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Background
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was multilaterally negotiated and signed in 1968. It entered into force on 5 March 1970 and as of 1 August 1998 had 186 Parties. The NPT enshrined two kinds of bargain: assistance in developing nuclear energy in exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons; and nuclear disarmament by five defined nuclear weapon states (NWS)(1) in return for non-acquisition of nuclear arms by all the other States.
In 1995, the States Parties to the NPT took three decisions which ensured the indefinite extension of the Treaty and set up a strengthened review process. Conferences to review the Treaty will continue to be held every five years, with the next due in 2000. The review process enacted in 1995 also provided for at least three preparatory committees (PrepComs), to be held in the years preceding a review conference, with a possible fourth, if necessary. Where previously the PrepComs were expected to provide procedural preparation and agreed documentation for the forthcoming review conference, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference initiated a more substantive and far-reaching role for the PrepComs.
Intensive consultations under the auspices of the President, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, led to the simultaneous adoption of a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (P&O), consisting of 20 paragraphs on seven themes: universality, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, and 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy. Following high level and often difficult negotiations, principally between Arab States (led by Egypt) and the United States, a resolution on the Middle East was proposed by the three depositary States (Britain, Russia and the United States). This resolution was adopted without a vote immediately following the package of three decisions on reviewing and extending the Treaty.
The first PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference was held in New York from 7 to 18 April 1997, chaired by Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland. It adopted its report by consensus, including a three page 'Chair's Paper', which summarised general agreement on the major issues, subdivided along the lines of the P&O. The first PrepCom was generally regarded as having laid some useful foundations, but it did not get very far in working out how the strengthened review process would utilise its additional tools and powers to address matters of substance, make recommendations or decide on action. Although the meeting itself went quite smoothly, it revealed significant differences and interpretations regarding the role and limitations of the PrepComs and quinquennial review conferences in decision-making, including setting of targets, prioritising work or monitoring progress. (2)
The Second PrepCom: What Happened
The second session of the PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference was held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998. It was chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland and attended by 96 delegations from States Parties, with Brazil and Israel as non-party observers. Over 76 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were also represented as observers. India on principle sends no-one to observe. This year, for the first time, Pakistan did not attend as an observer. (3)
The meeting closed shortly after midnight on 9 May, after failing to come to agreement on anything but a bare skeleton of procedural decisions to enable next year's PrepCom to take place. The 1998 PrepCom was unable to take decisions on the rules of procedure or background documentation, or any substance or recommendations for the 1999 PrepCom or the 2000 Review Conference. The third session of the PrepCom will be held in New York from 12 to 23 April, 1999, with Ambassador Andelfo Garcia Gonzalez of Colombia as the designated Chair.
Once the various officials were accepted and installed, the PrepCom opened with three sessions of 'General Debate', followed by an informal plenary addressed by representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGO). Reproducing the structure utilised in the first PrepCom, which was in turn modelled on the Main Committee allocations recently practised in the review conferences, it was decided to divide the issues into three 'clusters': nuclear disarmament; safeguards, including nuclear weapon free zones; and nuclear energy. Each cluster was allocated three sessions. In keeping with the intentions of the first PrepCom and the statement of its Chair, Pasi Patokallio, as additional session in each cluster was devoted to discussing the implementation of the Middle East resolution, security assurances, and the FMCT respectively. (4)
Three Focal Proposals
From the myriad perspectives, analyses and ideas presented during the general and cluster debates (5), three became focal to the conduct of the Second PrepCom: arguments from the NAM, the Arab States and Egypt regarding the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; South Africa's proposal for addressing nuclear disarmament; and Canada's proposal for current issues to be reflected in agreed statements or documents from the PrepComs as well as from Review Conferences.
Implementing the Middle East Resolution
The NAM working paper raised the issue of Israel's nuclear capability in general terms and called for full implementation of the Middle East resolution. The Arab States went further, requesting the depositary States to inform each PrepCom and Review Conference of the measures being undertaken to implement the resolution and achieve its objectives. Egypt followed up with its own working paper, recommending ways in which the Middle East resolution could be addressed, including dispatching a special UN envoy to the Middle East to assist with establishing a NWFZ and a series of studies and seminars on the nuclear status of the region, arms control and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
Procedures to Address Nuclear Disarmament
Though a large number of statements called for more progress on nuclear disarmament and evoked the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Canberra Commission, most emphasised either the START process or the long-standing NAM demand for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). South Africa's proposal, therefore, stood out as making specific proposals for how to address nuclear disarmament more effectively in the NPT context. Taking as its starting point item 4c of the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (6), South Africa argued for "a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps" for implementing Article VI and the programme of action outlined in the P&O, and proposed i) specific time to be allocated to nuclear disarmament at the Third PrepCom in 1999; ii) for the 2000 Review Conference to ensure that time would be devoted at future PrepComs for the practical consideration of nuclear disarmament steps; and iii) the establishment at the 2000 Review Conference of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 1 to provide more structured and focused deliberations on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the P&O and Article VI.
South Africa also proposed that the PrepCom should issue three documents: one with recommendations on 'principles, objectives and ways' to implement the Treaty, following the format of the P&O, updated where necessary; a second with specific proposals and initiatives that had not yet obtained agreement; and thirdly, the procedural arrangements for the review conference, financial arrangements etc. With respect to the review conference, South Africa proposed two kinds of documents: a 2000 Principles and Objectives, to be a guide and yardstick for progress towards the next review conference in 2005; and a Final Declaration, to review and evaluate the working of the NPT in the previous five years.
