ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never

ACRONYM Report No.8, October 1995

The Conference on Disarmament

In 1994 the CD had undertaken several tasks on its agenda in addition to prioritising CTBT negotiations. Committees had been established - though with no negotiating powers - to discuss transparency in armaments (TIA), negative security assurances (NSA) and prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space (PAROS). Following a consensus resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1993 (UNGA 48/75L), the CD had appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to seek views on how best to achieve a ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (Fissban). Consultations had also been undertaken into the review of the CD agenda and the improved functioning of the CD. At the end of the year, the CD backed the reconvening of the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee, but put off recommending re-establishment of other committees pending further consultations.

The NTB Committee was quickly re-established in 1995, chaired by Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland. Ambassador Shannon was also re-appointed to continue his consultations on a mandate for Fissban negotiations. All other committees and issues fell victim to disagreements over the role of the CD and the allocation of time and resources between conventional and nuclear weapons control. These arguments became increasingly polarised and acrimonious as the year drew on. To begin with, a number of countries in the G-21 (Group of Non-Aligned States) argued for transparency in nuclear arms to be considered alongside the particular conventional weapons included on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The Western group disagreed, arguing that this was the only CD agenda item that did not deal with nuclear arms, and the committee should retain its focus on the weapons 'that are really killing people'. At the same time, the US and the UK argued that the PAROS Committee should not be reconvened as its subject matter was no longer relevant. In view of recent developments on the issue of theatre missile defence in the US, Russia and a number of non-aligned countries disagreed. The ability of the CD to deal with negative security assurances has long been complicated by the desire of non-aligned states for a legally binding instrument, the interests of India and Pakistan in getting unconditional assurances, and the refusal by all the nuclear-weapon states except China to extend such assurances to states which are not party to the NPT or an equivalent regional non-proliferation agreement. Some states from both the G-21 and the Western group began to argue for 'linkage', refusing to permit agreement on one committee without the rest. As a consequence, agreement eluded successive Presidents of the CD throughout the year.

When representatives returned to the CD after the NPT Conference in April-May, several G-21 states pushed for an ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament to be established. Some, such as Egypt and Iran, argued that a Committee on Nuclear Disarmament was now needed to oversee the implementation of Article VI and the Principles and Objectives decision taken by the NPT Conference in May. Without reference to the NPT, to which it is not party, India also called for a Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, to negotiate a 'phased and time-bound framework' for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Subsequently the G-21 issued a statement on 21 September which urged establishment 'on a priority basis, of an ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the beginning of 1996, and a balanced consideration of all other outstanding issues on the CD's agenda.'

The post-NPT call for a Committee on Nuclear Disarmament came to be linked with the convening of the Fissban Committee formally agreed in March, which in turn became linked with the establishment of other committees, stalemated since January. To the frustration of the moderates, the inflexible attitude of three of the nuclear weapon states - France, the UK and the US - and a few G-21 states, notably Pakistan, Iran and Egypt, prevented agreement throughout the year. In a nutshell, the Western nuclear-weapon states wanted the Fissban Committee to be convened immediately, together with TIA; they adamantly opposed a nuclear disarmament committee, thought PAROS should be dropped and that NSA was a waste of time in the CD context. The G-21 wanted a nuclear disarmament committee and the reconvening of PAROS and NSA; they considered that TIA should have a wider brief than only conventional armaments, to include weapons of mass destruction; and while most supported establishment of a Fissban committee, India was content for this to take some time, while Pakistan and others continued to push for inclusion of stockpiles. Once linkage had been asserted, gridlock set in. Although successive CD Presidents tried, and Ambassadors Antonio de Icaza of Mexico and Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco got very close, agreement on the 1995 agenda and programme of work eluded consensus to the very end of the year.

CD PRESIDENTS: JANUARY - DECEMBER 1995

The chair of the CD rotates among member states alphabetically, every four weeks while the CD is in session:

Alessandro Vattani of Italy

Hisami Kurokochi of Japan

D D C Don Nanjira of Kenya

Antonio de Icaza of Mexico

Shirchinjavyn Yumjav of Mongolia

Mohamed Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco