| Acronym Institute Home Page | Calendar | UN/CD | NPT/IAEA | UK | US | Space/BMD |
| CTBT | BWC | CWC | WMD Possessors | About Acronym | Links | Glossary |
After obtaining agreement in 1994 that the CD was the appropriate forum for negotiating a fissile materials ban, Ambassador Shannon had attempted to get consensus on a negotiating mandate. Several countries, notably Pakistan, Algeria, Iran and Egypt, had held out against a mandate that did not explicitly include stockpiles. Others, particularly the P-5 nuclear-weapon states and India, stressed that the resolution agreed by consensus in the UN had covered only future production, with no mention of existing stocks. Previous UN resolutions, which included stocks, were passed by overwhelming majorities but had never achieved consensus. While the majority of countries were clearly of the view that stockpiles ought to be considered, they judged that insistence on their inclusion at this stage could break the fragile consensus for negotiating any kind of a Fissban treaty. Arguing that the purpose of this first step was to cap forever the military production of the P-5 nuclear-weapon states and to initiate some verification controls on the nuclear production of non-NPT states India, Israel and Pakistan, these states backed a mandate that was narrow enough to permit negotiations to get underway and build confidence for further measures.
Following intensive negotiations and several near-misses, on 23 March 1995, the CD agreed the following report containing a mandate for negotiating a Fissban Convention:
Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
As you know I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Mid-way through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee, there was agreement in principle, that an Ad Hoc Committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee in order to enable the convening of this Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.
At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.
I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a Committee should be based on Resolution 48/75L of the UN General Assembly, and reads as follows:
1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a "Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".
2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.
During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.
Mr President, it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.
Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an Ad Hoc Committee on Cut-Off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.
I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result.
The CD session gave way to the NPT Conference before a Chair could be agreed and the Fissban Committee convened. Ambassador Shannon was designated first, but with the issue caught up in the linkage gridlock, he returned to Canada to take up a different post. Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of Iran was then proposed by the G-21, but not appointed, since the Committee was never convened. Failure by the CD to begin negotiating a fissile materials ban has angered many delegations, particularly in view of the commitments made in the NPT Principles and Objectives agreed in May.
© 1995 The Acronym Institute.