A Role for the PrepComs
Canada proposed that in addition to general agreements and compiled proposals, such as those envisaged for adding to paragraph 3 of the 1997 report, the PrepCom or Chair's report should contain two sections which would specifically reflect the important contemporary issues, likely to change with each year. One part would briefly report on the issues to which special time had been allocated (for 1998 that would be security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East, and FMCT) and another section would contain collective perspectives or agreements of a time-urgent or more specific nature than envisaged in the general agreements. Canada had proposed text on these three special issues, the CTBT and the START process. Referring to START being "at a standstill", Canada wanted to reaffirm the importance of the US-Russian bilateral progress on nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament, including the engagement of the three smaller NWS. Such a statement could also be issued as a communiqué from the PrepCom or as a stand-alone statement from the Chair.
Chair's Consultations
Some States expressed immediate interest in the proposals from Canada and South Africa. Others regarded them more warily, apparently unsure of the long term implications of giving the review process a more pro-active role. The NWS appeared united in their rejection of the ideas. The Middle East peace process was at a very precarious stage, with meetings between Israeli and Palestinian leaders scheduled for London during the NPT, and subsequently for Washington. This almost certainly added to the pressure on the United States to protect Israel from being singled out and vilified. The US position, however, seemed to harden as the days went by, leading it to reject any endorsement of the 1995 Resolution's objectives, or even proposals for information on this issue to be provided to the 2000 Review Conference as background documentation.
The cluster debates were proceeding slowly, but a few 'hot proposals' were already being canvassed in corners when at the end of the first week, Wyzner convened what was initially termed a 'private meeting', with representatives from around 25 delegations. Variously regarded as 'Friends of the Chair' and 'Chair's consultations', the meetings became the principal focus of negotiations on recommendations during the second week, opening up to participation by around 30-35 delegations, including: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, China, Chile, Colombia (Vice Chair), Canada, Egypt, France, Finland (Vice Chair), Germany, Hungary, Iran, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland (Chair), Russia, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, South Korea, United States and Viet Nam.
In his opening statement Wyzner had given an overview of the issues, but few indications of his preferred procedural approach. Signals were sent out by the Polish delegation, however, which said it "strongly believes that the second PrepCom session should adhere as closely as possible to the 1997 format... build upon the recommendations and ideas contained in the Chairman's working paper and seek to expand the area of consensus." Although a number of the proposals suggested changes or developments (though not mutually exclusive alternatives) to the 1997 format, Wyzner appeared more comfortable following Patokallio's precedents. The Chair's consultations therefore focused on developing the previous Chair's paper, attempting to add to agreed paragraphs on the range of issues covered in the P&O. If accepted, the language was intended for inclusion in paragraph 3 of an updated Chair's "working paper". By the end of the second week, late night consultations had succeeded in obtaining consensus on only fourteen paragraphs, few of which added anything substantial to what had been agreed in 1997. The delegations were faced with a Chair's working paper which duplicated or even weakened the 1997 agreements, and a sharply drawn division between the NWS, led by the United States, and a group of non-nuclear weapon states, led (on different aspects) by Egypt, South Africa and Canada. In the end, a significant number refused even to adopt the paragraphs of the Chair's paper that they had so painstakingly negotiated.
Half way through the second week, the Chair's consultations sub-divided at times to form two other groups, under the auspices of the Vice-Chairs, Andelfo Garcia (Colombia) and Markku Reimaa (Finland) respectively.
Rules and Procedure
Garcia's group focused on trying to get agreement on procedural recommendations to the next PrepCom and to the 2000 Review Conference. The States parties had decided to apply the rules of procedure that had been in operation in past review conferences. South Africa argued that some rules should be changed to reflect the different role and objectives of the enhanced review process. In particular, South Africa sought to amend rule 34 (7) to reflect the reference to subsidiary bodies in paragraph 6 of the 1995 Decision on Strengthening the Review Process (8). As part of its proposal for addressing nuclear disarmament in the review process, South Africa had called for special time to be allocated at each PrepCom to address nuclear disarmament issues more coherently, and had proposed that a subsidiary body should be established at the 2000 Review Conference for "focused deliberations on the nuclear disarmament issue and the full implementation of Article VI". In opposing South Africa's proposal, Russia argued that the term 'working groups' could just as well cover subsidiary bodies. In the end, Garcia's consultations were unable to work out a compromise that would be acceptable to all. As a result, the PrepCom was unable to adopt rules of procedure for future meetings, which may have to apply the existing rules without formally adopting them, until the disagreements can be resolved.
'Dual Track' Approach
Reimaa's group focused on Canada's proposal that contemporary issues should be reflected in the Chair's paper or PrepCom report. The Canadian paper was dubbed a 'dual track approach', in part because some delegations viewed it as unnecessary duplication of text they thought they were negotiating for the Chair's paper. Since Canada had proposed language on the Middle East, FMCT, security assurances and CTBT, as well as START II, the Chair decided that its proposal needed to be debated separately from the negotiations he was conducting on 'rolling text'. Characterising Canada's proposal as a dual track approach, however, made it easier to deflect attention from the principle of contemporary relevance it embodied, with the consequence that a number of delegations seemed to dismiss the idea as an exercise in competing negotiations on language. Though interest in the concept of having the PrepComs reflect current issues grew during the meeting, there was no agreement on this. The main discussion in Reimaa's group was on the Middle East issue, where Canada's proposed language was innocuous, but since the principle of special mention was unacceptable to the United States, it got nowhere.
Background Documentation
The Middle East issue also affected the decision on providing background documentation to the 2000 Review Conference. Reports on the implementation of various aspects of the NPT are usually prepared in advance by bodies such as the Secretariat, the IAEA and the organisations overseeing the different nuclear-weapon-free zones. Egypt and other Arab States argued that the Secretariat should be asked to provide information on implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The United States refused to consider this proposal, arguing that the background documentation should be based on past precedents and limited to addressing the Treaty articles. The US delegation went further, arguing that though the Resolution on the Middle East was adopted at the 1995 Conference, it was inappropriate to have documentation on an issue not referred to in the Treaty itself. The Arab States refused to back down, objecting to the US characterisation of the Middle East Resolution as not germane to the package of decisions adopted in 1995.
