. As at the NPT Conference, there are clearly deep divisions and different priorities within the EU, bearing not only on the test ban talks but the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. Some states have sought to make the treaty accomplish disarmament or security objectives that are wider than a halt on nuclear explosions. Lest the ideal become the enemy of the achievable in this case, it now behoves all states to use the period before January to re-examine their positions closely and consider which compromises would best facilitate conclusion of a genuine CTBT. If this can be achieved, the international community can then focus on the next steps towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, including measures which would plug the gaps that a test ban cannot cover.

A clean draft treaty text some time in February would seem to be the most effective means of focusing and accelerating negotiations. This may be provided by the NTB Committee Chair or another state, but given the significant convergence already achieved, such a draft text would carry more authority and fulfil its function better if proposed by a few states, or perhaps three, symbolically from each of the three groupings. This would have to be with the close cooperation, if not under the auspices, of the 1996 Chair of the NTB Committee, likely to be the Netherlands' Ambassador, Jaap Ramaker. The purpose of the clean draft would be to enable states to let go of 'their' bracketed text and focus the endgame attention on the crucial political questions that remain unresolved. At this stage, most of the draft could be obtained from existing negotiated language in the rolling text. On the issues where no obvious front-runners have emerged it may be necessary to substitute a 'vision' proposal. Timing will be critical. The CD will recommence on 22 January. To have any chance of concentrating negotiations constructively, a clean text would have to go down in February (or March at the latest). If conclusion by the end of 1996 is desired, it is no good expecting that this will be achieved outside the CD timetable. Since the CD will close on 13 September, and the previous two months may be taken up with report writing, the NTB Committee will need to aim for conclusion of the CTBT negotiations and an agreed text by June 1996. Beyond that, and the treaty could be lost. The political window of opportunity could slam shut once more.

Finally, the impact on CTB negotiations of developments towards expanding the Conference on Disarmament from 37 to 60 members could either complicate or expedite matters, depending on the attitudes of the new members and whether they are admitted to full membership, including the right to exercise a veto. Some reorganising of the CD's structure and methods will be inevitable to enable the larger body to negotiate effectively. While commitment to consensus is clearly important to the CD, the risk of misuse of the veto will grow with larger membership. Non-governmental organisations, which worked with consensus but could not afford to let government undercover agents use this to paralyse action, developed ways of moving forward which could perhaps be adapted by the CD.

For the CTBT the chance may well be now or never. However things turn out, 1996 will be a watershed year for the CD. The CD has failed many past challenges, but succeeded in a few, and is now on the threshold of larger membership, with a fissile materials ban and possible further treaty negotiations waiting in the wings. If a CTBT is achieved, it will enhance the credibility established by the Chemical Weapons Convention, negotiated by the CD and signed in 1993. If the CD lets a CTBT slide out of reach, questions will be raised about the ability of such a multilateral body to deliver the goods. Most importantly, loss of a CTBT at this point would have a deleterious effect on arms control and non-proliferation endeavours in general and send the worst kind of signal to an unstable world.