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The second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998. ACRONYM 11 is intended to be a resource to governmental and non-governmental participants attending the 1998 NPT PrepCom. It provides summaries of the main events of the Review Conference in 1995 and the first PrepCom in 1997 and the texts of the Treaty and key decisions. Articles by Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard pose some of the key questions the NPT Parties will need to consider regarding nuclear disarmament, energy and safeguards.
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the States parties adopted a package of decisions intended to strengthen the Treaty's review process. These established a set of Principles and Objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and provided for three to four PrepComs to be held in the four years leading up to the five-yearly Review Conferences.
Under the strengthened review process, the Review Conferences were mandated to look forward, evaluate the Treaty's operation and identify the areas and means for making progress on its implementation. Where previously the PrepComs had been regarded as having only a preparatory function, the 1995 decisions clearly intended them to become more far-reaching and substantive, with the stated and practical purpose of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. It will be important at this early developmental stage not to close off any potential means, procedures or opportunities that could help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the future. Subject to the terms of the Treaty, States parties can empower the review process to do whatever they collectively agree it should do, including establishing subsidiary bodies and making substantive recommendations, if they so desire.
Debating issues of substance is not necessarily the same thing as addressing substance with a view to facilitating progress. The way in which debates on substance are presently conducted may not be conducive to accomplishing the PrepCom's wider tasks. If extra time is allocated to the Middle East, security assurances and the fissile materials production ban, as intended by the 1997 PrepCom, it will be important to ensure that the remaining time is allocated fairly. At present, discussions are structured around the 'clusters' of issues covered by the three traditional Main Committees. Cluster debates may provide some continuity with the Review Conferences, but too many issues are now crowded into cluster 1 on nuclear disarmament for a three-way equal split to be balanced. A distribution of time that would better reflect the weight accorded the different components of the Treaty, as indicated in general statements and negotiations on the 1995 decisions, could be achieved if the sections in the Principles and Objectives were taken as a guide instead. This would enable half the time to be allocated to the several issues in the nuclear disarmament cluster, with the remaining half divided equally among safeguards and nuclear energy.
While the device of informal 'Chair's consultations' among some 25 key delegations was utilised effectively in 1995 and 1997 and may continue to play a useful role, it will be important to ensure that all the main players are involved and that there is effective communication between those on the 'inside' and the rest of the States Parties.
Although universality, safeguards and exports were also of major importance, the need for more progress on nuclear disarmament was the driving force behind the negotiations to strengthen the review process. Paragraph 3 of the Principles and Objectives reaffirmed the Article VI commitment by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 4 set forth a programme of action with three components: (a) completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty by a specified date (1996); (b) a ban on the production of fissile materials; and (c) progress by the NWS in efforts to reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons. In the absence of clarity on what 4 (c) means, it would be useful if the NPT Parties could identify some of the concrete elements they would envisage. The status of the Principles and Objectives must therefore be determined for the future. This PrepCom also needs to establish a clear right to make recommendations, which would most usefully take the form of practical proposals on specific aspects or measures within the purview of the Treaty.
ACRONYM 11 suggests building on the precedents set by the 1995 decisions and instituting greater accountability. In addition to encouraging implementation of the bilateral START process, the time has come for the NWS to work together on specific issues of 'qualitative nuclear disarmament' and to keep the non-nuclear-weapon States informed of their progress. Such 'qualitative' measures could reduce nuclear dangers and contribute towards implementing paragraph 4 (c) of the Principles and Objectives. Suggested measures could include:
The NPT Parties should also re-affirm their commitment to the CTBT and pledge to ratify the Treaty before the end of 1998. Both the NWS and the non-nuclear-weapon States need to consider what they can do to move past the obstacles to negotiating a fissile materials production ban, especially the problems of stockpiles and confidence-building among nuclear-capable States and their neighbours.
Regarding Article IV, the Principles and Objectives emphasised the importance of non-discriminatory exchange of materials and technology for non-military nuclear applications, giving "preferential treatment" to NPT Parties. Looking beyond the perspectives of 1968, ACRONYM 11 raises concerns that widespread commercial nuclear use may create "a nuclear-weapon-world in waiting" and notes that for most States the key appeal of Article IV was the promise of a cheap and reliable energy supply, not necessarily its nuclear generation. While it is daily becoming clearer that nuclear power is less able to deliver cheap, safe and reliable energy than alternative and sustainable technologies, the NPT may be diverting countries with the legitimate objective of energy security into an unequal relationship with big nuclear business dominated by a few developed States. ACRONYM 11 endorses the call for a new, non-contradictory mandate for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a multilateral strategy of technology management to prevent proliferation.
The 1998 PrepCom is likely to be tougher than in 1997, reflecting a sharper awareness of what is at stake and some frustration over the Conference on Disarmament's continued inability to negotiate a fissile materials ban and agree the level of multilateral involvement in nuclear disarmament. More States will come prepared to fight for procedures, precedents and substantive proposals to advance their interests, giving rise to sharper conflicts over how to address nuclear disarmament, export controls, and the nuclear-capable States in the Middle East and South Asia. Additionally, security assurances and the nuclear dimension of NATO expansion will be hard fought, though with little prospect of constructive progress. There are likely to be delays on the first day over seating Yugoslavia and North Korea followed by diplomatic absences by both. The future credibility of the Review Process could well rest on the tools which are developed and the ideas put forward at this Second PrepCom, which should aim to be constructive rather than smooth!
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.