As a consequence of the failure of the 1998 PrepCom to decide on background documentation for the Review Conference, there are now three options open to States Parties: i) to have no background documentation -- this would be unacceptable to most; ii) to take the decision in 1999 and hold a fourth PrepCom in 2000 to consider and agree the documentation -- as is usual practice; or iii) to take the decision in 1999 and accept whatever documents are prepared in 2000 without additional prior review. In the recent past, questions have been raised about some of the documentation, requiring their modification prior to publication as Conference documents. Most background documentation is uncontroversial, but in recent years some objections have been raised. Iran, for example, in 1994-5 questioned the treatment of export controls on nuclear technology and components.
Reasons for Failure
The short answer, and one convenient to many delegations, is that the second PrepCom foundered on the Middle East issue, at a very delicate moment in the stalling peace process, caught between the insistence of the Arab States and stonewalling by the United States. Though partly true, that is not a sufficient explanation. The PrepCom failed due to a combination of political, substantive and procedural factors. Underlying all these was a fundamental division of interests over the purpose and objectives of the review process. If the PrepCom had not come to grief over its inability to agree language on the Middle East, it would have cracked apart over nuclear disarmament; and if not that, there were other incipient conflicts waiting in the background.
Political Context: the Middle East
A crucial factor was the unfortunate coincidence between the dates of the 1998 PrepCom and a very sensitive political situation in the Middle East. Both London and Washington were attempting to reinvigorate the peace process, which appeared to be in serious trouble. The US delegation seemed to have its hands tied by rigid instructions from Washington, while at the same time the Arab States and Egypt were pushing ever harder. A couple of personalised exchanges between members of the US and Egyptian delegations may have exacerbated the deterioration in relations and hardened attitudes.
Although embracing the concept of universality of the Treaty, for long-standing political reasons the United States has sought to protect Israel from being isolated and condemned. Since 1995, Egypt has succeeded in signing up the few Arab States which had remained outside the NPT. The fact that Israel is now the only State in the region outside the Treaty and with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities makes it increasingly difficult for the United States to prevent Israel being singled out without appearing to protect or condone Israel's nuclear capabilities. The US argued that it was inappropriate to introduce the Middle East issue into the non-proliferation debate because it could only be resolved in a regional context. It was clear that the US delegation in Geneva, headed by Norman Wulf, had little room to manoeuvre. US objections moved from the substantive debates on the Middle East Resolution and how to characterise Israel's nuclear capabilities to obstructing calls for background documentation on the 1995 Resolution. While recognising the complexities of the whole issue and agreeing that it would not be solved by means of the NPT, some of the NWS and even some US allies supported selective parts of Egypt's proposals, such as studies and background documentation. There was widespread frustration at the US tactic of opposing all mention, with most States taking the view that Israel's nuclear capabilities - as well as those of India and Pakistan - were relevant for NPT parties to discuss in the context of universality and support for nuclear weapon free zones, although few thought such discussions would assist practical progress.
The United States was primarily concerned not to isolate Israel and push the Netanyahu government into further excesses, but its privileging of Middle East policy over the NPT was interpreted by many as an expression of complacency after achieving the Treaty's indefinite extension. In resisting calls for steps towards implementing the 1995 Resolution, the United States appeared not only to downgrade the status of the Middle East Resolution, but also to promote the view that the 1995 decisions were not binding. Many delegates objected to the implication that the Middle East Resolution and the P&O were merely reflections of the situation in 1995 with little role beyond the Extension Conference. A number of delegations and observers drew the conclusion that Washington had decided that protecting Israel at the PrepCom as part of its larger Middle East strategy was more important than the NPT review process.
Political Approach: Limiting the Review Process
Though much criticism was heaped on the United States for its intransigence on the Middle East, all the NWS were perceived as wanting to roll back the 1995 decisions and to limit substance, especially on nuclear disarmament; in effect, to turn the review process into a four year text-drafting process for the five-yearly Review Conferences, and nothing more. They resisted attempts to develop structures and mechanisms to enable States parties to participate more effectively in strengthening accountability and implementation.
On the positive side, at least some of the nuclear weapon States - notably the United States and France - had made genuine efforts to provide more detail about what they were doing to comply with their obligations in terms of controlling and reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, weapons dismantlements, the decomissioning of production facilities, arms control initiatives, and so on. Having worked hard to overcome traditional attitudes about secrecy and national security and to persuade the Washington agencies into allowing considerably more information to be revealed, the US delegation were disappointed that their statement to the General Debate and report to cluster 1 had not been better appreciated. In fact, many delegations welcomed these moves towards greater transparency and accountability and encouraged all the NWS to do likewise (9).
Here again, however, there was a gulf of perception between the NWS and NNWS. Where the NWS appeared to consider that providing more open and detailed information fulfilled their obligations for greater accountability, the NNWS wanted to engage in dialogue and be able to discuss the pace of arms reductions and dismantlements and to offer technical and political ideas for further progress. The South African proposal, for example, was not intended to set up nuclear disarmament negotiations under the NPT, but was intended to offer a mechanism for exchanging views and identifying further steps or measures which might be undertaken to assist the bilateral US-Russian process, or to engage the smaller NWS in plurilateral negotiations, such as those identified by the Canberra Commission or National Academy of Sciences. The response of the NWS, however, was summed up by an unnamed US official: "We won't be dictated to".
