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ACRONYM Reports
ACRONYM Report No.10, May 1997
Executive Summary
Negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)
opened at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in January
1994. The CTBT was concluded in the CD in August 1996 and adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 10, 1996
by 158 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions. ACRONYM 10 reviews the final
year of the negotiations and assesses the effectiveness of the
resulting Treaty and prospects for its implementation.
- Despite a very difficult final stage of negotiations, the CTBT
was achieved by the deadline set by the UN General Assembly and the
US Congress. To date it has been signed by 142 countries and
ratified by two. The five declared nuclear weapon states and Israel
signed in the first week.
- From the 1950s on, a CTBT was sought for three main purposes:
to curb proliferation; to end the contamination and destruction of
fragile environments from nuclear explosions; and to halt the arms
race by preventing new and modernised weapons from being added to
the nuclear arsenals.
- The 1996 CTBT provides a zero yield ban on all nuclear
explosions, including hydronuclear experiments and 'peaceful'
nuclear explosions (PNE). It will create an important norm against
nuclear testing and will prevent further environmental harm.
- The nuclear weapon states have ensured that the CTBT will play
a less effective role in nuclear disarmament than originally
conceived. The Treaty will discourage but not preclude the
manufacture of crude nuclear bombs. It will significantly
constrain, but cannot wholly prevent, the development of new
warheads by technologically advanced powers or the modernisation of
existing weapons to suit changing doctrines of nuclear warfighting.
Sophisticated research and laboratory testing capabilities being
put in place by the US 'science-based Stockpile Stewardship'
programme and similar plans in other nuclear weapon states go well
beyond any reasonable requirements of safety, reliability and the
maintenance of existing stockpiles.
- The planned US programme of subcritical tests, due to start in
June 1997, sets a dangerous precedent and could create compliance
ambiguities and verification complications. In line with the
overall intention and spirit of the CTBT, the US needs to
reconsider its position on subcritical tests and the cost, size,
role and sophistication of its approach to stockpile
stewardship.
- Britain, Russia and China insisted on a rigid provision to make
the Treaty's entry into force conditional on accession by all the
nuclear capable states. Of the 44 states whose ratification is
required in article XIV, 41 have signed. India, which vetoed the
Treaty in the CD and voted against it in the United Nations,
declared it would never sign. Pakistan's signature depends on India
joining the Treaty. North Korea has also not signed. This leaves
the CTBT with an inherent weakness: if it never enters into force
it may lose its political authority. This could weaken the funding
commitments for the verification regime and encourage proliferators
to cheat.
- All states bear responsibility for furthering the aims of the
CTBT and its full implementation, so that it becomes a credible
component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The CTBT should
not be circumvented by technology nor held hostage to
all-or-nothing concepts of disarmament.
- The CTBT's entry into force will depend on three factors:
irreversible nuclear arms reduction, greater regional security in
South Asia, and further progress on nuclear disarmament.
- Prompt ratification of the CTBT will be important. In
particular, early ratification by the nuclear weapon states will
remove uncertainties about their long term intentions, send a
strong signal to the hold-outs, and increase pressure on India,
Pakistan and North Korea to join. The new Labour government in
Britain would have overwhelming support for ratifying the CTBT in
its first term. In view of the difficulties over ratification of
arms control treaties in the US and Russia, it would be desirable
for Britain, France and China to take the lead.
© 1997 The Acronym Institute.