ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Endgame

ACRONYM Report No.9, April 1996

Conclusion

The June 30 target date is not a final deadline but a means of forcing all states to realise that time is running out. To achieve a treaty in 1996, the political games must now be set aside so that negotiations can focus solely on states' real needs and requirements. The June target for completion is unlikely to be met, but its existence will enable Ambassador Ramaker to put his clean text down by mid June without risking its outright rejection as 'premature'. Under these circumstances, it is likely that the Chair's text will be presented in terms of 'take it or leave it', perhaps requiring consensus to make any but minor drafting changes. The international weight behind the unanimous 1995 UNGA resolution on a CTBT should provide Ramaker with the authority to back up his strategy, providing he gets the timing right and chooses solutions that can command majority acceptance.

The apparent hardening of positions over the last few weeks is not necessarily a negative indicator. It should not be taken to mean that compromise is being ruled out. Rather, this is a sign that the endgame is beginning to pinch. If the political will exists, and with some flexibility from the key states, 'adequate but bearable' solutions can be found for all the outstanding issues. Since the CTBT will only affect the military aspirations or programmes of eight nuclear and threshold states, it is inevitable that these are the ones with 'treaty-breaking' requirements.

India's intentions and the conditions China may require in order to accede to the treaty could jeopardise conclusion and force other states to confront some unpalatable possibilities. What kind of treaty will this be, and how universal? If China's bottom line turns out to be 'no PNEs, no treaty', should they conclude a non-comprehensive treaty or would that be worse than a sham? While it is clear that Pakistan would not sign without India, or that India would not sign without China, would India's failure to sign affect other states, particularly China? The prevailing view is that China's signature will depend on the other P-5 states and on whether it has enough in the treaty to be able to qualify it as 'good'. How many of the Arab states will make their own accession conditional upon Israel's ratification? While it is clear that one purpose of the CTBT is to involve the threshold states in a multilateral verification regime, would a delay in India's signature cause the treaty to collapse?

The constructive roles taken by Indonesia, Mexico, Iran and other non-aligned countries in these negotiations shows their commitment, but they should not be taken for granted by the nuclear weapon states. The non-nuclear weapon countries have judged that a CTBT is worth achieving, but they want it to be part of a process towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is strong opposition to turning the test ban treaty into a tool to freeze the nuclear status quo or legitimise the dominance of US nuclear weapons. If a CTBT is not a nuclear disarmament agreement per se, it certainly has a nuclear disarmament context which can and should be reflected. A commitment to end vertical as well as horizontal proliferation would be consistent with the CTBT's long held purpose. Acknowledging this in some form in the preamble, and identifying further P-5 and multilateral steps to reduce nuclear arsenals, would go some way to reassuring the non nuclear weapon states, while at the same time weakening India's arguments. India and China have their own decisions to make. In the final analysis, the CD members can only affect the cost-benefit equation for these countries and find ways to limit the damage if either decides against the treaty.

If a good endgame strategy cannot guarantee success, it can at least provide optimum conditions. Ramaker's two-stage approach looks shrewd, with his working paper laying the essential groundwork. Although there are mixed views on whether their specific suggestions aided or complicated the resolution of particular issues, Iran and Australia probably helped pave the way with their draft texts.

However well prepared, though, it must be expected that the Chair's clean text will precipitate a major confrontation, during which the political responses of key states will indicate whether there is sufficient political will for successful conclusion. Crisis and confrontation are inevitable in the endgame, as states come to terms with the implications of each decision. If the frantic fluctuations between optimism and pessimism in the past few months can be likened to a fever chart, Ramaker must not try to avoid the crisis, as that is when the fever breaks. As with any serious fever, the timing and type of crisis will determine whether the treaty lives or dies. It is to be hoped that Ramaker is given the support he will need to push the negotiations through the endgame crises to achieve a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.