To many NNWS, whose adherence to the NPT meant that they voluntarily accepted the dictates of full-scope safeguards, the IAEA and export control regimes, the NWS' attitude was galling. Ideas for using the review process to assist progress on universality or nuclear disarmament originated with several countries, particularly the NAM, Sweden, Mexico, New Zealand and Japan, as well as the South African, Egyptian and Canadian proposals which came to dominate the proceedings. Though there was by no means full agreement among the NNWS on how to proceed, the perceived resistance of the NWS to any serious proposals for practical mechanisms or steps caused considerable resentment. The behaviour of the NWS was interpreted by many as indicating that having achieved indefinite extension, the NPT was no longer a priority for diplomatic action.
Procedural Issues
Several procedural questions contributed to the impasse at the Second PrepCom, including: lack of adequate preparation; the role of the Chair's consultations; the allocation of time to substantive issues; the role of subsidiary bodies; and the reporting products or documents.
Lack of Preparation
Some criticisms have been made of the preparation and management of the Conference, although many also acknowledged that the Chair faced particular difficulties, having taken the task on in the middle of the year, without having attended the first PrepCom. Many thought that Wyzner should have presented a draft working paper much sooner and convened his Chair's consultations earlier in the first week. Others were dismayed by the Chair's apparent assumption that the role of the 1998 PrepCom was simply to expand on the precedents set by the first PrepCom, a position put forward by the NWS and European Union, but by no means the view of all (10). Some complained that the structural and political challenges posed by some of the proposals were left until nearly the end of the fortnight, leaving little time to find compromises. On the other hand, it has to be recognised that leaving things to the last minute can be an effective strategy if the aim is to avoid political confrontation while sidelining inconvenient ideas. There were clear indications (starting with Mexico's stand at the 1997 PrepCom) that a number of NAM States wanted to revisit the Patokallio framework and provide a more active and practical role for the PrepComs and review process. Yet the Chair did not seem to have considered how to respond to other approaches. As frustration mounted, there was some sub voce criticism that the management of the PrepCom was at best ill prepared, and at worst, 'in the pocket' of the United States and EU axis, with speculation about the effect of Poland's aspirations for both NATO and EU membership. Chairs of international meetings are frequently vulnerable to accusations that they are overly influenced by external political factors or alliances, however, without that necessarily being true.
Ultimately, although lack of preparation may have been a contributory factor, no-one assigns it the major role in the failure of the Second PrepCom. The smoothness of the first PrepCom was partly due to so few delegations having thought about what they wanted the review process to be and to do. Patokallio's management was well prepared in advance, but he also met with little coherent opposition. In the intervening year, ideas have crystallised around two conflicting views of the role of the PrepComs: as sausage-makers to recommend text to the Review Conferences, which was the model that the first PrepCom began to establish; and as mini Review Conferences, with additional functions of commenting on contemporary issues and generating ideas and leverage for full implementation. Given these fundamentally different approaches (as well as external but related political problems, such as the Middle East peace process and Duma ratification delays), the best preparation and management in the world would have been hard pressed to deliver a successful outcome at the Second PrepCom.
The Role of Chair's Consultations
Opinion on the Chair's consultations was mixed. There was initial resentment after the first meeting, which had seemed restricted to selectively invited delegations. As the second week proceeded, however, the meetings were opened up to any delegation that had the desire and resources to attend, culminating in participation by around 30, with the larger delegations fielding several representatives. This assuaged some of the resentment, but raised further questions concerning representation and decision-making. Furthermore, a few delegations felt that the group became too large to negotiate effectively.
For their privileged participants, the Chair's consultations were clearly more relevant and substantial than the plenary discussions. Those not attending, however, complained that they were not kept informed, a problem which became even worse when the consultations subdivided into groups under the vice-chairs, thereby stretching delegation resources even thinner.
The Chair's consultations illustrated the inadequacies of the PrepCom's central structure based on formal and informal plenaries. The general debates and cluster debates were misnamed, as they consisted of national monologues, usually repeating positions already delivered to the Conference on Disarmament, UN Disarmament Commission or First Committee. Little was debated or exchanged. The division of time between the different issues was not efficient and did not reflect actual priorities. Real debate only took place in the Chair's consultations, involving less than a quarter of the States Parties. Only when proposals were being fought for in the context of reporting products and language did the delegations ask questions, exchange views, and argue for their own positions and against those of others. These debates were sometimes heated, but understandings and compromises were more likely to be reached here than in the plenaries: whether intentionally or not, this was the only place where substance and procedure were seriously addressed. Negotiations over disputed text on some of the key paragraphs, particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament, sometimes took hours and revealed the underlying political positions, constraints and pressures much more clearly than the polite reading of serial national statements which comprised much of the plenary sessions.
If Chair's consultations are to be employed for major negotiating tasks in future PrepComs, it will be necessary to address the problems of representation and participation, giving greater consideration to how communication between those on the inside of the consultations and delegations on the outside can be improved, perhaps even systematised. In addition to prompting a restructuring of the main sessions to make them more relevant and focused, it would be helpful if the relationship between the Chair's consultations and the PrepCom plenary sessions could be clarified.
Time Allocation
Despite attempts by some delegations, including Sri Lanka and South Africa, to have the allocation of sessions reconsidered to provide more time for issues deemed to be the most important or controversial, the PrepCom adopted the convention of equal time for all three clusters. Based on the allocation of issues to three Main Committees in recent review conferences, equal treatment for the clusters was accepted as though established in the rules of procedure. Some sessions closed after an hour, having heard only a few national or group statements. As a result, there were complaints that valuable time had been wasted. This was especially true of the sessions allocated to non-military uses of nuclear energy (article IV) and safeguards (article III). Lack of things to say does not necessarily connote lack of interest or commitment, but lack of substantial disagreement. These issues may have generated more controversy in the past (and may again in the future), but in the current political climate, there is broad agreement among States parties on promoting nuclear energy and supporting strengthened IAEA safeguards. Iran's objections on export controls are routinely included in NAM statements, but are not widely supported. Some States take the opportunity to mention nuclear waste or safety issues, but these are not normally discussed in any meaningful way.
