ACRONYM Reports

Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes

ACRONYM Report No.12, September 1998

A Statement by H.E. Joëlle Bourgois, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Head of Delegation, 29 April 1998

Committee 1

Unofficial Translation

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are one of the most keenly-awaited subjects for this second Preparatory Committee, perhaps because of the long tradition associating Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament with progress in this area. Half-way along the road leading to the review conference, the moment has come to consider - on the basis of the advances made over the past three years - ways of broadening the consensus on this issue. The items agreed upon, which may be found in the working paper by last year's Chairman, need to be further developed in the field of nuclear disarmament. This delegation intends to devote itself to doing so and already feels that many of the proposals in the paper could be carefully sorted and detailed, so giving us a broader base to work on together, without, of course, ruling out the possibility of new ideas.

Mr. Chairman,

In 1995, the international community was no more able than before to reach complete understanding on assessing progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Perhaps it would be too much to hope for such an assessment in the year 2000. I believe, however, that in the absence of formal agreement, all of us here today share the opinion, confirmed by a certain number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, that important results have been achieved. I am thinking more especially of what was accomplished regarding the implementation of Article VI of the NPT at the May 1995 Review and Extension Conference, namely:

(a) The conclusion, signing and, in France's case, ratification of the CTBT - the French instrument being deposited in New York on 6 April. The question which must be considered now is the entry into force of the Treaty. In a few month's time, the international monitoring system could start running and the entry into force of the Treaty could become technically possible. We must prepare for the Conference provided for under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. This requires ratification of the Treaty by the largest possible number of signatory States. Already, the signing of the Treaty by over 140 States confers on it undisputed moral authority and allows us confidently to envisage a world delivered from nuclear test blasts. These, even with maximum safety precautions taken to make them harmless, are deemed intolerable by all the world's peoples.

(b) The contribution to the overall reduction in nuclear stockpiles. We realise that at the present time the most important step to be taken in this respect is ratification of START II. When the process is complete, two-thirds of the systems existing in Russia and the United States during the Cold War will no longer be operational. This underlines the importance of ratification and launching START III negotiations.

The way ahead to reaching this objective is long, however, and remains strewn with obstacles, if only because of the accumulation of fissile materials which will result from the reductions. France is alert to these problems and, with others, is shouldering part of the burden, as witnessed by the AIDA [IAEA] programme, for example.

(c) As regards negative security assurances, France is ready in this forum to examine the record to date and the outlook in this sector, particularly the progress achieved via the nuclear weapon-free zones. It also intends to make use of the possibilities opened up by the agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament last March. The restoration in this forum of an ad hoc committee on the matter, for which my country had been pleading since the beginning of this session, will enable our discussion to be continued and eventually draw the necessary conclusions.

(d) Lastly, the effort to launch immediately and conclude rapidly negotiations for a comprehensive and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices - "cut-off" - has not faltered. All the States here present, faithful to the commitments undertaken in 1995, back the idea of these talks beginning without delay, before the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein. France supported Austria's initiative this year at the Conference on Disarmament proposing a decision along these lines. As we well know, the fact that this decision has not yet been adopted in Geneva has nothing to do with any of us. It is due to continued opposition from certain major States, not party to the NPT, without which any agreement on the banning of fissile materials production for nuclear weapons use would have little sense. We must tirelessly pursue our efforts to convince these States, in the knowledge that the technical and political logic underlying the choice of cut-off as the next step on the path to nuclear disarmament cannot lastingly be ignored, even outside the NPT forum. We shall return to this point in more detail and precisely in the debate devoted to this subject. This logic will necessarily prevail once the political circumstances regionally hindering progress toward nuclear disarmament so permit. In the meantime, we must be careful to avoid any retreat and, more particularly, refuse to create or accept further preconditions for starting negotiations. This is a task within our reach.

We should all be able to agree on the key points of the situation which I have outlined. And, on that basis, we should all turn our thoughts to the next steps.

Mr. Chairman,

France, in becoming party to the NPT in 1992 and at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995, accepted the commitment to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons comprehensively with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons and concluding a comprehensive and universal disarmament treaty under strict and effective international supervision. It has done its share, as I have said, in the multilateral efforts devoted to this purpose. It needs to be stressed here, however, that, in addition to the Treaties, very substantial progress has been achieved within the framework of decisions taken unilaterally by the States concerned.

I should like briefly to outline France's record, about which accurate and detailed information is too often missing. Nuclear disarmament action involves social, economic, technical and financial factors that make it a long-haul job. The safety, security and transparency aspects attached to the movement entail, in the interests of everyone, slow maturing and complex administration, the basic details of which are too frequently regarded lightly.

Allow me to illustrate my remarks by using the example I know best, that of my country.

(a) First, as regards nuclear weapons themselves, the President of the Republic in February 1996 announced the suppression, given the evolution of the strategic context, of the French ground nuclear component. The decision involves dismantling the 18 surface-to-surface strategic missiles, i.e. weapons whose reaction time is by their nature extremely short, and 30 short-range mobile weapons. These weapons systems, both the fixed strategic system on the Plateau d'Albion and the Hades force mobile system, will be completely dismantled by the end of 1998. For this, an important financial effort has been made, covering not only the dismantling process itself and its related aspects (delocation, transfers and safe management of materials, etc.) but also aid to the regions affected by these changes and the necessary reconversion of several military sites.

This leaves the air component and the strategic ocean force. Here again, the principle of sufficiency which governs French thinking in the matter has had the effect of limiting to four the number of our missile-launching nuclear submarines. It is perhaps worth mentioning that France has no tactical weapons.

On the question of detargeting and alert posture drawdown, the changes are worth stressing. On 26 September 1997, France announced that, with the dismantling of the Plateau d'Albion surface-to-surface missiles, none of the nuclear assets of the French deterrence force would henceforth be targeted. Finally, air and submarine force alert levels have been drawn down in accordance with the new world strategic context.

Taken overall, the French defence budget now represents only 3% of GDP as compared with 3.5% in 1990. Within this budget, the nuclear force's share is now down to 10% as against 17% in 1990. That is to say that this share has shrunk even faster than the defence budget as a whole. Nuclear appropriations, in other words, have been divided by two since 1990 despite the extra costs occasioned by the weapons reductions. What I am saying is that the adjustments relating to the new international context have been reflected in tangible and measurable decisions.

(b) As to the production of fissile materials, the cessation in 1992 of plutonium production for explosive military use and in 1996 of high-enriched uranium production is a known fact. Why then talk about it, you may ask, since other nuclear powers also have announced cessation of their production? The difference is that France has taken the risk in this connection of dismantling the relevant installations.

Final shut-down operations of the two plants in Marcoule and Pierrelatte will begin in 1998.

This means two things. First, production of these materials could not physically resume on these sites even were a sudden change in the international situation and the stance of certain key players to make it necessary. Second, whereas there is no certainty as to the conduct of the others and the threshold States are developing their capacities in the matter, the financial sacrifice is huge, since dismantling and site rehabilitation will cost several tens of billions of francs.

(c) The name of Mururoa [Moruroa] is fresh in the minds of everybody. The Pacific test site is now closed. In May, the IAEA is due to hand in its report on the tests' baneful or non-baneful effects on the region's environment and the health of its inhabitants. This is the final stage in the site-closing process. In itself, all this is no more than the honouring in good faith of the commitments pronounced in 1996 by the Head of State and translated into legal terms by the signing of the CTBT in September 1996 and its ratification at the beginning of this month. The speed of the operation, however, is evidence of the seriousness with which we have fulfilled our undertakings. We have even gone further. I should like to underscore the exceptional nature of our action, which consists here also in its conclusiveness. The test-specific installations have been disassembled, and the dismantling operations at Mururoa [Moruroa] and Fangataufa should all have been completed by Summer 1998.

All being said, the verdict reached depends on the observer's chosen standpoint. There is still a long road to hoe before all nuclear stockpiles are eliminated. On the other hand, the distance travelled in the space of a few years by a country like France is vast. The efforts required to translate the decisions taken into reality will doubtless continue far into the future.

Mr. Chairman,

Following the Canberra Report, many eminent researchers, competent military men and important non-governmental organisations have wondered what could be done over and above the programme laid down in 1995 - while waiting for the cut-off negotiations to be launched - to prevent the movement towards nuclear disarmament, which has gathered exceptional momentum in recent years, from slowing down. I hope that what I said earlier proves that the movement is continuing. Owing to its complexity, it requires monitoring over several years. It is all very well to sign treaties, and even better to ratify them. But what is best of all is to implement them. The practice of the different international actors has to be judged from these three points of view. In the final analysis, what counts is what happens in reality by virtue of the treaties or in the absence of a treaty. As evidence of the need for vigilance in observing what really happens, I would point to the Ottowa convention on anti-personnel mines which was signed by France and many other States. What would be the use of this fine gesture if it is not followed by action?

It is no less natural that thinking should be pursued and should supply the policymakers of States having nuclear capacity with further matter for judgement. This year, before the Conference on Disarmament, France declared itself in favour of continuation within this forum of discussion on all the issues relating to nuclear disarmament in the most substantial and transparent manner possible. I am happy to note that the Chairman of the Conference has been instructed to intensify consultations on the subject on an ongoing basis.

(a) This preparatory committee should enable us to proceed further in discussing the various issues of general interest that concern the international community with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

For this, we should make the best use of the time available to us to go to the heart of the subjects under discussion. If our deliberations are to be fruitful, it is vital here, as in the Disarmament Conference, to avoid institutional debates.

(b) What the community and public opinion expect from our proceedings is information and assurance on the means by which we are working to make the world safer and less opaque. This is why verification is so important; like the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons; like safe management of resources and stockpiles that will guarantee against accidents, terrorism and illicit trafficking.

The challenge today is not so much to ensure full mathematical universality for the NPT, which numerically associates 98% of the world's States, as to act in a way that action in the nuclear disarmament field includes all the potential actors. Whence the value of this sui generis institution, the Conference on Disarmament. Whence the interest of regional approaches to supplement the comprehensive one, or bypass the obstacles against which it might stumble. I am thinking, naturally, of the CTBT, as well as of the cessation of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons use, among other things. Such approaches must respect the sensitivities and national interests of all concerned. They must also show imagination in order to inspire more confidence and flexibility.

We may then place hope, alongside our multilateral efforts, in the unilateral contributions which certain States might choose to make, at the appropriate moment, to nuclear disarmament.

All in all, what is needed is a recurring process that involves: the impetus-giving machinery constituted by the NPT enhanced review process; the Conference on Disarmament, sole multilateral negotiating organ, which relies on the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and the resolutions drafted by the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly; the development of regional solidarities; and unilateral decisions.

The NPT remains the cornerstone of this complex construction. Why? Because this forum, thanks to the summum of texts, and to the ideas that crystallise from the preparatory committees to the review conference, is the point where the ideal and the possible meet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.