As is clear from the volume of statements and proposals, universality (encompassing NWFZs, especially the Middle East) and nuclear disarmament are the two issues which generate most interest and disagreement. Notwithstanding the special time devoted to security assurances and the fissban, these issues are more usually regarded as sub-sets of the nuclear disarmament cluster. The imbalance between the three clusters is even more clearly exposed now that the paragraphs of the P&O have been added to the traditional division of subject by Treaty articles and preambular paragraphs.
The recommendation from the Chair of the first PrepCom that time be specially allocated in 1998 to three issues resulted in one session each being devoted to discussion of fissile materials, security assurances and the Middle East Resolution. Some delegations considered these sessions as big a waste of time as the general and cluster debates. Others, however, thought they were at least a partial success, pointing to the more focused proposals and ideas put forward, especially on the FMCT. Though on the whole delegates stuck to the format of national statements, there was a little more unscripted exchanging of views in these three sessions than in the cluster debates. Even those who considered that the special allocation of time had resulted in a more effective focus on these issues still expressed frustration at the lack of real or relevant debate. Others seemed relatively content, viewing the plenaries and cluster debates as 'par for the course', providing what they had always provided, a valve for airing views and stating positions.
Successive Chairs have behaved as if the main committee and cluster allocations were immutable requirements. In fact, the allocation of issues to three main committees dates only to the height of the Cold War, in 1985, and was a device to enable each of the three groupings to chair a committee. It served a purpose then that it does not fulfil now and needs to be reconsidered if there is any intention to make the general sessions more relevant.
Role of Subsidiary Bodies
The debate over subsidiary bodies versus working groups was fought out in discussions over rule 34 of the rules of procedure. The NWS, especially Russia, maintained that there was no need to specify subsidiary bodies: 'working groups', already cited in the rules of procedure could cover any task which the review process might wish to assign to a subsidiary body. South Africa headed non-aligned pressure, arguing that to fulfil the intent and letter of the 1995 decisions, the procedures for establishing subsidiary bodies should be formally reflected in the rules. The dispute over rules and language is at core a debate over the structure, function and future relevance of the review process.
Working groups have been set up in past review conferences to negotiate text for aspects of the final review. One such example is the working group on security assurances convened separately from Main Committees I and II at the 1995 Review Conference. This was presumably acceptable to Russia. What the NWS are more concerned about is the possibility of a subsidiary body being convened to focus on practical measures on nuclear disarmament. Though South Africa called only for deliberations, the NWS yet again feared a 'slippery slope'. At root, this obscure procedural conflict is about the larger question of whether the review process could have a negotiating role and if so, what kind. If there were more convergence of views regarding the role and function of the review process, it is likely that concerns over what to call any potential subsidiary bodies would diminish.
Products
The debate over reporting products is important because it is a primary means of addressing the kind of outcome and objectives sought for the Review Conferences and PrepComs under the strengthened review process. Some delegations were clearer than others about what they thought should be the purpose of the review process. The maximalist view, shared by some non-aligned states, was that the review process should be empowered to negotiate agreements, such as protocols on security assurances, a no-first-use treaty or even (as a number of NGOs have proposed) a nuclear weapon convention.
'Minimalists', including (it appeared) all the nuclear weapon States, counselled caution. They argued that the States Parties should concentrate on developing consensus for a final document which would contain elements of looking back and looking forward. With this in mind, it made sense for them to focus the work of the PrepComs on developing rolling text for eventual inclusion in a final document to be adopted by a Review Conference. The heated argument over the introductory paragraph (known as the 'chapeau') of the Chair's draft working paper appeared arcane, but was related to disagreements about the status of the 1997 report as establishing a precedent and foundation for future approaches. In essence, the NWS and their allies wanted the 1997 report to be the basis for recommendations to 2000, with additional paragraphs added on in 1998 and 1999. The non-aligned States, on the contrary, did not want to be tied down to precedents set so early (and before they had properly thought about how they might use the review process).
Most States probably placed themselves along a continuum between the minimalist and maximalist poles. Citing the 1995 decisions, South Africa argued that each review conference was meant to: i) look back and review the progress in the previous five-year period; ii) look forward and identify objectives and measures to be striven for during the next five-year period; and iii) work towards full implementation and universality. In fulfilling these three purposes, therefore, the Review Conferences should aim for three types of outcome: i) a final document reporting on the review of the previous five years; ii) a new or updated set of Principles and Objectives; and iii) commitments to take action or undertake negotiations on agreed measures to advance implementation and universality. South Africa's proposals regarding the work of the PrepComs flowed from its perspective on the purpose of the review process. In this regard, South Africa proposed that the PrepComs should try to agree on three kinds of documents. One would contain recommendations of the principles, objectives and ways of implementing the treaty, following the format of the 1995 P&O. This would form the basis for a set of 2000 P&O. A second document would contain recommendations on specific proposals where further work was needed before agreement could be reached. The third document would cover the procedural and financial arrangements for the Conference.
Less detailed proposals were also made by other countries, including New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, Sweden and Sri Lanka. Some of these would seem compatible with South Africa's approach, though with variations of emphasis and detail. Others, like Canada's proposal, would necessitate some additional section, report or communiqué from the PrepCom or its Chair. With regard to updating the P&O, several delegations wanted to emphasise that distinctions should be made between the principles and the objectives: the paragraphs covering 'principles' should be renewed but not revised, whereas objectives, such as the programme of action under paragraph 4 on nuclear disarmament, would need to be updated and developed at least every five years. Some expressed concerns that attempting to update the P&O could result in weakening or losing commitments that should be retained. For this reason, South Africa argued that the 2000 P&O should not replace or be a renegotiation of the 1995 P&O, but be regarded as an addition. A number of European delegations worried that (citing the history of the Treaty's previous review conferences) the aim of negotiating two different documents and commitments to action was too ambitious and could lead to failure, which might be worse for the NPT in the long run.
The P&O were a product of the particular circumstances in 1995, when achievement of indefinite extension was a sufficiently important objective to the nuclear weapon states that they were prepared to accept proposals and pressure from the NNWS. The P&O were negotiated in Chair's consultations among twenty-five delegations, on the basis of a Canadian idea and a South African first draft. These negotiations occurred in parallel with the main committee meetings, which were supposed to be developing text for the final document. In the end, the P&O were adopted, while it proved impossible to get consensus on a final document, due in large part to the shambles of disagreement in Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament.
If future review conferences aim to produce both a final document and an updated set of P&O, there needs to be more consideration of who will be deciding what, and where: i.e. how the negotiations are to be structured, the different purposes of the two documents, and how the different sets of negotiations on overlapping issues will be coordinated.
Group Dynamics
Some interesting alignments among States which formally belong to different groups are beginning to emerge. The Cold War structure, which is no longer representative, divided States into three groupings: the Western group, based on NATO/European Union(EU) membership and other military allies of the United States; the Eastern European group comprising former Soviet bloc States; and the Non-Aligned, with China remaining as a 'group of one'.
None of these groupings is homogeneous. The Eastern European group coordinates nothing but nominations for Chairs and positions, and is further fragmented by retaining States which are applicants for NATO and EU membership, and which now associate themselves with the EU's coordinated, collective statements. The EU tries to act as a bloc. On nuclear disarmament, this generally means that formal statements express lowest common denominator positions, out of deference to their nuclear partners, Britain and France. While some EU countries maintain ranks on these positions, those with traditionally strong anti-nuclear public opinion, such as Sweden, Austria and Ireland, whose arguments may have been suppressed in joint statements, tend to make their points during the cluster debates. While the position of the Western States are fairly unanimous on safeguards, there was significant divergence over the management of fissile materials and nuclear safety, while some of the strongest individual statements and proposals on nuclear disarmament came from Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.
Several Western States, including EU countries, expressed qualified support for issues of importance to the NAM. Thus some important bridge building was accomplished, including: recognising that existing fissile material stocks cannot be ignored; supporting a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; the Canberra Commission proposals on nuclear disarmament and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; more transparency regarding export controls, and so on. The NAM arrived much better prepared than last year, and organised more effectively around the proposals in the NAM working paper, coordinated by Indonesia, and from individual members, such as Egypt and South Africa. Though they fought hard on issues of importance to them, especially nuclear disarmament, they also offered some flexibility. Extreme and ideological positions were less in evidence from expected quarters and NAM countries were quick to support constructive proposals from Western delegations. Nevertheless, there remain some serious problems among the NAM, in part due to the diverging and often hard-line positions adopted in other fora due to the influence of India and Pakistan, two significant NAM States with nuclear capabilities outside the NPT.
The fact that the NAM came to the second PrepCom with more coherent and reasoned positions resulted in the real locus of divided opinion being brought into sharper focus: the fundamental incompatibility of the interests of the five NWS and those of the vast majority of NNWS Parties to the Treaty. Although some of the NWS opposed each other on specific issues, such as ballistic missile defence and no first use, a NWS 'bloc' appeared to come together in mutual support of the objective of limiting the potential role and relevance of the enhanced review process.
Although the NWS had made a considerable effort to respond to calls for greater transparency and accountability, that seemed to be as far as they were prepared to go. As this report shows, the United States took the lead in resisting the attempts to consider implementation of the Middle East resolution and in quashing both the Canadian and South African initiatives, but the others were in general agreement with its minimalist approach.
Russia is enmeshed in its own political difficulties and took an exceedingly conservative position on almost everything. It is increasingly clear that Russia is re-assessing (and reasserting) the value of its nuclear weapons, backing away from nuclear arms control, and re-emphasising the importance of nuclear deterrence postures. The Russian delegation, which supported START II ratification, was strongly opposed to the Canadian proposal for a statement on START, arguing that it was poorly targetted and would be counterproductive. In general, Russia's positions at the PrepCom aimed to reinforce the privileged status of the NWS and to dampen attempts to use the 1995 decisions to develop any kind of active role for the review process. Russia did not seem particularly upset by the collapse of the second PrepCom and may be hoping that if the review process founders in its first five years, the NPT in 2000 can decide to go back to business as usual.
China was more obviously concerned by the implications of the 1998 PrepCom's disarray. Beijing differs from the other nuclear weapon states in rejecting the theory of deterrence and in advocating no first use and a treaty to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons; but from its behaviour at the PrepCom, China partners the other NWS in taking a minimalist attitude towards the review process and shares their aim to restrict its potential powers of leverage or negotiation. Although it said little by comparison, China was clearly unhappy with the idea of the review process having a role in facilitating and commenting on current issues.
Britain had several important hats, as a depository government, President of the EU, Convenor of the Western Group and Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Its delegation was therefore working round the clock trying to co-ordinate different group positions and statements on a variety of issues. Nevertheless, in view of the more politically pro-active role it might have played, had the Strategic Defence Review been published in time, the UK missed an important opportunity (11). In relation to EU positions, Britain provided basic drafts and France held the line in discussions to prevent the positions of anti-nuclear partners from being expressed in EU statements. France strongly rejected attempts to draw the smaller nuclear weapon states into nuclear disarmament negotiations and greater transparency, but played a constructive role in some areas, notably in its unsuccessful attempts to bridge the chasm between the United States and Egypt over the Middle East Resolution as it came up in various forms and decisions.
In 1997, some diplomats spoke of a defining moment when the participants in the Chair's consultations suddenly polarised between the NWS and the NNWS. In 1998 it could again be observed that the nuclear weapon States (with a few of their allies) were more or less united against two or three broad coalitions of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is still too early to gauge what effect this emerging dynamic, reflected elsewhere in initiatives such as the Eight Nation New Agenda Coalition (12), will have on the review process.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The second PrepCom was never going to be easy. It took place in a context of serious regional problems and mounting frustration over the continuing impasse in the CD. In order to gain consensus in 1995, the decisions were carefully phrased and ambiguous in places. The difficulties of the 1998 PrepCom were due in part to the contest between competing interpretations of the meaning and intent of the 1995 decisions and, perhaps, the NPT itself. The NWS appear to want the Treaty to function as a lid on proliferation. The NNWS wanted non-proliferation, but they also wanted the Treaty to act as a lever for nuclear disarmament. The primary rationale for opposing indefinite extension was concern that it would remove their only leverage on the NWS for nuclear disarmament. Their acceptance of the extension decision (permanence) was therefore bought with the strengthened review process, offering a different type of lever for accountability and implementation.
At the time of the second PrepCom, complacency appeared to be the biggest threat to the NPT regime. The NWS and a number of their allies seemed to have got what they wanted with indefinite extension and were thence-forward keen to suppress the aspirations prompted by the 1995 decisions on strengthening the review process. While China, Britain and France appeared genuinely worried by the collapse of the second PrepCom, some of the representatives of the United States and Russia were more sanguine, giving the impression that the failure of the new review process would not be lamented if it hastened a return to the less expensive and relatively undemanding five-yearly Conferences - business as usual. The South Asian nuclear crisis, with its implications for international non-proliferation and the Middle East may prompt a rethink. The United States has to tread a precarious tightrope between its Middle East strategy and non-proliferation objectives. If it operates double standards, it risks undermining the rationale and respect on which the non-proliferation regime relies.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime cannot be taken for granted. At its heart lies a reciprocal obligation: nuclear disarmament for non-proliferation. Whether this dual commitment is taken seriously is a fundamental question which is subject to rhetoric but seldom really examined. Though all pay lip service to Article VI, there is a deep divide between those who see the NPT as a vehicle to promote and achieve nuclear disarmament and those who see it as a way to maintain the status quo. What would be the implications for the non-proliferation regime if the NWS and many of their nuclear-umbrella allies were to acknowledge that they do not envisage real nuclear disarmament, but would actually prefer the maintenance of a very limited nuclear club with nuclear arsenals that are much less numerous than at present (but perhaps more advanced and flexible), combined with more efficient arms control and anti-proliferation mechanisms? And where does such a scenario leave the majority of countries without a nuclear 'Big Brother' to scare off the bullies (including other States' nuclear brothers)? In the wake of the South Asian nuclear tests it is important to reconsider the options and risks of different scenarios. Can the lid be kept on or will the pot have to be emptied to prevent it boiling over? Is it possible to have a stable non-proliferation regime without nuclear disarmament? If nuclear disarmament is not the real objective of the NWS and their allies, is it still valid to use the multilateral fora to prevent further proliferation and to encourage nuclear arms control and reductions?
How seriously should States such as Egypt and South Africa be taken, when they say that they might have to reconsider their NPT obligations if nuclear disarmament is not effectively pursued or if the nuclear club is widened to accept India, Pakistan or Israel? The morning after conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, its President, Jayantha Dhanapala, warned of the "grave danger" of a mass exodus from the Treaty if the nuclear weapon states disregard the nuclear disarmament commitments. Are warnings such as these merely diplomatic ritual, or could this happen? The NWS have taken the Treaty for granted in part because they believed that it was sufficiently in the interests of the NNWS that they would not risk compromising their own security by playing politics with their adherence to a Treaty that kept nuclear weapons out of the hands of their neighbours. How reliable is this assumption now?
Frustration with the lack of progress on Article VI and concern about the South Asian nuclear crisis is prompting some NGOs to explore the process for amending the NPT, with a view to converting Article VI into a commitment to a nuclear weapon convention. The arguments in favour rest on the stated position of India (and assumed of Pakistan) that they would respect only a non-proliferation regime based on nuclear disarmament for all. Furthermore, the example of the Amendment Conference to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) is cited. The PTBT Amendment Conference was finally held in January 1991. Although no amendments were passed, because of opposition from the depositary NWS (Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States), the initiative is credited with having contributed to the pressure which finally gave the CD a mandate to negotiate the CTBT two years later. The principal argument advanced against this strategy for the NPT is that the Treaty could be fatally injured by attempts to amend it. There is an implicit assumption here that the NWS would not commit themselves to actual nuclear disarmament, even to save the NPT.
The military postures of the NPT nuclear powers a decade after the end of the Cold War suggest that this assumption may be correct; in that case, the NPT rests (and has perhaps always rested) on false premises. Does this matter, if the Treaty functions as an effective proliferation inhibitor as it is? False ground is inherently unstable. The conflicts of perception and purpose which stymied the second PrepCom (and which also contributed to the CD's long paralysis) are illustrations of the growing importance of resolving the relationship between non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Papering over the cracks is no longer adequate.
In refusing to address the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the United States called into question whether that resolution was an integral part of the indefinite extension package. The Resolution had been proposed by the depositary States and adopted without a vote at the same time as the three decisions on extending the NPT and strengthening its review process. In challenging the status of the Middle East Resolution, the United States raised questions about whether it had lasting validity beyond the political context of the 1995 Conference. Arguing that the indefinite extension decision would not have been possible without the Middle East Resolution, the implementation of which was therefore a legitimate issue for the NPT Parties, Egypt and the NAM States reasoned that the 1995 decisions were of equal validity. The United States clearly disagrees. Moreover, some delegates have also cast doubt on how binding to regard the two review decisions.
Because the differences of attitude to the review process reflect rather different political interests, especially on nuclear disarmament, consensus on the nature and scope of the enhanced review process will be very difficult to achieve. Unless there is greater agreement on the underlying purpose and objectives, it is hard to see how States parties at the next PrepCom and Review Conference will be able to agree on the structure and content of the products. Some analysts have argued that thought should be given to adopting some or all of the documents from the PrepComs, and possibly the Review Conference, by a majority vote or consensus minus a small number, e.g. five (13). It could also be useful to consider presenting the reports in two forms: paragraphs which have consensus; and a description of different positions where consensus is not obtainable. This would certainly be more useful than reaching agreement only by watering ideas down to a meaningless rhetoric or banal generalities.
The structure of the PrepComs needs to be rethought. In view of the opportunities for general statements on disarmament in other fora, do the NPT PrepComs require a general debate? What is the best way to ensure that the PrepComs can give adequate time to controversial issues without ignoring aspects of the Treaty which are less contested? The cluster debates, if retained, do not require equal time. Cluster 1, for example, comprises so many of the controversial issues, that it could be allocated half the available time for substantive debate. Clusters 2 and 3 could be combined (which would make common sense, in view of the duplication of concerns raised about aspects of waste and safety, relevant to both nuclear energy and the IAEA) or they could remain separate and each take up a quarter of the time. In addition to any decisions that might be taken, the Chair could (on the basis of consultations) recommend at the beginning of a PrepCom that time be specially allocated to certain issues that are deemed current priorities or particularly problematic. This might help in lessening the 'national monologue' aspect and promoting more genuine debate on substantive issues.
Even so, the allocation of issues to clusters is not very efficient. Issues that overlap two Main Committees, such as security assurances, still cause problems. An alternative approach would be to structure the substantive debates according to the Treaty articles, factoring in both the preamble and the relevant paragraphs from the P&O (14). The Chair and Secretariat would be responsible for ensuring that the meeting gives appropriate time to each issue and is able to move to the next discussion in a timely manner.
Overlapping meetings are also a problem which requires more thought. At present, issue debates in the PrepComs are consecutive, but the Main Committees in the Review Conference often run concurrently. If some form of concurrent Chair's consultations are also convened for negotiating documents such as P&O, as looks likely, the resource implications for delegations and for the Secretariat and Chairs need to be carefully considered. If the real political debates and negotiations are going to be conducted in such smaller, 'informal' consultations, as was the case in 1995, '97 and again in '98, where does that leave delegations who only attend the plenary debates or with too few members to cover concurrent meetings?
Recommendations
1. Article IX.3 defines a nuclear-weapon state as one which had
manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967,
which covered only Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union (now
the Russian Federation), and the United States.
2. Ben Sanders 'The NPT Steps into the Future: The Preparatory
Committee and the Enhanced Review Process,' Disarmament Diplomacy 15, May 1997; R.
Johnson, 'Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for the
Future', ACRONYM 11, April 1998; R
Johnson, 'Reviewing the NPT: 1997 PrepCom', Disarmament Diplomacy 14, April
1997.
3. This report does not discuss the South Asian tests and their
implications for the non-proliferation regime. See Disarmament
Diplomacy, Nos 26 on, especially R.Johnson, 'International
Implications of the India-Pakistan tests', Disarmament Diplomacy 28, July 1998. See
also Himal, The South Asian Magazine, vol 11, No 7, July 1998, and
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1998.
4. The acronym 'FMCT', adopted initially by the United States,
dominates the discourse on this issue, although it strictly
speaking relates only to the narrow objective of a cut-off of
future production. The more open abbreviation 'fissban' has been
favoured by some analysts and diplomats wishing to leave the
question of scope more open (or who prefer the broader concept,
encompassing stockpiles). Since August 1998, the acronym 'FMT',
standing for Fissile Materials Treaty, has been gaining in
currency. As the NPT documents usually referred to FMCT, ACRONYM 12
will do likewise, without prejudice to the question of addressing
stocks.
5. These are summarised in Part II.
6. Decision 2 on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,' 1995 Review and Extension
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32).
7. Rule 34 currently reads: "The Conference shall establish three
Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such
Committee may establish working groups. As a general rule each
State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be
represented in the working groups unless otherwise decided by
consensus." NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/CRP.1
8. Decision 1 (NPT/CONF.1995/32), op. cit.
9. See Part III for the General Debate and Cluster I statements
from the nuclear weapon States.
10. For an interesting discussion of the difficulties faced by
Chairs and the influence exerted by the depositary governments, see
Tariq Rauf, 'The 1998 NPT PrepCom: Farewell to the NPT's
Strengthened Review Process?' in Disarmament Diplomacy 26, May 1998.
11. The UK Strategic Defence Review, originally planned for early
1998 was eventually published in July. It contained significant
initiatives on transparency of military fissile materials and
further reductions in the number of warheads deployed on Trident.
'The Strategic Defence Review, CM 3999, The Stationery Office,
London, July 1998. See also discussion of the nuclear aspects in Disarmament Diplomacy 28, July
1998.
12. Joint Ministerial Declaration by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, entitled 'A
Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda', published 9
June 1998.
13. See Rauf, op. cit. for a fuller discussion of this
suggestions.
14. This suggestion was also made by Tariq Rauf, op.cit.
15. The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)
and the Monterey Institute of International Studies already convene
seminars involving some of the NPT key players. Further sessions
along such lines could be developed to examine whether it will be
possible to bridge the perceptual and political chasm between the
NWS and majority of NNWS and develop a meaningful review
process.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.